Quote:
Originally Posted by GreenSalsa
I think its a bad idea to do unilateral operations across virtually any border, especially when it winds up in the MSM.
Talking with Pakistani Officers (and Indian Officers) they are very uncomfortable with us violating their national sovereignty. The reason is not because it violates some arcane constitutional clause--it is because it inflames the masses THEY have to deal with when we return to their bases.
The military would rather be part of the process (you know like "by, with, and through") in order to deal with the threat themselves. I think it is better to do a "good" operation rather than a "perfect" operation WITH a partner.
I am very concerned that we might win a battle or two only to loose the war of ideas with these people. I'm not naive and understand most of the very people I am talking about will NEVER accept our way of life--but maybe, just maybe--they might accept a moderates point of view in the short run--one from within the Pakistani government / military.
When we operate without cooperation from the Pakistani government we alienate one of the few, if marginal, friends we have if the area.
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OK—some very good points to think about, but I offer the following points to be considered:
(Note-this is all open source material)
I am not yet sure that it was—according to the MSM—a ‘unilateral’ decision and would be surprised if it does turn out to be that way.
In today’s free-wheeling WWW atmosphere, everything winds up in somebody’s MSM and I am sure our planning is such that we took that into consideration. Sometimes we ‘want’ things to be known for much less obvious reasons.
On the seventh anniversary of 9/11, many Americans remain confused about the nature of the current terrorist threat. The ‘public’ has been told for years that Iraq was the central front in the war on terror…yet the CIA says the front is now on the Afghan-Pakistani border…and I agree.
Osama bin Laden and crew are well and operating out of a safe haven just inside Pakistan and I cannot believe the ISI—whose loyalty is doubtful—does not know where and among whom. As a result, Al-Qaeda still trains terrorists headed for Europe, the Mideast and South Asia – as well, I’m sure, as a number who certainly want to come here and strike another blow at the Great Satan (us).
Our top terrorism experts all agree that al-Qaeda remains at the center of the terrorist problem. According to our own intelligence services, it is still as powerful as it was six years ago, still capable of training people from around the world and then sending them off to stage attacks.
Al-Qaeda is in effect a multinational corporation—an ideologically-driven NGO—that operates on a global stage. The CEO is OBL and the headquarters is in Pakistan, with franchises around the world taking general instructions. We know this, the Pakistani’s know this, and the World knows this…which is why extremists continue to come in small groups to train in Pakistan, including many of those involved in recent terror plots in Europe.
Experts believe the greatest Islamist threat is to Europe, in part because it is easier to travel to Europe and has become harder to hit the U.S. mainland. According to British media, about 400,000 members of the British Pakistani community go to Pakistan each year—and some of them go expressly to hook up with Kashmiri militant groups and eventually with al-Qaeda.
Pakistani jihadis are expanding their territorial base—mindless of the region’s borders—and have proclaimed their desire to acquire nuclear materiel. Doesn’t every one of these groups, but who knows? And can we afford to take such a chance?
IMO, one of the reasons it is so difficult to fight the threat in that region is because the public and the army are reluctant to fight the jihadis and their hate-spewing madrasas…yet are hostile to any allied (US or otherwise) troops on their soil.
All the experts have agreed that the free world needs to rethink the strategy for battling militant jihadis…and I suspect that is what is being done. I also do not like second-guessing such matters (especially on the word of the MSM) and have to assume (such a dangerous word that) that our intelligence was such that we had a VERY GOOD REASON to do what we did.
Victory over a group like al-Qaeda is—IMO—possible, but it does not come easily and, based on UW/CI studies, there are four conditions of a mostly political nature which are generally thought of as being required to defeat them. Two of them concern the state, where the national leadership must:
- Understand and accept the political and public relations challenge involved in battling insurgents.
- Appreciate the vital role of intelligence, invest in it, and require the military to use it effectively.
Another two conditions concern counterterrorist operations, which must:
- Isolate terrorists from the non-terrorist civilian population.
- Control and isolate the territories where terrorists live and fight.
If these guidelines hold true to form, then we need to look at the status of the GWOT and see if we can figure out where we are now in all this. It looks to me as if we’ve accepted the first two conditions and are now working on the other two. I hope.
Richard’s $.02
