Quote:
Originally Posted by bubba
The short answer, gadget forces NEED gadgets. UW forces need their minds. There is something to be said for not having to have a laser-guided, light weight, see in the dark, go-faster this or that. When that crap fails, and it will, if you expect a plane to drop in a replacement, you are not in an UW environment. Just a thought, "People are more important than hardware"
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My point is the following:
An SFODA is a small element that requires that it be intelligently employed as well as exceptionally supported (logistically and otherwise). The availability of "gadgets" is not the issue here. The issue is their availability whenever, and wherever an SFODA may need them. If you ask an SFODA to ground convoy as part of a CRP for several hours over rough and dangerous terrain at night, the least you can do is provide the detachment with the proper optics that can provide proper depth perception and resolution so that it has the best possible advantage over the threat (both enemy and terrain-based) when required.
What equipment is required? The best equipment available. SF deserves it. Can we work without technology? We certainly can. But, as the most powerful military in the world, with the most well-trained and experienced UW force currently fielded, should we have to? No. SF certainly does not deserve to be on the bottom of the list on the many equipment procurement initiatives out there. Anyone here that's been to the sandbox knows that SF is about the only combat element that is always outside the wire, to some capacity, delivering results way out of proportion to our size.
I am tired of the unnecessarily bureaucratic tangled logistics procurement system that SF - more than other SOF - has been expected to put up with. I'm tired of taking casualties because we have to make do with GMVs as opposed to being inserted via aircraft (a very large gadget) and, thus, not taking full advantage of the element of surprise that offsets the limitations our small numbers and the enemy’s sophisticated early warning system.
SF has been asked, time and again, to make do with less than the optimal support available. It kind of reminds me of when commanders run their units into the ground simply because they don't have the ability (for whatever reasons) to simply give other options to their higher for fear of looking like they are weaker than their peers. We should have better advocates for our needs than we currently have. We’ve been asking for a secondary weapon with better stopping power for years now and yet, we are still saddled with the M9. What does MARSOC – a brand new organization – have? 45 Caliber semi-automatics.
"People are more important that hardware", actually "Humans are more important than hardware" (and I've actually met and spoken to the man that developed the SOF Truths as the tenets we are so familiar with today) is meant to mean that preparing the man for what is expected of him, is far more important that buying the latest "gadget" to solve the issue for which he was trained for in the first place. The context of the SOF Truths is that of cautionary advice for any government (specifically, ours) faced with selecting and training SOF for future combat employment. The SOF truth you paraphrased was never meant to direct priorities of support for forces already on the ground and already in the employment phase. SF has been in the employment phase since prior to 9-11.
In any real sense, nearly every piece of mission-critical equipment we use to fight the battle today - the radio, our rifle, the GPS, etc. - is a gadget, a tool. The real weapon is our mind. That being said, if your radio fails, your weapon malfunctions and your GPS dies, there will be very little between you and 140 to 150 Taliban facing you on an Afghan valley. That problem is greatly compounded when there are only 12 of you along with about 20 to 30 less-than-motivated Afghan National Army soldiers. And yet, we have seen tremendous guile and bravery on the part of our SFODAs result in some of the most heroic anecdotes in the history of warfare. Our men deserve the best support there is because we ask them to do the nearly impossible nearly every day. Period.