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Old 01-16-2011, 22:15   #16
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There is an excellent book which is critical to understanding the region that outlines in detail a comprehensive study of the both the tribal configuration, interaction and boarders which are meaningless to the same. The Book is:Invisible History of Afghanistan untold story, by Fitzgerald and Gould. It is truly worth the read if you are interested in understand why the concept of "winning" is a cultural impossibility.
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Old 01-17-2011, 13:37   #17
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Just my .02

Taliban maybe homegrown entity, but as much as that is do they have the power to rise up from the dust in Afghanistan. Al Qeada is a foreign element operating within a given countries broader - YES.
To look at what is going on in this nightmare within Afghanistan, I think you have to look at the whole “dream”. Not the “two seconds” here or there of the nightmare. I guess you might ask why do people have nightmares? IF you know why then you will know where they are coming from. Yeah yeah I know; psycho mumbo jumbo. Nightmares are associated with anxiety, fear or terror and this is what I feel military leaders and policy makers are looking at. I say, let’s look at why we are having this nightmare of Afghanistan.
Can we stop having them? Will they continue? IF so for how long. I really don’t think we will ever know this answer.
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They might- but it is an assumption. Many people (including ISAF, some politicians, and many think-tanks) state it as fact: if the Taliban takeover and/or we leave- AQ will naturally come back, set-up training camps, and resume bombing our cities.

All of those are a chain of assumptions, and many analysts have written that they are bad assumptions- or at least assumptions that are not worth banking the amount of money/troops/and effort we are to make sure they don't happen. There's also the thought that if they DO come back- they'd be more targetable and it would cost us much less, we'd get more of them, and it would be easier to hit them there as opposed to being in Pakistan, Somalia, Indonesia, etc.
I don’t see this as an assumption of Taliban coming back to Afghanistan if the International community pulls out in full, it will especially happen in every Pashtun area. This is where Taliban has their internal base within Afghanistan now.

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But- to get to the main point: I would submit that the Taliban had a very tenuous relationship with AQ and that today they are very different than what they were prior to 2001. They probably wouldn't want to come to power in certain places and then make a group welcome that they know would invite U.S. retaliation and interest. There are many places in Afghanistan that- given the chance- they will fight ANY outsiders- to include AQ. And the Taliban aren't a monolithic entity either- many are local powerbrokers using the Taliban moniker for their own local interests.
These are my points on why this nightmare is happening now.

In 2002 Taliban ran like the wind, mainly to Pakistan, but also Iran, and to the northern central Asia states. But during 2002 one of the focuses was on, just as the whole world, the near-war between Pakistan and India. Yes a nuclear war, we came pretty close to one. U.S. along with their coalition partners were killing some serious Taliban, but with everyone running to Paikstan, the U.S. IMHO didn’t care about Taliban, they cared about the Al Qaeda elements Arab leadership; U.S. wanted the Al Qaeda Arab leadership running into Pakistan. Al Qaeda Arab leadership controlled and funded and support everything that was going on in Afghanistan, so I really feel the U.S. did not question what Pakistan and Musharraf’s was doing, as long as Pakistan’s Army was cooperating with our (U.S.) principle objectives in catching the Al Qaeda Arab leadership. But during that time period Pakistan IMO really didn’t give a rat’s ass about Al Qaeda they could pawn them up to the U.S. Pakistan was dealing with issues in Kashmiri and internal militant group in and around the Capital. This started Pakistan’s refusal to internal grapple with their homegrown terrorism. But wait, we said that Taliban was a homeground entity already right? Yes we did, but was this the Taliban in Pakistan? IMHO, NO this was not the Taliban. This was one of the many different militants groups set up by the ISI within Kashmiri to deal with India. ISI was setting up these groups for a number of years, no decades. ISI has been working on promoting the Kashmiri cause, the new nuclear program, and promoting the pro-Pakistan Government inside Afghanistan (the Taliban). ISI set up the Taliban to promote the pro-Pakistan Government inside Afghanistan so this entity would be supportive of any causes against India. ISI has set up numerous extremist groups, both in Kashmiri and inside the uncontrolled areas of the FATA and NWFP. Many of these extremist groups, especially in the FATA and NWFP breed into Al Qeada groups or support base. These extremist groups abandoned the ISI for Al Qaeda as these main base of support. ISI change the way they did things in 2003, but that’s a different story. U.S. also kicked off Iraq war in 2003, this changed a lot of what was going on inside and out of Afghanistan.

