Go Back   Professional Soldiers ® > UWOA > Insurgencies & Guerrilla Warfare

Reply
 
Thread Tools Display Modes
Old 02-13-2011, 12:53   #31
NiteTrain
Quiet Professional
 
NiteTrain's Avatar
 
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: The Underground Rail Road
Posts: 20
Things that make you go HMMMMM!

So, I was at a shura today and asked the question, "How do you all as elders and leaders of your villages, view what we are doing and trying to do in your villages?" The answer was, "You say that you are here to help us and to remove Taliban from our villages...so we will let you continue to help us and then when you leave we will go back to what we know best." And our terps have stated that just because you offer something and the locals accept it it does not mean they area allied with you, actually willing to cooperate with you and damn sure DOES NOT mean they wont turn around and IED the road, shoot at you, or just give what you gave them to INS in the area.

You see, the thing about UW is that you have to have an attainable/winnable end result. One that is tangible in nature and not just ideology that can not be manifested because of improper planning, UNREALISTIC expectations, and lack of follow-through. You cant go into an area and give the villages everything they ask for as far as AID-PROJECTS without expecting..no..demanding something in return.

You can not create an ALP/VSO program, which is community policing on steroids, and not provide constant oversight and follow-through of the program. You train "SELECTED" villagers to take on the task of protectors of their respective villages, but where is the constant oversight. An SFODA split can not train, equip, and oversee a mass produced program like this and still run combat operations to create "white-space" in their AO. That is a man-power issue. What happens when ALP is left unchecked in a village? Do they take over the village? Do they join with the INS because they were with them all along and only wanted training and equipment? Do they start or continue bloody tribal wars now that they have weapons? Or what happens to these ALP forces when we leave. Who takes care of them then? Are the people anymore pro-GIRoA than they have been?

The bottom line question is...in the end did we fix the problem or cause a bigger problem? Somewhat like...give a man a fish and he can eat for a day, but teach him how to fish and he can eat for a lifetime....we are teaching how to fish with TNT. You really think that after awhile, the only use for it will still be fishing..and have we truly brought stability to this region?
__________________
"When engaged in combat, the vanquishing of thine enemy can be the warrior's only concern...This is the first and cardinal rule of combat...Suppress all human emotion and compassion...Kill whoever stands in thy way, even if that be Lord God, or Buddha himself...This truth lies at the heart of the art of combat...Once it is mastered...Thou shall fear no one...Though the devil himself may bar thy way..."
Kill Bill, Vol. 1, movie

"Some respect the badge, but all respect the gun"
Righteous Kill
NiteTrain is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 02-13-2011, 16:08   #32
cszakolczai
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Quote:
Originally Posted by NiteTrain View Post
So, I was at a shura today and asked the question, "How do you all as elders and leaders of your villages, view what we are doing and trying to do in your villages?" The answer was, "You say that you are here to help us and to remove Taliban from our villages...so we will let you continue to help us and then when you leave we will go back to what we know best." And our terps have stated that just because you offer something and the locals accept it it does not mean they area allied with you, actually willing to cooperate with you and damn sure DOES NOT mean they wont turn around and IED the road, shoot at you, or just give what you gave them to INS in the area.

You see, the thing about UW is that you have to have an attainable/winnable end result. One that is tangible in nature and not just ideology that can not be manifested because of improper planning, UNREALISTIC expectations, and lack of follow-through. You cant go into an area and give the villages everything they ask for as far as AID-PROJECTS without expecting..no..demanding something in return.

You can not create an ALP/VSO program, which is community policing on steroids, and not provide constant oversight and follow-through of the program. You train "SELECTED" villagers to take on the task of protectors of their respective villages, but where is the constant oversight. An SFODA split can not train, equip, and oversee a mass produced program like this and still run combat operations to create "white-space" in their AO. That is a man-power issue. What happens when ALP is left unchecked in a village? Do they take over the village? Do they join with the INS because they were with them all along and only wanted training and equipment? Do they start or continue bloody tribal wars now that they have weapons? Or what happens to these ALP forces when we leave. Who takes care of them then? Are the people anymore pro-GIRoA than they have been?

