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Old 05-08-2011, 15:50   #46
DevilSide
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I just read the whole thread, my $.002:

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bailaviborita- I don't know if it is "again"- but our senior leaders over there don't understand "Afghan" ways of doing things and are insisting we build them just like they are Americans.
Why are the leaders *politicos * not educated in the nature of the war, or even the nature of the country/culture we are fighting in? From what you people have talked about, this is what holds us back, constant infighting, bad decision making, etc. we're only as strong as the weakest link so if the weak is what is giving out commands instead of letting those who can do their jobs, why are they atleast not educated in the situation?


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Do we need an Infantry Platoon to pull our Security? Can we not do what we did in the earlier days of Afghanistan or Vietnam days? Raise and control our own Guerilla Force? Can we do what we did with ASGs and do it with locals?

Why is'nt this allowed to happen? Working with irregulars in A-stan seems to be more effective than working with their conventional army, something they've never had.
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Old 05-10-2011, 17:25   #47
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Originally Posted by DevilSide View Post
Why is'nt this allowed to happen? Working with irregulars in A-stan seems to be more effective than working with their conventional army, something they've never had.
It is happening, IMHO I feel it isn't happening as it should be for many reasons.


politicos, local civial reasons, SF "guys", Tactical Level reasons, ETC and ETC
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Old 05-10-2011, 18:33   #48
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I think one main issue SFODAs and SOF Commanders are having within Afghanistan is with the publication of FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) and FM 3-07 .22 (Counterinsurgency Operations). I see these FMs as being some reason for Conventional Officers to think that they have gotten a major step in the evolution of military thinking about unconventional warfare. They way they think they are thinking. With these FMs, they think they know how to run an unconventional warfare environment. They think they have Command and Control of the tactical level Battlespace within an unconventional warfare environment that their Counterinsurgency Operations are happening it. Yes officially they do have the Tactical control Battlespace. Unconventional Warfare - NOT! They feel they know what Special Forces have been saying or doing on the battlefield, they think they know how to do it. For them FM 3-24provides guidance to military commanders, soldiers, and NGOs as they face the Taliban. Yes it does provide provides guidance to military commanders, Military FM do that. The Taliban is a determined enemy interwoven into and within a foreign (Social) culture in Afghanistan. Why can’t the Conventional Military just step back from their Books, PDFs, Thesis' and Blogs; just recognizes that the Conventional Military cannot do counterinsurgency alone.

IMHO Counterinsurgency Operations is a multi-dimensional warfare. Yes they do need to take the advice, expertise, and resources of their Special Forces, not their SOF elements within their tactical Battlespace. Yes Special Forces have many SOF elements working with them, but it is the SFODA Commander, Detachment Operations SGT (AKA: Team SGT) and all those Detachment members that know what is going on most likely for those new Convenetional Forces. Even the civilian agencies that focus on the political, social, and developmental of a given area to counter or better yet to undermine support for insurgents within that area. Not to listening to us Special Forces nut heads that many just be “people that somehow or other tended to be nonconformists, couldn't get along in a straight military system, and found a haven where their actions were not scrutinized too carefully, and where they came under only sporadic or intermittent observation from the regular chain of command."
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Old 05-11-2011, 21:30   #49
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to conduct counterterrorism or counterinsurgency??

As we transition toward an Afghan-led counterinsurgency strategy that relies on a limited conventional forces footprint, aided by Special Forces and the CIA. Counterterrorism strategy relies on U.S. Special Operations Forces and others to conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. I say U.S. Military needs to develop a better plan to train, equip, and advise Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police forces from the top down counterinsurgency program. Why Top Down. Because to me most policemen and soldiers are uneducated and their leaders are what need to know on how to plan, forecast and execute training and operations.

How do we assist local communities improve security, governance, and development – including through village-level community forces. The bottom-up approach to counterinsurgency. The selling points of the Afghan Local Police program, which so many try to say has undermined Taliban control in Helmand, Kandahar, and Oruzgan, by helping villagers protect their communities and better connecting them to district and provincial government. I love the way Karzai didn’t want the Local Power but the Central Government Power that the USG sold him one.

While we have been conducting direct action operations against high value targets with little effects on the overall scheme. Most within Military feels a ANA lead strategy entails some risks for both sides. It relies on ANA and ANP doing the bulk of counterinsurgency, but with U.S. assistance and oversight. How can we provide “enablers” for the Afghan Forces. Yes enablers such as intelligence, civil affairs, and military information support operations.

