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Old 09-14-2005, 22:39   #31
magician
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"Detention of Iraqi Employees Angers Western News Media" (NYT)

http://nytimes.com/2005/09/15/intern...pagewanted=all

Detention of Iraqi Employees Angers Western News Media

By ROBERT F. WORTH
Published: September 15, 2005
BAGHDAD, Iraq, Sept. 14 - On April 5, Abdul Ameer Younis Hussein, an Iraqi cameraman for CBS News, was struck in the thigh by an American sniper's bullet while filming the aftermath of a suicide bombing in Mosul. As he recovered in a military hospital, the Americans arrested him. They later said the film in his camera suggested he was working for insurgents.

More than five months later, Mr. Hussein is still in an American military prison. The Iraqi criminal authorities have reviewed his case and declined to prosecute him. Colleagues who were with him that day have produced affidavits supporting his innocence. The American military has not released any evidence against him, despite repeated requests for information by CBS producers, lawyers and even the network's president, Andrew Heyward.

Mr. Hussein's case exemplifies a quandary faced by Western news organizations here. Their own reporters are mostly confined to fortified compounds and military bases. As a result, they are forced to rely on Iraqis, who work in increasingly dangerous settings, where the line between observer and participant is not always clear.

Western bureau chiefs concede that they cannot be certain the people they hire do not have links with insurgents, though they do their best to weed out such people.

One thing is clear: dozens of Iraqis who carry out assignments for the news organizations have been detained while on the job, and sometimes released weeks or months later with no explanation. American forces have mistakenly killed a dozen others, including a soundman working for Reuters who was shot dead by a sniper on Aug. 28.

Some of those cases raise a broader question: how close can Iraqi reporters get to insurgents without being considered the enemy? American commanders often suggest that reporters who are tipped off about an attack are automatically implicated, but Iraqis often take a different view.

"Maybe some are working with insurgents, but many others just get a call from someone saying, 'There will be clashes,' " said Ibrahim Saraji, the director of the Iraqi Journalists' Rights Defense Organization, formed last year after the fatal shooting of two Arab journalists in Iraq. "It doesn't mean they are an insurgent."

Pentagon lawyers have told CBS that Mr. Hussein is being held on classified evidence, according to letters sent to the network that were provided to The New York Times. The military has released statements saying that Mr. Hussein tested positive for explosive residue, and citing accusations that he "had knowledge of future terrorist attacks." It is not clear who made the accusations, or whether the residue may have resulted from his proximity to the scene.

Mr. Hussein's friends and relatives - who have not been able to visit him in prison - say the military has not interviewed them or searched his home, standard procedure with people suspected of having ties to insurgents. CBS executives say the network has investigated the incident and has no reason to believe that its cameraman was working with insurgents.

Clearly, it is often difficult for American soldiers to tell a reporter from a combatant in Iraq's chaos, with no uniforms or clear battle lines. The fact that insurgents routinely film and distribute scenes of their attacks makes it even harder. The military cannot afford to give journalists special treatment under those circumstances, said Lt. Col. Steven A. Boylan, a military spokesman in Baghdad.

But Western bureau chiefs say the military often seems to arrest their Iraqi employees merely for getting too close to the action - in effect, for doing their jobs too well. When journalists are killed, the bureau chiefs say, the military often does little more than a cursory investigation.

"They seem to have moved to the view that everyone in a conflict area with a camera is a potential terrorist," said Alastair Macdonald, the Reuters bureau chief in Baghdad. "The burden of proof is on them to prove that they're not."

A number of Reuters Iraqi employees have been detained by the American military, including three who said after being released that they were abused by American interrogators while being detained in Falluja last year. Ali al-Mashadani, a Reuters cameraman, was detained in Ramadi on Aug. 8 and remains in American custody. Mr. Macdonald said he had seen no evidence against Mr. Mashadani or clear accusations, and had no reason to believe he had any insurgent connections.

Iraqi employees with many other companies, including CNN, Associated Press Television News and Agence France-Presse have been detained for long periods in the past year. But some companies declined to comment about the detentions, saying they feared that doing so might harm their relations with the military.

