Stirring stick and a bottle of soju: The next Korean War (or the one after that)

[Airbornelawyer]

On SOCNET there was a brief thread on a Korean news story on the pending 2/2 BCT deployment to Iraq. The story mentioned that the US was also considering redeploying some additional forces to the south of the peninsula, away from the DMZ. The plan to move more US forces south is in fact old news, pre-Iraq war, and is unrelated to the Iraq deployment. However, it reminded me of the strategic dilemma in US/ROK relations that this redeployment is unlikely to fix, and may actually worsen. I invite your thoughts and analysis.

The long term strategic dilemma in Korea is this:

For 50 years, we have defended South Korea from the threat posed by the North. Whether a million US troops in 1954 or 37,000 today, the main US mission was to defend South Korea. Other than to those troops, North Korea was not really a direct threat to the US (although the impact on our allies and economic partners of a regional war would be an indirect threat to the US).

Now, North Korea is seeking to develop nuclear-armed missiles capable of reaching the United States. If they do so, or are on the verge of doing so, then North Korea becomes a direct threat not just to South Korea or Japan but to the US.

Given this looming threat, the US must consider preemption, to destroy North Korea's missile and nuclear capabilities at a minimum, or even to change the regime. But it is simply tactically impossible to destroy all of the North's offensive capability in one first strike, and our number one priority will necessarily be the nuclear facilities and missile launch sites that threaten us. Therefore, it is just as inevitable that North Korea will be able to launch at least some retaliatory strike or counterattack across the DMZ. Given the large percentage of the South's population living within short-range missile and tube artillery range of the DMZ, massive South Korean civilian casualties may be expected.

So this is the strategic conundrum: for 50 years, the strategic interests of the US and South Korea coincided. If the balloon went up, Americans and Koreans would die side by side to save South Korea.

Now, however, we are fast approaching the day when our strategic interests diverge. The US may soon be forced to make a choice where thousands of South Korean lives will be sacrificed to save thousands of American lives.

The nature of our relationship is changing, and for many South Koreans not in a good way. If you were a South Korean, and you saw the US considering a preemptive strike and moving its forces away from the main zone of retaliation, mightn't you become skeptical or cynical of our motives? What would your response be?* We may have to consider removing all our troops from the peninsula, lest they go from being a North Korean tripwire to being South Korean hostages.


_________

* The "rational" response, of course, would be for the US and the ROK to work together to defang the North to preclude preemption from becoming necessary, but this is an example of the prisoner's dilemma - what would be the rational choice for each working together may not be the rational choice for each working separately. In the classic prisoner's dilemma, each party ends up pursuing its own "rational" self-interest and each ends up screwing himself and the other.

[Roguish Lawyer]

I have a few preliminary thoughts and questions on this topic:

1. How much thought went into the provocative title, and in particular the first two words? Good luck. LOL I like the topic a lot.

2. What is the risk that North Korea actually would strike the US with ballistic missiles? Sure, the Dear Leader is crazy, but is he not trying to deter us from striking at him by acquiring strategic nukes? (NOTE: This is a question for discussion purposes, not necessarily a statement or suggestion of my position on the issue.)

3. What really is the probability of this strike to the south after a devastating US first strike? If we decapitate the leadership, won't there be confusion and chaos? Isn't the NK military even less disciplined than the Iraqi military under Saddam?

4. What about China? Isn't that still a BIG part of this problem?

5. I'd like to see some open source order of battle information.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Those last 4 are probably the same 4 questions being pondered by letter agency Asia desks on a daily basis.

AL - Yes to all your questions.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
Those last 4 are probably the same 4 questions being pondered by letter agency Asia desks on a daily basis.

AL - Yes to all your questions.

You forgot to tell him that you like the title too.

[Footmobile]

Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
Isn't the NK military even less disciplined than the Iraqi military under Saddam?

I'd always been under the impression that the opposite is true, that the average North Korean trooper has been indoctrinated and brainwashed to the point of total and absolute obediance to orders.

It has been proven that the same cannot be said of Husseins forces, even at their best in the late 80's thru early 90's....