Then there is the Pakistan option. Pakistan and the United States have failed IMHO to target the insurgent sanctuary in Pakistan, especially in Baluchistan Province. Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps forces have conducted operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas to the north, and the United States has conducted numerous drone strikes in Baluchistan Province. But relatively little has been done in Baluchistan. The United States and Pakistan must target Taliban leaders in Baluchistan within Chamman, Wana and Quetta. The most obvious way is to conduct joint US-PAK clandestine raids to capture Taliban leaders in Baluchistan; large-scale military force would be unnecessary and counterproductive, especially after current events. Most Taliban are in or near cities like Quetta and Karachi.

Special Forces need to push their Afghan Partners to do more within in their areas. ANA leadership needs to plan and execute kinetic and non-kinetic missions not USSF. SF needs to understand that they are the ones to teach ANA, ANP and ALP to kick in those doors and shoot people in the face. SF NCOs must understand that language capability is essential in order to support ANA to follow the key counterinsurgency injunction to live with the population, and requirements will grow a relationship those ANA and locals. Not falling back on the interpreters ODA find to support their operations. More SF guys with local language ability makes, but such guys that have been enrolled in Command Language Programs for Dari and Pashto. Must also require time to develop their ability to communicate in either of them on substantive matters, basic Combat terms would be great for all SF NCOs to know. Yes we all want more money, but the value you’re getting to know just how to say the basics in an language goes hundred miles when you say it and not your interpreters.

I also think the SF Interpreters that have come to the U.S. via a SF sponsor and want to go back to Interpret should be slotted to go back to USSF teams and not to Conventional Forces.
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Old 05-12-2011, 06:52   #50
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Originally Posted by MtnGoat View Post
SF NCOs must understand that language capability is essential in order to support ANA to follow the key counterinsurgency injunction to live with the population, and requirements will grow a relationship those ANA and locals. Not falling back on the interpreters ODA find to support their operations. More SF guys with local language ability makes, but such guys that have been enrolled in Command Language Programs for Dari and Pashto. Must also require time to develop their ability to communicate in either of them on substantive matters, basic Combat terms would be great for all SF NCOs to know. Yes we all want more money, but the value you’re getting to know just how to say the basics in an language goes hundred miles when you say it and not your interpreters.

I also think the SF Interpreters that have come to the U.S. via a SF sponsor and want to go back to Interpret should be slotted to go back to USSF teams and not to Conventional Force
I completely agree. 10 years into this and we, both US Mil and US Gov, still are relying on 'terps and contractors. I simply do NOT understand this; especially on the SOT-A side. I cannot speak to the Mil side (I've yet to make a combat deployment) but I my civilian experience from Iraq was quite different than AF. We had quite a supply of Arabic lings with Iraqi dialect yet in AF, we are hurting for qualified Dari, Pashto, and even Uzbek speakers.

My experience with the USG Pashto program is sofa king frustrating:

teaching Afghani Pashto but testing in Paki Pashto
"allowing" sub 3/3 Pashto lings to work but not paying them lang pay
language resources, intermediate/advanced courses are non-existent
low numbers of personnel resources do not allow "down time" for needed refresher training

Basically the SAME issues that you guys are experiencing but with a different skill set.

I'm frustrated with working for an organization where "good enough is good enough". Lead, follow, or get the hell outta my way (yes, my civilian evaluation does reflect my perceived lack of tact). It's that important to many of us low-level GS employees but apparently not to career USG managers. Not one manager in my entire civilian COC has completed a tour in IQ or AF, yet they think they know how we should do business and how to interact with US Mil. I, no kidding, had one guy ask me "Why do you keep meeting with the SF guys over here?" I guess he's waterlogged from spending too much time in the swimming pool in Kabul.
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Old 05-23-2011, 13:40   #51
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Today we were talking about the VSO Program within Afghanistan. I brought up how people were thinking VSO is some kind of new or refocused UW. One key point brought out by a younger “NEW” SF NCO on if SF thinks VSO is some kind of UW. The point was "You can’t do an OSS or Sage style UW for a long term, differently not in Afghanistan."

This is what I came up with beating my brain over this point.

