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The Consequence Of Inaction In Libya

This is always an issue when looking to depose a gang of bandits.

Richard :munchin

Foreign Policy: The Consequence Of Inaction In Libya
Michael Singh, NPR, 7 Mar 2011

The sanctions which have been placed on Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, his family members, and his senior officials are strong. They include asset freezes, travel bans, and threats of criminal prosecution. All of which add up to a powerful signal to the Libyan regime that the war it is waging on its own people is illegitimate and unacceptable, and to the Libyan people that our sympathy is with them and we will act to prevent their national assets from being pillaged. The world is now a considerably less inviting place for Libyan officials, who have been known to carouse in the capitals of Europe, the Caribbean, and elsewhere.

But therein a problem lies. The strategy followed thus far by the United States and its allies may persuade many Libyan officials that there is no future in following Gadhafi and therefore, defection to the opposition or negotiating an exit from Libya altogether is the most sensible course of action. But for others, especially those closest to Gadhafi, the sanctions and threats of international prosecution, combined with the advance of opposition forces, may convince them that they have little choice but to hunker down in Tripoli and Sirte and fight.

To deal with this possibility that Gadhafi and his loyalists will use all of the force at their disposal before giving in, and that the violence in Libya may therefore get considerably worse, further international action is needed. The United States and EU should seek U.N. Security Council authorization for the imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya.

We have heard much from U.S. officials in recent days about the risks of imposing a no-fly zone, but inaction also has its consequences.

Gadhafi has used warplanes against the opposition in recent days, and there is little indication that he will cease doing so as long as it is an option. This not only increases the chances of mass casualties, but it will extend the conflict as the relatively lightly-armed and poorly-trained rebels worry about advancing while Gadhafi has such armaments at his disposal. As the fighting drags on and the violence deepens, the risk that extremist groups will enter the fray as they have in other conflicts in the region increases as well, which has serious implications for our future relations with whatever Libya that emerges from the fighting.

Inaction also strikes a blow to U.S. credibility. On Capitol Hill March 2, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the "stakes are high" in Libya, which she warned could become a "giant Somalia." The United States has "joined the Libyan people in demanding that Colonel Gadhafi must go now, without further violence or delay," she asserted. Yet it is not clear to the world that we have joined the Libyan people in doing anything about it. Our sanctions will work indirectly and over the long term. Our warships are standing off the coast of Libya, but taking no part in the struggle there. This perception — that we can help but have chosen not to, despite calls from the Libyan opposition to impose a no-fly zone —is one we may rue for years to come.

The reasons provided by senior U.S. officials for not imposing a no-fly zone in Libya seem pale in comparison to their descriptions of the stakes in Libya. They have said that imposing a no-fly zone would be complicated and would not account for fighting on the ground. These are prudent points, but they make better arguments for a smartly-crafted intervention than for doing nothing. There are well-grounded fears that a no-fly zone could turn into a long-term commitment (like the one over Iraq in the 1990s) if a stalemate develops. But this risk must be weighed against the potential of a no-fly zone to bring the conflict to an earlier end, keeping in mind that a protracted conflict will carry costs for U.S. national security regardless of whether we are directly involved. U.S. officials have also questioned whether aircraft are being used by Gadhafi against civilians, or whether the Libyan opposition wants a no-fly zone. Recent news reports undermine both points. Likewise, fears that Russia and China would veto a no-fly zone in the Security Council should not deter us from putting the question to them.

Other reasons given for our inaction are less persuasive. Secretary of Defense Gates questioned the wisdom of taking action in "another country in the Middle East," and Secretary Clinton suggested that there are messages on websites that the United States intends to "invade for oil." We cannot allow such canards to guide U.S. foreign policy.

From Tunisia to Egypt to Bahrain to Libya, the world has been wondering where the United States stands. It was on Feb. 23 that President Obama said regarding Libya that the United States would "stand up for freedom, stand up for justice, and stand up for the dignity of all people." And on Feb. 25 Secretary Clinton asserted that, "This is a time for action. Now is the opportunity for us to support all who are willing to stand up on behalf of the rights we claim to cherish." On March 2, she observed that the events in the region demanded a "strong and strategic response." They were right, but so far our actions have not matched these words.

Michael Singh is an associate fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council (NSC).

http://www.npr.org/2011/03/07/134326...ction-in-libya

I doubt the world is hanging onto BJ's ol' lady's every word.

