US Army Combat Tracking School

[PSM]

Originally Posted by MAB32

Does David-Scott-Donelan teach any of the schools lately? Did he teach anywhere in the Army before? If so was he good?

MAB32

He was teaching it in 07. A young Marine sniper I know went through the course then and really enjoyed it and learned a lot.

Pat

That is what I was thinking. I took his course which was six days if my memory serves me well. A very good course. He has allot of great stories to tell when he was a Selous Scout and on the SAS that pertaind to tracking.

I should tell you one, and I will when I get back. Gotta go and pick up a Boxer.

MAB32

[Combat Diver]

Originally Posted by MAB32

Does David-Scott-Donelan teach any of the schools lately? Did he teach anywhere in the Army before? If so was he good?

MAB32

Its his course and he was present for a few days in 08'. Had another team mate that took his mobilty training tracker course there at Camp MacKall one year when he was in SWC.

George

David told are class that while he was with the Selous Scouts, one day he and a "Combat Tracking Team" (3 trackers) heard an explosion about a kilometer in the direction where they had found allot of tracks, so they knew right away that the "anti-Personal" mine(s) had worked as planned. Now they began to walk as fast in that direction as they could. Sure enougth they'd caught up with the Terrs.

When they got there they found 2 Terrs dead at the scene. They then found spores of two terrs and one of them was bleeding quite profusaly and leaving a blood trail walking South of where they were. They picked up their speed to catch these other Terrs. They had gone no further than a couple kilometers when they dicovered that the blood trail had stopped and now there was only 1 Terr walking through according to the spore he/she was making. Thereby making his own spore through the semi-arrid countryside. This was mostly bush and allot of sand and dirt.

They soon came across the two Terrs and captured them both. It seems,from an interpreter that his friend could't make it going across the lake; so they found out why there was all of the sudden no more blood trails. It tuns out that the one terr lost his foot initially, and couldn't go on and so the other Terr decided that his best friend couldn' stand much more pain so he carried him on his back. Thru the Interprarter they also found out what they were doing in Rhodesia. They stated that they were a raiding party to hit this village not to far away and they were going to recruit young men who were of fighting age. The village Chief said emphatically "NO". If they were to say "NO" then the Terrs were to kill everyone in the village. So through the Interprater, David and the others were laughing histerically because they were making jokes with each otherf. David and the others shared some of their food and drink and even started to fix the other's foot. After a few more minutes while, they turned around and shot each one in the back of the head. Using a silenced .22cal. semi automatic

David stated to the class that this was their way of doing things back then. To make friends of the Terrs they captured and would make the Terrs totally comfortable, making the Terrs feel satisfied and then they were offerd food and water, and then they would shoot each one in the back of the head with a silenced .22 cal.

All of The Terroists ncluding ZAPU (The Zimbabwe Africans peoples Union) led by Joshua Nkimo and the ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) which was led by Robert Mugabe.

Both sides trained and recieved support from the Soviet Union and Red China. From both of them. Also, the following Country's surrounding Rhodesia where: Zambia, Angola, Tanzania,Botswana, and Mozambique all provided Communist docterine along with weapons and Interrogaters for them. They were also providing Base Camps for the terrorists.

Richard can give you more information about the failure of Rhodesia because of Ian Smith.

[Intel_Geek]

I've heard a lot of interesting [and creepy] stuff from African white hunter/FOG-types. And from other soldiers who have interacted with them...

Things like man tracking, given specific operations, are incredible force multipliers. The fact that the folks at FT. Hua can't see tracking as in intel-related discipline is really not surprising. Disappointing, but not surprising. Though honestly, I can't really think of a more relevant incarnation of tactical intelligence support short of your HUMINT/terp or or your techy surveillance geeks. (Though, tracking *is* HUMINT.)

Not to mention, you then have someone on the scene who understands not only the immediate importance of the skill, but also the overall strat-level information that needs to go higher, whether you find what you're tracking or not. The subtleties gleaned from each and every tracking action would [over time] start to net troves of actionable and analyzable information. As long as there was someone there who was paying attention. And not just to the tracks.

Tracking is all about patterns. Analysis is all about patterns. They really are the same mental skill set, just applied in excruciatingly opposed environments.

It's a shame the ball is rolling so slowly on that realization.

