Go Back   Professional Soldiers > UWOA > Insurgencies & Guerrilla Warfare

Reply
 
Thread Tools Display Modes

GEN(R) McChrystal - "It Takes a Network"
Old 03-08-2011, 09:18   #1
Richard
Quiet Professional
 
Richard's Avatar
 
Richard is online now
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: NorCal
Posts: 14,647
GEN(R) McChrystal - "It Takes a Network"

"It takes a network to defeat a network" - the new frontline of modern warfare according to Stan McChrystal who is currently writing his memoirs and is a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs.

Richard


It Takes a Network
ForeignPolicy, Mar/Apr 2011
Part 1 of 2

From the outset of my command in Afghanistan, two or three times each week, accompanied by a few aides and often my Afghan counterparts, I would leave the International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul and travel across Afghanistan -- from critical cities like Kandahar to the most remote outposts in violent border regions. Ideally, we left early, traveling light and small, normally using a combination of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, to meet with Afghans and their leaders and to connect with our troops on the ground: Brits and Marines rolling back the enemy in Helmand, Afghan National Army troops training in Mazar-e-Sharif, French Foreign Legionnaires patrolling in Kapisa.

But I was not alone: There were other combatants circling the battlefield. Mirroring our movements, competing with us, were insurgent leaders. Connected to, and often directly dispatched by, the Taliban's leadership in Pakistan, they moved through the same areas of Afghanistan. They made shows of public support for Taliban shadow governors, motivated tattered ranks, recruited new troops, distributed funds, reviewed tactics, and updated strategy. And when the sky above became too thick with our drones, their leaders used cell phones and the Internet to issue orders and rally their fighters. They aimed to keep dispersed insurgent cells motivated, strategically wired, and continually informed, all without a rigid -- or targetable -- chain of command.

While a deeply flawed insurgent force in many ways, the Taliban is a uniquely 21st-century threat. Enjoying the traditional insurgent advantage of living amid a population closely tied to them by history and culture, they also leverage sophisticated technology that connects remote valleys and severe mountains instantaneously -- and allows them to project their message worldwide, unhindered by time or filters. They are both deeply embedded in Afghanistan's complex society and impressively agile. And just like their allies in al Qaeda, this new Taliban is more network than army, more a community of interest than a corporate structure.

For the U.S. military that I spent my life in, this was not an easy insight to come by. It was only over the course of years, and with considerable frustrations, that we came to understand how the emerging networks of Islamist insurgents and terrorists are fundamentally different from any enemy the United States has previously known or faced.

In bitter, bloody fights in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it became clear to me and to many others that to defeat a networked enemy we had to become a network ourselves. We had to figure out a way to retain our traditional capabilities of professionalism, technology, and, when needed, overwhelming force, while achieving levels of knowledge, speed, precision, and unity of effort that only a network could provide. We needed to orchestrate a nuanced, population-centric campaign that comprised the ability to almost instantaneously swing a devastating hammer blow against an infiltrating insurgent force or wield a deft scalpel to capture or kill an enemy leader.

When I first went to Iraq in October 2003 to command a U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) that had been tailored down to a relatively small size in the months following the initial invasion, we found a growing threat from multiple sources -- but particularly from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). We began a review of our enemy, and of ourselves. Neither was easy to understand.

Like all too many military forces in history, we initially saw our enemy as we viewed ourselves. In a small base outside Baghdad, we started to diagram AQI on white dry-erase boards. Composed largely of foreign mujahideen and with an overall allegiance to Osama bin Laden but controlled inside Iraq by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI was responsible for an extremely violent campaign of attacks on coalition forces, the Iraqi government, and Iraqi Shiites. Its stated aim was to splinter the new Iraq and ultimately establish an Islamic caliphate. By habit, we started mapping the organization in a traditional military structure, with tiers and rows. At the top was Zarqawi, below him a cascade of lieutenants and foot soldiers.