The bottom line question is...in the end did we fix the problem or cause a bigger problem? Somewhat like...give a man a fish and he can eat for a day, but teach him how to fish and he can eat for a lifetime....we are teaching how to fish with TNT. You really think that after awhile, the only use for it will still be fishing..and have we truly brought stability to this region?
So would you say that the oversight of the villages needs to be done by someone who is not known to be an overseer?

Almost like an unmarked squad car... people slow down when they see the marked police cars but the second they are out of sight they start speeding again... when the unmarked cars are there and if you make it known the unmarked cars are very much active in patrolling, people are more cautious and abide by the rules. The key is to make sure there is constant oversight like you said.

Also, do you think there is anyway to ensure people stay loyal to GIRoA or has it become embedded in their nature throughout the decades to side with anyone in power? Have it be the Soviets, the Taliban, or now the US?

Anyone can answer, I was merely quoting NiteTrain because it was the most recent post.
  Reply With Quote
Old 02-13-2011, 21:03   #33
bailaviborita
Quiet Professional
 
bailaviborita's Avatar
 
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Pineland
Posts: 555
Quote:
Originally Posted by NiteTrain View Post
You see, the thing about UW is that you have to have an attainable/winnable end result. One that is tangible in nature and not just ideology that can not be manifested because of improper planning, UNREALISTIC expectations, and lack of follow-through.
Shoot- I'd say that that should be the same for any mission we go on- but you're right- the lack of that in Afghanistan- which I blame 99% on the military- is what is hurting us the most (about 70%?).


Quote:
Originally Posted by NiteTrain
You can not create an ALP/VSO program, which is community policing on steroids, and not provide constant oversight and follow-through of the program. You train "SELECTED" villagers to take on the task of protectors of their respective villages, but where is the constant oversight. An SFODA split can not train, equip, and oversee a mass produced program like this and still run combat operations to create "white-space" in their AO. That is a man-power issue. What happens when ALP is left unchecked in a village? Do they take over the village? Do they join with the INS because they were with them all along and only wanted training and equipment? Do they start or continue bloody tribal wars now that they have weapons? Or what happens to these ALP forces when we leave. Who takes care of them then? Are the people anymore pro-GIRoA than they have been?
Great point. Since ISAF is planning on massively increasing ALP, one wonders what will happen then. Not enough SOF- so IJC forces step in and do "partnering" and overwatch of the ALP- much like their partnering with ANCOP and ANP. We called it "drive-by partnering". So, it only gets worse...???

Quote:
Originally Posted by cszakolczai
So would you say that the oversight of the villages needs to be done by someone who is not known to be an overseer?

Also, do you think there is anyway to ensure people stay loyal to GIRoA or has it become embedded in their nature throughout the decades to side with anyone in power?
Not following your first question. Bottom line is that we can't set up a force, help arm and train it, then not provide it with proper oversight. A whole litany of problems can happen: they sell their weapons/equipment, they attack GIRoA forces, they attack Coalition forces, they molest the people, or they simply provide the people with no value.

I adhere to the "propensity" school of thought. Much like in the U.S.- people have a certain worldview and not much will change that worldview. So- the propensity in much of Afghanistan is to "survive". That takes on different forms in different parts of the country- but in many places- if not most- it manifests itself in people only trusting local folks and being very suspicious of and not wanting to invest in outsiders. This includes Tajik police and soldiers if you're not in the Tajik areas. GIRoA will have to prove to the locals that they can provide them with more good than they cause them pain- and GIRoA is as screwed up as a 9 year-old democracy can expect to be in an area that doesn't necessarily appreciate or find useful governance of the self through formal elections and proxies...

So- in short- no way to ensure people "stay" loyal to GIRoA since they aren't loyal already- and there hasn't been much success in "ensuring" anything that we want that involves changing established behavior.
__________________
To an imperial city nothing is inconsistent which is expedient - Euphemus of Athens
bailaviborita is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 02-14-2011, 01:06   #34
cszakolczai
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Thanks bailaviborita, I think I mis read NiteTrains first point and completely interpretted it in the wrong way. But you explained it well. Thanks for the info, I'm definitely learning a lot reading the personal experiences from you guys.
  Reply With Quote
Old 02-14-2011, 17:12   #35
MtnGoat
Quiet Professional
 
MtnGoat's Avatar
 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Asscrackistan
Posts: 4,289
I think that as long as we do most of the fighting, the Afghans (both Civilian and Military) will hold back in what needs to be done. If by 2012 we as a Nation call these last Ten years a "W", then the Afghan military will crumble without our combat troops. If by 2012 we remove most of the troops from Afghanistan, stop spending billions on the dream of a modern democracy in a Country built on tribalism, but without ISAF leaders insisting the Afghans (ANA) fight their own battles and not U.S. Military.