[Bushranger]

On War #325: How the Taliban Take a Village (Lind/Sexton)
William S. Lind December 7, 2009

EDITOR’S NOTE: The following is a guest column, written by a reserve NCO with Special Forces, Mark Sexton. It is based on his personal observations in Afghanistan. It represents his analysis only, not any position taken by DOD, the U.S. Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government. In my opinion, it represents exactly the sort of intelligence analysis we need but seldom get.

How the Taliban Take a Village
A current method used by Taliban in Afghanistan to gain control of an area deemed of strategic interest to the Taliban leadership operating from safe havens in Pakistan or within Afghanistan is to identify and target villages to subvert. The Taliban have recognized the necessity to operate with the cooperation of local population with the modus operandi being to gain their cooperation through indoctrination (preferred) or coercion (when necessary).


TALIBAN CAN CONTROL WITH FEW FIGHTERS
The Taliban method requires relatively few of their own personnel. Its strength is in the local subversion of the most basic levels of village organization and life. It is also a decentralized approach. Guidance is given and then carried out with commanders applying their own interpretation of how to proceed. The goal is to control the village, and at the local level the only effective method, which must be used by all commanders, is to control what we have termed the nodes of influence. Form fits function, an Afghan village can only work one way to allow its members to survive a subsistence agrarian lifestyle, and the Taliban know it well.

To control an area the Taliban will identify villages that can be most easily subverted. They will then spread to other villages in the area one at a time, focusing their efforts on whichever node of influence seem most likely to support their effort first. Using this model the Taliban could influence and dominate or control a valley or area with a population of 1000-2500 -- of ten villages with 100-250 people (100-250 compounds) -- with only between 20-50 active fighters and ten fighting leaders. The actual numbers may be more population and fewer fighters.

The Taliban will have an elaborate network to support their fighters in areas they control or dominate. They will have safe houses, medical clinics, supply sites, weapons caches, transportation agents, and early warning networks to observe and report. The US and Afghan forces, heavily laden with excessive body armor and equipment, are reluctant to leave their vehicles. They are blown up on the same roads and paths they entered the area on. The Taliban will use feints and lures to draw our forces away from caches and leaders in an attempt to buy them time to relocate, or into a lethal ambush. After the attack the Taliban will disperse and blend into the village. The village will usually sustain civilian casualties and the information or propaganda will be spread of US and Afghan forces using excessive force. The US and Afghan forces will leave or set up an outpost nearby, but the attacks will continue because the forces are not in the village, do not truly know “who’s who in the zoo”, and aren’t able to effectively engage Taliban personnel or effectively interface with the village nodes of influence to their benefit.

We say one thing but our actions are different. Locals are reluctant to help because to be seen talking with the Americans and Afghan security forces will result in a visit from a Taliban member to determine what they talked about and to whom. The local villagers know the government has no effective plan that can counter the Taliban in their village and will typically only give information on Taliban or criminal elements to settle a blood feud. The Pashtu people are patient to obtain justice and will use what they have to pay pack "blood for blood" even against the Taliban.

COUNTERING THE TALIBAN IN THE VILLAGE
Countering Taliban subversion of the populace is not done effectively with just more troops located at outposts. The troops must coordinate their activities with the local population and establish security through and within the village. When US and Afghan forces do this the fight will typically take on a particularly violent aspect, and involve the population as the Taliban attempt to maintain control.

The US and Afghan forces and Government will need to identify individuals to use lethal and non-lethal targeting. This requires in- depth knowledge of tribal structure, alliances and feuds. Viable alternatives or choices need to be available to village leaders and villagers. Just placing US and Afghan soldiers at an outpost and conducting token presence patrols and occasionally bantering with locals and organizing a shura once a month are not going to work.

Afghan identity is not primarily national, i.e. belonging within a geographic boundary with a centralized national government. Afghan identity is tribal in nature. Americans view identity as a national government, in the villages Afghans do not. The tribe is most important. The country "Afghanistan" running things from Kabul does not mean very much to the Afghan people in the villages under duress from the Taliban.

