Quote:
Originally Posted by Roguish Lawyer
Please elaborate.
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When then MG Petraeus was in charge of northern Iraq in 2003, he prevented Kurdish troops allied with the US from coming into the area to assist with security on the Syrian border, mainly on the main route running from Sinjar through Tal Afar to Mosul. This is a mixed area, with Kurdish, Arab and Turkmen populations, so I imagine he thought presence of the armed and organized Kurdish peshmerga might lead to tension. But his choice of an alternative was something which I found troubling. He essentially ceded border security to the Arab tribes, mainly of the Shammar Federation. But the Shammaris exist on both sides of the border and profit heavily by smuggling across it. Shammaris became one of the main backbones of the Baathist insurgency
Tal Afar subsequently, after the 101st had left, became an insurgent hornet's nest. In 2005, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted a major clearing operation in the city. Though problems continue in the city, this operation was pointed to as the testing ground for "clear, hold and retain". At the time, though, I remember thinking that the reliance on the Shammaris was probably a big reason why Tal Afar became a hornet's nest in the first place.
When then-LTG Petraeus was in charge of MNSTC-I, I was concerned that the incentive to more quickly build up the Iraqi Army might lead to the same types of problems - army units with divided, mostly tribal loyalties and a return of Baathist influence.
Now, while trying to remain positive about the results of the surge, especially in Anbar, I have this nagging fear that the Anbar Awakening, neighborhood watch groups, and new Sunni soldiers is just a Band-aid that might allow for a U.S. drawdown at some point, but is only sowing the seeds for future instability. (Sorry for all the metaphor-mixing)
Having just written this, I also found an article from 2004 discussing the same issues with Petraeus' tenure in northern Iraq:
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubI...pub_detail.asp