She hasn't had any credibility with anyone with a brain since day one, and with anyone with half a brain since she claimed to have come under sniper fire when exiting a helicopter.

As for Obama-its been reported that the rebels want W back in there.

What are US Interests in Libya?

Richard,

A good read, though I am no fan of the current milquetoast US administration, at the risk of being a cynic, is it possible in the cold world of geopolitics it is better for US interests that Gaddafi stay in power? We can pay lip service to the sufferings of the Libyan people, but if this was Saudi or someplace we truly cared about there would have been US boots on the ground weeks ago.

Gaddafi is a devil, but the devil we know, he chirps, he does bad things, but at his age and energy level he seems more interested in his Ukranian nurse, than Islamism. He reinvented himself as African since the Arabs don't take him seriously, and lest we forget he has been cozying up Libyan oil to the West the past decade. On the other hand if he is replaced by some young charismatic Islamist firebrand, this could lead to much bigger problems for US interests.

My knowledge of Libyan military capability is slight, and limited to brief readings, however it is a country of 6.5 million people 90% of whom reside in 3 cities along the coast, with a relatively small military and aging Soviet equipment, who got smacked by Chad in the Toyota War. Given US military capabilities, it doesn't seem we want change in Libya, how can the rebels win without logistic resupply?

Quote:

...how can the rebels win without logistic resupply?

In a UW environment which is in the overt military action phase like this one, every enemy force is a potential source of resupply - win the battle and win the supplies. Hell of an incentive to fight and win, isn't it? ;)

Richard :munchin

Quote:

Originally Posted by Richard (Post 380091)

Some points to consider, but I don't see how we can support such regimes as this one anymore and hope to retain any sense of credibility in today's 'under the microscope lens' environment.

As for this item:

In a UW environment which is in the overt military action phase like this one, every enemy force is a potential source of resupply - win the battle and win the supplies. Hell of an incentive to fight and win, isn't it? ;)

Richard :munchin

This made me wonder... If the US and/or other foreign nations begin supplying the rebels do you think we would see a shift in support from the pro Qadafi forces? Possibly due to the fact the rebels are believed to be just holding on, without current US involvement? Thus they believe they will overthrow the rebels. With US support the pro Qadafi forces may see Qadafi as the weaker player. Or maybe their loyalty is deeper than just who is the stronger player? Just a question for you guys who know more. Something I've been pondering.

"To be or not to be..."

"de oppresso liber".......hmmm

We reportedly aid Egypt's military to the tune of 1+ billion dollars per year.

Egypt shares a border with Libya.

This is the first rebellion I've noticed reported where Arab citizens are asking for Western military assistance.

It's a civil war. Poses zero threat to the US other than oil prices and any regime wants to sell it's produce.
Who are the rebels? Anyone know what political bent they have?
Let Libyans kill libyans for awhile.

Richard's point on credibility is key. What the people see and recognize as legitimate in the end is of paramount importance. Every bomb Qadafi's planes drop on the rebels undermines any credibilty we may have with the people who are looking to us to put a stop to this, not to mention the obvious blow to the credibility and legitimacy of the Libyan armed forces (a rats' nest that will take years to build back up after this ends). From a US perspective it's a Catch 22 - Do nothing or too little and you look incompetent and apathetic but do too much and you're imposing American will on the people of Libya.

I think it's interesting in light of the SECDEFs comments in recent weeks about bolstering the Air Force and Navy and directing the Army towards security assistance - kinda looks like a most likely course of action in this contingency with a very limited ground presence.

Regardless, without getting our foot in the door we lose our place at the table to help assist and frame the future of Libya once this concludes. Eventually Qadafi will quit, leave, be killed, get run out, or just flat out die. His sons don't have the referent power to stay in power once the old man leaves. I have a feeling once the military leadership starts to feel like they're backing a losing horse they'll take care of the internal displacement in an attempt to resurrect some semblance of legitimacy.

One of the things that helped our stake in the Egyptian revolution was the fact that for nearly 40 years Egyptian officers have been attending our professional military education courses; from the basic course to the War College and everything in between. We don't have this relationship with the Libyans and we're going to need to do something to fill in that gap.

It should also be remembered that Egypt isn't fully resolved yet and Egypt is the prize. Anything we do (or don't do) in Libya has potential effects on how we're percieved or recieved in Egypt's post-Mubarak government, not to mention all the concern we had a few weeks ago about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

On the other hand, we have the words of TE Lawrence to ponder and guide; "better they do it tolerably than for you to do it perfectly."

