[The Reaper]

Anbar and the Danger of Civil War
Last is the argument that by “arming” former insurgents U.S. forces are setting the conditions for a terrible civil war if they turn against the Iraqi government at a future date. To begin with, despite a variety of media reports to the contrary, U.S. forces are not arming former insurgents in Iraq. The American command has been explicit and consistent on this point many times, I observed it for myself on a trip at the end of July, and Michael Gordon also addressed it after a longer and more extensive trip from which he recently returned. One of the characteristics of an insurgent is to be armed. By Iraqi law, every household is entitled to possess one AK-47. Almost everyone in Iraq is armed. The last thing former insurgents need is weapons. And, as noted above, not only do we not give them weapons, but we take the serial numbers of the weapons they do have. Whatever else is going on, the U.S. forces are not arming the Sunni in preparation for a civil war.

Nor are we helping them to organize in preparation for fighting such a civil war. Another characteristic of insurgents is that they were already organized to fight. The new organization is based heavily on Iraqi Security Forces and groups partnered with American troops — hardly a solid basis for fighting a sectarian civil war. Finally, if a civil war developed in Iraq — most likely as the result of a premature American withdrawal — does anyone imagine that the Sunni would fail to organize and arm themselves to fight it? On the contrary, by helping the Sunni community establish a legitimate local security force tied into the central government and both supported and advised by American troops, we are helping to establish the basis of long-term stability at the local level. Fear of Shia genocide has been a powerful force behind Sunni rejectionism. Local Sunni security forces help alleviate that fear. Fear of Sunni revanchism has been a strong motivation for Shia intransigence. Incorporating Sunni into the ISF mitigates that fear. Local developments in Anbar and beyond are far more likely to be elements of long-term stability and political progress than to be dangers — as long as the U.S. continues the right strategy.

BACK TO WASHINGTON
Much depends on what America does. Progress in Anbar and throughout the Sunni community has depended heavily on a skillful balance between military force and political efforts at the local level. Neither alone would have been successful, as commanders on the ground readily attest. Stripping the U.S. effort of the forces needed to continue this strategy, as some in Washington and elsewhere are demanding, will most likely destroy the progress already made and lay the groundwork for collapse in Iraq and the destabilization of the region. President Bush clearly understands this fact, as his choice of venue in Iraq demonstrates. We should all understand the significance of the president’s presence in Anbar. With a little good fortune and the continued pursuit of a successful strategy, this visit could well mark a key turning point in the war in Iraq and the war on terror.

— Frederick W. Kagan is a military historian and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.