SO with U.S. not truly caring about the Taliban Leadership flowing into Pakistan in 2003 to 2004; so in turn the ISI gave key Taliban Leadership sanctuary inside the uncontrolled areas of the FATA and NWFP. Afghan refugee camps inside the NWFP and FATA became Taliban and AQ training camps and support hubs. Oh BTW, I have worked inside the FATA and lived with the Frontier Corps and the Pakistani Military Commanders, this is where I get my options. Not just from books and news articles.

Now with this nightmare feeding off this, we come to the next step which I feel is what the ISI is doing within Afghanistan and the undermining of the international community’s efforts. ISI we know set up the Taliban and funded them from their beginnings in the Mid 1990s to today. The feeling is that the ISI was working with and through the Taliban and Afghan Pashtuns. ISI maybe with or without Islamabad knowing, did this because of the link between the two countries. Their tribal link of the Pashtun’s in Pakistan tribal belt of the FATA. In turn Pakistan was turning over and naming many AQ Arabs and non Afghans to the U.S. Government. But what the U.S did with and through the ISI in the 1980s coming back to bite us? Maybe, adding to the nightmares. As you look and read on what Pakistan is doing what and not doing anything within their tribal belt. You can see where we have our nightmares coming from. Since 2004 Taliban has been running training camps inside Pakistan and attacks within Afghanistan were going up. Taliban and Al Qaeda had done their Three R’s (Rest, Refit, Redeployed) from Pakistan and attacked at will in Afghanistan. Taliban likely increase their confidence as they perceive having four key requirements of insurgents — Proxy war (Key Leadership in Pakistan and elsewhere), unlimited manpower (Madrassas), unlimited time, and a safe havens in Pakistan within NWFP - North and South Waziristan and Quetta; from the Madrassas that the ISI fund and help set up. Insurgent funds, that most likely came from other Center Asian states and Arabian Gulf Countries. The arrest of Sheikh Ahmed Saleem, the key planner of the 1998 Embassy bombings in Africa, had provided a wealth of information of how Al Qeada was possible getting their leaders out of Pakistan and support base for action in Afghanistan. But in 2004 we had Dr. A. Q Khan Scandal break, of proliferating nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Focus change for a while due to this.

But how does Al Qeada still have a pull over this, if their key leaders are gone from Afghanistan or Pakistan? Keep in mind what Al Qeada is and what is means. “The Base”, so it has no real home. Looking at Pakistan and Afghanistan as part of the greater Central Asia states, you near to look at the Islamic Movements in and around Afghanistan you can see foreign elements (Central Asia states) come to Afghanistan to be “tested” (IMO). Islamic movements in the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union are to some points a focus on state and non-state actors or funding for Al Qeada. Key elements are the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and the movements Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); are each trying to achieve power in their respective contexts but in very different ways within their given countries. About the same time that the Taliban rose from the dust of the Soviet Army leaving Afghanistan, the same happen to the north. Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) movements both started out in the early to mid 1990s. IRPT in Tajikistan and the IMU and HUT in the Ferghana Valley region of eastern Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; offering different paths to the acquisition of power and somewhat differing views of Islam. IMU is a serious force, incorporating foreign fighters such as Arabs, Chechens, Pakistanis and Afghans, in addition to Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other Central Asian nationalities operating throughout the region. The IMU goal was to first overthrow the repressive regime of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and then “liberate” the other countries in the region to create a pure Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. Man this sounds a lot like the goals or aims of Al Qeada. Yep and that is why in the 1990s, IMU received training and support in Afghanistan from Osama bid Laden. Both to bring these groups into current times, I feel that IMU and HUT growing discontent in the Ferghana Valley does not automatically mean imminent regime change in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan or the Kyrgyz Republic. But with the nightmare in Afghanistan growing and IMU showing up in Central to Southern Afghanistan to North and South Waziristan makes you wonder what plans global Al Qeada have for Central Asia States and any regime changes. What in fact are the strategic plans of the U.S. for the entire central Asia States and region?
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Old 01-17-2011, 13:38   #18
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My .02 Cont'

In 2005 to 2006 the British took over the Helmand and brokered a “peace deal” molded after the Northern Ireland. With this combat operation slowed, if not halted. The only U.S. presence was USSF in the Helmand. This “deal” added to the increase drug cultivation of poppy fields in Southern Afghanistan. Poppy field establishment and cultivation doubled if not tripled due to this “deal” in the Helmand. Now Taliban had an internal source of funding their campaigns against the occupying forces in Afghanistan. ISAF, DOS and international community has yet to control this problem.

