Leadership in WW2

[hoot72]

I have had this on going debate with a school teacher who is now working as a historian and book writer about the merits of sending 2000 men into enemy held territory via an airborne parachute drop in World War Two to rescue over 2000 prisoners of war who were ill, and in some cases on the verge of death due to diseases and malnutrition and poor hygienic conditions with very little logistical support in the way of extracting not only the airborne assault force but also moving the prisoners from a bombed out air strip and pow camp to the coast some 8 kilometers-10 kilometers away and to evacuate them by sea with an enemy suicide boat squadron located on an island nearby.

She has this idea that the leadership chickened out of this rescue and they were responsible for the deaths of 2000-3000 prisoners of war.

I wonder if senior commanders here on the forums would have a take on this...sending men into a combat zone on very little intelligence, difficult rescue to conduct, insufficient medical support, limited long range transport planes and no Plan B in the event Plan A fails.

Comments?

[Noah Werka]

I couldt hardly keep a train of thought trying to read the first paragraph. Break it down into a more readable series of sentences. What was the question?

Not a writing critic, just trying to understand what you wrote.

Noah W

[hoot72]

Originally Posted by Noah Werka

I couldt hardly keep a train of thought trying to read the first paragraph. Break it down into a more readable series of sentences. What was the question?

Not a writing critic, just trying to understand what you wrote.

Noah W

Sorry Noah.

If you had to make a choice, to send men into harm's way, would you?

-To rescue over 2000 prisoners of war in poor health
-Located near an enemy airstrip that was 3-4 kilometers away at a POW camp in the jungle
-Runway at the airstrip is unusable
-Enemy strenght is about 2000-3000 men in a 5 kilometer area including at the air strip and prison camp
-No boat/ship evacuation possible as harbour is destroyed and the town where the harbour is located at is 5 kilometers away
-Limited transportation available in the form of vehicles to use
-Air drop could involve potentially up to 2000 men and equipment, flown in on C47's from Morotai Air strip down south to the drop zone located 1200 kilometers away behind enemy lines
-Enemy air activity still strong in and around the vicinity and neighbouring Luzon

[scooter]

Well, all of this depends on a lot of factors that you haven’t laid out, but just for fun lets go with it.

3000 Japanese soldiers are probably an Independent Mixed Regiment, similar to a US Army Brigade Combat team. Three infantry battalions, some artillery, engineer support, probably some rudimentary air defense, and other supporting assets. By your situational template you provided, the enemy can contest local friendly movement in the air and sea. How much of the greater sea and airspace is contested depends on what stage of the war we are talking about, so lets just assume the Japanese are still contesting air and maritime freedom of maneuver in the Pacific since you have to go 1200 kilometers by air.

Even under the dire scenario you lay out, I could probably devise a plan to insert an airborne Regiment (your 2000 men), and liberate the camp. Most of the local force would not be literally IN the camp, they would be garrisoned in the local area. Their level of alertness and preparedness for major combat operations would be greatly reduced in there were no opposing forces within 1200 kilometers, as you stated. If well planned and properly conducted, a raid force could land, assault the camp, and liberate the prisoners while the lion’s share of the force was used as a blocking / delaying force to hold off a hasty counter attack. With no numerical advantage, the enemy would have a hard time overwhelming the blocking force. If the airborne force brought their own artillery and jeeps, they could hold off the Japanese while moving off into the jungle. Enemy air would have a hard time targeting friendly forces through the thick jungle canopy, limiting their effectiveness.

However, this is hardly the end of the situation. The viability of this plan depends entirely on the ability of friendly forces to 1) reinforce, 2) exfiltrate, or 3) resupply the force on the ground. Ammo, fuel, batteries, and other supplies for 2000 men and medicine, food, and spare clothing for 4000 men. If you ever spent any time doing logistical planning for stuff like this, you’d be amazed how much.. Stuff…. we’re talking about here. It has to move 1200 kilometers, with regularity, through contested airspace or seas.

If you are going to reinforce the island, you’ve essentially bypassed a bunch of other islands, and you are compounding the problem at hand. Your lines of communication are not secure; you have to send people and stuff a long, long way to get it to this island. If you want to get everyone OFF of this island, you either need to do it by sea or air. It could be done by air, but you would have to seize the airfield, repair it, and conduct an air bridge while trying to maintain local air superiority (very hard to do when you have 1200 kilometers each way per sortie). You would also need more people – the 2000 men (less now – you have casualties) has the same problem the Japanese had – you do not have numerical superiority, and likely have a controlled supply rate for artillery and small arms expenditure. You don’t have the ass to do it with the initial force. Now, If you had more forces, you may as well have used them to help even the odds during the initial assault.

