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Originally Posted by 82ndtrooper
I'd be curious how you felt the suppressor (Knights) performed. Did you fire it "DRY" and "WET" and were you impressed with the sound reduction ? I own the Knights OHG that was designed for the Mk23 MOD O project, and also the SWR HEMS II .45 ACP suppressor. Both suppressors fired "DRY" are incredibly loud !! Though no hearing protection is needed, neigther suppressor provides a sound reduction that would be considered impressive if compared to 9mm suppressors, let alone .22Lr suppressor.
Both suppressors, the Knights and the SWR are incredibly quite when used with an ablative such as water. I generally just pour some distilled water down the tube coating the baffles as I place my thumb over the end as to allow for the water to stay inside in the suppressor as I tilt it back and forth to allow for all baffles to be coated then simply shake out the excess water. This proves to be incredibly quite with both suppressors.
What was your take on the sound redcution and the POA and POI shift with the use of the Knights ?
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Shot the Knights suppressor dry only. No instrumentation on the range. This was strictly a "back of the cocktail napkin" operational assessment (to personally validate other opinions that mattered orders of magnitude above mine). There was no way that any individual could come close to accumulating the volume of test data needed to have a learned technical discussion with USSOCOM, and no need. They had some great technical data. But I was in the position of defending other COAs to the HQ and explaining opposition to this particular solution. I wanted some quality time with this weapon, so it was me, the Mk23 system complete and the woodpeckers...
On paper, Mk23 is the heat. Individually, many technical performance metrics of the Mk23 are outstanding. Collectively, these individual performance metrics, even though they are individually impressive, combined to produce a design solution that did not enjoy operator acceptance.
This gets us back to the point of the thread. Without a clearly articulated definition of an "offensive handgun", the SOF community wound up with what was perceived as a pig, when in fact, as you have noted, the Mk23 is a high performance weapon - on the range. Note that the range in this case does not mean the shooting house.....
The classic problem materiel developers and manufacturers face is the compromises in the design elements. The operational requirements document for the system must articulate the user's tactical concerns and priorities in the "shortcomings of existing systems", "concept of employment" (now CONOPS) and the "capabilities required" paragraphs. And not just the technical specs. It is the required operational capabilities that lead to the critical operational issues and criteria used to test/assess the design solution - in an operational context - that will determine success or failure of that solution. The bottom line is the military and tactical utility as assessed by the user.
There is a sign on the wall in 22 SAS that sums this up nicely: "The tactical concept of employment leads to the equipment requirement".
In the case of the Mk23, the materiel developer did not adequately articulate in the requirements document the priority of the multiple operational and technical metrics associated with an "offensive handgun". Instead, the materiel developer focused on the technical performance metrics - all of them - with no trade space for the multiple competing design elements. The loser here was overall system performance in an operational context and ultimately, user acceptance by operators accross USSOCOM.
The teaching point for me was to pay close attention to what was going on with the 4 star HQ and blue requirements documents, because sometimes they try to change colors on you downrange when there is no longer an opportunity to influence the outcome, and a Mk23 in a green box shows up on your doorstep....
As an aside, it is also possible to take a perfectly good rotary wing aircraft, load it with "good ideas" such as refuel probes, jammers, nav aides, FLIRs, primary weapons, back up weapons, ammo for all the above, etc. to the point where the lift, range and speed of the platform no longer meets the original operational requirement for infil. In the first gulf war we also proved that helos modified in this incremental fashion will only fly in a circle until they burn off fuel.
The point is that any system can become a victim of an incomplete/ill-defined requirement, multiple good ideas, too many user reps and number one priorities, and mission creep. Mk23 is the small arms poster child for this undisciplined approach to materiel development. Nothing a little systems engineering and configuration management can't fix-but only in the requirements analysis phase of the project - and only if there is operational and technical tradespace. If everything is important, you get suboptimal hardware. But once you have the logo on a coffee cup it's too late and you're hosed.
v/r
Karl