Quote:
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Originally Posted by Martin
I wonder how far this is supposed to be interpreted.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Nikolaj Sadchikov, Russian ambassador in Stockholm, SvD 07Sep04, page 5
[...] It is without doubt an agony for those behind the plans for a sustainment of the instability in Chechnya and therefore they don't stop to financially and morally support the Chechnyan "resistance".
In relation to this, I want to reiterate the lesson the Taliban regime of Afghanistan ought to have taught us. The Talibans were brought to power with support from certain outer forces with concrete aims. We know today what this led to.
Those within the EU who wonder how the terror acts could happen, should instead think about "the policy of double moral".
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[EDIT: Corrected the date for the article.] |
It is an attempt to link all Chechen rebels to the Islamist terrorists. Chechen opposition to Moscow is divided between Chechen nationalists who seek Chechnya's independence, Islamist radicals who want to ignite a holy war in all of the Caucasus and old-school bandits profiting from the chaos. Because of the experience of many Europeans under the Soviet thumb and because of the atrocious human rights record of the Russian government in the Chechen wars, the Chechen nationalists (but not the Islamists) have much support in Europe. By linking them to the terrorists, Russia wants to dry up this source of funding and sanctuary.
The specific target here is Aslan Maskhadov. A colonel in the Soviet Army, Maskhadov became Chief of Staff of the Chechen armed forces when Chechnya declared its independence under former Soviet Air Force general Dzhokhar Dudayev. Maskhadov led the successful guerrilla campaign in the First Chechen War (1994-96). Dudayev was killed in a rocket attack in April 1996, and Maskhadov was elected President in 1997 (beating, among other candidates, Shamil Basayev). The Chechen and Russian governments existed in an uneasy coexistence during that period. Maskhadov and Islamist warlords such as Basayev cooperated initially, but soon broke with each other.
In 1999, Chechen Islamists opposed to both Maskhadov's government and the Russians launched a series of attacks, including a raid into neighboring Dagestan. Then, in September 1999, a series of bombs went off in Russia, including one in an apartment complex. Putin immediately blamed the Chechens, though it is widely believed in Russia that the FSB actually set off the bombs, either as part of a CT exercise gone wrong or as a pretext to relaunch the war in Chechnya. The FSB refused to allow FBI forensics specialists to assist in the investigation.
Whatever the truth, relaunching the war is what Putin (former head of FSB) did. Avoiding the mistakes made in the first war, Russian forces overwhelmed Chechen forces and took Grozny, where they installed a pro-Russian government. The rebels fled to the hills and continued the guerrilla campaign, but have fractured even more than they had before.
An Arab, Ibn al-Khattab, was the main leader of the Islamist Chechens. He was poisoned in 2002. Shamil Basayev now has that role. Basayev led the 1995 Budyonnovsk hostage raid and the 1999 Dagestan raid. He has claimed "credit" for the 2002 Dubrovka Theatre raid led by Movsar Barayev, five suicide bombings in 2003, and many other acts. Among the dead terrorists in Beslan were several associates of Basayev.
Other Chechen "rebels" specialized more in banditry than war. Arbi Barayev, killed in 2001, was one - ransoming hostages was his specialty. Barayev did try to kill Maskhadov in 1999, though.
Notwithstanding Mr. Sadchikov, the lesson of the Taliban regime, if any, is that if you destroy your opponents, what may rise from the ashes may be even worse. Having almost completely destroyed the Chechen nationalists, the Russian government has only strengthened the Islamists. Further, the Islamists also know that when they strike, the Russians will either retaliate directly against the nationalists, further strengthening the Islamists, or randomly against all Chechens, further radicalizing them. So they have a perverse incentive to commit even more horrific acts of terrorism.
To judge by Mr. Sadchikov's remarks and other Russian government statements, it appears that Putin has chosen to continue this vicious cycle. Though, to be fair, I am not sure what choice he has. He could reach out to Maskhadov, and try to bring together his rebels and the pro-Russian government in Grozny, in order to marginalize the Islamists. But while Maskhadov is no Basayev or Bin Laden, he is not exactly innocent either (nor is Putin for that matter), and given what Russia has done to Chechnya, I doubt he would welcome the invite. And the bandit wing will continue its activities no matter what. It is inconceivable that Putin would reach out to a man he despises, and who despises him, with so little chance that anything positive will come out of it.
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