You could get everyone out by boat. Even with the harbor destroyed, your Regimental engineer assets might be able to get it functional again. If not, its over the beach ops out to transport ships. Your aforementioned suicide boat squadron would contest this, as would the Japanese air. You would need your own air to counter this. Like we discussed, the 1200 Km sortie option isn’t going to work; you need local air and that means an aircraft carrier. It isn’t coming on its own…. Now we mean an aircraft carrier battle group. This is now a major naval operation. Of course, you are bypassing lots of other islands that are under enemy control. These islands will have airfields and ground troops. The enemy’s navy is still out there, as are their submarines that would make your life hell just trying to get the navy into the area. You would lose ships, each of which means a couple hundred dead or missing sailors. Also, your WW2 navy isn’t nuclear powered – you need fueling stations and places to resupply your ships as time goes on. It is way, way easier to take the islands, one at a time, and give yourself secure lines of communication and your own (unsinkable) air projection platforms and logistics hubs.

Of course, it doesn’t matter if you try the “great naval raid”, “island hopping campaign” (might take years, see: WW2), or the “air bridge”. The enemy is going to use their local control of the seas to start moving in reinforcements to the island your rescue force is on. Your lack of local air and maritime control will mean you can’t fully stop this. Very quickly, you are going to be overrun or ground down.

Airborne raids in the pacific that rescued POWs by doing what your teacher suggests DID work, but they were late in the war when many of the factors I brought up were a moot point. The allied coalition controlled most of the sky and ocean. I assumed this isn’t the case for your scenario, otherwise no need for the long travel distances you used.

I am sure there are flaws in my rambling, but that’s my dime store off-the-cuff military analysis for the evening.

[WarriorDiplomat]

Originally Posted by hoot72

I have had this on going debate with a school teacher who is now working as a historian and book writer about the merits of sending 2000 men into enemy held territory via an airborne parachute drop in World War Two to rescue over 2000 prisoners of war who were ill, and in some cases on the verge of death due to diseases and malnutrition and poor hygienic conditions with very little logistical support in the way of extracting not only the airborne assault force but also moving the prisoners from a bombed out air strip and pow camp to the coast some 8 kilometers-10 kilometers away and to evacuate them by sea with an enemy suicide boat squadron located on an island nearby.

She has this idea that the leadership chickened out of this rescue and they were responsible for the deaths of 2000-3000 prisoners of war.

I wonder if senior commanders here on the forums would have a take on this...sending men into a combat zone on very little intelligence, difficult rescue to conduct, insufficient medical support, limited long range transport planes and no Plan B in the event Plan A fails.

Comments?

Every one of those soldiers would be willing to sacrifice to rescue POW's, commanders are responsible for the lives of those men who would willingly do the mission as well as the POW's if given the mission. The commander weighs the risk vs the gain of mission success and in this case success is defined as rescue of all POW's returned to U.S. alive if possible, his decision includes risking the lives of 2000 men for a mission with a low chance of success ending in the deaths of the men he would send in and in effect doubling the loss of life. U.S. military policy today is a 3-1 fire superiority in other words if their are 2000 known enemy in the area he wants to be successful meaning he would send in U.S. 3- to 1 enemy ratio to reduce the threat...not sure if they had that luxury during WW2

[hoot72]

Originally Posted by scooter

Well, all of this depends on a lot of factors that you haven’t laid out, but just for fun lets go with it.

3000 Japanese soldiers are probably an Independent Mixed Regiment, similar to a US Army Brigade Combat team. Three infantry battalions, some artillery, engineer support, probably some rudimentary air defense, and other supporting assets. By your situational template you provided, the enemy can contest local friendly movement in the air and sea. How much of the greater sea and airspace is contested depends on what stage of the war we are talking about, so lets just assume the Japanese are still contesting air and maritime freedom of maneuver in the Pacific since you have to go 1200 kilometers by air.

Even under the dire scenario you lay out, I could probably devise a plan to insert an airborne Regiment (your 2000 men), and liberate the camp. Most of the local force would not be literally IN the camp, they would be garrisoned in the local area. Their level of alertness and preparedness for major combat operations would be greatly reduced in there were no opposing forces within 1200 kilometers, as you stated. If well planned and properly conducted, a raid force could land, assault the camp, and liberate the prisoners while the lion’s share of the force was used as a blocking / delaying force to hold off a hasty counter attack. With no numerical advantage, the enemy would have a hard time overwhelming the blocking force. If the airborne force brought their own artillery and jeeps, they could hold off the Japanese while moving off into the jungle. Enemy air would have a hard time targeting friendly forces through the thick jungle canopy, limiting their effectiveness.

However, this is hardly the end of the situation. The viability of this plan depends entirely on the ability of friendly forces to 1) reinforce, 2) exfiltrate, or 3) resupply the force on the ground. Ammo, fuel, batteries, and other supplies for 2000 men and medicine, food, and spare clothing for 4000 men. If you ever spent any time doing logistical planning for stuff like this, you’d be amazed how much.. Stuff…. we’re talking about here. It has to move 1200 kilometers, with regularity, through contested airspace or seas.