I would have much rather fought in Iraq against their troops last year than go to N.K and fight against troops that can live off one bowl of rice a day and hump their little asses off in the Korean terrain.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Having "played" in the DMZ circa 1978 and worked with the South Korean units that were stationed on our left and right as well as those within the joint security area I have always thought that the main reason for us manning that particular area was to keep the South Korean Army from forays into the North. While it was no secret that the US forces stationed along and in the DMZ had a limited life span at the outset of any North Korean initiated hostilities because of the massed Artillery and short flight time for its MIGs, the South Korean forces were well dug in and were looking for excuses to pull the trigger. You see, that was part of the plan. Use the US forces to secure the most likely avenue of approach into the South to ensure that the US would have to respond to the attack. That provided comfort to the South and acted as a deterent for the North. Having said that I think that you also have to consider both China and Russia as players here to keep North Korea in check. They really don't want that crazed, train riding, fear of flying, elavator shoe wearing, idiot to overstep his bounds by fomenting a nuclear exchange anywhere near their territory. As far as the feelings and concerns of the South Korean populace, those that were old enough to remember we pulled their chestnuts out of the fire are no longer in control of the country and have been marginalized. Those that still make a living farming the land and populating the countryside really don't give a rats butt about who is in charge as long as they can feed their family. I am not sure that you will hear anything but applause from those that are most vocal today because they think the only reason why the North has an Army is to defend itself from US aggression. Just my humble opinion.

Jack Moroney

[Sigi]

North Korea needs a headache with the USA as much as we do. I call BS that they have the resources to attack anytime in the next decade.

Could they? Maybe. Will they? Doubtful.

Suicide never seems to be a State sponsored alternative. Terrorists, on the other hand....

[The Reaper]

The NK nukes are a lever against the U.S.

If the NKPA heads south, and the Glorious Leader has a delivery system for his handful of nukes, he may be able to influence U.S. participation in the conflict.

Sure, we can burn his country down to bedrock, after he pulverizes several U.S. Metro areas. One nuke popped on a U.S. city could easily end a conventional U.S. intervention and doom the administration.

Would we be willing to risk that? MAD worked because the other side was considered to be relatively rational. Can we say that of Kim?

That is why our missile defense is so vital. It would be inadequate for the Russian strike/counterstrike, but it could prevent that card from being played by nations with small numbers of primitive delivery systems, like NK.

It also allows Kim to divert attention of his people away from their poverty and revolt, and get some sort of nationalistic pride as he continues milking the situation trading empty promises to the U.S. for fuel and food relief.

He may go off the deep end and drive for Seoul one day, threatening us with his nukes. We need to make sure that contingency does not occur by ending his program, or making it useless.

NK has been isolated for so long, and improverished for so long, that they have few strat targets worth hitting. Are we going to bounce the rubble of a starving country operating at the peak of 1940s Soviet industrial technology?

China is NK's big brother and is the voice of reason to Kim. They are his primary trading partner, and could close the border and plunge North Korea further into the Dark Ages. Besides, if they wanted to, China could invade NK easily and seize the country militarily at a cost of maybe a few million troops, insignificant to them.

The NK military is huge, equipped along the lines of 1960s Soviet formations, with large numbers of relatively well trained SOF which would wreak havoc in developed South Korea. The AF is weak, but could be compensated for by tremendous quantities of artillery and air defense formations. The Navy is well suited to infil, sabotage, and harrassment of shipping, not power projection. Do some research and see for yourself. The Army is very impressive, and relatively well trained. The intent is to close with the U.S and RoK forces so quickly that it becomes impossible to target them without hitting our own forces, like a fighter in a clench.

Remember, Seoul is VERY close to the border, much more so since of the boom and expansion. Take a look at the map. One school of thought was that the ROKs would defend Seoul and if it looked like it would be lost, declare it an open city and fall back to the next line of defense south. The NKPA would then occupy, loot and pillage, negotiating a future withdrawal back across the DMZ only after taking what they wanted from Seoul and negotiating terms favorable to them. It is all in the timing. Would our Korean allies allow us to nuke the NKPA in Seoul? Would we risk a nuke strike on the U.S. to defend South Korea, even if our nuclear counter-strike burned them to death?

At this time, Kim appears to have firm control of the NKPA, and thus the country. If Kim remains firmly in control and relatively satisfied, I think we face no real threat but his weapons development. If he loses control of the military, we could have a coup and a move toward rapproachment with the South. If he feels that his position may be nearing a catastrophic end, he may choose to make further demands or to launch an attack on the RoK to occupy his military, strengthen his power base in NK, and to extort resources from the RoK and the rest of the world. That is the real nightmare scenario.

