|
Quiet Professional
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Free Pineland
Posts: 24,826
|
The NK nukes are a lever against the U.S.
If the NKPA heads south, and the Glorious Leader has a delivery system for his handful of nukes, he may be able to influence U.S. participation in the conflict.
Sure, we can burn his country down to bedrock, after he pulverizes several U.S. Metro areas. One nuke popped on a U.S. city could easily end a conventional U.S. intervention and doom the administration.
Would we be willing to risk that? MAD worked because the other side was considered to be relatively rational. Can we say that of Kim?
That is why our missile defense is so vital. It would be inadequate for the Russian strike/counterstrike, but it could prevent that card from being played by nations with small numbers of primitive delivery systems, like NK.
It also allows Kim to divert attention of his people away from their poverty and revolt, and get some sort of nationalistic pride as he continues milking the situation trading empty promises to the U.S. for fuel and food relief.
He may go off the deep end and drive for Seoul one day, threatening us with his nukes. We need to make sure that contingency does not occur by ending his program, or making it useless.
NK has been isolated for so long, and improverished for so long, that they have few strat targets worth hitting. Are we going to bounce the rubble of a starving country operating at the peak of 1940s Soviet industrial technology?
China is NK's big brother and is the voice of reason to Kim. They are his primary trading partner, and could close the border and plunge North Korea further into the Dark Ages. Besides, if they wanted to, China could invade NK easily and seize the country militarily at a cost of maybe a few million troops, insignificant to them.
The NK military is huge, equipped along the lines of 1960s Soviet formations, with large numbers of relatively well trained SOF which would wreak havoc in developed South Korea. The AF is weak, but could be compensated for by tremendous quantities of artillery and air defense formations. The Navy is well suited to infil, sabotage, and harrassment of shipping, not power projection. Do some research and see for yourself. The Army is very impressive, and relatively well trained. The intent is to close with the U.S and RoK forces so quickly that it becomes impossible to target them without hitting our own forces, like a fighter in a clench.
Remember, Seoul is VERY close to the border, much more so since of the boom and expansion. Take a look at the map. One school of thought was that the ROKs would defend Seoul and if it looked like it would be lost, declare it an open city and fall back to the next line of defense south. The NKPA would then occupy, loot and pillage, negotiating a future withdrawal back across the DMZ only after taking what they wanted from Seoul and negotiating terms favorable to them. It is all in the timing. Would our Korean allies allow us to nuke the NKPA in Seoul? Would we risk a nuke strike on the U.S. to defend South Korea, even if our nuclear counter-strike burned them to death?
At this time, Kim appears to have firm control of the NKPA, and thus the country. If Kim remains firmly in control and relatively satisfied, I think we face no real threat but his weapons development. If he loses control of the military, we could have a coup and a move toward rapproachment with the South. If he feels that his position may be nearing a catastrophic end, he may choose to make further demands or to launch an attack on the RoK to occupy his military, strengthen his power base in NK, and to extort resources from the RoK and the rest of the world. That is the real nightmare scenario.
The U.S. 2nd ID was there North of Seoul to act as a trip wire for further U.S. involvement, to include use of special weapons as required to defend our forces, as well as our allies. Our presence communicated our intent (to NK, China, and the Soviets), in no uncertain terms to support our Korean allies and put our lives on the line with theirs. Last time we left an ambiguous alliance there, we left the opening for the war, similar to our gaffe in Kuwait. Realistically, all the ROKs really need today is probably Air Support.
I agree that the average young South Korean citizen has no idea of the evil intent of the North, the history of loss, or the thousands of gallons of U.S blood spent securing the South and chasing the North back across the border. They see the U.S. as occupiers and despoilers, we are damned if we do and damned if we don't. What the future holds for our alliance is uncertain, but it is, IMHO, likely to drift further apart.
Just my .02, YMMV.
TR
__________________
"It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat." - President Theodore Roosevelt, 1910
De Oppresso Liber 01/20/2025
|