Insurgencey study
 

Inside The Pentagon
August 12, 2004
Army Eyes Past Guerrilla Wars For Picture Of Future Activity In Iraq
The Army is conducting a study of the possible intensity and length of
guerrilla warfare in Iraq, focusing on drawing up an estimate of U.S. and
coalition casualties to determine appropriate force size and the cost of the
conflict.
The Center for Army Analysis announced Aug. 10 it plans to award a study
contract to The Dupuy Institute (TDI), an Annandale, VA-based non-profit
organization that does research and analysis related to warfare and conflict
resolution.
According to a notice posted in Federal Business Opportunities, the Army
wants the institute to look at several 20th-century guerrilla conflicts such
as the Indonesian war of independence, the Greek civil war, the Indochina
war, the Malaysian insurrection, the Mau Mau revolt, and the Greek Cypriot
insurgency.
The Army is trying to get a picture of how the Iraq insurgency may play out.
One of the questions TDI will look at is whether casualties "tend to peak at
certain points during the course of the operations; and whether one can
determine by comparisons of Iraq data to some or all of the other
operations, if the casualties in Iraq will decline over time, increase over
time, or remain at a steady state."
As of Aug. 11, 931 U.S. military personnel have been killed in Iraq. Of that
number, 791 deaths occurred after major combat operations ended May 1, 2003,
with 582 having been killed in action.
The Army is also trying to get a feel for the events that either increase or
decrease the number of casualties in a guerrilla war. "Assemble basic
narratives of each of the guerrilla wars in an attempt to identify those
major events or turning pints in each of the wars that resulted in a
downturn or upturn in the casualty pattern," the notice states.
"The project will provide unique insights to the Army leadership and to the
analytical community [on] casualty estimation in guerilla conflicts, and
specifically the Iraq war," it adds.
Since May 1, 2003 -- the period the Defense Department terms "post-combat
operations" -- Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz have resisted calling the fighting in Iraq a guerrilla war or an
insurgency. During a June 30, 2003, press briefing, roughly one month after
the U.S. military ceased major combat operations, Rumsfeld said he wasn't
using the term "guerrilla war" because "there isn't one." He cited former
members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, foreign fighters and common
criminals as responsible for attacking U.S. and coalition troops.
"They're all slightly different in why they're there and what they're
doing," Rumsfeld said. "That doesn't make it anything like a guerrilla war
or an organized resistance. It makes it like five different things going on
that are functioning much more like terrorists."
As recently as this June, Wolfowitz told the Senate Armed Services Committee
and a television interviewer that what the U.S. faced in Iraq was not "an
insurgency." He argued that the fighting is a continuation of what the U.S.
military faced when it invaded Iraq last year.
Other Bush administration officials have publicly referred to the fighting
as an insurgency
The Army expects to award a sole-source contract to TDI by Aug. 23. The
institute will then have until the middle of January 2005 to complete its
analysis.
Telephone calls to the Center for Army Analysis went unanswered by press
time (Aug. 11).
-- Thomas Duffy

Interesting
 

This reminds me very much of what Dr. Cable described the US government doing prior to and during the Vietnam War. His book, Conflict of Myths, analyses each of the insurgencies (Greece, Malaya, Phillipines, Banana Wars, South Korea) and looks at what SHOULD have been derived as lessons learnt from these insurgencies, what WAS derived, and why.
The end result was that the US did not pay proper attention to the previous insurgencies because they regarded all insurgencies with the incorrect slant (a 'nuclear army' slant, IMO).
I would be interested in discussing if this might happen here.
Is this information even applicable?

Thank you,

Solid

Re: Insurgencey study
 

This is absolutely blows my mind, as if this has never been done and it is almost as if they have no idea that they have the expertise in house to do what they want to hire an outside agency to do. This is so frigging typical, let's get someone else to tell us what we really should be doing so when it is adopted we can place the blame on a faulty study and not have to stand up and be counted for fullfilling our own responsibilities and doing the job for which we are being paid. I can almost predict the outcome of the study. The conclusion will read, " The results of this study show that the DOD has once again fallen victim to mistakes revisited and not lessons learned."

Jack Moroney

While I don't have a problem with studies or even outside studies, this one needs to be re-looked IMO. The outcome will likely be "Casualties peaked during those periods of heavy combat" or some such bullshit.

I am also not sure one can go back further than Mogadishu, Gaza, etc., to get a historical look at the current conflict.

Sounds like somebody is getting their master's thesis funded by the taxpayers.

Re: Re: Insurgencey study
 

Perhaps after 10 years that will be the conclusion. I'm willing to bet that the initial one will be "We recommend expanding the study, which will require 2 more contract years and 40% more funds than the original contract"

Well, better an insurgency study than government funding of porn at the universities.:D

depends on how interactive the classes are.

Do you know Raymond White?

TR

LOL

does he run www.juggs.com?

I guess it is all a matter of perspective. My problems with this process is twofold. First of all, you want to keep the casualties down then take the frigging money you are going to spend on this and spend it on bullets for the troops. The other aspect is more of a personal perspective. I have been part of this "outside agency" process since I have retired on more than one occassion. While I was hired to provide some insight because of special skill sets with which I had acquired some expertise, in my opinion had those tasks been done by those folks who were "guided" in various tasks completion by me, they not only would have learned more, but would have realized that they had the ability to lend more relevancy to what they were going to have to use these skills sets for when they went on their way. And lastly, I have seen some of these products for which the DOD has paid big bucks and the ones that really bugged me where those that reinforced the convoluted logic that drove the requirement for the study in the first place. All they did was waste time and provide the action officer with the "proof" that was needed to drive the program in the direction that had been a fore gone conclusion but needed "outside" corroboration. Again, my perspective from perhaps my own tunnel vision, if you can't figure out what the hell you are doing then get out of the way and let someone else take charge. Don't get me wrong, I fully agree that one should get information from whatever source one can, analyze it, develop the courses of action and come up with recommendations/decisions. But something that is so critical to the core of what the military is all about that has to rely on some damn beltway bandit organization does not give me a warm and fuzzy feeling about who is calling the shots in the DOD.

Jack Moroney-where's my prozac:D

I knew you would get it.:D

Good comments, Sir!

TR

You should put in a bid.

Re: Insurgencey study
 

Aren't these guys completely wrong? :munchin

They are politicians attempting to avoid any connection between Iraq and Vietnam. Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare are dirty words to many civilians in the US.

Personally, I use them as mantras to calm me after being forced to deal with many civilians.