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09-29-2009, 19:51

A little more on how they became who they are:

U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan During Soviet Occupation

In 1978 a revolution occurred in Afghanistan which resulted in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led by Hafizullah Amin gaining power. The PDPA was socialist and pro-Soviet, whereas the previous government in Afghanistan preferred to strengthen ties to the United States and Iran. The PDPA instituted numerous reforms that did not sit well with Afghanis and armed rebel groups began to form. Eventually these rebel groups called for a “jihad”, or holy war, against the PDPA. This takeover by a pro-Communist regime and the subsequent uprising provided “proof that Soviet foreign policy was ‘expansionist’ in nature.” (1.) U.S. policy toward communism had been “containment” since Truman was president. The U.S. saw importance in Afghanistan in terms of the “domino theory.” Afghanistan presented a perfect situation for the United States to combat the Soviets indirectly, exercising its policy of containment and later “roll back.”

Afghanistan was perceived as a “buffer” between the Soviet Union and U.S. allies until the fall of the Shah of Iran to a fundamental Islamic group in 1979. Afghanistan had always had ties with the Soviets, but mainly by means of humanitarian assistance. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan combined with an unstable Iran, which could be easily influenced by Soviets from neighboring Afghanistan, were seen by the U.S. as serious threats to the balance of power in the region. The domino theory prevailed in Washington. If Afghanistan were to fall to the communists, a weakened Iran could possibly be next, thus giving the Soviets a firm grasp in Southeast Asia for further expansion into other areas.

The U.S. began contacting the Afghan rebel organizations in 1979 with offers of aid to assist them in overthrowing the PDPA. The Soviets saw the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as a threat to their security because of a shared border and feared more “capitalist encirclement” if the rebels succeeded in overthrowing the pro-Soviet PDPA with help from the United States.

The U.S. policy was to prevent excessive Soviet influence in Afghanistan that could lead to their establishment of a forward “foothold” that might lead to further aggressive action in the region. (1.) In December of 1979 the Soviet Union sent military units to Afghanistan to assist the PDPA, and a “proxy war” between the U.S. and Soviet Union began. Afghanistan itself held little importance for the U.S., but neighboring Pakistan, Iran, the Persian Gulf and ports of the Indian Ocean were seen as critical, however. Afghanistan became a Cold War battlefield.

U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (1979-1989) was primarily covert. The Central Intelligence Agency sent operatives into the country to advise and equip the rebels, mainly using Pakistan as a conduit. Several Afghan dissident groups had operated out of Pakistan prior to the Soviet invasion. They were primarily Islamic groups who had formed during the early 1970s, one of which was the “Hizb-I Islami” led by a man named Hekmatyar. A Pakistani source introduced a CIA official to Hekmatyar in 1979. Hekmatyar was described as “more radically Islamic and Anti-American than most Afghans” but headed what the Pakistani government considered one of the most militant and organized rebel groups. (1.) His rebel group received a much larger share of weapons and funds from Pakistan than the other groups.

The Soviet Union sent hundreds of thousands of troops into Afghanistan in an attempt to put a stop to the rebel uprisings and help establish the new socialist regime. The U.S. saw this as communist aggression that could destabilize the balance of power in the region.

Throughout the 1970s pro-Soviet governments had taken over in many third world countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Afghanistan was seen as simply more Soviet expansion, and many in the U.S. government suspected that the Soviets played a hand in the initial pro-communist takeover, although it has yet to be proven. The Soviets disliked the new Amin’s methods and attempted to advise him as to how to establish, stabilize, and consolidate his government. Amin refused to take the Soviets’ advice and continued to operate the way he saw fit, which contributed to the eventual Soviet invasion and removal of Amin by the Soviets. The Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, an exiled leader of one of Afghanistan’s many tribal factions, as the Prime Minister of Afghanistan.

1980 was an election year in the United States, and Soviet expansion into Afghanistan was high on the list of candidate topics. To oppose the Soviet aggression, President Carter established the “Carter Doctrine” in January 1980, stating:

“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. and would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” (1.)

President Carter approved moderate levels of covert aid to the Afghan rebels and sought to negotiate a settlement for a Soviet withdrawal. Reagan’s policy of “roll back”, or to take back the areas that communists had taken over, appealed to the American public, however, and Carter lost the election.

With the election of Reagan in 1980, U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and the Soviets changed drastically. Reagan took a more hard lined approach to dealing with the Soviets. Reagan approved a six-year economic and military aid package for Pakistan. A large number of weapons were given to Hizb-I Islami and other rebel groups. Reagan’s intent was to tie down the Soviets and make Afghanistan too costly for them to continue the occupation by keeping the rebels well equipped. By doing so, the U.S. would make the Soviet occupation simply too expensive to maintain. This plan eventually worked, but at a tremendous cost in both Soviet and Afghan lives, money, and equipment.

With Reagan in the White House and Congress supporting the idea of Afghan self-determination and rolling back the communists, support for the Afghan rebels grew. During the early 1980s, in order to retain some plausible deniability of U.S. involvement, the U.S. initially purchased foreign Soviet-style weapons to give to the rebel groups. Most of them were AK-47 assault rifles purchased from China through Egypt and then sent to Pakistan, then passed to the rebels.

In 1982 Congress approved almost three billion dollars in aid for the mujahidin rebels. In 1984 several congressmen called for U.S. material aid for the rebels to increase the size and quality of the rebel covert aid program. In 1986, the CIA provided the mujahidin rebels with U.S.-made Stinger missiles to combat Soviet aircraft. This was the first time the CIA had used U.S.-made weapons to support a covert insurgency. By 1987, the U.S. was giving the rebels nearly $700 million in military assistance per year, including Swiss and British antiaircraft missiles.

To be continued...