Now with the LDI/VSP programs being implemented as a program similar to the approach advocated by Major Jim Gant. To use Afghanistan’s various tribes as a proxy for both political legitimacy against the Taliban and a more effective and relevant structure for a local village provision of governance I love the term of “Tribe-Centric Unconventional Warfare/Foreign Internal Defense.” Really? But, I thought in 2003/2004 the international community had pushed for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program to pull power from the Warlords and put it back into the newly formed Central Government power.

Doing my VSP, I would see internet articles indicating that the Taliban are supportive and already making the ‘government in a box‘ coming true in Marjah and Kandahar as promised by Gen. McChrystal; but it isn’t materializing. But these VSP and “ink spot” strategy in remote village are indicative of what we can expect in Kubal, Kandahar and elsewhere. What is the best strategy for Afghanistan? What will make this nightmare go away? If anything. Is it a Tribe-Centric Unconventional Warfare/Foreign Internal Defense (TC UW/FID) approach executed by leveraging the social tribal system that defines Afghan society? For any SF guy out on the ground, does anyone really ask a person in Afghanistan, “Who are you?” What will they tell you? Most likely they will tell you about their tribe, ethnicity or sect – but not nationality. Most people in Afghanistan don’t know Jack outside of their villages. Even Jinga Truck drivers look at Afghanistan as a line on a map — drawn by the British. This is from someone that went to some kind of schooling too, most don’t know how to read or anything. The only “Afghan” people are in Kabul, because it pays so well to be Afghani. When you start looking at the tribal Areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is no line. That’s why Afghanistan and Pakistan can’t control their own broader. Adds to this nightmare and will inherently allow the Taliban to take control of Afghanistan outside of the Government control and their currently control areas and providences.

The tribal-based approach has recently crashed and burned in eastern and southern Afghanistan, mainly where the Pashtun majority are and Taliban control or drug trade are. Where an effort to capitalize on a given tribe’s willingness to fight the Taliban in exchange for cold hard cash encountered the insurmountable obstacles of inter-tribal rivalries; hostile and threatened Afghan government structures which typically are drug controlled government lands; U.S. civilian unwillingness to risk alienating the Afghan government; and simply insufficient U.S. policy makers knowledge of the complexities of Afghan tribal structures and how to navigate them. I feel a contributing factor of this lack of understanding within the U.S. Military and high-level U.S. decision makers, is how can you teach someone how the cultural changes from the East to the West to the South to the North that come from a Kabul-centric background or political. Hell, all educated and wealthy enough Afghani’s leave Afghanistan, learn English, acquire a security clearance and secure lucrative western government employment do so. But what do they do for their villages, cities? Most Interpreters move from Kabul to work elsewhere. Vast majority of people in Afghanistan do not view the legitimate of any national authority from Kabul-tribal based centric. Further, Afghanistan lacks the infrastructure of commerce, transport and communication that facilitate the development of national identity. What Nation building has happen in Afghanistan? I think also within the military, both SOF and Conventional, we have Officers that have done two or three trips at ground leaders (Officers) and now are at the staff levels and they feel that they know what is going on. At the SOF level you have commanders that say “I know all I need to know about Unconventional Warfare” or the Conventional Officer “ I know how to run an Counterinsurgency Campaign, what else do I need to learn” To both of them, do you really know (or DO) UW or COIN? Maybe you just had a surrogate force (to achieve U.S. objectives??) that you really only lead from compound to compound and did they really go do things for U.S. objectives? This adds to the raise IMO of the Taliban if and when the U.S. and ISAF pulls out.

To this end, people throughout Afghanistan do not view Hamid Karzai as a legitimate leader, mainly it is only the Phastun’s. This sentiment has hardened in the aftermath of the massive fraud uncovered in connection with the recent election (2004, 2005 and 2009) with literate Afghans and international with the links between Karzai and his brother and the drug trade and the Taliban along with the Karzai’s Government corruption.