Maybe so, maybe we can't do an OSS or Sage style UW for a long term in a Muslim Country. Why will it never work in a Muslim Country for a long term period? Not because it is Muslim or anything religion based. But the reality is that most Muslim Countries are poor and their dynamics are so different than any UW model we have ever studied, IMHO. Yes we did it in the 80’s in Afghanistan and we did it from 2001 to 2003ish. But I’m taking long term UW like some think we can do it. What is long term too??? That MILLION $$ Question!! Can we really do an OSS or Robin Sage style UW in Afghanistan right NOW? Can we do it in a Muslim Country for a long term time period? Egypt, Yemen, Syria, ETC??

Do SF Commanders (at any level) and CJSOTF-A think that SF can do VSO as a typically UW mission. Yes SF is best in doing VSO style missions, better than what anyone thinks in COMISAF. Can VSO be a UW model “mission”? Is anyone thinking that now; but really how? Why for that matter.

I think that if you go with the system we still teach in Robin Sage of - basic tactics of the guerrilla forces expended to attack only where the margin of success is high to convince a skeptical population that a tyrant, Government, etc is not being authority or power. Methods that worked well for Che won't work today in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these tactics are much more difficult to employ in modern times based off where we are within Afghanistan. Within that Unconventional Warfare Environment. Can we use the techniques and tactics of the old UW TTPs with new methods for success? What have we looked at as far as the current Technology to enable a resistance movement or insurgency or surrogate forces to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government (the Taliban) or occupying power (Al Qaeda) by operating through the country or with an Unconventional Warfare Environment in a denied area?

Yes we can have an “anthropological sense a Neanderthal can kick in doors, a homo sapiens can teach guerrilla” to kick in that Door and shoot someone in their Face, but to inspire a people what does SF within Afghanistan really have going on. Now VSO with this “UW Mindset" is the success to VSO program? No I don’t think so, but I do see many thinking that UW is a Key to VSO.

I ask really how is “UW Mindset" a success to VSO program? What that “skilled advisor, foreign language proficiency, possessing the characteristics of open-mindedness, empathy, self-reliance, adaptability thinking, patience, mental stability, self confidence, along with being a self motivator, an extravert under control, externally motivated” is the success and that is why it is UW? Yes Afghanistan is a COIN operation Environment, but and I will throw this BUT in here, we are going after a majority Pashtu ethic group that are fighting for what? Fighting for their land? Fighting their livelihood? They are fighting against their Central Government that they don’t like? (Maybe this one is true in many parts of Afghanistan due to TB influences within the IRoA. Is Afghanistan within an internal Civil War right now? Stepping away and looking at many different facts, all of this play true in some form with many providences.

What is the Taliban and what is Al Qaeda as far as Afghanistan? Yes one is the internal force that ran a country for many years and yes Pashtun Taliban has many potential danger within Pakistan, with own agenda of encouraging Pashtun nationalism and Taliban-style Islamic fanaticism in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federal Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA). The other is an External Force that has come to a country to support other in a given cause. After Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union, the Afghan Islamist extremists found a rallying call for their cause, as young Muslims from around the world came to Afghanistan to volunteer in what was being called a "holy war," or jihad, against the invading Soviets. One of these young Muslims was a 23 year old from Saudi Arabia named "Usama" bin Ladin. Yes we should all know this.

How Al Qaeda and Taliban made their ties together… I’m option and readings of... Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam (a Palestinian and disciple of Sayyid Qutb) decided that their new organization should not dissolve. They established what they called a base (al Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future jihad. However, bin Laden and Azzam differed on where the organization's future objectives should go. Azzam favored continued fighting in Afghanistan until there was a true Islamist government, while Bin Laden wanted to prepare al Qaeda to fight anywhere in the world. When Azzam was killed in 1989, bin Laden assumed full charge of Al Qaeda. AQ was formed fully in the eyes of the world. Now AQ started their OI campaign worldwide and followers started to follow the speaking of Bin Laden. The Taliban is a domestically motivated organization, but it is broken up into in “unions” just as any U.S. Union does within its regions. Is the Taliban a classic enemy? Then why is SF fighting Classic style warfare against a non Classic enemy? YYES we do IMHO, we have been driving in GMVs now MATVs and RGs; different platform but the same style. So is the answer to lead a VSO style operation into the countryside’s of Afghanistan? Look at it this way, to lead Conventional style warfare that to locals will look like a colonizing army. They call our GMVs "TANKS" why due they because of the Soviet War hostory they have. Which for the history of the Country HAS NEVER WON!!! Wait haven’t we been there for what 8 years now, going on TEN YEARS?

