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It might be ore to China. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/we...0Plenty&st=cse Quote:
FWIW, Dr. Eggert predicted the current US/China trade relationship back in the early '90s. :munchin |
naval war 2015
Interesting article I came across in my research on UW stuff.
What will this administration do? How will the next administration react to the fall out and conduct itself?? Scary prospect. Thoughts? http://www.fpri.org/orbis/5401/kraska.navalwar2015.pdf MT |
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I consider these types of articles as just seeds being planted in the minds of the people who fail to understand the difference between capabilities and motives. This is to do nothing more than to continue to justify the need to feed the military industrial complex. Many of our nation's wealthiest men own these companies. The Chinese have everything to lose if they were to trigger a conflict with the U.S. Nobody in their right mind wants a war with the United States.
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In the Kraska piece, the hypothetical threat is not so much from the development of a large Chinese navy (the symmetric threat), as from the capabilities of anti-ship weapons. That threat is not a future problem, having seen use in 1982 in the Falklands. The tactical guided missile, in the forms of the anti-ship weapon, the guided anti-tank weapon, and MANPADS, comprise the poor man’s counter to $multi-million Western weapons systems and platforms. This principle was demonstrated in Southern Lebanon in the summer of 2006, where Hezbollah played a shell game moving Russian, French and American made anti-tank weapons inside an extensive trench and bunker network to stop Israeli armor. For the first time in its history, Israel was fought to a standstill by an Arab force. It is not clear that Israel has devised a successful counter to this problem. Iran intends to use the principle again in the Persian Gulf (supplemented by mines and armed speed boats) should hostilities erupt with the West. A 2007 paper by an American college student identified the sinking of an American aircraft carrier as an Iranian victory condition in a military conflict with the U.S. Much of the discussion over at the Airwarriors forum centers on the unlikelihood of a major conflict with China. Fine. All that is necessary is for the Chinese to export the weapons to Iran. This would be a preferred course of action for China, and somewhat predictable. Now you have a credible scenario that is not such a future hypothetical. While not costing the U.S. the dominance and control of the Western Pacific, the loss of the U.S.S. George Washington in the Arabian Sea would call that dominance into question in the same fashion that Israeli military superiority has been since 2006. While we are definitely looking the other way while China develops a blue water navy, we may very well face the question of the catastrophic loss of a carrier (and the implications of that) in the short term. |
All at the Yellow Sea: Obama's Provocative Weakness Against China
All at the Yellow Sea: Obama's Provocative Weakness Against China
http://www.afpc.org/publication_list...ewArticle/1064 "..........First, Mr. Obama tried to split the difference, hosting exercises led by the George Washington in the less contentious Sea of Japan, off Korea’s eastern coast. However, the move was interpreted by allies and enemies alike as a cessation of American authority in Asia and an embarrassment to South Korea, which had gone on record insisting the George Washington would stand by its side in the Yellow Sea. The message carried particular salience in the capitals of Southeast Asia, where tensions with China are fast on the rise. After years of an effective Chinese charm offensive, many East and Southeast Asian nations have become alienated by hardening Chinese territorial claims in the Pacific. The South China Sea, where island chains such as the Spratlys and Paracels are disputed by China and Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Phillipines and Taiwan, has become a particular flashpoint......" All the above goes with....... http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37068&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=058b05b6b8 "......Chinese academic engineering literature cited by a prominent Western defense magazine supports the fact "that the PLA has also been researching fuel-cell AIP engine technology—with the PLA having benefited via Chinese academics from several conferences with German fuel-cell technology experts" (Jane's Defense Weekly, October 7). The addition of an AIP system could allow a Chinese submarine to operate underwater for up to 30 days on battery power, and would make the Song and Yuan submarines inaudible to existing U.S. surveillance networks-and U.S. subs........." |
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http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news...-1226063671201
Few reasons to fear China's 'pearls' May 27, 2011 Ashley Townshend REVELATIONS that Pakistan has invited China to construct a naval base at the strategically located port of Gwadar have intensified anxieties about Beijing's Indian Ocean objectives. For many observers, any militarisation of the Gwadar facility - a predominantly Chinese-funded commercial port about 500km from the Strait of Hormuz - would confirm deep-seated suspicions about Beijing's so-called "string of pearls" strategy. According to proponents of this view, China is establishing ports throughout littoral South Asia as a smokescreen for intelligence gathering and as a precursor to more permanent basing arrangements. Many worry that ostensibly commercial ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma will eventually be transformed into fully-fledged naval facilities. Access to such bases would enable Beijing to project military power right across the Indian Ocean - challenging US naval primacy, encircling