I have seen where a Country sees everything that we have as far as weapons to equipment. They expect the DOS or U.S. Government to provide them with M4 with all the Bells and Whistles, NVGs, ETC to they will be the best in their Region. Not understanding that just because you have a Tricked out M4, doesn't mean you will hit the 100m Target. They don't want the training, just the money. But we dump money into of Foreign Policies to help out of Goals for that country. But once that country gets what they want or need, our mission slow or stop.

Afghanistan is a Lost Country that ISAF doesn't know what to do with it because it is in the same car as the Afghanistan Government. They all live and stay in Kabul and don't really know what is going on. They may say they understand the difference between Eastern Afghanistan to Southern. But they really don't in my Eyes.
__________________
"Berg Heil"

History teaches that when you become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

COLONEL BULL SIMONS

Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”
MtnGoat is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 02-15-2011, 14:29   #36
NiteTrain
Quiet Professional
 
NiteTrain's Avatar
 
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: The Underground Rail Road
Posts: 20
Quote:
Originally Posted by MtnGoat View Post
I think that as long as we do most of the fighting, the Afghans (both Civilian and Military) will hold back in what needs to be done....

Afghanistan is a Lost Country that ISAF doesn't know what to do with it because it is in the same car as the Afghanistan Government. They all live and stay in Kabul and don't really know what is going on. They may say they understand the difference between Eastern Afghanistan to Southern. But they really don't in my Eyes.

SALUDE...I WILL DRINK TO THAT!
__________________
"When engaged in combat, the vanquishing of thine enemy can be the warrior's only concern...This is the first and cardinal rule of combat...Suppress all human emotion and compassion...Kill whoever stands in thy way, even if that be Lord God, or Buddha himself...This truth lies at the heart of the art of combat...Once it is mastered...Thou shall fear no one...Though the devil himself may bar thy way..."
Kill Bill, Vol. 1, movie

"Some respect the badge, but all respect the gun"
Righteous Kill
NiteTrain is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-14-2011, 21:24   #37
MtnGoat
Quiet Professional
 
MtnGoat's Avatar
 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Asscrackistan
Posts: 4,289
I have something to think on... To add to this nightmare

What would have happen if the Taliban become part of the Official Government of Afghanistan? Can we stay that TB is within the GORA? Does TB have a Shadow Government ruling within the broader of Afghanistan ? So if you answer yes to these questions, what effects would it have on the Country if say back in 2005, 2009 and last year if the TB became representatives in parliament.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has said that the Taliban command and control system is in Pakistan, so what would happen to Afghanistan if Taliban's "spring offensive" which promises further attacks throughout Afghanistan in the coming months was order to hold for this year. Someone told the Taliban not to attack unless you are attacked? No attacking US or ISAF Patrols unless they come in your homes or untill Poppy Season harvest?

I bring these all up, because reading AQ in different Countries and how they operate and direct the elements and how they have done these same things in their “AOR”.
__________________
"Berg Heil"

History teaches that when you become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

COLONEL BULL SIMONS

Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”
MtnGoat is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-15-2011, 09:33   #38
scooter
Quiet Professional
 
scooter's Avatar
 
Join Date: Feb 2008
Location: Tennesse
Posts: 766
No, most likely it would be the opposite: Coordinate with GoIRA officials before all movement, and inform them of your route, times of movement, composition, and mission. No targeting of TB personnel without prior approval from GoIRA. Attacks on US/CF would not cease, but ability to retaliate or pre-empt these attacks would lessen. Insistance of a Strategic Framework Agreement that limits US operations. Karzai placing certain TB personnel and safe areas on no-strike lists. Hard limits imposed on the use of CAS and artillery/mortar fire. I could go on...
scooter is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-15-2011, 16:19   #39
MtnGoat
Quiet Professional
 