With all of that, what have we really done within Afghanistan? Yes Kicking a Ton of Doors, stood up the ANA, ANP, ETC Forces here and there; start to develop a country. But what have we?

I really don’t think or I should say I have yet to be told of or read of a Taliban subversion OI campaign within Afghanistan to counter the Taliban PAO message (train) to their masses. Yes, the Taliban has a National Agenda but each sect of the Local Taliban has its own agenda for that Providence which typically are very different to one in the South or the East or to the Southeast. If the TB has an OI message campaign how are they doing? How are we doing ours? Well, we are still there and if Al Qaeda is gone as the Former CIA Station Chief, Islamabad, PK has said, GEN Petraeus and many others. What is the goal of the COIN strategic plan?


Quote:
History provides no basis for expecting large-scale foreign military intervention to make COIN victorious. Rather, there is a correlation between large-scale foreign military intervention and unsuccessful COIN. The larger the foreign troop presence—France in Algeria, France and the United States in Indochina, the USSR in Afghanistan— the worse the outcome tends to be. Of course, causality is ambiguous: Was large-scale foreign intervention a response to the inability to prevail over insurgency by other means, or did it contribute to failure?

“Tribe-Centric Unconventional Warfare/Foreign Internal Defense” is what we have been pushing for some time now. This is our COIN SOF plan and somewhat of COMISAF plan too. Day Kundi is the best success story for VSO and is the example model for everyone with CJSOTF-A. But the one major fact with this VSO is that is a Hazara culture broadened by a Pashtun culture. Anyone that knows their history and why this VSO would work. Now looking at other Pashtun areas and the COMISAF agendas and how they have worked or not worked. What are the reasons then?
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Old 05-23-2011, 13:43   #52
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GWOT and the War on Drugs??

For the ones that say that GWOT or WOT is a non winnable WAR. I say look at that Drug War and how people said the same thing years ago to current times. How about what the U.S. has done in Colombia and its drug war and the Colombian FARC and other groups (death squads). Should this be a better role model for a new Campaign for Afghanistan? Look at what has happen there in its history and the similarities with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Colombia’s raise or fall into chaos is very similar to Pakistan and Afghanistan, with both regional having a Key part to the Drug trafficking.

Quote:
The regime’s lack of efforts to reduce poverty and the tremendous social inequality, lead to armed resistance against the government from new opposition groups. Instead of doing something about the social inequality, the government in the 70’s reacted to the growing numbers of guerrilla movements by carrying out campaigns against rebellion groups with the help of military advice from the US. A key point in these initiatives was to establish paramilitary groups. These groups were established by the army and their allies amongst the landowners and the political elite. The paramilitary groups were sometimes meant to have the roll of protective forces for the landowners and leading businesses against attempts at blackmail from the guerrilla movements. But quickly they became the central force in the government’s strategy to fight against the rebellion. In the middle of the 1980’s the paramilitary groups formed close ties to Colombia’s narcotics mafia. Already at this point, the paramilitaries functioned as regular death squads. It began to become more and more difficult to discern who controlled who in the complex network of the state apparatus, the military, rich landowners and business people, and the narcotics mafia, who all controlled their own paramilitary forces.
Where I’m I talking about? Central Asia – Afghanistan and Pakistan? Or Colombia and her neighbors.

The amount of U.S. Aid to Colombia, 1997-2003 is over 11 Million. I’m not going into the Political or military planning or inter-Agencies used in Colombia.

But I will end with Colombia and her War on Drugs. The U.S. Military and Inter-Agency have been doing something there that has somewhat worked. So it is a different in culture or different Governmental or Military approach between the two countries and their cultures?
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Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”
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Old 05-23-2011, 14:43   #53
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I fondly remember briefing one of the top military figures of the Afghan army. I was briefing him in a place where you could see a lot of our systems - though things were pretty much "sanitized" for the sake of proper OPSEC. Anyway, when the briefing was done (and it was fairly brief, I might add), the general spoke to his interpreter for about two minutes. The interpreter turned to me and said: "The general says that, 'If we only had all these computers, we'd be able to do much more'" I smiled and shook hands and sent the entourage - and their general - on their way to the rest of their journey through our compound. At that moment it became completely clear to me that the truest lessons of war have not yet reached this emerging security force. Computers do not make a good army; they are capabilities and, at times, can be liabilities. Also, warfare's experience alone does not make an army out of a group of armed men; it takes a measure of civilization behind that experience to steer those hard-earned lessons to create a viable army. And, civilization is far more than having the latest technology.