Well, if Egypt is the 'prize', can we get beyond this?

http://egyptianchronicles.blogspot.c...fell-down.html

And so it goes...

Richard :munchin

Quote:

Originally Posted by Richard (Post 380185)

Well, if Egypt is the 'prize', can we get beyond this?

http://egyptianchronicles.blogspot.c...fell-down.html

And so it goes...

Richard :munchin

If not we'll have plenty of time to think about it as we're shipping around the south end of Africa.... :D

Quote:

Originally Posted by PRB (Post 380174)

I like your thinking,, :cool:

" Letting Libyans kill each other for a while."

I agree with this policy for a couple of reasons. First, we don't know who these "rebels" are, what they really want, or what will be their policy toward us.
Second. If you abandon former allies like Mubarak and take a stand against a current government such at Libya's government. What do do our "allies" such as the Saudis and Pakistanis think, and how do they respond?

In the short term we can let them kill each other in Libya, we can support the Egyptian Military for a while. In the longer run the US needs a coherent policy that works. Two place we should have an inside track in helping form governments we can live with long term are Iraq and Afghanistan. I don't think we are doing this very well particularly in Afghanistan.

STRATFOR: How a Libyan No-fly Zone Could Backfire

George Friedman's $.02

Quote:

Published on STRATFOR (stratfor.com)

How a Libyan No-fly Zone Could Backfire

Created Mar 8 2011 - 07:50

By George Friedman

Calls are growing for a no-fly zone over Libya, but a power or coalition of powers willing to enforce one remains elusive. In evaluating such calls, it is useful to remember that in war, Murphy’s Law always lurks. What can go wrong will go wrong, in Libya as in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Complications to Airstrikes

It has been pointed out that a no-fly zone is not an antiseptic act. In order to protect the aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone, one must begin by suppressing enemy air defenses. This in turn poses an intelligence problem. Precisely what are Libyan air defenses and where are they located? It is possible to assert that Libya has no effective air defenses and that an SEAD (suppression of enemy air defenses) attack is therefore unnecessary. But that makes assumptions that cannot be demonstrated without testing, and the test is dangerous. At the same time, collecting definitive intelligence on air defenses is not as easy as it might appear — particularly as the opposition and thieves alike have managed to capture heavy weapons and armored vehicles, meaning that air defense assets are on the move and under uncertain control.

Therefore, a no-fly zone would begin with airstrikes on known air defense sites. But it would likely continue with sustained patrols by SEAD aircraft armed with anti-radiation missiles poised to rapidly confront any subsequent threat that pops up. Keeping those aircraft on station for an extended period of time would be necessary, along with an unknown number of strikes. It is uncertain where the radars and missiles are located, and those airstrikes would not be without error. When search radars and especially targeting radars are turned on, the response must be instantaneous, while the radar is radiating (and therefore vulnerable) and before it can engage. That means there will be no opportunity to determine whether the sites are located in residential areas or close to public facilities such as schools or hospitals.

Previous regimes, hoping to garner international support, have deliberately placed their systems near such facilities to force what the international media would consider an atrocity. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi does not seem like someone who would hesitate to cause civilian casualties for political advantage. Thus, the imposition of a no-fly zone could rapidly deteriorate into condemnations for killing civilians of those enforcing the zone ostensibly for humanitarian purposes. Indeed, attacks on air defenses could cause substantial casualties, turning a humanitarian action into one of considerable consequence in both humanitarian and political terms.

Airstrikes vs. Ground Operations

The more important question is what exactly a no-fly zone would achieve. Certainly, it would ground Gadhafi’s air force, but it would not come close to ending the fighting nor erode Gadhafi’s other substantial advantages. His forces appear to be better organized and trained than his opponents, who are politically divided and far less organized. Not long ago, Gadhafi largely was written off, but he has more than held his own — and he has held his own through the employment of ground combat forces. What remains of his air force has been used for limited harassment, so the imposition of a no-fly zone would not change the military situation on the ground. Even with a no-fly zone, Gadhafi would still be difficult for the rebels to defeat, and Gadhafi might still defeat the rebels.

