[The Reaper]

IMHO, it goes back to the USAJFKSPECWARCEN being the admin HQs for SF.

That, and when USASOC stood up, they raped all of the billets they could from the MSCs, like 1st SOCOM, which became USASFC. IIRC, when I was there, the USASFC G1 and G4 each had two personnel assigned. The G2 would have looked like that as well, had they not had a CI Det.

With five AC SF Groups, two RC SF Groups, and the other assorted units that the USASFC CG has been given responsibility for, the argument could potentially be made for a MG-LTG billet. Certainly, the USASFC staff should be bigger and do more for the Groups.

Finally, I would make the USASFC HQs at least partially deployable. The theater SOCs and SFGs are being forced to form the CJTFs and CJSOTFs on a permanent basis, rather than the Groups functioning as at worst, the ARSOTF HQs. This is unsat and the units were never staffed to be the joint HQs in a combat environment. The sad fact is that IMHO, SF is the only SOF unit that built any real deployable staff capability into their TO&E. The somewhat more robust theater SOF staffs are a result of SF GO input. To do this wartime SOF business right, the SOCs at war (especially a theater with multiple countries in combat operations) need an IMA type plus up with one year tours. USASFC needs to be deployable, with the ability to form a CJSOTF should the need arise.

Look at CENTCOM right now. They have combat ops in Iraq, Afghanistan, multiple lesser contingencies from the Horn of Africa to Pakistan. What is left over to be looking at Iran and planning for possible operations there? We already have the remaining SF Groups apportioned to other theaters rotating through CENTCOM. How long can we keep this up?

All of this really points to the decision under Klinton (and Bush 41) to eliminate large parts of the US ground combat forces as a "peace dividend". The two simultaneous major theater war (MTW) strategy was designed to prevent a second theater from lacking military leverage and becoming a potential threat while we were engaged in a MTW elsewhere. That was downgraded to two near simultaneous MTWs, where we fought the first and used the air and naval forces available to delay while we resolved the first conflict. That was then further reduced as force structure no longer matched strategy. This (and the extended commitment of virtually all conventional forces in Iraq) is IMHO, one of the primary reasons that we are having issues with the Iranians and North Koreans right now. They know that we are tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan, and do not present any sort of threat, other than air attack or a nuke strike. I also believe that is the reason for the dismissal of Shinseki (for saying the Emperor has no clothes) and for the reorganization into BCTs and unit of action under the current CSA. More units look better on paper, without really increasing end strength or combat power. Kind of like when we went from five tanks per platoon to three tanks per platoon. It is a shell game. Rant off.

Back to the point, yes, USASFC is understaffed. BG Mullholland is a good guy, led 5th Group into OEF, and will do well wherever he goes.

TR