MtnGoat's Avatar
 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Asscrackistan
Posts: 4,289
Quote:
Originally Posted by scooter View Post
No, most likely it would be the opposite: Coordinate with GoIRA officials before all movement, and inform them of your route, times of movement, composition, and mission. No targeting of TB personnel without prior approval from GoIRA. Attacks on US/CF would not cease, but ability to retaliate or pre-empt these attacks would lessen. Insistance of a Strategic Framework Agreement that limits US operations. Karzai placing certain TB personnel and safe areas on no-strike lists. Hard limits imposed on the use of CAS and artillery/mortar fire. I could go on...
This stuff would never happen in a Combat Zone.. Come on!!

I know the deal. ..
__________________
"Berg Heil"

History teaches that when you become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

COLONEL BULL SIMONS

Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”
MtnGoat is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-15-2011, 16:47   #40
greenberetTFS
Quiet Professional (RIP)
 
greenberetTFS's Avatar
 
Join Date: May 2007
Location: Carriere,Ms.
Posts: 6,922
What will most likely happen in A-stan is what happened in Vietnam when we left!...... Does anyone believe any differently?.......... I don't think anyone has to graduate from a War College to figure that out..........

Big Teddy
__________________
I believe that SF is a 'calling' - not too different from the calling missionaries I know received. I knew instantly that it was for me, and that I would do all I could to achieve it. Most others I know in SF experienced something similar. If, as you say, you HAVE searched and read, and you do not KNOW if this is the path for you --- it is not....
Zonie Diver

SF is a calling and it requires commitment and dedication that the uninitiated will never understand......
Jack Moroney

SFA M-2527, Chapter XXXVII
greenberetTFS is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-16-2011, 19:16   #41
MtnGoat
Quiet Professional
 
MtnGoat's Avatar
 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Asscrackistan
Posts: 4,289
Momentum in Afghanistan

I saw this today. I just ask realy?

Coalition Has Momentum in Afghanistan, Petraeus Says
Quote:
By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, March 15, 2011 – The Taliban’s momentum has been reversed in most areas of Afghanistan, but the progress achieved there is fragile and reversible, the commander of NATO and U.S. forces said here today.

Army Gen. David H. Petraeus told the Senate Armed Services Committee that much dangerous work remains ahead for coalition and Afghan government forces in the country.

“Nonetheless, the hard-fought achievements in 2010 and early 2011 have enabled the joint Afghan-NATO transition board to recommend initiation this spring of transition to Afghan lead in several provinces,” he said. The progress also will factor into his recommendations in drawing down the number of U.S. forces in the country, now at around 100,000, the general added.

The progress, Petraeus said, has put the NATO-led effort on the path to turn over security responsibility for the country to Afghan forces by 2014.
Well if we are going to start looking at turning this over to the Afghan Military and Goverment then I say we start making the ANA, ANP, ETC start leading, planning and excuting their Patrols and their operations. ISAF can be there to oversee and provide the "Steel on Target" and Whatever air support they let us deliver.
__________________
"Berg Heil"

History teaches that when you become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

COLONEL BULL SIMONS

Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”
MtnGoat is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 03-17-2011, 06:02   #42
cszakolczai
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Thought this might go well here.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/17/wo...iban.html?_r=1

Can't post the entire article but it speaks about Taliban officials and the new Afghan government. It speaks somewhat to what mtngoat was speaking about a few posts up.

Posted - lots of good points for consideration - Richard

Pressure Mounts on All Parties in Afghan War to Begin Talks
NYT, 16 Mar 2011

As American troops press the Taliban in their desert and mountain redoubts, Western diplomats, Taliban leaders and the Afghan government have begun to take a hard look at what it would take to start a negotiation to end the fighting.

Efforts to start peace talks have yielded little in the past. Nonetheless, interest in a political track is growing as pressure mounts to find a palatable way to reduce the military commitment here and as public support for the war ebbs in the United States and Europe.

“The environment is shifting,” said a Western diplomat here, who echoed a number of others interviewed. “If the Taliban make a decision they are interested, things could move quite quickly.”

