[CDRODA396]

I originally posted this over at another forum and it didn’t generate as much discussion as there has already been here. I do feel that SF is at a critical cross roads right now. We sewed up our importance back in the fall of ’01, but now Big Army doesn’t quite know what to do with us, and we (our senior leadership) aren’t doing a good job of voicing that we are being improperly utilized and what it is we should be doing.

I think we blew the golden opportunity thrown our way in early '02 and are now not sitting as pretty as we'd like to think. 5th Group was thrown at a problem in the fall of ’01, until the big brass could figure out a plan and move enough forces to execute it, only no one told 5th Group that, so off they went. Word is in the Pentagon there were Generals yelling’ and cussing’ and screaming for someone to stop “them Cowboys” when Kandahar and Kabul fell, but Rumsfeld told them to shut the fuck up!

Since then however, I believe we've slowly allowed ourselves to become marginalized, pushed out to the periphery of the fight (at least in Big Army's eyes) until the Big Army can figure out what to do with us.

I don’t know about Iraq, but over in OEF, we have been ushered out to Fire Bases in what is akin to a more traditional Cavalry role (economy of force operations). As of the end of our most recent rotation (May this year), we don’t even own any terrain now, all of the Firebases are owned by a Conventional Force Commander. The guys will tell you all they are really doing is Movement to Ambush, and they're tired of it. Hell, before long you'll be able to say traditional “Armor Cav” role, as the fielding of the MRAP is in full swing, but the relative merits for, and/or against that are a whole other discussion.

Approval of a CONOP based on the ODA’s assessment of the situation and development of their own intelligence are rare. They are mostly Top Driven and rarely a well thought out, comprehensive plan that supports the ODA’s long term engagement plan for their area.

The Army and Marines are, or have, taken over our Bread and Butter, FID, and are now the ones doing the living with, training, cultural awareness thing with the "Indig" while we drive around the countryside waiting to get hit. Right now in OEF, there are no more Host Nation forces working directly with our guys. If we want the HN support, they have to go coordinate with the MiTT for theirs. Hell even the fleet Navy and Air Force are getting a piece of the action. Both have FID training/cultural awareness courses and are offering up troops to augment PRT’s and MiTT’s.

To a degree its our fault...back in the early 70's Bldg 4 ripped the proponency for Counter-Insurgency away from the JFK Center and then let it sit for years without capturing the valuable lessons learned from Vietnam, and then when we found ourselves smack dab in the middle of one, instead of turning to the Subject Matter Experts, SF, it took Big Army what, three, four years to capture in writing and publish what SWC has been teaching for decades? And since Big Army wrote the book, you know the Big Army is going to run the fight, even though 5th Group did just fine before Big Army (XVIII ABC) showed up in mass in June of '02.

Right now, training and advising, host nation building, etc., is viewed as the critical component of the “Long War,” not only in both ongoing AOR's, but as part of preparation of the battlefield for future fights...remember the "Long War" will be far from over when we are done, pulled out, win, whatever you call it in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So right now all the other Services see it and are chomping' at the bit to get a "piece of the action" to ensure future relevance. All the while, we are dead set on kicking in doors and shooting people in the face. Not to say that isn’t good shit, but that should not be our sole purpose, if you want to do that, and that alone, take the long walk, there is a very good element that does that very well.

Kicking in doors is a component if you will, of FID, but if you are doing it (FID) right, it’s not long before the Host Nation Forces are doing the kicking. In mid '02, 1/3 opened up the Training Academy in Kabul with a grand plan to turn out X number of trained and equipped Afghan Army troops and soon we'd be done and Karzi able to stand on his own. That rotation wasn’t even over before over half the Teams assigned to training were out roaming the battlefield, and the 10th Mountain was ear-marked to take the whole thing over. OUR mission given up as quickly as we could so we could go out and shoot people...which again, I'm all for, but we are the FID SME's, cultural experts, world class instructors, aren’t we?

We should have been running that Academy, and as part of the Graduation Exercise, running live combat patrols, then the Teams would still be getting their killing on, but by now, there would be a far more competent, cohesive Afghan National Army to take over the countries internal security issues.

There are some that would argue we are also violating three of OUR SOF Truths...Quality is better than Quantity. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced, and Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.

If we look at the Pipeline right now, I fear, but can’t say for certain that the Mass Production of us is ongoing. The only capitalization on our early success is our growth... just a few years ago, we totaled 6000 give or take in the Active Component Groups, and now we are trying to increase by a battalion+ a year, over the next five years, which what that really amounts to is we are trying to increase the force by roughly 2500 in five years, while simultaneously sustaining the normal attrition of the current force, and all the while fighting a Global War.

SWC has almost totally revamped the Q to increase through-put, and say they have maintained quality, but the instructors I know and have talked to would probably be willing to have a professional discussion on the merit of that statement. I don’t know if the standard has been lowered or not, but it seems as though something has to have given, or will give very shortly if we are to man the growing force over the next five years.

According to some calculations, as of today, MFF and CDCQ cannot at maximum output, adequately man the current force, and as a new battalion grows each year, there is no accompanying growth of these two schools. SWC says they are at maximum output and with the exception of attrition, can and are going to meet the needs of the force. All of the projections based on current allocations and success rates say otherwise, but the Pipeline has priority, and is going to maintain priority for some time.

On top of the possibility that the standard may be suffering in the Schoolhouse, in MY OPINION, the turnover of personnel is killing the quality of the force. In the old days, you would hear Team Sergeants all the time talk about "Building a Team," how the Team Leaders were "Transients" and it was commonplace for a Team Sergeant, and the Warrant, to be on a team for five, six or more years...now the Team Sergeants come and go as fast as Team Leaders, two years and move out...even the SR/JR NCO's are getting about three years before the long arm of SWC reaches out and grabs them. This might be more of a problem here (FBNC) due to being so close to SWC's flagpole, and it being an intra-post PCS, I can’t say for sure. Some of the turnover is the willing, moving out of the Groups to somewhere to take a "Break" after five rotations, and that is understandable, but it is still impacting the force.