But the closer we looked, the more the model didn't hold. Al Qaeda in Iraq's lieutenants did not wait for memos from their superiors, much less orders from bin Laden. Decisions were not centralized, but were made quickly and communicated laterally across the organization. Zarqawi's fighters were adapted to the areas they haunted, like Fallujah and Qaim in Iraq's western Anbar province, and yet through modern technology were closely linked to the rest of the province and country. Money, propaganda, and information flowed at alarming rates, allowing for powerful, nimble coordination. We would watch their tactics change (from rocket attacks to suicide bombings, for example) nearly simultaneously in disparate cities. It was a deadly choreography achieved with a constantly changing, often unrecognizable structure.

Over time, it became increasingly clear -- often from intercepted communications or the accounts of insurgents we had captured -- that our enemy was a constellation of fighters organized not by rank but on the basis of relationships and acquaintances, reputation and fame. Who became radicalized in the prisons of Egypt? Who trained together in the pre-9/11 camps in Afghanistan? Who is married to whose sister? Who is making a name for himself, and in doing so burnishing the al Qaeda brand?

All this allowed for flexibility and an impressive ability to grow and to sustain losses. The enemy does not convene promotion boards; the network is self-forming. We would watch a young Iraqi set up in a neighborhood and rise swiftly in importance: After achieving some tactical success, he would market himself, make connections, gain followers, and suddenly a new node of the network would be created and absorbed. The network's energy grew.

In warfare, you make decisions based on indicators. When facing the enemy, you estimate its tactical strength and intuit its planned strategy. This is much simpler when the enemy is a column advancing toward you in plain sight. Our problem in both the Iraq of 2003 and the Afghanistan of today is that indicators popped up everywhere, unevenly and unexpectedly, and often disappeared as quickly as they emerged, flickering in view for only a moment.

We realized we had to have the rapid ability to detect nuanced changes, whether the emergence of new personalities and alliances or sudden changes in tactics. And we had to process that new information in real time -- so we could act on it. A stream of hot cinders was falling everywhere around us, and we had to see them, catch those we could, and react instantly to those we had missed that were starting to set the ground on fire.


(cont'd)
__________________
I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul.
  Reply With Quote

Old 03-08-2011, 09:20   #2
Richard
Quiet Professional
 
Richard's Avatar
 
Richard is online now
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: NorCal
Posts: 14,647
It Takes a Network
ForeignPolicy, Mar/Apr 2011
Part 2 of 2

Shortly after taking command of the JSOTF, I visited one of our teams in Mosul, the largest city in northern Iraq, which was at that time under the able command of then-Maj. Gen. David Petraeus and the troops of the 101st Airborne Division. Although Mosul was still less violent than some other areas of the country, it was clear that al Qaeda was organizing to aggressively contest control of the city -- and, from there, all of northern Iraq.

Our special operations force there was small: about 15 men, supported by a single intelligence analyst. They were set up in a corner of a larger base, operating quietly from a modest white trailer. Although they coordinated with the military forces and civilian (particularly intelligence) agencies on the base, operational security procedures and cultural habits limited the true synergy of their effort against AQI and the fight for the city that lay outside the base's gates.

Moreover, the few antennas that adorned the trailer's roof were unable to pump enough classified information between them and our task force headquarters (or other teams in Iraq) with any timeliness. It wasn't a marooned outpost, thanks to the remarkable team that manned the effort. But it felt like one.

That night, on the plane back to Baghdad, I drew an hourglass on a yellow legal pad. The top half of the hourglass represented the team in Mosul; the other represented our task force HQ. They met at just one narrow point. At the top, our team in Mosul was accumulating knowledge and experience, yet lacked both the bandwidth and intelligence manpower to transmit, receive, or digest enough information either to effectively inform, or benefit from, its more robust task force headquarters. All across the country -- in Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah, Diyala -- we were waging similarly compartmentalized campaigns. It made our hard fight excruciatingly difficult, and potentially doomed.

The sketch from that evening -- early in a war against an enemy that would only grow more complex, capable, and vicious -- was the first step in what became one of the central missions in our effort: building the network. What was hazy then soon became our mantra: It takes a network to defeat a network.