India and threatening the sea lanes that transport about 25 per cent of the world's oil. But there are many reasons to be sceptical about this hypothesis. While Chinese state-owned corporations have bankrolled commercial "pearls" in South Asia, there's no evidence to suggest these have a military dimension. All are unfortified container ports designed to connect maritime supply chains to a growing network of continental roads, railways, pipelines and airfields. Most serve to link the land-locked provinces of southwestern China to the lucrative trade routes of the Indian Ocean. Beijing's strategic interests to the west of Singapore appear more concerned with energy security than naval power. Since almost 80 per cent of its oil imports must traverse the Indian Ocean's vast and vulnerable waterways, China's main maritime objective is to secure its hydrocarbon lifeline. A string of South Asian shipping hubs shortens the voyage from the Persian Gulf to China and reduces Beijing's reliance on the Malacca Strait "chokepoint" - dominated at both ends by US and Indian warships. Of course, any deep-water port can also harbour warships. It is thus true that the maritime infrastructure under construction in South Asia will provide a series of useful footholds for naval vessels to rest, refuel and possibly refit.... [graphic from:http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2725814/posts ] |
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China needs and desires oil and customers. They don't need or want a military project beyond their borders. The development of the "string of pearls", IMHO, doesn't represent China expanding it's military capability, but rather doing what it has to do to insure economic growth. It's "economic projection" that equals "power". That being said, the effects of a PLAN CV presence in Gwadar would have quite an impact on the mission sets (and the military industry) the USN (and the EU) would pursue to counter them. We haven't had a potentially hostile CVBG threat (Soviet Navy notwithstanding, and theirs was more an ASM platform than it was a platform from which they could project carrier based air assets) since WWII. That's my opinion FWIW anyway. |
WSJ - China Flexes Naval Muscle
There are pictures and additional links embedded in full story.
EXCERPT: "U.S. carriers come to Hong Kong, so why shouldn't ours go to California or New York?" said Xu Guangyu, a retired Chinese general. WSJ – online - ASIA NEWS AUGUST 11, 2011 China Flexes Naval Muscle By JEREMY PAGE BEIJING—China sent its first aircraft carrier to sea, a defining moment in its effort to become a top-tier naval power that seeks to challenge U.S. military supremacy in Asia and protect Chinese economic interests that now span the globe. China's first aircraft carrier has begun its inaugural sea trial, the defence ministry said Wednesday, a move likely to stoke concerns about the nation's rapid military expansion. The carrier, based on an empty hull bought from Ukraine, sounded its horn three times as it plowed through fog around the northeastern port of Dalian early Wednesday to begin its first sea trials, according to a Twitter-like service by the state-run Xinhua news agency. The vessel, nearly 1,000 feet long, is far from fully operational: It has a new engine, radar, guns and other equipment, but has limited combat potential without backup from other carriers and an array of support ships. For the moment, it will be used mainly for training personnel, especially fighter pilots who must learn to take off from and land on a moving deck. China's carrier, designed to carry about 2,000 people and 50 fighter jets, is dwarfed by the nuclear-powered U.S. Nimitz-class "supercarrier," which can carry 6,250 people and launch planes with more fuel and weaponry thanks to a catapult system and longer runway. China's carrier, which isn't nuclear powered, is thought to have a gas-turbine or marine-diesel engine. China has yet to name its carrier, and tried to play down its significance Wednesday, saying in a Xinhua commentary: "There should be no excessive worries or paranoid feelings on China's pursuit of an aircraft carrier, as it will not pose a threat to other countries." The vessel nonetheless sends a powerful message both to China's domestic audience, for whom a carrier has for decades been equated with national strength, and to the U.S. and its regional allies, many of whom are embroiled in territorial disputes with Beijing. It is the most potent symbol yet of China's long-term desire to develop the power both to deny U.S. naval access to Asian waters and to protect its global economic interests, including shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and oil sources in the Middle East. Its launch is thus seen as a milestone in relations between an ascendant China, bent on reclaiming its historical role as a global power, and a debt-ridden U.S. that wants to retain the military supremacy it has wielded in Asia since 1945. China denies trying to match the might of the U.S. Navy, which now has 11 carriers, including one, the George Washington, that is based in Japan. Even Chinese experts admit it could take a decade to master the intricate choreography of a carrier group, which typically involves frigates, destroyers, submarines and satellites, all using an integrated command and control system. But serving and retired Chinese officers make no secret of their country's aspiration to develop up to four larger, indigenous carriers by around 2020. China has also alarmed the U.S. and its regional allies in the past year with a more combative stance on territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. The Pentagon is also playing down the carrier's significance. Some U.S. officials privately question the quality of Chinese engineering, which came into sharp relief last month with a deadly train crash on the country's high-speed rail network. At the same time, the U.S. is countering China's military build-up by shoring up defense ties with old Asian