| Airbornelawyer |
06-03-2004 12:30 |
Quote:
Originally posted by Solid
Would it be feasible for US air power to successfully destroy a majority of firebases, missile emplacements, and airfields in range of the DMZ and the SK civilian populations?
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Echoing TR, no.
Numbers: The army has some 3500 pieces of towed artillery, 4400 SP guns, 2600 MRLs, 11000 AA guns and SAMs. Add in an unknown number of SCUD and SCUD variant TELs (maybe 50, with 500+ missiles). Plus, of course, Kim Jong-il has No dong.
Locations: Extremely mountainous terrain. TR noted the hardened targets and tunnel complexes, for which North Korea is famous.
Historical perspective (this deals more with interdiction than destruction of forward targets, and technology is better today, but still worth noting): - From a CGSC study: "Notwithstanding the heavy damage inflicted by UN airpower, the overall air interdiction campaign in Korea had only partial success. The destruction did not succeed in significantly restricting the flow of the enemy's supplies to the frontlines, or in achieving interdiction of the battlefield.... Throughout the campaign, the enemy seemed to have ample strength to launch an attack if he wished. His frequent and heavy artillery barrages were evidence that he did not suffer from a shortage of ammunition."
- GEN Mark Clark's assessment: "...as in Italy, where we learned the same bitter lesson in the same kind of rugged country, our airpower could not keep a steady stream of enemy suppliers and reinforcements from reaching the battleline. Air could not isolate the front."
- Assessment of US Navy historians: "It must be grudgingly admitted that one of the key reasons why isolation of the battlefield could not be achieved in Korea was the surprising tenacity, determination, and ingenuity displayed by the Communists to keep their rail and highway networks in operation. In spite of incessant daylight attacks and nighttime harassment, despite the necessity of working at night, of using old equipment, of having long, exposed, and vulnerable supply lines, the Chinese were able to maintain and even increase the flow of supplies to the battlefront.... At no time during the course of the war did either the UN's surface or air interdiction efforts succeed in stopping the flow of enemy supplies from Manchuria to the front to a decisive degree. ... By every index, in fact, the Communists were able to steadily increase their flow of supplies to the frontlines. ... the enemy was never kept from supplying his needed requirements. At no time—except locally and temporarily—did the enemy limit his combat effort because of supply considerations."
- VADM J. J. Clark: "The interdiction program was a failure. It did not interdict."
Close air support took a second priority to interdiction, but the USAF still flew 250,000 ground attack sorties. The Navy flew 167,552 sorties and the Marines 107,000 (all combat missions, not just CAS). South Koreans, Australians and and South Africans also flew. Most CAS missions were direct support to ground troops.
Quote:
Originally posted by Valhal
Would China commit troops if that happened?
Or sit back and watch.
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I'm not a China expert either, but in analyzing all potential China war scenarios in the near and short term, I concluded that a Chinese war against North Korea is a distinct possibility. The scenario I envisaged was increasing instability in the North leading to mass waves of refugees (estimates of the current number of Korean refugees on the Chinese side of the border range from 50,000 to 300,000). The PLA decides to established a buffer zone on the south side of the river, leading to confrontations with DPRK troops. The increasingly erratic Kim orders a counterattack, and the PLA responds.
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