I feel that three things need to happen to help ease these anxiety, fear or terrors that have been leading to these nightmares. It is vital for policy makers to understand—some of the very tribal leaders we seek to influence in our efforts against the Taliban are actually threatened by our support of Karzai’s Government. Regardless of our intent or mission, they perceive our actions as empowering his (Karzai) tribe (Pashtun) and their tribal allies to dominate the other tribes via the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and National Police (ANP) once the coalition eventually withdrawals its forces. Which both are broken due to ISAF leading them by the hand on every mission. Second policy makers and military alike need to lay out a policy of what needs to be done with the Central Asia States and to disseminate this plan out to the lower levels. Lastly we need to use a Rumsfeld's quote “put Boots on the ground” in Pakistan tribal belt (NWFP and FATA). Why have we not done this, IMHO it is because of the balancing act the U.S and UK must do between Pakistan and India. We have not gone into NWFP and FATA to attack the known Taliban and Al Qeada locations and Madrassas are; we could drop a shit tin of hell overnight if we wanted too. But we can’t IMO, Why? This would add to another nightmare; Rekindling effects over the 2002 nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan. We don’t go into Pakistan because we need the land routes from the Karachi ports to Afghanistan Bases. India has ports, but their land routes into Afghanistan really didn’t get fully established until 2005. But in 2008 Pakistan said not to India and not allowing India any land route from within Pakistan to trade with Afghanistan and no accord will be signed to the detriment of national (Pakistan) interest. So for us to change direction and start using land routes in India and to start combat operations inside Pakistan.. well, do I need to go down that road? Nightmare!!

So if the U.S. Pulls out of Afghanistan will the Taliban and Al Qeada come back and control Afghanistan? YES they will. Not only Afghanistan but Pakistan, and other Central Asia States - AQ is there now is some form. Taliban will rise faster, but Al Qeada will sit back and feed Taliban for many years before stepping in full. Al Qeada has base of operations elsewhere. Not to mention Iran influence (Qods) inside Afghanistan and the region.
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Old 01-17-2011, 13:44   #19
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Penn View Post
There is an excellent book which is critical to understanding the region that outlines in detail a comprehensive study of the both the tribal configuration, interaction and boarders which are meaningless to the same. The Book is:Invisible History of Afghanistan untold story, by Fitzgerald and Gould. It is truly worth the read if you are interested in understand why the concept of "winning" is a cultural impossibility.
Good book to read on Central Asia States is Adeeb Khalid Islam after Communism. He covers the international the fear of radical Islam that dominates many of Central Asia’s governments, a look at understanding of the politics of antiterrorism, which allows governments to justify their own authoritarian policies. He compares Islam in Central Asia to experiences in other countries like the former Yugoslavia, and other secular Muslim states.
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Intelligence failures are failures of command [just] as operations failures are command failures.”
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Old 01-17-2011, 14:43   #20
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Originally Posted by MtnGoat View Post
Good book to read on Central Asia States is Adeeb Khalid Islam after Communism. He covers the international the fear of radical Islam that dominates many of Central Asia’s governments, a look at understanding of the politics of antiterrorism, which allows governments to justify their own authoritarian policies. He compares Islam in Central Asia to experiences in other countries like the former Yugoslavia, and other secular Muslim states.
Thanks for your posts. I usually think about the issue as AFG and PKN while completely forgetting about India.
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Old 01-26-2011, 16:35   #21
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The drug trade has a lot more significance in Afghanistan than is acknowledged. It provides funds for both the Taliban and Karzai's own pockets. As I have previously stated, I would use a soil sterilant on any poppy field found. These people are not our friends nor do they respect us. For Karzai, we are a funding and security source, for the Taliban, we are a pain in the ass, keeping them from subjugating the locals under sharia. I do feel for the average Afghan citizens, especially the women. They are the only reason I wouldn't carpet bomb the place.

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Old 01-27-2011, 09:33   #22
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I don’t see this as an assumption of Taliban coming back to Afghanistan if the International community pulls out in full, it will especially happen in every Pashtun area. This is where Taliban has their internal base within Afghanistan now.
Are you saying you see it as a "fact"? Anything to do with guessing about the future would be an assumption- but, as you state here, many- including ISAF and RAND and others state it as a fact. IJC and RC planners are notorious for this. And, worse- they don't identify all of their assumptions nor develop metrics to test these assumptions, so- we theoretically are continuously banging our head against reality, but don't have anything in place to test our assumptions to understand this reality. We just keep on blindly following the latest COIN tactical theory fad and wondering why nothing important is improving (like the Afghan forces taking over responsibility). Of course, this doesn't stop us from spinning metrics to make them look good.