Publicly, at least, the Taliban have always stated that they will not negotiate before foreign troops leave the country. Now, however, some Taliban leaders have signaled that they will be open to talks sooner if their security can be guaranteed, and rank-and-file fighters appear increasingly eager to see an end to the war.

For their part, United States officials have also been adamant that they will not talk to top Taliban or other insurgent leaders they consider to be “irreconcilable.” But recently they have quietly begun reducing the obstacles to talks.

In February, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, in a speech at the Asia Society in New York, appeared to recast longstanding preconditions for talks: that the insurgents lay down their arms, accept the Afghan Constitution and separate from Al Qaeda. Instead, she described them as “necessary outcomes.”

Officially, the State Department played down the change in language, but a senior Western diplomat in Washington, who was familiar with the strategy behind Mrs. Clinton’s speech, said: “It was not intentional to explicitly make preconditions into outcomes. But the text now leaves room for interpretation, which opens doors.”

Intentional or not, the speech was read in Kabul as giving a green light to other Western countries to start laying the groundwork for talks.

“The seismic shift here was Hillary Clinton’s speech,” said a diplomat here. “This is liberating for other countries who want to try to facilitate a negotiation.”

It is the American nod that many have been waiting for. Several countries, among them Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have tried to serve as peace brokers, but without the imprimatur of the United States. That the Americans are signaling that they are open to talks “is a paradigm shift,” said Rangin Dadfar Spanta, President Hamid Karzai’s national security adviser.

The Afghan government insists that the preconditions for talks remain the same but supports diplomatic efforts that would lead to negotiations, and it appears willing to provide amnesty and security for the Taliban leaders so that they can participate in talks unhindered.

The High Peace Council, which was appointed by Mr. Karzai, recently wrote letters to the Quetta Shura and the Peshawar Shura, two of the Taliban’s leadership organizations, inviting them to talk. A member of the council, Hajji Deen Mohammed, said the Taliban shuras replied with questions about whether the council had true autonomy and could ensure the safety of insurgent leaders.

“We are working on this process to find a location or safe haven for the Taliban to go there with protections and guarantees to talk to the Americans and the world,” said Arsala Rahmani, the former Taliban minister of higher education and now a member of the High Peace Council.

American officials in Washington said that allowing the Taliban to open an office in Turkey was a possible measure under active consideration, but that no decisions had been made.

“We have gotten approval for an office from Turkey, and if we have an office, then the world can come and the Taliban can come and within a week, once it’s set up, they will be talking,” said Mr. Rahmani, who is one of a handful of former Taliban officials who maintain contacts with the Quetta Shura.

Mr. Rahmani, however, is viewed as a moderate. When asked, a member of the Quetta Shura insisted that there were no talks at all. Several diplomats in touch with the Taliban indirectly said members of the leadership could not be seen to be reaching out to the West because then they would lose their ability to persuade Taliban foot soldiers to keep fighting.

The Taliban would also consider it vital that some of its leaders be removed from the United Nations sanctions list, which would allow them to obtain passports and travel outside Pakistan, where they are based, so that they could be part of negotiations, said Western diplomats.

Removing them from the list would also build confidence that American and Western officials were negotiating in good faith, as would releasing one or two high-profile Taliban fighters who are in detention in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, the diplomats said.

But the effort is fraught as well. Each application for a Taliban member’s removal from the list requires voluminous documentation and approval by each United Nations Security Council member. Russia, which fought a nine-year war with the Afghans, has been skeptical of efforts to remove any of them.
Another looming problem is Pakistan. The Taliban’s fortunes are intertwined with that of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, which helped to create the Taliban in the 1990s, but now the Taliban feel trapped by Pakistan. Some senior Taliban leaders have tried to negotiate with the Afghan government without Pakistan’s approval, including the No. 2 Taliban commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was arrested in Pakistan last year.

Other Taliban commanders, too, have been detained, threatened or even killed by Pakistani security forces, to press them to keep fighting.

The “Taliban won’t go for peace talks either in Pakistan or Afghanistan,” said Hajji Qar Mohammed, a senior tribal leader in Quetta who is close to the Taliban.

“In Pakistan the ISI won’t let them talk freely and say what the leadership wants, and in Afghanistan the Taliban leadership doesn’t trust Karzai’s administration,” he said.