By the time I left Afghanistan this time around, I left with the feeling that the Afghan war effort on our part was akin to a dying elephant on its way to its grave. Victory in Afghanistan is now undefined. Certainly, complete victory seems beyond reach at this point. And, even if it was within reach - say ten more years and a thousand casualties more - to what end? I have a few friends who have either lost limbs, or their lives, on Afghan soil. I'd like to think that they sacrificed for their team mates, and ultimately for National Security. But, the question that bothers me is, "Was it necessary?" I'll keep convincing myself that it was; I have to sleep at night after all.
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Old 05-23-2011, 15:18   #54
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This thread topic is something I think about a lot. Though I have yet to be deployed and am by no means a BTDT I want to see how my thoughts sit with those of you who have been down range before.

Does having an uncoventional warfare MANUAL, especially in the hands of conventional leaders make unconventional warfare less unconventional? In other words does having predetermined strategies for an unconventional enemy undermine the necessity for "out of the box" thinking that SF is so well trained to utilize?

What might the results be of reducing conventional troop levels, but simultaneously increasing the flexibility given to SF and SOF along with their support elements to function without so much top down central planning from the chain above?

Seems to me that this war is perfectly designed for SF and SOF to basically be "unleashed." I remember a video clip from somewhere, maybe on this site, about SF soldiers ousting the taliban in a very short period of time in the beggining days of the war mostly because ya'll were given more freedom to utilize the kind of training that SF stands for.

Also, what repercussions/advantages would come from possibly reducing the amount of money we poor into nation building and trying to be friends with everyone and allocate some of that money over to SF and SOF to further fight the enemy? I fully understand the need to win hearts and minds, especially in order to obtain intelligence. However, are we doing this so much that we lose sight of the fact that there is an enemy that is relentless in the pursuit of our destruction?

Finally, for the BTDTs, is there any thinking from those involved that this might be a war that is not so much a win/lose type of conflict so much as more of a maintenance war? Here is what I mean...the GWOT, mainly radical Islamic terrorists is comprised of a staggering number of enemy combatants that I believe are never going to go away. Ever. At least not any time soon. Their religious beliefs mandate them to always bring the fight to us. That being said, what would the ramifications be of treating the conflict in the middle east with our enemies as more of a pest problem? One that requires consistent action for many years to come by the US and her allies to more so mitigate the problem to a safer level through SF and SOF and their support elements. I say this because I do not see radical Islamic terrorism every dying out. It is too rooted in their beliefe structure. Some might say hell no thats too expensive and too labor intensive, but could we do it while also reducing our conventional troop numbers thus saving more money and allocating some of it to our more financially efficient SF/SOF units to do what they are trained to do. That being force multiplication with indigenous forces and turning enemy combatants into swiss cheese.

Sorry for the long post, just always wanted to hear the BTDTs opinions on some of my thoughts. I welcome any criticism/praise, just please be respectful as all of you have my complete respect for your expertise and bravery. Thanks.

Last edited by DX251; 05-23-2011 at 15:24.
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Old 05-24-2011, 09:08   #55
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Originally Posted by Brush Okie View Post
My unit got "trainig" CD that was labeld Pashto. A native speaker was helping me, I put the CD in and he laughed. He said it was Pacto not pashto. They do not understand each other. He explained the differance but I am too stupid to quite get what the differance is.
I can speak of the DLI Pashto CD and Book sets are CRAP!! Do not use them.. it is PAKTO meaning the Pashto spoken in northern Peshwar area or pashyuns living close to Peshwar Paksitan. It's like jive talking or as a part of Pakistani Pashtun Vernacular Pashto.

BLUF - IMHO DO NOT USE the DLI Pashto Basic Language Survival Guide!!

Okie - if your deploying PM me and I will make you up a CD with related pharses in Southern (Kandahar-Urzagun-Zabul-Helland) Pashtun delict. Something covering what I'll call "Combat survival Pashtun".
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Old 05-24-2011, 09:25   #56
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Quote:
Originally Posted by DX251 View Post
This thread topic is something I think about a lot. Though I have yet to be deployed and am by no means a BTDT I want to see how my thoughts sit with those of you who have been down range before.

Does having an uncoventional warfare MANUAL, especially in the hands of conventional leaders make unconventional warfare less unconventional? In other words does having predetermined strategies for an unconventional enemy undermine the necessity for "out of the box" thinking that SF is so well trained to utilize?

