[The Reaper]

SUPPORT YOUR LOCAL POLICE

Military force can be used to identify and imprison the insurgents. But in Iraq, we aren't doing this. In Chicago and elsewhere, police carry palmtop devices that take fingerprints and send them to HQ - and in two minutes the patrolmen have a reply. If the suspect is not in the database, he is automatically entered. Our border police routinely use this system. But for some reason we have not provided such a simple system for Iraq. An insurgency cannot be quelled if the insurgents hiding among the civilians cannot be identified. The lack of an identification system, of the kind many American police forces use, is the greatest technical failure of the war.

The problem is also one of numbers. U.S. and Iraqi battalions arrest at a rate about one-eighth that of U.S. law-enforcement agencies; Iraqi police make even fewer arrests. If Iraqi police had the same arrest and imprisonment rate for violent crime as the U.S., there would be 85,000 inmates in Iraqi jails, instead of 14,000. The Iraqi court system in Baghdad imprisons 10 to 24 criminals and insurgents each week - one-twentieth the number in New York City. It is unlikely that a resident of Baghdad believes his neighbors are 20 times more law-abiding than those in New York.

In Iraq, the "rule of law" is another factor aiding the insurgency. An enemy soldier in uniform is imprisoned for the duration of the hostilities - but an insurgent in civilian clothes can kill an American soldier and, unless the evidence is airtight, walk free in a few days to kill again. Iraqi and American forces have been in the same locations for four years. They know the usual suspects. But to make more arrests, we would have to stop releasing so many detainees.

This last will be hard for the U.S. to do. Currently, the U.S. military processes every detainee through four layers of review and releases eight out of every ten. Everyone knows why this "catch and release program" persists: It's driven by an overreaction to the abuses at Abu Ghraib in 2003. But the Iraqi security forces cannot win if the insurgents cannot be identified, arrested, and imprisoned for the long haul. If current arrest and imprisonment rates persist under the "new" strategy, the American effort in Iraq is in deep peril.

THE SOLDIERS' STORY

It's also essential that we use our troops more wisely. American troops in American battalions are less vital than American troops in Iraqi battalions. We have now about 4,000 advisers in the Iraqi forces; a better number is closer to 20,000. They do not have to be of the caliber of our Army Special Forces. The Marines in Vietnam successfully inserted rifle squads into villages to form Combined Action Platoons with local forces. Many more advisers are needed to go out on patrol with the Iraqis, and to extract resources for the Iraqi troops from the sclerotic ministries in Baghdad.

In return for our assistance, we must demand joint U.S.-Iraqi boards that appoint Iraqis to key police and military positions and remove officers for malfeasance. Maliki is pushing for full control over the Iraqi army by the summer. To grant him that would be a huge mistake: He hasn't earned it. The ministries in Baghdad have been unable to support their own forces. If a Shiite government could do what it pleased with the Iraqi army, we would lose all leverage. For sectarian interests to pack the top ranks with loyalists would destroy morale.

The insurgents, death squads, and common thugs now have the initiative; they choose when to attack. Iraqi soldiers and police dare not wear a uniform when they visit their own homes. That tells you who is in charge.

Clear benchmarks for performance under the new strategy can be easily instituted. It is not sufficient to report only incidents of violence. In the early '90s, New York City substantially increased its police force and instituted tough standards. The same can be done in Baghdad. Arrest and incarceration rates can be tracked. So can the location and criminal affiliation - Sunni insurgent or Shiite death squad - of the culprits.

We face two different military challenges. The first is curbing the Sunni bombers and Shiite death squads in Baghdad: The goal is to destroy the Sunni insurgents and to stop the Shiite militias who are murdering and driving out the non-insurgent Sunnis. The U.S. military has the information and the operational skills to break the death squads. This must include moving into Sadr City. The Shiite militias are frightened by what might be coming; that fear should be backed by action. If Moqtada al-Sadr responds by urging a third rebellion by the Mahdi Army, he must be seized, imprisoned, and not released. There is no way of avoiding the risk of citywide chaos for a few days. But things will settle down.

The second challenge is destroying the Sunni insurgents in Anbar province. Anbar, the size of North Carolina, is the lair of the Islamic extremists. These murderers are an especially tough problem, because a few car bombs wreak so much carnage, provoking Shiite rage and revenge. Al-Qaeda in Iraq must be destroyed in Anbar, if we want to keep the bombings in Baghdad from resuming after American forces pull out. The key in Anbar is allying tough local cops or Iraqi battalion commanders with the local tribes, providing a robust adviser corps, and situating American battalions in bases for quick strikes and on-call reinforcement.

A short-sighted consensus is forming to play defense and to concentrate on neighborhoods where the Shiite militias are not strong. Maliki has argued that this would give the death squads a chance to redeem themselves: If they don't disband, we will supposedly move against them in the summer. But they are killers, not patriots, and murderers persist in their trade. Sadr and his followers have to be hit - and hit hard. They have consistently folded under attack in the past, and they are scared now: Sadr has begun betraying his own. If we are serious as New York City was in the '90s, the arrest and long-term incarceration rate in Baghdad will exceed 2,500 per month, of whom 50 percent or more will be members of Shiite death squads. The only institution, finally, that can bring stability to Iraq is not the under-performing office of the prime minister or the fractious national assembly. It is the Iraqi Army. Casey knew what he was doing; that's why Sadr feared him.

In sum, we need a coherent, aggressive military strategy on the local level as well as a top-down political strategy. If we are serious about a military strategy, we will take the following actions immediately:
- Deploy hand-held identification devices to fingerprint all military-age males and deprive the insurgents of the ability to move about and blend in with the population.

- Shift platoons from our battalions to Iraqi army and police units.

- Train our units and advisers in tough police techniques.

- Give cash to our battalions and advisers to buy the loyalty of tribes and reward Iraqi battlefield performance.

- Take the offense in Baghdad, with no area off-limits.

- Imprison insurgents and militia leaders for the duration of hostilities - period.

- Insist on joint U.S.-Iraqi boards for key appointments and removal for malfeasance.

The Iraqi army is the least sectarian organization in Iraq. President Bush should keep open the possibility that the army will control Iraq, as the military did in South Korea and in Turkey in decades past. A stable Iraq under military rule - overt or behind-the-scenes - is preferable to a failed state.

Mr. West, a former Marine and former assistant secretary of defense, has accompanied more than 30 U.S. and Iraqi battalions on operations over the past four years and has written two books about the combat.