The U.S. 2nd ID was there North of Seoul to act as a trip wire for further U.S. involvement, to include use of special weapons as required to defend our forces, as well as our allies. Our presence communicated our intent (to NK, China, and the Soviets), in no uncertain terms to support our Korean allies and put our lives on the line with theirs. Last time we left an ambiguous alliance there, we left the opening for the war, similar to our gaffe in Kuwait. Realistically, all the ROKs really need today is probably Air Support.

I agree that the average young South Korean citizen has no idea of the evil intent of the North, the history of loss, or the thousands of gallons of U.S blood spent securing the South and chasing the North back across the border. They see the U.S. as occupiers and despoilers, we are damned if we do and damned if we don't. What the future holds for our alliance is uncertain, but it is, IMHO, likely to drift further apart.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

[Sigi]

Originally posted by The Reaper

The NK military is huge, equipped along the lines of 1960s Soviet formations, with large numbers of relatively well trained SOF which would wreak havoc in developed South Korea. The AF is weak, but could be compensated for by tremendous quantities of artillery and air defense formations. The Navy is well suited to infil, sabotage, and harassment of shipping, not power projection. Do some research and see for yourself. The Army is very impressive, and relatively well trained. The intent is to close with the U.S and RoK forces so quickly that it becomes impossible to target them without hitting our own forces, like a fighter in a clench.

With the utmost respect.

That is what we thought Saddam was capable of. Are we overestimating our enemies? Does NK posses the capability that we should fear?

Yes, I fear the possibility they are capable of striking the border, much less our troops. But the International community, which in some nations is more credible than the United States, would make any strike by NK suicide. IMHO.

What makes you think we should worry about NK when the majority of the planet says they would be suicidal to act against ....the West?

[The Reaper]

Originally posted by Sigi
With the utmost respect.

That is what we thought Saddam was capable of. Are we overestimating our enemies? Does NK posses the capability that we should fear?

Yes, I fear the possibility they are capable of striking the border, much less our troops. But the International community, which in some nations is more credible than the United States, would make any strike by NK suicide. IMHO.

What makes you think we should worry about NK when the majority of the planet says they would be suicidal to act against ....the West?

With equal respect, and in comparioson to Iraq and their WMD, we know that Kim has some nukes, bugs, and gas, right now.

We know that he has a ballistic missile program able to reach Japan, as of several years ago.

We know that he is an irrational figure with some serious psychological problems.

NK is much more reclusive and isolated than Iraq, which had vibrant international trade and international ties. NK does not have these ties with anyone but China, and probably does not care what the world thinks, or does.

I think you underestimate the POTENTIAL threat, and all of its permutations due to the known factors above.

Just my .02.

TR

[Solid]

When it comes to WMD and irrational state actors, IMHO it is better to overestimate than underestimate.

Would it be feasible for US air power to successfully destroy a majority of firebases, missile emplacements, and airfields in range of the DMZ and the SK civilian populations?

Thank you,

Solid

[Valhal]

Good discussion. So what are possible solutions? What would happen if China did close the spigot of trade with NK? Would they use that as an excuse to attack SK?

[The Reaper]

Originally posted by Solid
When it comes to WMD and irrational state actors, IMHO it is better to overestimate than underestimate.

Would it be feasible for US air power to successfully destroy a majority of firebases, missile emplacements, and airfields in range of the DMZ and the SK civilian populations?

Thank you,

Solid

With conventional munitions after 50 years of digging in?

Surely you jest.

Originally posted by Valhal
What would happen if China did close the spigot of trade with NK? Would they use that as an excuse to attack SK?

That would be a distinct possibility.

Think of it as a death spasm from an irrational leader with nothing left to lose.

TR

[Valhal]

Would China commit troops if that happened?
Or sit back and watch.

[The Reaper]

Originally posted by Valhal
Would China commit troops if that happened?
Or sit back and watch.

Not an Asian specialist, but IMHO, the Chinese can pretty much be relied upon to act in their own self-interest above all else.

Why would they intervene with troops, and on which side?

TR