allies Japan and South Korea as well as new partners like India and Vietnam. Several Asian nations, including Japan and Australia, are beefing up their arsenals too, fearing that the U.S. security umbrella is being eroded by China's enhanced capabilities and possible U.S. defense budget cuts. For Beijing, however, the carrier's short-term capabilities are less important than its symbolic significance, especially for Communist Party leaders courting military support ahead of a leadership change next year. As if to exaggerate the achievement for a fiercely nationalistic audience, China's state television featured no images of the sea trials, and instead used footage of what appeared to be fighter jets taking off from Russian or U.S. carriers. "From the Opium War in 1840 to the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China suffered more than 470 offenses and invasions that came from the seas," the Xinhua commentary said. Chinese officials say their country's naval power is now expanding in tandem with its economic interests, and has benefited the rest of the world by taking part in antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. They also point out that of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—China, the U.S., Britain, France and Russia—China has been the only one without an operational carrier. India and Thailand have a carrier each, while Japan has one that carries helicopters. "China is a big country and we have quite a large number of ships, but they are only small ships," said Chen Bingde, the chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, at a July news conference with Adm. Mike Mullen, the visiting U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "This is not commensurate with the status of a country like China." Plans to develop a Chinese carrier, first proposed in 1928, intensified after Adm. Liu Huaqing, China's naval chief, toured a U.S. carrier—the Kitty Hawk—in 1980. Adm. Liu, who died in January, wrote in his autobiography that he was "deeply impressed by its imposing magnificence and modern fighting capacity." China purchased a decommissioned Australian carrier for scrap in 1985. Chinese companies also acquired two small Russian carriers in 1998 and 2000, both of which are now used in amusement parks. But the real breakthrough came when a Chinese company acquired the vessel, then called Varyag, for $20 million in 1998, on the understanding that it would be towed to the gambling enclave of Macao and used as a floating casino. The plan to use it for the navy soon became an open secret because it was visible from much of Dalian, and military enthusiasts posted regular reports, photographs and videos of its refurbishment. Still, China officially confirmed its existence only last month, when it tried to ease regional concerns by saying it would be used for "research, experiments and training." China's Defense Ministry didn't respond to a request to comment on the sea trials Wednesday, and Xinhua said only that they "would not take a long time." "After returning from the sea trial, the aircraft carrier will continue refit and test work," Xinhua said. Analysts say Chinese pilots are unlikely to try flying from the carrier yet, though are thought to have practiced on a land-based mock-up of the deck. Andrei Chang, Hong Kong editor of Kanwa Defense Review, which monitors China's military, said the first tests were probably designed to check the engines—a potential weak point—and that sea trials would continue sporadically for another year or two. Once basic tests are concluded, however, analysts said the carrier could be used for limited patrols around China's territorial waters, as well as for conducting visits to foreign countries to present China's newfound naval strength in a nonthreatening manner. "U.S. carriers come to Hong Kong, so why shouldn't ours go to California or New York?" said Xu Guangyu, a retired Chinese general. Most importantly, however, the carrier will give China experience to develop indigenous carriers, the first of which some defense experts say is already under construction at a shipyard in Shanghai and could be completed as soon as 2012. China, like most countries, considers at least three carriers necessary to be effective, so that one can be in action, one in transit and one in port for repairs and resupplies, according to Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan. But each active one requires its own carrier group, which could take at least 10 years to develop, according to retired Chinese navy Rear Adm. Yin Zhuo. "China's 'starter carrier' is of very limited military utility, and will primarily serve to confer prestige on a rising great power, help the military master basic procedures, and to project a bit of power," wrote Andrew Erickson, an associate professor in the U.S. Naval War College's Strategic Research Department, in a research note. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...267407488.html Write to Jeremy Page at jeremy.page@wsj.com |
FWIW, the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute has published a number of papers on China's growing sea power. The CMSI's portal is here.
Similarly, the Naval War College Review has published a number of articles on the growth of the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in recent issues. The review's portal is here with links to recent issues to the right and down. |
We regularly allow port calls by our allies' ships.
Not sure the PLA Navy would qualify, based on their previous aggressive actions. They also have to demonstrate that their carrier could sail that far, yet to be proven by the ex-Varyag. TR |
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A bit off topic, a friend is former Swedish Navy, he told me they made a US port call in NY with " the Flagship of the Swedish Navy". Apparently we were expecting a much bigger ship, since the mooring they got was for a much larger ship, He joked "we felt so inadequate..." |
Some points to consider...perhaps.