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What in fact are the strategic plans of the U.S. for the entire central Asia States and region?
GREAT question. I'd submit there is none- or it is very short-term and not very "strategic". The Chinese and others are running circles around us in the CAS and we (I'd argue because our pols and populace are ignorant, hubristic, naive, and apathetic) are trying to play t-ball in a major-league environment. I'd argue part of the issue in Afghanistan is that regional power politics are in play- but our State Dept. structure has never made it easy for us to develop a regional policy. It is similar to LTG Rodriguez (IJC) conducting a "district-centric" fight while much of the environment (outside of the cities) is more tribal-centric (village/valley-centric?), NATO is pushing for a more Provincial-centric effort, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the International Community (IC) favor a Kabul-centric/city-centric focus. We are concentrating on a supposed terrorist threat in an area that has no de facto borders, ethnicity is more important than nationality, and regional interests and local powerbrokers are much of the gravity that weighs on "why things happen". Meanwhile we're stuck on "people-centric" when the people don't and haven't traditionally held any power or influence in this area. So, great- we avoid bombing them- but that doesn't stop them from supporting guys that put IEDs in the road...

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I think also within the military, both SOF and Conventional, we have Officers that have done two or three trips at ground leaders (Officers) and now are at the staff levels and they feel that they know what is going on.
It's worse than that, brother. We have guys who have never done a tour in Afghanistan and never been on the ground in any country, sitting in air-conditioned (or heated now) cubicles all day and on day one are asking for a pack of gum so they can show everyone how to chew it. That wouldn't be that bad- but these are the guys writing our operational and strategic plans (although there's an argument to be made that no-one is working anything strategic in Afghanistan). They simplify everything to two options- a worse case and a best case- argue for a Course of Action (COA) that will supposedly help us avoid the worst case and never i.d. the assumptions backing up their worst case scenario.

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It is vital for policy makers to understand—some of the very tribal leaders we seek to influence in our efforts against the Taliban are actually threatened by our support of Karzai’s Government.
I think many people understand this, but that rocket has left the stratosphere already. The IC and NATO back a central government. There is much political pressure to create an Eden (or a Denmark/Sweden/Netherlands- take your pick) in Afghanistan- with human rights, womens rights, gay rights, etc. Many politicos see Afghanistan as the ultimate test for NATO's continued existence. Some see it as a chance to "really" nation-build- not like the U.S. did in Iraq (badly according to our Euro sisters), but legitimately: with the UN, NATO, EUPOL, etc.- all singing kumbaya together. So, in short- they don't care about the issue: they want to change Afghanistan and the culture of the Afghans- and worse, they think they can.

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We have not gone into NWFP and FATA to attack the known Taliban and Al Qeada locations and Madrassas are; we could drop a shit tin of hell overnight if we wanted too. But we can’t IMO, Why?
Now we can get to the thing no-one seems to admit or take into account: U.S. internal politics. This is the 14,074,544,583,361 (3 extra credit points for why that number is relevant) pound guerrilla in the room (pun intended) The U.S. population doesn't link AQ or the Taliban in Afghanistan or Pakistan to a domestic threat to us anymore. Polling shows 81% of Americans think we should start withdrawing this summer or earlier. Only 35% favor being there now. And this has been a steady trend for some time now. The Democrats in power want us out now and were against the surge. The President has announced we will start withdrawing this summer. The VP has continuously said it may start sooner. With all of that- I couldn't imagine any politician trying to make the case that we need to send troops into Pakistan. It is just not politically feasible at this point. We had our chance in 2002/2003. We chose to go into Iraq. It's a little late now- we've lost the support, both politically and monetarily. Many in the military continue to have a pipe dream that we can show progress by this summer and keep the "surge" troops. All of the HQs are still asking for more troops. "Just one more year"- we keep hearing, plus "10,000 more troops" (along with additional support personnel/equipment, of course). We heard last year that we only had one year to turn things around- before the report due to Congress in DEC. Now we are hearing we only have 6 months. Then what? Then either the President starts withdrawing combat troops and we start transitioning to Afghan lead, or... NATO pulls out, Karzai begs for 3 more years (2014 everything will be hunky-dory for some reason), and the American people vote whoever is in office out (that's an assumption I'm making, btw). With a year and a half left until the next election- what politician today would risk going against 83% of the population (or more- since this is the # for Afghanistan)??

