[x-factor]

Incidentally, I had an email exchange with Barnett in 2004 after I read Pentagon's New Map. He's a nice guy with a lot of good ideas, but he's not Moses with the tablets.

Generally speaking, he's great at assessing the problem. My only beef with his Core/Gap paradigm is that he's got a blindspot for perception. He doesn't appreciate that not everyone in the world wants to be globalized, that large portions of the world view the global economy with mistrust, fear, and/or disgust. But thats not the question of this thread, so moving on.

Also, I agree with NDD 100%. I think, because he doesn't have any operational experience in anything (intel, military, diplomacy, whatever) his solutions fall a little short on practicality. He needs to think about things as spectrums rather than dichotomies.

Enough about Barnett though...

The problem with RL's initial question is that building a modern military takes very specific service-centric technical expertises, but employing a military is a joint effort. All things considered, the US has actually done a remarkable job of squaring that circle by having the services build and the regional commands fight. I don't think that basic dynamic is something you want to mess with. Going back to a service-dominant system is a bad idea. Moving to a system where the commands raise their own forces may be tempting but I think it would be a disaster for efficiency and interoperability.

I think TR's got the right idea in terms of keeping the service/command system, but reshuffling the missions/responsibilities of the services.

Here's a couple ideas along those lines off the top of my head:
- All fixed wing aircraft brought under the Air Force. With the Air Force no longer under pressure to prove its need to exist, it will stop trying to win wars by itself and commit to being a team player.
- Marine forces brought into the Army, but retain the "Marine" tag as a unit specialty, like being Airborne. The elite traditions live on, the petty bickering dies (or at least is down-sized).
- Reconstitute the Strategic Air Command as a subset of the Air Force responsible for non-joint strategic strike missions. This will be the Air Force component of STRATCOM.
- The rest of the Air Force should be broken down into self-sufficient Composite Air Expeditionary Wings (as it is today). Everything from cargo to refueling to fighters to bombers. Each CAEW is then paired with a US Army Division (and under that squadrons paired with brigades) to form standing JTFs, along the same lines as the Marines current operational model. Those JTFs train together in peace and fight together in war.
- SOCOM remains largely as it is, but the AFSOC component will be expanded to include a certain number of fast-movers (currently A-10s...in the future, probably the VSTOL version of the Joint Strike Fighter).
- Carriers and amphibs continue on in their current role as mobile staging bases. CAEWs paired with Marine divisions will operate carrier-capable aircraft.