This link comes to me via one of my lists this AM, courtesy of SWJ. Having read a bit of this "campaign" & some personal journals from this time, the retrospective is interesting to me in its message of cautioning (again) against stereotyping a situation when the sample for reference is a very low number.
Malaya: The Myth of Hearts and Minds
By Sergio Miller
Journal Article | Apr 16 2012 - 4:44am
An extract:
Quote:
At a RAND Symposium on counter-insurgency held in April 1962, Brigadier-General David Powell-Jones cautioned allies that ‘too much in the way of generalities should not be deduced from the Malayan
campaign’.
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And this:
Quote:
None of the British participants (all military) spoke of winning Malay hearts and minds by military force. In Colonel White’s words – one of the few interlocutors to comment on this aspect of the campaign – ‘it was the consistent show of reasonableness that won over the people of Malaya and the problem was still easier once the country became self-governing’.
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It would seem there are those who make success because they deal with what's actually in the windshield and others that consistently look for directions in an old filing cabinet.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/12513