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So if the U.S. Pulls out of Afghanistan will the Taliban and Al Qeada come back and control Afghanistan? YES they will. Not only Afghanistan but Pakistan, and other Central Asia States - AQ is there now is some form. Taliban will rise faster, but Al Qeada will sit back and feed Taliban for many years before stepping in full. Al Qeada has base of operations elsewhere. Not to mention Iran influence (Qods) inside Afghanistan and the region.
I respectfully disagree with this assumption- as well as the way you worded it: "yes they will". I agree it is a possibility, but not guaranteed. Unfortunately that is the way our HQ words the same assumptions- and shuts out any debate or alternative possibilities. "The district focus is the only way to win in Afghanistan"- stated as a fact. "The people are the Center of Gravity in Afghanistan"- stated as a fact. "The people just want good governance" and, my favorite: "If they had good governance the insurgency would die". None of these are stated as assumptions and therefore we don't try to figure out if they are correct assumptions or not. Our metrics look for trends that something is improving- and we latch on to those that look like they are (or re-interpret them to show that they are) and go on our merry blind way, refusing to hear that we aren't even the emperor- much less that we are naked.

Since, as you state, AQ has ops elsewhere- I don't think we should focus so much attention on Afghanistan- and I don't think we should focus on the Taliban. There are Taliban fighters in RC-N fighting HIG fighters- none of that has to do with taking over Afghanistan or attacking the U.S. It has everything to do with two local groups not liking each other. But, we are involved because it is a metric that could be interpreted as negative to someone- and that might upset the appearance of progress (and heaven knows we cannot withdraw if things don't look good).

COMISAF has one mission right now: make things on paper look as good as they did in Iraq so that it can be politically feasible to leave. The press won't hear a soldier drop in the woods if it isn't a U.S. soldier- so as long as we can support GIRoA and the ANSF enough to keep AQ from hitting us from Afghanistan- we can declare victory. All that will take is some SOF, some trainers, and a whole lot of money and equipment (although not nearly what we are spending now: for every American soldier we send home we can fund something like 20-50 (??) Afghan soldiers/police, I think). And if things turn bad- we can always come back with a killer surge force (the "Biden" plan anyone?). Bottom line: we've got more threats to our security at home (our economy) than we do in Afghanistan right now- and no-one right now can convince our populace that we will change anything in Afghanistan no matter what we do.
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Old 02-09-2011, 18:10   #23
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Still In the Nightmare

AFG is what I would like to think of as a petri dish. It has all the various elements (i.e.; corrupt government, HQN, Taliban, HIG, ISI, tribal in-fighting, difficult terrain, sorted history of invaders, etc.) to make it a vile and volatile nightmare. You really have to have your head screwed on tight with concise and current S2 just to know which way is up in this place.

Also, having a unified upper echelon C2 element with balls would not hurt either. I had a E-9 tell me the other the day, "The days of deliberately killing bad guys are over". I laughed hysterically to keep from vomiting. Not to mention my team had just been in a 55 min TIC. We have stopped with the "kill bad-guys" mentality and assumed a HUM-AID stance. “HEARTS AND MINDS”, that is what we are suppose to be winning. These people understand whoever has the biggest stick and who is not afraid to use it wins.

We are creating programs and infrastructures that are westernized to the core and will crumble like a qalat that just got hit with a 500 lb. JDAM if we ever leave. And now we are implementing a program that will not be able to withstand constant oversight in the villages. I won't go into detail about the program, but lets just say it is a lot like community policing.

The longer we stay the more red tape is thrown out. Commanders don't want to hear that their master plan is a bunch of crap. No, they want to hear how you are doing everything in your power short of rape and murder to implement the plan in a timely manner. This campaign now is smoke and mirrors. We spend more time on VTC’s, filling out request to follow up on a request, and OP’s paper work than you do actually on the operation. The same people we train today we will be back in 5-10 years killing. It has happened before.

Maybe I have said to much and will get my ass in a sling on here for it. But I am resonating what the guys on the ground feel and think.
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Old 02-10-2011, 19:37   #24
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That is one of the major weaknesses of US counterinsurgeny operation aka PRC aka COIN (pick your favorite term) for years. We look at their culture through western eyes insted of looking at it through their eyes and impliment programs that would work in western europe but not there.
This is so true!! Same thing in OIF, but hey it worked there.