Iraqi reporters often point out that they routinely receive death threats from insurgents, who have killed more reporters than the United States military by far. But they also say the military's suspicion is making it almost impossible for them to work in some areas.

"The American military has intelligence sources, but they don't seem to understand that we have sources too," said Maher Hassan al-Thanoon, 36, who has carried out assignments for Reuters in Mosul for 18 months. "They may just be people who live in insurgent neighborhoods. It doesn't mean they support what the insurgents are doing."

Western bureau chiefs also say that after being detained by American forces, their Iraqi employees often disappear into a void, where nothing can be learned about the case against them and their legal status is unclear. Mr. Hussein, for instance, was initially scheduled for a hearing with the Combined Review and Release Board, a nine-member panel formed to review detention cases. It is made up of three American military officials and six Iraqi government officials from the Justice, Human Rights and Interior Ministries.

But before the board could hold a hearing his case was transferred to the authority of the Iraqi central criminal court. He remained in American custody, though. The Iraqi criminal authorities reviewed the case, though they had not been provided with the classified part of it, and declined to prosecute it.

Jurisdiction over Mr. Hussein was then transferred back to the combined board, which is scheduled to hear his case on Thursday.

His status seemed uncertain in other ways, too. When CBS officials first asked about his health after he was shot and detained, military officials declined to answer, citing American laws on medical privacy.

On Wednesday, Iraq's justice minister, Abdul Hussein Shandal, criticized the detentions of Iraqi journalists in an interview with Reuters, saying he wanted to change a United Nations resolution that gives American troops immunity from Iraqi law. He said journalists were not free to report on all sides of the conflict.

He also dismissed American claims that his ministry had an equal say in detentions, suggesting that the American military controlled the Combined Review and Release Board.

Military officials in Iraq contend that some Iraqi cameramen and photographers show up at attacks so promptly that they must have had advance notice. Colonel Boylan said he knew of two Iraqi journalists in detention whose film footage indicated that they had filmed several attacks on one day, from the start.

Mr. Macdonald and other Western bureau chiefs say they have seen no evidence of such cases. They also say the frequent repetition of that accusation is irresponsible because it makes soldiers more likely to be aggressive with Iraqi journalists at attack scenes.
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Old 09-15-2005, 07:23   #32
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Magician,
May I ask your opinion?

Zarkawi seems to have been on a media blitz the last week and half. Could this mean that the operation in Tal Afur has hurt his group in a significant way? Although, I don't believe the actions in Tal Afur were orchestrated by him. Is he throwing everying out there as a last-gasp or is his group gaining strength? Personally, I think his sphere of control is diminishing.

thanks
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Old 09-15-2005, 09:17   #33
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One of the U.S. battalion commanders in country was saying that the number of hard core fighters is diminishing, and that more and more often, they are seeing untrained young kids being used by the insurgents.

While they can still drive a car bomb, or act as suicide bombers, this represents a change and it looks like a positive trend to me.

TR
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Old 09-15-2005, 09:42   #34
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Quote:
Originally Posted by The Reaper
One of the U.S. battalion commanders in country was saying that the number of hard core fighters is diminishing, and that more and more often, they are seeing untrained young kids being used by the insurgents.

While they can still drive a car bomb, or act as suicide bombers, this represents a change and it looks like a positive trend to me.

TR

Thank You TR.
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Old 09-15-2005, 11:58   #35
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I have no idea.

I will say however, that I tend to notice things like the number of car bombings. Their number is an indicator. But the question is, an indicator of what, exactly?

While it may be some time before AMZ can prepare more VBIEDs for the next wave of attacks, their number, their geographical distribution, their quality, and the strategems used to deliver them to their target are all possible indicators. There are a host of facts that can be coaxed from such incidents. This list is not comprehensive.

It is important, however, to not look at such indicators in a vacuum. The analyst must remain agnostic. Misinterpretation is a genuine risk. Information from other sources needs to be integrated, and data accumulated over time, and in this way, the probability that such indicators can be correctly interpreted rises.