09-29-2009, 19:51	#2
rltipton Guest Posts: n/a	More Taliban info A little more on how they became who they are: U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan During Soviet Occupation In 1978 a revolution occurred in Afghanistan which resulted in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) led by Hafizullah Amin gaining power. The PDPA was socialist and pro-Soviet, whereas the previous government in Afghanistan preferred to strengthen ties to the United States and Iran. The PDPA instituted numerous reforms that did not sit well with Afghanis and armed rebel groups began to form. Eventually these rebel groups called for a “jihad”, or holy war, against the PDPA. This takeover by a pro-Communist regime and the subsequent uprising provided “proof that Soviet foreign policy was ‘expansionist’ in nature.” (1.) U.S. policy toward communism had been “containment” since Truman was president. The U.S. saw importance in Afghanistan in terms of the “domino theory.” Afghanistan presented a perfect situation for the United States to combat the Soviets indirectly, exercising its policy of containment and later “roll back.” Afghanistan was perceived as a “buffer” between the Soviet Union and U.S. allies until the fall of the Shah of Iran to a fundamental Islamic group in 1979. Afghanistan had always had ties with the Soviets, but mainly by means of humanitarian assistance. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan combined with an unstable Iran, which could be easily influenced by Soviets from neighboring Afghanistan, were seen by the U.S. as serious threats to the balance of power in the region. The domino theory prevailed in Washington. If Afghanistan were to fall to the communists, a weakened Iran could possibly be next, thus giving the Soviets a firm grasp in Southeast Asia for further expansion into other areas. The U.S. began contacting the Afghan rebel organizations in 1979 with offers of aid to assist them in overthrowing the PDPA. The Soviets saw the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan as a threat to their security because of a shared border and feared more “capitalist encirclement” if the rebels succeeded in overthrowing the pro-Soviet PDPA with help from the United States. The U.S. policy was to prevent excessive Soviet influence in Afghanistan that could lead to their establishment of a forward “foothold” that might lead to further aggressive action in the region. (1.) In December of 1979 the Soviet Union sent military units to Afghanistan to assist the PDPA, and a “proxy war” between the U.S. and Soviet Union began. Afghanistan itself held little importance for the U.S., but neighboring Pakistan, Iran, the Persian Gulf and ports of the Indian Ocean were seen as critical, however. Afghanistan became a Cold War battlefield. U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation (1979-1989) was primarily covert. The Central Intelligence Agency sent operatives into the country to advise and equip the rebels, mainly using Pakistan as a conduit. Several Afghan dissident groups had operated out of Pakistan prior to the Soviet invasion. They were primarily Islamic groups who had formed during the early 1970s, one of which was the “Hizb-I Islami” led by a man named Hekmatyar. A Pakistani source introduced a CIA official to Hekmatyar in 1979. Hekmatyar was described as “more radically Islamic and Anti-American than most Afghans” but headed what the Pakistani government considered one of the most militant and organized rebel groups. (1.) His rebel group received a much larger share of weapons and funds from Pakistan than the other groups. The Soviet Union sent hundreds of thousands of troops into Afghanistan in an attempt to put a stop to the rebel uprisings and help establish the new socialist regime. The U.S. saw this as communist aggression that could destabilize the balance of power in the region. Throughout the 1970s pro-Soviet governments had taken over in many third world countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Afghanistan was seen as simply more Soviet expansion, and many in the U.S. government suspected that the Soviets played a hand in the initial pro-communist takeover, although it has yet to be proven. The Soviets disliked the new Amin’s methods and attempted to advise him as to how to establish, stabilize, and consolidate his government. Amin refused to take the Soviets’ advice and continued to operate the way he saw fit, which contributed to the eventual Soviet invasion and removal of Amin by the Soviets. The Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, an exiled leader of one of Afghanistan’s many tribal factions, as the Prime Minister of Afghanistan. 1980 was an election year in the United States, and Soviet expansion into Afghanistan was high on the list of candidate topics. To oppose the Soviet aggression, President Carter established the “Carter Doctrine” in January 1980, stating: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the U.S. and would be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” (1.) President Carter approved moderate levels of covert aid to the Afghan rebels and sought to negotiate a settlement for a Soviet withdrawal. Reagan’s policy of “roll back”, or to take back the areas that communists had taken over, appealed to the American public, however, and Carter lost the election. With the election of Reagan in 1980, U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and the Soviets changed drastically. Reagan took a more hard lined approach to dealing with the Soviets. Reagan approved a six-year economic and military aid package for Pakistan. A large number of weapons were given to Hizb-I Islami and other rebel groups. Reagan’s intent was to tie down the Soviets and make Afghanistan too costly for them to continue the occupation by keeping the rebels well equipped. By doing so, the U.S. would make the Soviet occupation simply too expensive to maintain. This plan eventually worked, but at a tremendous cost in both Soviet and Afghan lives, money, and equipment. With Reagan in the White House and Congress supporting the idea of Afghan self-determination and rolling back the communists, support for the Afghan rebels grew. During the early 1980s, in order to retain some plausible deniability of U.S. involvement, the U.S. initially purchased foreign Soviet-style weapons to give to the rebel groups. Most of them were AK-47 assault rifles purchased from China through Egypt and then sent to Pakistan, then passed to the rebels. In 1982 Congress approved almost three billion dollars in aid for the mujahidin rebels. In 1984 several congressmen called for U.S. material aid for the rebels to increase the size and quality of the rebel covert aid program. In 1986, the CIA provided the mujahidin rebels with U.S.-made Stinger missiles to combat Soviet aircraft. This was the first time the CIA had used U.S.-made weapons to support a covert insurgency. By 1987, the U.S. was giving the rebels nearly $700 million in military assistance per year, including Swiss and British antiaircraft missiles. To be continued...