What might the results be of reducing conventional troop levels, but simultaneously increasing the flexibility given to SF and SOF along with their support elements to function without so much top down central planning from the chain above?

Seems to me that this war is perfectly designed for SF and SOF to basically be "unleashed." I remember a video clip from somewhere, maybe on this site, about SF soldiers ousting the taliban in a very short period of time in the beggining days of the war mostly because ya'll were given more freedom to utilize the kind of training that SF stands for.

Also, what repercussions/advantages would come from possibly reducing the amount of money we poor into nation building and trying to be friends with everyone and allocate some of that money over to SF and SOF to further fight the enemy? I fully understand the need to win hearts and minds, especially in order to obtain intelligence. However, are we doing this so much that we lose sight of the fact that there is an enemy that is relentless in the pursuit of our destruction?

Finally, for the BTDTs, is there any thinking from those involved that this might be a war that is not so much a win/lose type of conflict so much as more of a maintenance war? Here is what I mean...the GWOT, mainly radical Islamic terrorists is comprised of a staggering number of enemy combatants that I believe are never going to go away. Ever. At least not any time soon. Their religious beliefs mandate them to always bring the fight to us. That being said, what would the ramifications be of treating the conflict in the middle east with our enemies as more of a pest problem? One that requires consistent action for many years to come by the US and her allies to more so mitigate the problem to a safer level through SF and SOF and their support elements. I say this because I do not see radical Islamic terrorism every dying out. It is too rooted in their beliefe structure. Some might say hell no thats too expensive and too labor intensive, but could we do it while also reducing our conventional troop numbers thus saving more money and allocating some of it to our more financially efficient SF/SOF units to do what they are trained to do. That being force multiplication with indigenous forces and turning enemy combatants into swiss cheese.

Sorry for the long post, just always wanted to hear the BTDTs opinions on some of my thoughts. I welcome any criticism/praise, just please be respectful as all of you have my complete respect for your expertise and bravery. Thanks.
Most Conventional IMHO think that with a ton of SF or as they like to call them SOF manuls and/or FMs think this makes them SME. Hell even some newer SF NCOs and Tm Cdrs. When GEN McChrystal asked for his 30,000 more troops he got maybe 3,000 Combat fighters and about 25,000 clerks and maybe 5,000 Medical personnel. He needed IMO 25,000 warriors and 3,000 Clerk (not enough desk or computers for all them).

SF is one of the best Force within DoD.. We are Cheap. SEALS are cheaper then any Navel Ship made, PJs and CTCs same with Aircraft.. MARSOC..well their Marnies that branch never really took care of their own IMHO.. But on the ground SF is the cheapest out of any DoD SOF elements. We can live with locals, Eat their food and only need Ammo, Medical and stuff we break dropped into us. Almost eveything we can get from the locals logistical supplies within a give country. All of our radios system we can talk and do thing that most UNITS need a 3Di internet system to do. We are lite and very fast.. Look at what 5th Group did in 2001 to 2002!!! Some on Horse back too. No GMVs, No RG 33s, no 105mm, ETC and ETC. For me overall money isn’t the issue for SF. For the War machine of Conventional Army on KAF, BAF, JBAD, TK, ETC yes there money will always be an issue. Yes IMHO it is “more financially efficient SF/SOF units to do what” we are made to be able to DO!!

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Originally Posted by Brush Okie View Post
AQ opend up schools and put the poor uneducated children in these schools and indoctranated them to their extreme views. IMHO we can not kill our way to success in Afganistan Soviet experance there is a shining example), combat is a means to gain access to the population so we can impliment programs. Education of the children and indoctranationg them into our belief system is the only way to win long term. The Jesuits used to say "give me a child until they are 7 and I will give you a Chatholic for life" That principal still applies.
This one of the reason many Think Tanks say GWOT is a non winnable war. May be true. I say Military working with a “police action” style of investiagtion is what will help out a lot. inter-agency corporationis a key thing. For some a big pipe dream in many areas. But when AQ works as NGO in Yemen, Pakistan, in Afica, ETC you need more than just pipe hitters.
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Old 05-24-2011, 10:11   #57
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Originally Posted by bailaviborita View Post
I just got back and pretty much agree with both commentaries. Although I would add I don't think we should take the gloves off as much as just leave. I don't think what we are doing there is improving American national security interests- in fact, we're probably hurting our interests by continuing to waste money better invested internally.