I am not conscientiously accumulating data and assessing it. I merely engage in a background process, I notice things periodically, and I tend not to form strong opinions as a result.

At this point, I have suspicions. I am not married to them.

One thing to consider about the number of car bombs: AMZ was able to designate that many drivers to commit suicide with their vehicles, and that many were successful, inflicting a great number of casualties. Does this mean that Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia has a plenitude of willing homicide bombers? Or does it mean that they patiently accumulated them, and shot their wad, and that it will take them weeks or longer to acquire more?

Graphed over time, this sort of information can suggest probabilities about AZM's particular slice of the insurgency. Where you draw the peripheries of the problem, how you defiine it, also effects your analysis. I have not done this in any systematic way.

Uncle Sugar has a host of folks who are better placed and better qualified than I to do such work.

For folks like us, consumers of media information, it is important to remember that such events are packaged for media consumption and distribution.

As has been said, terrorism is talk.

I would also like to point out that it can be counterproductive to form strong opinions based only on news reports in open media, for obvious reasons.
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Old 09-15-2005, 18:54   #36
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Magician.

Understand your points, Thanks.
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Old 09-16-2005, 06:50   #37
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Might not be completely in keeping with the thread, but I thought this op-ed was interesting. Maybe this latest round of attacks will unite instead of divide.

http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7&sect...=16&m=9&y=2005

THE bloodbath that has taken place in Iraq in the past couple of days defies condemnation. Over 160 dead on Wednesday, most of them Baghdadi laborers whose only crime was to try and find some work so that they could feed their families. It was an act of sheer evil.

People can understand why the insurgents attack the forces of occupation: Iraqis are a proud people; they are thankful to be rid of Saddam Hussein, but the ignominy of occupation is humiliating. Explicable too, though to a much lesser extent, are the attacks on Iraq’s fledgling security forces who bore the brunt of Thursday’s carnage. They are seen by the insurgents as collaborators with the Americans — even though that is not true. The Iraqi government and the Iraqi security forces are pro-Iraqi.

But to send out suicide bombers to deliberately kill ordinary Iraqis is beyond any understanding. This was even worse than the suicide bombing two months ago which killed around 30 children. At least then there could be the pretence that American troops were the target. There can be no pretence this time. There was no attempt to target the Americans or the security forces. Just plain Iraqis gathered near a meeting point for laborers, hoping for a day’s work.

But, as we know, the head of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, has reportedly declared all-out war on Shiites in Iraq. Those blown up in Kazimiyah were largely, but not entirely, Shiite. In an Internet statement shortly after the outrage, he said it was in revenge for the attack on “the Sunni people of Tal Afar.” He may claim to be fighting for the Sunnis, but he cannot have their interests at heart. He is clearly desperate to trigger a civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, but it is a war that cannot do any good for Sunnis. If there were such a conflict, the massively outnumbered Sunnis would face massacre. No outside force would intervene; the regional balance of power is too delicate. Any intervention would trigger a regional war, unless it were by all Iraq’s neighbors jointly — and that is hardly what Al-Qaeda wants.

This slaughter of the Shiites was no outburst at Iraq’s continued occupation. Nor was it linked to the proposed federal constitution which has left many in the Sunni community fearful for their economic future and which that very day was being submitted to the UN for approval; Zarqawi is not remotely interested in the Iraqi constitution. His interest is in creating an empire of killing fields where, as in the Cambodian original, anyone who does not fit into the desired model is to be exterminated — Shiites included. It is a vile, twisted vision, and it bears no semblance to Islam.

Iraq’s Sunnis must be as revolted and horrified by the attack and all that it implies as everyone else in the region. It raises the stakes dangerously — the mainstream Iraqi Shiite leadership will continue to refuse to be goaded, but there are others in the Shiite community, hotheads who may not listen to counsel of patience, who may take a different line. It is to be fervently hoped that they do not yield to their own passion for revenge.

Last edited by ghuinness; 09-16-2005 at 07:40.
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