[D9 (RIP)]

IMHO, this latest example of indecisiveness and hesitancy stems ultimately from our refusal to justify the war in terms of our own security. Of course, instead, the primary justification for the war offered was that it was a war of social service - to free the oppressed Iraqi people. The implication was almost that any benefit we would gain was incidental. Especially as the campaign against war gathered momentum in the UN, the moral justification offered was increasingly the plight of the Iraqi people, and how happy they would be once we rid them of Hussein. The cherry on top, of course, was the naming of the Operation as "Iraqi Freedom."

While I agree that this is all only mildly relevant to the conduct of the actual war, the consequences of the decision to de-emphasize our own interests in going to war are now being felt throughout the entire Middle-East.

In the first place, I think the characterization of the war as a selfless act of social service on America's part was responsible for the restrained ROE that we saw during the "combat phase" of the conflict. American forces behind cover taking fire from enemy combatants were they couldn't fire back for fear of hitting civilians became a familiar scene on the evening news. I think it is now clear that the first iteration of a critical message was delivered then, as regime loyalists dragged people out of their houses at gunpoint while America sacrificed our own soldiers to avoid putting Iraqi civilians into danger: of the two antagonists, the more ruthless and dangerous one is not the Americans.

As the combat phase of the operation ended, and the nation-building/counter-insurgency phase began, the consequences of our soft handed approach became clear. Enemy forces in Iraq - be they Islamic militants or regime dead-enders - were having no trouble operating within and among the civilian population. Although for a few months our forces appeared to be gradually rounding up the last troublesome elements, in the wake of the activity of the past few weeks it now appears more likely that we may have only been witnessing a proverbial quiet before the storm, as insurgent leaders planned and coordinated the mass attacks that we now see.

And one reason they have been able to do so is that the average Iraqi is far more afraid of being complicit with the Americans (for fear of reprisals by the insurgents) than he is of being complicit with the insurgents. We now have a country full of ostensible "innocent" civilians, who out of some mixture of general anti-Americanism and pragmatic fear of the insurgents, are providing the insurgents a comfortable medium from which to plan, coordinate, supply, and execute their activities. As far out of control as the situation has become at this point, I don't see any alternative but to seriously change our tone. We must go from being the "nice" guys, to the "tough" guys. The average Iraqi should be so afraid of American reprisals, that he is willing to do everything within his power to disassociate himself from the insurgents. At this point, the insurgents have taught us a lesson that we should never have overlooked: the way to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people is by convincing them that you are the most dangerous group in the country.

At the macro level, this insistence that we are doing this only for the Iraqis has forced us to let them dictate certain terms of the post-war transition, such as the June 30th handover of power that everyone knows is ridiculous. So it is that this week, as the insurgents made a coordinated move around the country, we found ourselves in a crisis. The governing council, which must be kept intact if there is any hope of seeing the promised June 30th transition take effect, threatened to walk out unless our forces ceased offensive operations against Fallujah and allowed them to negotiate with the insurgent forces there. We allowed the same strategy to be forced on us with Moqtada al Sadr and his militia, and it now appears that we are willing to forgive this very dangerous individual if he will agree to "renounce violence." I think the connection between our obsession with appearing to be the Iraqi's social servants and the June 30th deadline, and the connection between that deadline and the "sitzkreig" policy of negotiations that The Reaper referred to, is all too clear.

All of this looks as weak-kneed and indecisive to the people of Iraq as it does to us here in America. They are starting to see that for all our tanks, Apaches, troops and fighter-bombers, we are no match for the unbridled brutality and ruthlessness of our enemies. Constrained by our own so-called "sensibilities" and a mawkish yearning to have the approval of the world, we are losing control of a situation that is well within our power to control. The Iraqi people, who have shown us nothing if not their willingness to submit to whichever authority is most ruthless, are seeing this picture clearly. And they are hearing it in their mosques: "the Americans will be gone someday, probably sooner that later, and we will still be here," is the message from behind the sinister smile.

The other day at a going away party for RAT (of SOCNET infamy), I had the opportunity to speak at some length with an American, originally from Jordan, who is now working as an interpreter with 5th and 10th SFG forces in Iraq. He had interesting comments that I believe are true and are certainly consistent with what one sees on the news. "The Iraqis," he said, "do not yet know how to be free. After so many decades, they still cannot get out of the mindset that they need to be led, and they need a strong leader. They are used to obeying those of whom they are afraid. We cannot win, until they fear us first. Then we can teach them to be free." I think there is great wisdom in that statement. We have used the carrot until is has been rammed back down our throats. When we have picked up the stick, as it we did recently in Fallujah, it was with a quivering hand and we quickly dropped it in favor of the carrot again. Our enemies on the other hand, have the stick. The population fears them, and it is becoming very obvious that this is not a population possessed of the kind of defiant individualism and independence to recoil against those who would wield sticks against them.

It is an unfortunate consequence of the situation, but in Iraq today we have to become as brutal as the insurgents until they are beaten down and ultimately submit. Then, and only then IMO, can we start talking again about offering the carrot.