But fashioning ourselves to counter our enemy's network was easier said than done, especially because it took time to learn what, exactly, made a network different. As we studied, experimented, and adjusted, it became apparent that an effective network involves much more than relaying data. A true network starts with robust communications connectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose, established decision-making processes, personal relationships, and trust. Ultimately, a network is defined by how well it allows its members to see, decide, and effectively act. But transforming a traditional military structure into a truly flexible, empowered network is a difficult process.

Our first attempt at a network was to physically create one. We convinced the agencies partnered with the JSOTF to join us in a big tent at one of our bases so that we could share and process the intelligence in one location. Operators and analysts from multiple units and agencies sat side by side as we sought to fuse our intelligence and operations efforts -- and our cultures -- into a unified effort. This may seem obvious, but at the time it wasn't. Too often, intelligence would travel up the chain in organizational silos -- and return too slowly for those in the fight to take critical action.

It was clear, though, that in this fusion process we had created only a partial network: Each agency or operation had a representative in the tent, but that was not enough. The network needed to expand to include everyone relevant who was operating within the battlespace. Incomplete or unconnected networks can give the illusion of effectiveness, but are like finely crafted gears whose movement drives no other gears.

This insight allowed us to move closer to building a true network by connecting everyone who had a role -- no matter how small, geographically dispersed, or organizationally diverse they might have been -- in a successful counterterrorism operation. We called it, in our shorthand, F3EA: find, fix, finish, exploit, and analyze. The idea was to combine analysts who found the enemy (through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance); drone operators who fixed the target; combat teams who finished the target by capturing or killing him; specialists who exploited the intelligence the raid yielded, such as cell phones, maps, and detainees; and the intelligence analysts who turned this raw information into usable knowledge. By doing this, we speeded up the cycle for a counterterrorism operation, gleaning valuable insights in hours, not days.

But it took a while to get there. The process started as a linear, relatively inefficient chain. Out of habit (and ignorance), each element gave the next group the minimum amount of information needed for it to be able to complete its task. Lacking sufficient shared purpose or situational awareness, each component contributed far less to the outcome than it could or should have.

This made us, in retrospect, painfully slow and uninformed. The linear process created what we called "blinks" -- time delays and missed junctures where information was lost or slowed when filtered down the line. In the early days of the effort, we had multiple experiences where information we captured could not be exploited, analyzed, or reacted to quickly enough -- giving enemy targets time to flee. A blink often meant a missed opportunity in an unforgiving fight.

The key was to reduce the blinks, and we did so by attempting to create a shared consciousness between each level of the counterterrorism teams. We started by sharing information: Video streamed by the drones was sent to all the participants -- not just the reconnaissance and surveillance analysts controlling them. When an operation was set in motion, information was continuously communicated to and from the combat team, so that intelligence specialists miles away could alert the team on the ground about what they could expect to find of value at the scene and where it might be. Intelligence recovered on the spot was instantly pushed digitally from the target to analysts who could translate it into actionable data while the operators would still be clearing rooms and returning fire. This knowledge was immediately cycled back through the loop to our intelligence and surveillance forces following the results of the raid in real time.

The intelligence recovered on one target in, say, Mosul, might allow for another target to be found, fixed upon, and finished in Baghdad, or even Afghanistan. Sometimes, finding just one initial target could lead to remarkable results: The network sometimes completed this cycle three times in a single night in locations hundreds of miles apart -- all from the results of the first operation. As our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan intensified, the number of operations conducted each day increased tenfold, and both our precision and success rate also rose dramatically.

Although we got our message out differently than did our enemies, both organizations increasingly shared basic attributes that define an effective network. Decisions were decentralized and cut laterally across the organization. Traditional institutional boundaries fell away and diverse cultures meshed. The network expanded to include more groups, including unconventional actors. It valued competency above all else -- including rank. It sought a clear and evolving definition of the problem and constantly self-analyzed, revisiting its structure, aims, and processes, as well as those of the enemy. Most importantly, the network continually grew the capacity to inform itself.