The attractiveness of the no-fly zone in Iraq was that it provided the political illusion that steps were being taken, without creating substantial risks, or for that matter, actually doing substantial damage to Saddam Hussein’s control over Iraq. The no-fly zone remained in place for about 12 years without forcing change in Saddam’s policies, let alone regime change. The same is likely to be true in Libya. The no-fly zone is a low-risk action with little ability to change the military reality that creates an impression of decisive action. It does, as we argue, have a substantial downside, in that it entails costs and risks — including a high likelihood of at least some civilian casualties — without clear benefit or meaningful impact. The magnitude of the potential civilian toll is unknown, but its likelihood, oddly, is not in the hands of those imposing the no-fly zone, but in the hands of Gadhafi. Add to this human error and other failures inherent in war, and the outcome becomes unclear.

A more significant action would be intervention on the ground, an invasion of Libya designed to destroy Gadhafi’s military and force regime change. This would require a substantial force — and it should be remembered from Iraq that it would require a substantial occupation force to stabilize and build a new regime to govern Libya. Unlike in Egypt, Gadhafi is the regime, and sectarian elements that have been kept in check under his regime already are coming to the fore. The ability of the country to provide and administer basic government functions is also unknown. And it must also be borne in mind that Gadhafi clearly has substantial support as well as opposition. His supporters will not go without a fight and could choose to wage some form of post-invasion resistance, as in Iraq. Thus, while the initial costs in terms of casualties might be low, the long-term costs might be much higher.

It should also be remembered that the same international community that condemned Saddam Hussein as a brutal dictator quite easily turned to condemn the United States both for deposing him and for the steps its military took in trying to deal with the subsequent insurgency. It is not difficult to imagine a situation where there is extended Libyan resistance to the occupying force followed by international condemnation of the counterinsurgency effort.

Having toppled a regime, it is difficult to simply leave. The idea that this would be a quick, surgical and short-term invasion is certainly one scenario, but it is neither certain nor even the most likely scenario. In the same sense, the casualties caused by the no-fly zone would be unknown. The difference is that while a no-fly zone could be terminated easily, it is unlikely that it would have any impact on ground operations. An invasion would certainly have a substantial impact but would not be terminable.

Stopping a civil war is viable if it can be done without increasing casualties beyond what they might be if the war ran its course. The no-fly zone likely does that, without ending the civil war. If properly resourced, the invasion option could end the civil war, but it opens the door to extended low-intensity conflict.

The National Interest

It is difficult to perceive the U.S. national interest in Libya. The interests of some European countries, like Italy, are more substantial, but it is not clear that they are prepared to undertake the burden without the United States.

We would argue that war as a humanitarian action should be undertaken only with the clear understanding that in the end it might cause more suffering than the civil war. It should also be undertaken with the clear understanding that the inhabitants might prove less than grateful, and the rest of the world would not applaud nearly as much as might be liked — and would be faster to condemn the occupier when things went wrong. Indeed, the recently formed opposition council based out of Benghazi — the same group that is leading the calls from eastern Libya for foreign airstrikes against Gadhafi’s air force — has explicitly warned against any military intervention involving troops on the ground.

In the end, the use of force must have the national interest in mind. And the historical record of armed humanitarian interventions is mixed at best.

ATTRIBUTED TO STRATFOR 3/8/11

Insightful evaluation by Stratfor, as usual. As an Air Force bubba with some no-fly zone experience (not directly flying... evaluating ONW/OSW operations from afar and briefing daily activities in the tit-for-tat affair) I must agree, the Devil is in the details. What sounds simple in sounds bytes is less than easy to implement, is financially expensive, and can rapidly consume resources. Without a deliberate strategy it could create a "we're here... now what?" situation while risking an escalation of unplanned events.

So what is our intended strategy? Despite news releases to the contrary, is anyone convinced we really have one?

Should our policy makers flail with the wind, or determine a favored long term outcome and influence the steps to get there? Sometimes a deliberate choice to wait and see is prudent, but as the thread title suggests there are consequences for indecision and inaction, regardless of reason.
:munchin

The Plot Thickens..

Looking for opinions on this. Where does it lead?

I would suggest that if it were some other European country there might be some greater level of significance.

R10

Quote:

10 March 2011 Last updated at 06:54 ET

France has become the first country to recognise the Libyan rebel leadership, the National Libyan Council (NLC), as the country's legitimate government. It comes as Nato is set to discuss military options in the Libyan conflict including a possible no-fly zone.

There is growing concern about the bombing of rebel-held areas by the forces of Col Muammar Gaddafi.

A BBC team which were detained and beaten up in Libya witnessed widespread mistreatment by the security forces.

In recent days pro-Gaddafi forces have tried to regain ground in the east, and have bombarded rebel forces in the town of Zawiya, 50km (30 miles) west of Tripoli.

Complete story from BBC here