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I talked to an Afgan that said he is through with that country. He wants his kids to grow up here and become american. In his opinion the ONLY way to change things is through the education of the populace and espically the women of Afganistan. He told me it would take 20 years at least. When his wife arrived he forbid her from wearing a burka or even a head scarf. He told her it is not the culture here on top of that it would draw too much attention. Two weeks after they got here I met his teenage daughter and she was wearing jeans and T-shirt. You could not tell her from any other girl of her age by looking at her.
I think it is better when the Afghans Terps that come here go back and do something. They can stay here, but do something for their Country. I had one come and go back and he Open up a tin or corrugated steel shops.. added jobs to Kabul (didn't really need it) and Kandahar. Plans on TK and Mazar. Another is working DOS Job in PAK, supporting Family in Country.

Good to see them adjusting well too.
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Old 02-11-2011, 07:34   #25
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We look at their culture through western eyes insted of looking at it through their eyes and impliment programs that would work in western europe but not there.
Exactly!! That should probably be written somehow into our doctrine as something to avoid at all costs. Of course, some of the pressure comes from our politicians, and I've often wondered at the usefulness of a doctrine written by the military, but out of necessity should incorporate everyone. Kind of hard to force the other horses to drink...
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Old 02-11-2011, 12:45   #26
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Old 02-11-2011, 12:55   #27
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Brush Okie
We look at their culture through western eyes insted of looking at it through their eyes and impliment programs that would work in western europe but not there.
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Originally Posted by bailaviborita
Exactly!! That should probably be written somehow into our doctrine as something to avoid at all costs. Of course, some of the pressure comes from our politicians, and I've often wondered at the usefulness of a doctrine written by the military, but out of necessity should incorporate everyone. Kind of hard to force the other horses to drink...
That's exactly the way we used to be taught to think and it was a cornerstone to our UW doctrine. FAOs are (were, anyway) also taught to think that way in order to advise senior level staffs and commanders, and to be LNOs with HN forces.

Is it broken again?

Richard
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Old 02-12-2011, 14:04   #28
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That's exactly the way we used to be taught to think and it was a cornerstone to our UW doctrine. FAOs are (were, anyway) also taught to think that way in order to advise senior level staffs and commanders, and to be LNOs with HN forces.

Is it broken again?

Richard

I don't know if it is "again"- but our senior leaders over there don't understand "Afghan" ways of doing things and are insisting we build them just like they are Americans. So- you've got U.S. military insisting they drive up-armored HMMWVs (even though the logistics to back them up doesn't exist outside of our forces), wear tons of gear (even though they can't carry it all), do U.S.-style PT so they can carry it all (because soccer doesn't lend itself to upper body strength), have UAVs, an on-line logistics system built for an expeditionary force, etc, etc. We can't seem to measure "Afghan" systems to show progress- so how will we know we are "winning" unless we digitize everything and develop American-type systems? The ORSAs are running this war and MacNamara would be SO proud of our number crunching!
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Old 02-13-2011, 05:57   #29
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But I am resonating what the guys on the ground feel and think.
I'll x2 you on everything you said. This has become one big CA mission. We've become completely neutered. Thats all I'll say.

And they wonder why guys are so burnt out...
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Old 02-13-2011, 07:39   #30
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Don't worry, guys... somebody will stick a fork in it and call it a "W" soon enough - probably around the 2012 elections. Why? Because I've noticed that wherever we have troops, the higher ups put little green circles on their Powerpoints designating that area as "Friendly controlled", then as you get further away from the bases, VSPs, OPs, they put little yellow circles meaning "Neutral or contested area". Finally, the furthest you can get away from the CF positions, you have the evil red blobs, which means "Insurgent controlled". Soon enough, the S-2's will look at the enemy activity in those red areas... and because there are no troops there, there is no enemy activity there (no one to get shot or blown up), and they will declare those red blobs should be green blobs. Between putting more bases and OPs and Powerpoint Rangers drawing green blobs everywhere, I assess Afghanistan will be a green blob.. err, I mean, "Friendly controlled" by 2012. At least it briefs well...

Speaking of Taliban, I don't have much Taliban where I am, at least not the "bad" sort... but I have plenty of other insurgents and militants that want control of the land and, in fact, they fight amongst themselves too. Kinda adds a little complexity to the situation beyond Taliban + AQ vs us.
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