From its birth in Iraq, both the actual network -- and the hard-earned appreciation for that organizational model -- increasingly expanded to Afghanistan, especially as our nation's focus turned toward that theater. When I became the commander there, we set about building a robust communications architecture and worked to establish relationships with key actors, moving frequently around the country to instill the shared consciousness and purpose necessary for a networked modern army. But that was only the first part of the task. As we learned to build an effective network, we also learned that leading that network -- a diverse collection of organizations, personalities, and cultures -- is a daunting challenge in itself. That struggle remains a vital, untold chapter of the history of a global conflict that is still under way.


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...akes_a_network
__________________
I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul.
  Reply With Quote

Old 03-08-2011, 11:17   #3
cszakolczai
Guerrilla
 
cszakolczai is offline
Join Date: May 2005
Location: :)
Posts: 322
Quote:
Originally Posted by Richard View Post
"It takes a network to defeat a network" - the new frontline of modern warfare according to Stan McChrystal who is currently writing his memoirs and is a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs.

Richard


It Takes a Network
ForeignPolicy, Mar/Apr 2011
Part 1 of 2

[I]From the outset of my command in Afghanistan, two or three times each week, accompanied by a few aides and often my Afghan counterparts, I would leave the International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul and travel across Afghanistan -- from critical cities like Kandahar to the most remote outposts in violent border regions. Ideally, we left early, traveling light and small, normally using a combination of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, to meet with Afghans and their leaders and to connect with our troops on the ground: Brits and Marines rolling back the enemy in Helmand, Afghan National Army troops training in Mazar-e-Sharif, French Foreign Legionnaires patrolling in Kapisa.

But I was not alone: There were other combatants circling the battlefield. Mirroring our movements, competing with us, were insurgent leaders. Connected to, and often directly dispatched by, the Taliban's leadership in Pakistan, they moved through the same areas of Afghanistan. They made shows of public support for Taliban shadow governors, motivated tattered ranks, recruited new troops, distributed funds, reviewed tactics, and updated strategy. And when the sky above became too thick with our drones, their leaders used cell phones and the Internet to issue orders and rally their fighters. They aimed to keep dispersed insurgent cells motivated, strategically wired, and continually informed, all without a rigid -- or targetable -- chain of command.

While a deeply flawed insurgent force in many ways, the Taliban is a uniquely 21st-century threat. Enjoying the traditional insurgent advantage of living amid a population closely tied to them by history and culture, they also leverage sophisticated technology that connects remote valleys and severe mountains instantaneously -- and allows them to project their message worldwide, unhindered by time or filters. They are both deeply embedded in Afghanistan's complex society and impressively agile. And just like their allies in al Qaeda, this new Taliban is more network than army, more a community of interest than a corporate structure.

For the U.S. military that I spent my life in, this was not an easy insight to come by. It was only over the course of years, and with considerable frustrations, that we came to understand how the emerging networks of Islamist insurgents and terrorists are fundamentally different from any enemy the United States has previously known or faced.

In bitter, bloody fights in both Afghanistan and Iraq, it became clear to me and to many others that to defeat a networked enemy we had to become a network ourselves. We had to figure out a way to retain our traditional capabilities of professionalism, technology, and, when needed, overwhelming force, while achieving levels of knowledge, speed, precision, and unity of effort that only a network could provide. We needed to orchestrate a nuanced, population-centric campaign that comprised the ability to almost instantaneously swing a devastating hammer blow against an infiltrating insurgent force or wield a deft scalpel to capture or kill an enemy leader.

When I first went to Iraq in October 2003 to command a U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) that had been tailored down to a relatively small size in the months following the initial invasion, we found a growing threat from multiple sources -- but particularly from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). We began a review of our enemy, and of ourselves. Neither was easy to understand.

Like all too many military forces in history, we initially saw our enemy as we viewed ourselves. In a small base outside Baghdad, we started to diagram AQI on white dry-erase boards. Composed largely of foreign mujahideen and with an overall allegiance to Osama bin Laden but controlled inside Iraq by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, AQI was responsible for an extremely violent campaign of attacks on coalition forces, the Iraqi government, and Iraqi Shiites. Its stated aim was to splinter the new Iraq and ultimately establish an Islamic caliphate. By habit, we started mapping the organization in a traditional military structure, with tiers and rows. At the top was Zarqawi, below him a cascade of lieutenants and foot soldiers.