Last edited by cszakolczai; 03-17-2011 at 06:05.
  Reply With Quote
Old 03-20-2011, 10:22   #43
MtnGoat
Quiet Professional
 
MtnGoat's Avatar
 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Asscrackistan
Posts: 4,289
New Warlords system or VSO??

In 2008 I was deployed to a country and we had many different National Level VIPs come a visit us due the sensitivity of our Mission. One thing I took away from this trip was that SF Commanders, SOCENT, CENTCOM, and National Level people never want to give what Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld call Ground Commander control in their decisions being made. I feel that today no SF Commanders will let ODAs leadership due what they feel they need to do. We see this in different ways in Afghanistan.

To bring to point, 2001 to 2003 in Afghanistan we had ODA manning numbers as low as 6 men on an ODA. ODBs with 6 men on them with maybe 3 extra Support MOSs. So if back then we have ODAs being Ground Commanders for their AOR within a “JSOA” and controlling Guerilla Forces with these numbers. Back then these ODA/ODBs broke down into 2, 3 4 man cells control their respective Guerillas Forces and lead attack and dropped bombs on Taliban Targets. But for the last three years ODAs have to roll out "50 man" strong.

I see today where ODA Commanders can’t say I’m going to go to this village and then this village. ODA manning levels most are at a certain number level so you can go do a set mission. I have said this before; ODAs in Afghanistan typically don’t make long day patrols and are now being told what and even where you will go patrol. Not even three years ago ODAs would load up Extra HUMMVE or a trailer and have locals roll out with them to visit different areas. We use to use ASGs to help out with security, but were told we could use them because there were hired as security forces and couldn’t be used in offensive operations. But today were have ODAs being the lead on programs include the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Community Outreach, Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), Community Defense Initiative (CDI), Local Defense Initiative (LDI), Village Stability Platform, Village Stability Operations (VSO), Afghan Local Police (ALP) Initiative, and others. Many of the same things we were doing three to five years ago but under each ODAs own naming or “program”. But today are we saying ODA leadership needs to be told were they need to patrol to and what to do when they get there? If we are, then we are opening a box for not only of Leadership, but for every young NCO coming to an ODA. If we say we can still do UW, and I truly believe we can, then I feel SF Commanders need to let ODA leadership do what they want for their OWN AOR. We live there not on KAF or BAF. Just because you’re the SF Commander and you read our SITREPS, remember back to your days and a TM Leader, you didn’t put everything in those SITREPS because of whatever reason. I know typically you want to “Feel out” the situation.

I think UW battlefield would play out like some of these programs which are no longer in effect due to politics within the United States military and diplomatic community, opposition of some entities of the Afghan government, lack of funding, divergent views on the use of 'militias' or Guerilla Forces, or because the programs simply did not work well because of the leadership on the ground didn’t want to do them.

The long-term Unconventional Warfare (Environmental) success of these kind of Military initiatives with a local bottom-up approaches depend on a number of things going right in Afghanistan. I will use Afghanistan as the Template “model” for current model for Unconventional Warfare. One important factor is the ability of the Department of State to field personnel as a part of the "civilian surge" on the battlefield that will work in the USSF Teams. The DoS Support Teams can assist in Unconventional Warfare Environmental programs like the Village Stability Program efforts. USSF teams (likely ODBs) will need to know how to tying to get district headquarters into the rural villages so that services such as justice, law, order, security, and development are provided in each village.

In Afghanistan some of these programs have been described as "bottom-up", the fact remains that the central government has to approve the program. All of the funding is funneled through a corrupt Ministry of Interior through the province and district headquarters, if there is a district center in the given area. As with all programs with any country, every Governmental Level skims money, supplies and equipment off the top. Iraq USSF teams saw their Military Partnered SF Officers take half (Steal) of the US Ammo and then come back from leave with new cars or whatever. In Afghanistan you Provincial level officials and Afghan National Police (ANP) exert their influence in the decisions about funding, selection of ALP members, and locations to stand up ALP elements. Then Karzai picks who he wants to be provincial governors; many times the post going to the highest bidder, a family member, or political ally. In turn, the provincial governor gets to appoint his own sub-governor (district leader). This contributes to an ineffective and corrupt provincial and district leadership.

