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ARVN question for Vietnam Vets?

Gentlemen,

George Friedman wrote an article last month about the challenge of building an Afghan defense force, and while acknowledging differences in situation, compared it to aspects of Vietnamization. I was curious if soldiers who actually served in Vietnam would agree that the ARVN failed not from lack of motivation but from enemy infiltration, or if this is just an academic's view? I also want to thank all of our vets past and present for their service.

Quote:

Today, Obama faces similar dilemmas as Nixon. The United States cannot indefinitely provide security for the local government. The local government will have to provide security for itself. Indeed, the eventual U.S. withdrawal — in both Southeast Asia and Central Asia — was designed to put pressure on the local government to prepare to provide for itself and its citizens.

But the lesson for this president and this generation of policymakers lies in this question: Why did Vietnamization fail? It failed not for lack of motivation within the ARVN, though there were certainly cases of it. Nixon’s strategy failed because as the ARVN expanded it was increasingly penetrated by communist sympathizers and agents of North Vietnamese intelligence services, from the senior staff and command to the squad levels.

Now, this dynamic — which defeated Nixon’s strategy in Vietnam — will arise in Afghanistan. The expansion of the Afghan military provides an obvious opportunity for Taliban operatives and sympathizers — not easily distinguished from loyal troops — to enlist.

With such operatives in place, the Taliban will know of and avoid army units. Knowing that the Americans will withdraw, the rational strategy of the Taliban is reduce operational tempo, allow the U.S. forces to leave, then take advantage of superior intelligence and ability to disrupt Afghan forces internally and strike with offensives.

This is not an insoluble problem; it requires penetrating the Taliban in return. The United States attempted to do this in Vietnam but on balance that intelligence war went to the North Vietnamese. In Afghanistan today, in contrast, the United States has far more sophisticated, technical intelligencegathering capabilities than it did 40 years ago in Southeast Asia. But the United States lacks multiple layers of human intelligence.

And here is where the president’s strategy rests upon a crucial — and often unreliable — ally: Pakistan. The president mentioned Pakistan and the critical role it plays. Clearly he understands the lessons of Vietnam, and has made it clear that he expects Pakistan to engage and destroy Taliban forces on its territory, and deny Afghan Taliban supplies, replacements and refuge.

http://www.jdnews.com/articles/justi...text-span.html

My observations were that many ARVN units were more interested in liberating chickens and pigs from the various villages they went through, than taking the fight to the enemy. There were notable exceptions, The 44th Rangers come to mind, good unit.

I didn't patrol with the ARVN's, merely provided CAS.

I was attached to a Bn of 1st AVN Abn, for a short period. They were motivated and ruff hunters. Twice they did night raids with only flashlights and hand grenades. The Bn commander often was on the ground with the lead platoon.

I spent TET on 70 with them,, they also partied very hard...

I can't say that all units were the same. I suspect that as we have discussed the fact that there are WARRIOR tribes,, the same can be said for the composition of some military units. The difference being the military units are not blood-DNA related, but bound by good or bad leaders.

If you read the different autobiographical books by the guys in SOG and MACV, they often speak of the uniqueness of the 50 or so Viet tribes. Some were fierce warriors,, others were craftsman and farmers.

Now,, you throw in local turn-coats and infiltrators in with the craftsman & farmers.. You create a weakness that is almost impossible to rout out.

Another part of the VN equation, was the residual appathy from years of French occupation. The French had encouraged a class system of have's and have-not's that probably still remains today. The have's did not necessarily make good leaders,, but they had the money. There were many officers in the VN system that paid for their rank... These same have's could have been NVA or turncoats..

So is the parallelism a fair comparison.. In some aspects yes. But that doesn't mean we have not learn from the past and can, with political nodes, overcome these problems..

We know the rules and how to play the game to win..

But sometimes someone disregards the obvious and wants us to play with the wrong rules.

This applies to ALL areas of the world,, on every continent and in every community...

My $00.0002

Certainly infiltration was a problem but in my opinion the main impediment to the success of the South Vietnamese Army was leadership. Command positions being handed out to political cronies, nepotism, corruption, etc. led to incompetent leaders in critical positions on a scale reminiscent of France in WWI or the early days of the American Civil War.

Troops in any society will follow and be inspired by good leaders. Giving them training and equipment is pouring water down a bottomless hole if their leaders are not up to the task.

I worked with some ARVN Officers and NCOs who were hard chargers. Alas, most were not.

Big difference in ARVNs and tribes, most of whom were with the CIDG program.
The A Team guys are the best authority on tribes and such, due to the everyday interactions at all levels. A lot of interaction at the local level was important in maintaining relations with them.
We did a lot of outreach stuff involving medical, socil, and educational issues.
I don't think infiltration had as much to do with ARVN shortcomings as did the systemic corruption in the country.
There were some bad guys working hard at high levels, though.

Seen some good stuff on the part of the ARVNs, some not so good.
Same-same US troops as well.

I believe there was far too little done to motivate the ARVNs and get them to stand up and take over.

I also believe if we had left them air support things might have turned out better.

ARVN, like most troops, did well or poorly because of leadership and the care or lack of care they got.
I've worked with ARVN and Afghans...some similarities as to leadship (good/bad) corruption and their perception of who is or is not looking out for them.
ARVN units when well lead did well.
Afghan units when well led (usually when married up with coalition guys) can do the same.
Loyalties of the Afghans are actually more diverse than the ARVN as religion plays in heavily to.

I had some interaction with the ARVN during my three tours. The ARVN were mostly dependent upon the Americans for logistical and combat support. When the U.S. pulled out, the ARVN were lost (literally and figuratively).

The U.S. stopped their support and the ARVN folded.