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Old 12-01-2009, 06:49   #1
Richard
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What Would You Do? — Incident at Shkin

What now, Dai-uy?

And so it goes...

Richard


Quote:
A combat leader has to decide how much force to use in a military operation and must weigh the possibility of injury or death of innocent noncombatants against the risk to which he might expose his troops. In this case, the commander accepts some risk to his troops to protect the innocent.

Did he accept too much risk by completing the mission in the manner he did?

The mission

The Special Forces team mission was to confirm or deny the presence of Taliban and al-Qaida leadership and prepare for a potential raid on a compound near the village of Shkin, Afghanistan. They had been sent to observe the compound after a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle had observed suspicious activity. The compound had the potential of offering up some key leaders, because earlier reports indicated it had been used as a meeting place for high-level leadership; only 7.5 kilometers from the Pakistan border, it was a very convenient staging area for equipment and men. Captain Smith, the Special Forces team leader, had been able to confirm the presence of what appeared to be al-Qaida or Taliban soldiers but had not seen signs of leadership. The team had observed armed patrols leaving, moving around the perimeter, and reentering the compound. They also had observed other activity indicative of a military presence — an armed sentry inside the compound and at least one gathering of armed men in what appeared to be some type of formation. So the Special Forces team watched and waited.

Unusual activity

Early on the night of Jan. 13, after several days on site, Smith and his team observed something unusual and reported it immediately. Previous Special Forces teams observing the compound had seen regular vehicular traffic coming into the village of Shkin from the border with Pakistan. However, this night the team observed a vehicle leave the compound, move to the Pakistan border, and flash its headlights. The team was able to distinguish the headlights of 12 vehicles traveling down the steep mountain roads from the border to the vicinity of the compound. Several of the vehicles remained at the compound, while others dispersed to other compounds in and around Shkin. Smith watched carefully for other unusual activity, but at night and from more than 2 kilometers away, he couldn’t see much, even with night-vision devices.

Unbeknownst to Smith, his report received attention at Central Command (CENTCOM) in Florida, and staff officers decided to take the initiative.

The plan

Smith’s boss was Navy SEAL Captain Hansen, who was in charge of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, and responsible for special-operations support to operations in southern Afghanistan. Hansen was aware of the potential importance of Smith’s recent report but was surprised when, approximately one and half hours after getting the report from Smith, he was contacted by CENTCOM. His staff was notified that a B-1 bomber with precision-guided munitions was en route to the compound with the mission to strike the compound and the concentration of Taliban and al-Qaida vehicles located there. The bombs were scheduled to be on target in two hours.

Hansen quickly got his key staff and commanders together and determined they potentially could put a team on the target a few hours after the strike. It would be difficult and risky given the short notice and the distance between his forces’ current location and the Shkin compound — but it could be done. However, he and his staff were concerned about the mission. Hansen knew from reports there were numerous noncombatants living in the compound, and while he also suspected the vehicles Smith had reported could be significant, they still didn’t know who was in those vehicles or what they were doing. Also, he knew there was not a large concentration of vehicles at the Shkin compound as the CENTCOM staff had indicated. They must have misunderstood the report from the field.

Hansen then spoke to Brigadier General Jones and explained what was happening and his concerns about the mission. Jones was unaware of the directed attack. He agreed with Hansen that this strike was inappropriate given the lack of specific information concerning the target and said he would take action to cancel it. But Jones also said the vehicles might be significant. He asked Hansen if he could get forces into the compound and exploit the potential opportunity. It certainly was possible someone of importance had arrived that night.

Jones then broke off the conversation to cancel the airstrike. The strike was canceled 30 minutes prior to its scheduled time-on-target. Soon after, CENTCOM sent Hansen an execute order to conduct a raid against the compound as soon as feasible.

Hansen hesitated about putting a team on the compound to exploit the planned airstrike. Smith’s Special Forces team on site did not have enough men or firepower, so Hansen would have had to divert another team to go into the compound unrehearsed and poorly prepared. It was doable, but very risky.

Hansen decided he would delay until the following night, while Smith stayed on target and watched. If Smith observed anything critical, he could speed up the timeline if necessary, but his forces needed the extra 24 hours to reposition troops, put the team together, study the terrain and the intelligence, and make sure they went in ready. By waiting 24 hours, he was risking the possibility of missing any leadership that might have arrived that night, but he significantly reduced the risk to his own forces of executing an inadequately prepared and rehearsed plan.

Compound assault

Six helicopters departed Qandahar and flew together most of the distance to the compound. They separated about 10 miles out to allow each to fly at a low level on its own separate route, landing simultaneously at each helicopter’s designated landing zone. The 12-member team exited its helicopter and approached the compound to breach an entry. Team members burst into the compound and encountered numerous hostile personnel who had been awakened by the helicopters. They detained two combative males, who were found with two females and a number of children in a room with posters on the wall of Osama bin Laden, and confiscated a large quantity of weapons. They found a wide variety of weapons, including mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and a variety of ammunition and a 4x4 vehicle. As they continued searching, they discovered a bunker with ammunition and antitank mines.

Meanwhile one of the other teams had landed so far away that, after exiting the helicopter, team members entered what they thought was an outbuilding of the compound complex and found themselves in a mosque with one person praying inside. The Special Forces soldiers flex-cuffed this individual and left him there, while they reoriented themselves and moved on to the compound. On their way to the compound they saw two people hiding in a ditch sprint away into the darkness. They did not fire and continued moving to the compound.

Having finally reached the compound, almost 10 minutes after the first team had arrived, they breached the closed northern gate and entered, moving immediately to the buildings nearest their gate. The door to the first building was locked, and they had to breach their way through it. Inside they found a large box covered with a blanket. They moved immediately into the next room where they encountered seven women and six young children sitting against the far wall of the room. The soldiers secured the women and children with flex cuffs and returned to the first room and opened the large box. The box contained a wealth of documents, passports, and photos, as well as numerous AK-47s, and RPGs, mortar tubes with sights and a collection of old rifles.

Leaving several men to guard the box and women and children, the soldiers continued clearing buildings. They found the door to the next building locked, and as they prepared to breach the door with a shotgun, one of the soldiers noticed through a crack in the door what appeared to be a woman on her knees on the other side of the door, listening. The soldier stopped the breacher from shooting the lock, which likely would have killed or seriously wounded the woman. Two men then were able to mechanically breach the door and found the woman with a number of children and three men sitting next to a large safe. One of the men was hostile, and the safe contained 198,000 Pakistani rupees, two AK-47s, four RPGs, and binoculars.

Another Special Forces team landed, entered the compound, and began clearing buildings that had not yet been cleared. In the first building, they found numerous documents along with weapons and several people.

Once the compound was secured, FBI agents who had accompanied the soldiers identified the men they wanted to further interrogate. The Special Forces team collected all of the munitions and weapons for the explosive ordnance disposal team to destroy prior to extraction. The helicopters were called back in, and at 2315 they took off, taking with them seven males whom the FBI judged warranted further interrogation.

The post-operation analysis indicated the operation against the compound at Shkin was an intelligence coup. Though the operation did not capture key Taliban or al-Qaida leadership, the prisoners and documents they captured proved of great value for later operations.

http://www.moaa.org/serv_prof/serv_p...ics_090908.htm
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