Richard :munchin Should The United States Fear A Chinese Aircraft Carrier? ToryReforGroup, 12 Aug 2011 Michael Horowitz, a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, observed in his recent book, “The Diffusion of Military Power”, that carrier warfare has been one of the most difficult military innovations for nation states to adopt. Carriers are expensive not only financially, but also in terms of organisational capital. Indeed, nations that have adopted carrier warfare have not only invested large sums of money into development programs, but also overhauled their personnel. Most importantly, successful carrier adoption requires decades of often risky experimentation and practical experience. With such barriers to adoption, many nations team up with existing carrier powers, while others develop cheap alternatives, such as anti-ship missiles. For these reasons, observers should view China’s recent sea trials of the refurbished Russian carrier Varyag with scepticism. From their very inception, aircraft carriers have significantly exceeded the cost of conventional warships. For instance, the Royal Navy’s HMS Nelson, a battleship commissioned in 1927, cost Great Britain approximately $36.4 million. That same year, the US Navy commissioned the USS Lexington and Saratoga, its second and third aircraft carriers respectively, for a cost of $45 million each. And unlike technologies associated with the age of steam—such as iron hulls, boilers, and screw-type propellers—aircraft carrier technology has little civil application. Thus the defence industry has little financial incentive to experiment with such technologies, driving up the costs for taxpayers. More significant though is the investment in organisational capital, as carrier warfare requires navies to train sailors in new specialties, and requires significant overhaul to promotion and evaluation systems. New schools are required to train entry-level pilots, maintainers, air traffic controllers and nuclear propulsion specialists; and it takes decades to train leaders capable of managing squadrons and ships. It also means creating a promotion system which rewards these new skill sets. Even the leadership of the US Navy, one of the leading carrier powers in the inter-war period, fiercely resisted such changes, favouring battleship commanders over aviators. Yet despite the US Navy’s initial reluctance to promote aviation-related skill sets, it quickly adapted to the new form of warfare after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Indeed, as Horowitz notes, the relatively young age of both the US Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy may have made both institutions more receptive to experimenting with carriers and overhauling their personnel systems. Finally, successful carrier adoption requires years, if not decades, of rigorous training and experimentation—often risky—in order to hone fully. Horowitz suggests that the Japanese Navy’s experience during combat operations in China during the late 1930s contributed to her relative advantage in carrier warfare up until the Battle of Midway, despite the fact that the US actually had more carriers. Yet the US Navy was able to learn valuable lessons after grievous setbacks during the few months of the war and, with its victory at Midway, finally offset Japan’s advantage in carrier warfare. Although the Soviet Union was finally able to fund the construction of a handful of carriers, it failed to become a viable carrier power. The Soviet Union’s overly secretive bureaucracy squashed valuable debate and the learning process critical to fostering innovation. Despite pouring billions into carrier development, the Soviets would only launch their first carrier, the Kiev, in 1975. Even then, the Kiev and her sister ships could only launch vertical-landing aircraft - and only a dozen at that. It wasn’t until the 1980s, with the launch of the Admiral Kuznetsov and the Varyag, that the Soviet Union had a true fleet carrier. Of course, by then the United States had a near monopoly on carriers. Thus the Soviet Union countered American carriers with cheap alternatives, such as submarines and sea-skimming anti-ship missiles. China will face similar difficulties in adopting carrier warfare. And even if China were successfully to field, man, and operate the diesel-powered ex-Varyag, she still lacks the support vessels for a true carrier battle group. There is also the issue of American dominance in carrier technology. An American Nimitz-class carrier has an aircraft compliment roughly twice that of the ex-Varyag, and considerably greater than that of HMS Hermes and Invincible. The Nimitz-class (plus the aging USS Enterprise) don’t need to refuel either, thanks to an on-board nuclear reactor. Plus, as the old saying goes, quantity has a quality all its own, and the US Navy operates nine carrier groups, with five currently at sea. That is not counting America’s fleet of amphibious landing craft, such as the Wasp-class, with a compliment of helicopters, tilt-rotor craft, and “jump-jets” which rival those of the HMS Invincible. It is no exaggeration to state that US carrier power exceeds that of the rest of the world’s navies combined. Will China’s carrier pose a credible threat in the Pacific? Doubtful. Much like Russia’s display of impressive wunderwaffen over the past few years, such weapons, though impressive, are unlikely to be built in sufficient numbers to challenge US power in the region. Should the US be looking for a sufficient response to growing Chinese power, it might be best not to increase military spending. After all, it’s in the field of budget deficits that China has the edge over the United States. http://toryreformgroup.tumblr.com/po...-warfare#notes |
Richard, the article points to the pivotal issues...well done.
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