Do we need an Infantry Platoon to pull our Security? Can we not do what we did in the earlier days of Afghanistan or Vietnam days? Raise and control our own Guerilla Force? Can we do what we did with ASGs and do it with locals?
__________________
"Berg Heil"

History teaches that when you become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

COLONEL BULL SIMONS

Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”

Last edited by MtnGoat; 03-20-2011 at 10:24.
MtnGoat is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 05-02-2011, 14:43   #44
MtnGoat
Quiet Professional
 
MtnGoat's Avatar
 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Asscrackistan
Posts: 4,289
3rd Brigade Combat Team training to deploy to Afghanistan

Ok I'm posting this Article here in this Tread (not in Early Bird) because it speaks of the Nightmare we have made for ourselves IMHO.

3rd Brigade Combat Team training to deploy to Afghanistan

Quote:
The extra soldiers assigned to the task force will allow it to expand operations that "assist in the defense of rural villages; provide support to the development of local governance; and provide support to economic and infrastructure development" through local Afghans, Afghan security forces and the Afghan government, Connolly said in an email.
I have never understood why we (U.S. Special Forces) need some Conventional Army Infantry, Striker SBTC or/and M1 Tanks at our VSOs. Fire Bases, maybe, but most bases I still say NO. My issue with the focus SF under CJSOTF-A is going with all of these Conventional Units "HELPING" SF and SOF forces out is - WHY. Wait their our BSO and Base Guards… Yes so we can sleep better for the next day’s missions and patrols. Yes, I know and have heard the reasons. I have sat down and talked to TS and TL and TM NCOs about this whole new focus just coming back from this last trip. Guys from both from 7th and 3rd Groups. How most I will say, we don't like it. We don't want them. Most will say they can't get money to pay locals to do the ASG jobs like at a FB. WTH - for real??? Okay yes you say that is the way it is. I got it, but why is it that way?? Many reasons we all know that have been on a VSO or FB. Once again, I say most are because of what we (USSF) has done to ourselves.

I just wonder for every QP on here that worked in Vietnam and other lands of far and away that is now a Former Action Guy. Did you really have to pay everyone? Don't use the times are different now. Really, that is the reason. I have been in places in Afghanistan that locals thought we were RUSSIAN!!! No SHIT RUSSIANS!! They have no Power, water for fields is from ditches, Mud huts, Blah Blah… they do thing like many of our Grandfathers did 70 to 90 years ago here in the Great USA. So you say they need money?? Yes many do, but not all of them. That’s what makes us different from those Other Guys Again.

What has happen with USASFC and CJSOTF-A using SFODAs as force multipliers, like we were in 2002 to 2004/5ish.

Are we saying USSF - SFODA can't raise a Surrogate force? When do we need a Conventional Army support to be our fighting arm?? Do we??
__________________
"Berg Heil"

History teaches that when you become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

COLONEL BULL SIMONS

Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”

Last edited by MtnGoat; 05-02-2011 at 18:11.
MtnGoat is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 05-05-2011, 20:18   #45
MtnGoat
Quiet Professional
 
MtnGoat's Avatar
 
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Asscrackistan
Posts: 4,289
I think this is a really good Article on SWJ. I like it because Andrew Bacevich’s makes some great points within his Article on David Kilcullen's Book.
Quote:
Like.. Andrew Bacevich also writes, in one of the best parts of his review: “If counterinsurgency is useful chiefly for digging ourselves out of holes we shouldn’t be in, then why not simply avoid the holes? Why play al-Qaeda’s game? Why persist in waging the Long War when that war makes no sense?”
Accidental Guerrilla: Read Before Burning

This is going to be on my reading list.
__________________
"Berg Heil"

History teaches that when you become indifferent and lose the will to fight someone who has the will to fight will take over."

COLONEL BULL SIMONS

Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”
MtnGoat is offline   Reply With Quote
Reply


Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests)
 
Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is Off
HTML code is Off

Forum Jump



All times are GMT -6. The time now is 16:07.



Copyright 2004-2022 by Professional Soldiers ®
Site Designed, Maintained, & Hosted by Hilliker Technologies