I think the Afghans can handle what they need to handle, I think we're building American systems that won't last when we leave, and I don't think AQ will come back if we leave...
Well put. Nobody seems to have a good answer on what to do, so let's just leave. The Al Qaeda presence in AF is either minimal or non-existent depending on who you ask.

Pointlessly trying to form a democratic government in a country used to tribal warlords and Islamic oppression doesn't seem like something that's helping our national interests, in reality. It's certainly a waste of taxpayer money, and more importantly, lives.

Back out and let them deal with their own country. If anything, maybe our interference will have given them a glimpse of life without Taliban rule and they might actually do something about it -- if they even want to in the first place.
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Old 05-24-2011, 17:00   #58
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Originally Posted by MtnGoat View Post
Most Conventional IMHO think that with a ton of SF or as they like to call them SOF manuls and/or FMs think this makes them SME. Hell even some newer SF NCOs and Tm Cdrs. When GEN McChrystal asked for his 30,000 more troops he got maybe 3,000 Combat fighters and about 25,000 clerks and maybe 5,000 Medical personnel. He needed IMO 25,000 warriors and 3,000 Clerk (not enough desk or computers for all them).

SF is one of the best Force within DoD.. We are Cheap. SEALS are cheaper then any Navel Ship made, PJs and CTCs same with Aircraft.. MARSOC..well their Marnies that branch never really took care of their own IMHO.. But on the ground SF is the cheapest out of any DoD SOF elements. We can live with locals, Eat their food and only need Ammo, Medical and stuff we break dropped into us. Almost eveything we can get from the locals logistical supplies within a give country. All of our radios system we can talk and do thing that most UNITS need a 3Di internet system to do. We are lite and very fast.. Look at what 5th Group did in 2001 to 2002!!! Some on Horse back too. No GMVs, No RG 33s, no 105mm, ETC and ETC. For me overall money isn’t the issue for SF. For the War machine of Conventional Army on KAF, BAF, JBAD, TK, ETC yes there money will always be an issue. Yes IMHO it is “more financially efficient SF/SOF units to do what” we are made to be able to DO!!



This one of the reason many Think Tanks say GWOT is a non winnable war. May be true. I say Military working with a “police action” style of investiagtion is what will help out a lot. inter-agency corporationis a key thing. For some a big pipe dream in many areas. But when AQ works as NGO in Yemen, Pakistan, in Afica, ETC you need more than just pipe hitters.
Thank you for your input! I was unaware that McChrystal's troop surge consisted of so little actual warriors. I fear that such a large number of clerks, etc. only make for too many cooks in the kitchen and thus retards any progress that can be made by the warriors.
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Old 05-24-2011, 21:00   #59
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Originally Posted by DX251 View Post
Thank you for your input! I was unaware that McChrystal's troop surge consisted of so little actual warriors. I fear that such a large number of clerks, etc. only make for too many cooks in the kitchen and thus retards any progress that can be made by the warriors.
DX251 - I say it this way as far as the numbers.. I can't break it down to the Thousands, let alone the hundreds or by what MOS or job skills went dow range. I not one within the Stratosphere of Starfleet. But I do know that the number GEN McChrystal asked for, did request, did not come the way he wanted to do "his style of warfare" for "HIS push" there. More people came forward to major base and not able to go forward to fight the enemy that he wanted to.

But this has been the same story for this country since the 80’s. So IMO nothing new SSDD!!

Be safe hunting!!
__________________
"Berg Heil"

History teaches that when you become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

COLONEL BULL SIMONS

Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”

Last edited by MtnGoat; 06-21-2011 at 08:36.
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Old 05-24-2011, 22:55   #60
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DX251 - I say it this way as far as the numbers.. I can't break it down to the Thousands, let alone the hundreds or by what MOS or job skills went dow range. I not one within the Stratosphere of Starfleet. But I do know that the number GEN McChrystal asked for did request did not come the way he wanted to do is style of warfare for HIS push there. More people came forward to major base and not able to go forward to fight the enemy that he wanted to.

But this has been the same story for this country since the 80’s. So IMO nothing new SSDD!!

Be safe hunting!!
Thank you again for the further explanation. It is nice to hear from the BTDTs. Helps me decipher the truth from the assumptions made by those who have not been a part of it. I suppose it will always be to much to ask to have every resource at your disposal when and how you want it in the theater of war. I'll be sure to take that with me along the way in the years to come.
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