But the closer we looked, the more the model didn't hold. Al Qaeda in Iraq's lieutenants did not wait for memos from their superiors, much less orders from bin Laden. Decisions were not centralized, but were made quickly and communicated laterally across the organization. Zarqawi's fighters were adapted to the areas they haunted, like Fallujah and Qaim in Iraq's western Anbar province, and yet through modern technology were closely linked to the rest of the province and country. Money, propaganda, and information flowed at alarming rates, allowing for powerful, nimble coordination. We would watch their tactics change (from rocket attacks to suicide bombings, for example) nearly simultaneously in disparate cities. It was a deadly choreography achieved with a constantly changing, often unrecognizable structure.

Over time, it became increasingly clear -- often from intercepted communications or the accounts of insurgents we had captured -- that our enemy was a constellation of fighters organized not by rank but on the basis of relationships and acquaintances, reputation and fame. Who became radicalized in the prisons of Egypt? Who trained together in the pre-9/11 camps in Afghanistan? Who is married to whose sister? Who is making a name for himself, and in doing so burnishing the al Qaeda brand?......
This just reminded me of the way many Arabic names are structured.

For example:

Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab
Muhammad Ibn (son of) Abd (a servant) (of) al Wahhab (the wahhab's)

Or the current leader of Saudi Arabia

Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
Abdullah bin (son of) Abdul Aziz of the Sauds.

It just shows the coorelation between the structure of ones name and the structure of the networks which the article points out. Lineage is as important than other factors when discussing who is who within the network.

Awesome article by the way sir, thanks for posting it.
__________________
insert intelligent and/or enlightening quote here.
  Reply With Quote

Old 03-08-2011, 11:46   #4
Dusty
Quiet Professional
 
Dusty's Avatar
 
Dusty is offline
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: The Ozarks
Posts: 9,157
I passed one of those "bin Abdul Aziz" kids who came through Robin Sage one time as a Lieutenant. Didn't have much of a choice-he bought one of the civilian auxiliary guys a brand new Ford pickup in trade for a ride to an objective.

He was pretty sharp, anyway.

Anyway, I agree 100% with the General on this.
__________________
"There you go, again." Ronald Reagan
  Reply With Quote

Old 03-08-2011, 12:19   #5
greenberetTFS
Quiet Professional (RIP)
 
greenberetTFS's Avatar
 
greenberetTFS is offline
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Carriere,Ms.
Posts: 6,926
Quote:
Anyway, I agree 100% with the General on this.
I do too!................

Big Teddy
__________________
I believe that SF is a 'calling' - not too different from the calling missionaries I know received. I knew instantly that it was for me, and that I would do all I could to achieve it. Most others I know in SF experienced something similar. If, as you say, you HAVE searched and read, and you do not KNOW if this is the path for you --- it is not....
Zonie Diver

SF is a calling and it requires commitment and dedication that the uninitiated will never understand......
Jack Moroney

SFA M-2527, Chapter XXXVII
  Reply With Quote

Old 03-08-2011, 13:09   #6
silentreader
Auxiliary
 
silentreader is offline
Join Date: Dec 2010
Location: Midwest
Posts: 87
If any of you are interested, the book- "Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach" lays out the framework for the network based approach to intelligence that the General talks about in this article.
  Reply With Quote

Old 03-08-2011, 19:35   #7
MtnGoat
Quiet Professional
 
MtnGoat's Avatar
 
MtnGoat is offline
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: DC Beltway
Posts: 3,525
Quote:
Originally Posted by silentreader View Post
If any of you are interested, the book- "Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach" lays out the framework for the network based approach to intelligence that the General talks about in this article.
I was thinking the same thing.. How this Above Book lays out how a Network is layed out and how to look at it with open eyes and analysis it (them).

Great Book... IF you ever take a Military University Inteligence Course, this will be a book you will have to use and read.

I tried to tell 18F Committee they needed to buy this book for every 18F graduating the Course.