If you are going to reinforce the island, you’ve essentially bypassed a bunch of other islands, and you are compounding the problem at hand. Your lines of communication are not secure; you have to send people and stuff a long, long way to get it to this island. If you want to get everyone OFF of this island, you either need to do it by sea or air. It could be done by air, but you would have to seize the airfield, repair it, and conduct an air bridge while trying to maintain local air superiority (very hard to do when you have 1200 kilometers each way per sortie). You would also need more people – the 2000 men (less now – you have casualties) has the same problem the Japanese had – you do not have numerical superiority, and likely have a controlled supply rate for artillery and small arms expenditure. You don’t have the ass to do it with the initial force. Now, If you had more forces, you may as well have used them to help even the odds during the initial assault.

You could get everyone out by boat. Even with the harbor destroyed, your Regimental engineer assets might be able to get it functional again. If not, its over the beach ops out to transport ships. Your aforementioned suicide boat squadron would contest this, as would the Japanese air. You would need your own air to counter this. Like we discussed, the 1200 Km sortie option isn’t going to work; you need local air and that means an aircraft carrier. It isn’t coming on its own…. Now we mean an aircraft carrier battle group. This is now a major naval operation. Of course, you are bypassing lots of other islands that are under enemy control. These islands will have airfields and ground troops. The enemy’s navy is still out there, as are their submarines that would make your life hell just trying to get the navy into the area. You would lose ships, each of which means a couple hundred dead or missing sailors. Also, your WW2 navy isn’t nuclear powered – you need fueling stations and places to resupply your ships as time goes on. It is way, way easier to take the islands, one at a time, and give yourself secure lines of communication and your own (unsinkable) air projection platforms and logistics hubs.

Of course, it doesn’t matter if you try the “great naval raid”, “island hopping campaign” (might take years, see: WW2), or the “air bridge”. The enemy is going to use their local control of the seas to start moving in reinforcements to the island your rescue force is on. Your lack of local air and maritime control will mean you can’t fully stop this. Very quickly, you are going to be overrun or ground down.

Airborne raids in the pacific that rescued POWs by doing what your teacher suggests DID work, but they were late in the war when many of the factors I brought up were a moot point. The allied coalition controlled most of the sky and ocean. I assumed this isn’t the case for your scenario, otherwise no need for the long travel distances you used.

I am sure there are flaws in my rambling, but that’s my dime store off-the-cuff military analysis for the evening.

No, I don't consider your point of view as ramblings. It makes sense and it does make one stop and think before jumping up and saying "send them!"

It is, by all regards, not as easy as some people think it is....it's a hell of a lot more complicated when it comes to mission planning and thinking about sending 2000-3000 men into harm's way with a very low chance of success in December 1944-March 1945.

[hoot72]

Originally Posted by WarriorDiplomat

Every one of those soldiers would be willing to sacrifice to rescue POW's, commanders are responsible for the lives of those men who would willingly do the mission as well as the POW's if given the mission. The commander weighs the risk vs the gain of mission success and in this case success is defined as rescue of all POW's returned to U.S. alive if possible, his decision includes risking the lives of 2000 men for a mission with a low chance of success ending in the deaths of the men he would send in and in effect doubling the loss of life. U.S. military policy today is a 3-1 fire superiority in other words if their are 2000 known enemy in the area he wants to be successful meaning he would send in U.S. 3- to 1 enemy ratio to reduce the threat...not sure if they had that luxury during WW2

Fair enough.

I don't think they had a 3-1 ratio in the Philippines but they could have, and I say this in absolute hindsight 70 years later, could have secured the POW camp and potentially the badly damaged airfield and harbour with 2000-3000 men BUT....I can think of the logistical nightmare if transport planes started to get shot down en-masse en-route with supplies (and men) to the drop zone....

The american's did carry out a successful parachute drop in the Philippines in early 1945 but it was done I believe with naval fire power as support and a large contingent of men to rescue POW's...I need to read up on that more to understand how complex that mission was
.

Thanks!

[WarriorDiplomat]

Originally Posted by hoot72

Fair enough.

I don't think they had a 3-1 ratio in the Philippines but they could have, and I say this in absolute hindsight 70 years later, could have secured the POW camp and potentially the badly damaged airfield and harbour with 2000-3000 men BUT....I can think of the logistical nightmare if transport planes started to get shot down en-masse en-route with supplies (and men) to the drop zone....

The american's did carry out a successful parachute drop in the Philippines in early 1945 but it was done I believe with naval fire power as support and a large contingent of men to rescue POW's...I need to read up on that more to understand how complex that mission was
.

Thanks!

The deconfliction of missions and fire control measures are also part of the equation....the Great Raid is based off Army Rangers rescue of the 500 POWs in the P.I. but keep in mind this was with the assistance of the Filipino resistance collecting Intel and keeping track of the Japanese by studying their movements and tactics over 3 years,....they had an extensive humint network developed, they knew the tactics and responses to raids and ambushes....etc, without modern technology we had as much information as you could possibly have. The key was the Japanese were not prepared to defend the camp against the force sent in....another raid to study is Son Tay......the preparation took the longest and that is where the mission is made or broke planning and rehearsals are critical to be ready for the variables unknown