The General is Correct!!! Sad to see him go out the way he did. IMHO I don't think he had the right people at the right spots while he commanded ISAF. Now we are on the Political Down hill.
__________________
"Berg Heil"

History teaches that when you become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

COLONEL BULL SIMONS

Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.
  Reply With Quote

Old 03-09-2011, 10:19   #8
Bad Tolz
Asset
 
Bad Tolz is offline
Join Date: Feb 2009
Location: Spokane, WA
Posts: 34
Thank you Richard for your laser focus on lessons learned.

L.E. needs to also be studying these nuggets, especially at the federal level.
__________________
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers; for he today that sheds his blood with me shall be my brother...Henry V

De Oppresso Liber

Who dares wins
  Reply With Quote

Old 03-09-2011, 15:29   #9
lindy
Guerrilla Chief
 
lindy's Avatar
 
lindy is offline
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: East Coast
Posts: 576
Quote:
Originally Posted by silentreader View Post
If any of you are interested, the book- "Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach" lays out the framework for the network based approach to intelligence that the General talks about in this article.
I suppose it does but I would offer the insurgency was (is?) more organized like Bloods, Crips, MS13, etc. It's all about power and money with the occasional Jihadist mixed in. The Godfather trilogy and Sopranos were my homework when I first arrived in theater. Personalities and roles were equated to the fictional characters so the new guys could understand.

Follow the money.

The best thing to come out of the fusion in Mosul was commo: the ability of the civilian agencies ref'd by the General to push info directly to folks like Mountain Goat, either directly or via the SOT-As, is KEY.

Is this happening?
__________________
"I see that you notice that I wear glasses. Well, it was to be. I've not only grown old and gray, I've become almost blind in the service of my country." - General George Washington

"There are times in your life you'll be required to perform an exceedingly difficult task to the best of your ability, regardless of your perceived capability. Mental toughness is what will carry the day during these times. In other words, you suck it up and do what you have to do." - Razor
  Reply With Quote

Old 04-01-2011, 06:09   #10
Almualla
Asset
 
Almualla is offline
Join Date: Feb 2011
Location: North Range Road
Posts: 9
Quote:
Originally Posted by cszakolczai View Post
This just reminded me of the way many Arabic names are structured.

For example:

Muhammad Ibn Abd Al Wahhab
Muhammad Ibn (son of) Abd (a servant) (of) al Wahhab (the wahhab's)

Or the current leader of Saudi Arabia

Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
Abdullah bin (son of) Abdul Aziz of the Sauds.

It just shows the coorelation between the structure of ones name and the structure of the networks which the article points out. Lineage is as important than other factors when discussing who is who within the network.

Awesome article by the way sir, thanks for posting it.
If I may add, by knowing such name, you could tell who is the guy, his family, the location of his family and tribe they live in, and some time the profession of the guy, and some family members.
I.E Abu Mousa`ab Al zarqaoee = Abu ( the father of) Mous`ab ( a popular name within Islamist due to one of Prophet Mohammad companion ) Al Zarqaoee ( Al Zarqa is one of the biggest major cities in Jordan After Amman, and one of the main area of the 100% Jordanian/bedouin tribe called Bnee Hassan, and which he was from Al Zarqa, and his real name was Ahmad Al-Khalayleh, and Al-Khalayleh is one of the main families of Bnee Hassan, and which the later paid lots of money to put ads in the local newspaper,Al-Rai,AL-Doustoor... to show they are still loyal to the kingdom and the king, plus the tripe renounced him which in the culture a person who bring shame to the family they can renounce him/her from being a daughter /son )
Yet many Islamist have what we called Konya which is a nick name, even though they might not have kids to be named the father of ..., they still carry one of such. Even they encourage kids at Friday schools ( sunday schools) to have one.
  Reply With Quote
Reply


Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests)
 
Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is Off
HTML code is Off

Forum Jump



All times are GMT -5. The time now is 17:18.



Green Beret Foundation

Copyright 2004-2014 by Professional Soldiers
Site Designed, Maintained, & Hosted by Hilliker Technologies