US and Afghan forces must be able to infiltrate and shape the village nodes of influence and then target individuals. Right now our military embraces a centralized, top-driven approach that prevents our military and US - trained Afghan counterparts from doing so. Current US procedures and tactics attempt to identify the Taliban without regard to their influence or social role at a village level. Instead we attempt to link individuals to attacks and incomplete network structures through often questionable intelligence. The individuals in nodes of influence must be identified as neutral, pro, or anti Afghan government and then dealt with. To target any other way is haphazard at best and does not gain us the initiative.

US and Afghan forces must also devise and utilize tactics to fight outside and inside the village. This requires true light infantry and real counterinsurgency tactics employed by troops on the ground, not read from a "new" COIN manual by leadership in a support base. The tactics must entail lightly equipped and fast- moving COIN forces that go into villages and know how to properly interact with locals and identify Taliban insurgents. They must have the ability to take their time and stay in areas they have identified at the local level as worth trying to take back.

Being moved from place to place and using armored vehicles while hardly reengaging local leadership will not work. Targeting identified high value targets will only result in the "whack-a-mole" syndrome. It's demoralizing for US and Afghan troops, the American public, and the Afghans who just want to live in peace. A light infantry force conducting specialized reconnaissance in villages, and using proven tactics like trained visual trackers to follow insurgents into and out of villages, proper ambush techniques on foot outside the village, and knowing the local village situation are the key. Infantry tactics should use also vertical envelopment of Taliban fighters by helicopter and parachute to cut off avenues of escape. Troops should foot patrol into villages at night, talk with and document compounds and inhabitants for later analysis, and have a secure patrol base locally from which to operate. Mega bases or FOBS are only for support and units and tactics should be decentralized.

Written by Mark Sexton This analysis is the opinion of the author and does not represent the Department of Defense, US Army, or any other state or federal government agency.

PS: The article was too long for posting, full version can be found here:
http://www.ttoscorp.com/news/news.html

[Combat Diver]

Mark was one of my instructors at Ft Huachuca Trackers Course.

CD

[PTHFNDR]

I just attended this course in MA by their MTT and thought it to be very good. I am an avid hunter and knew a lot of material covered but it was good none the less. I did hear that is was going to be discontinued also though. I would recommend it to anyone interested.

Originally Posted by PTHFNDR

I just attended this course in MA by their MTT and thought it to be very good. I am an avid hunter and knew a lot of material covered but it was good none the less. I did hear that is was going to be discontinued also though. I would recommend it to anyone interested.

Do you really want to know how many cources have been stopped then restarted. When a need arises, "they" find an FOG to sign on as a contractor.

Given the world we live in combined with human nature seldom changing, we'll see this surface again.

[MtnGoat]

Originally Posted by Bushranger

http://www.ttoscorp.com/news/news.html

TTOS Corp still runs the Ft Huachuca Trackers Course. You just need to do a DFT and have the Funds to cover the course now. Lets say something around $45,000.00 for a ODA. That will cover Plane tickets, Rental cars, Per-diem, Course funds per guy, ETC


But like what was told, The new FY is starting, so maybe come this New Jan, TRADOC could pick it up. Me I fell SWC sould pick it up.

[Bushranger]

Is here some available material like books, websites etc. on which I should definately get my hands on? Of course I go outside and track, but I would appreciate any other source of knowledge, thanks for any help.

[ScoutTracker]

Of course, going out and tracking is the only way to actually get any good. Even better is to go out with someone else and practice with them, either practice interpreting or trailing each other...but the debates and learning that ensues when you disagree on something can be the most valuable.

That being said, here are a few books that I personally own and have read, along with a brief description. These books focus mostly on trailing and mantracking.


- Brown, Tom jr. 1986. Tom Brown’s Field Guide to Nature Observation and Tracking. Berkley Publishing Group, New York, NY
Good book on expanding your awareness. It gives good exercises for tracking and awareness expansion.


- Brown, Tom, jr. 1999. The Science and Art of Tracking. Berkley Publishing Group, New York, NY
Good book on the study of “pressure releases” (aka “action indicators” by others). Many other books give examples of pressure releases, but this book delves much deeper into them. Some of this is information is excellent stuff and common sense, but some of it very controversial in the tracking communites.


- Carss, Bob. 2009. The SAS Guide to Tracking. The Lyons Press. Guilford, CT.
Great book on tracking, with a lot of excellent information on training. Good guide to training trackers


- Diaz, David. 2005. Tracking: Signs of Man, Signs of Hope. Lyons Press, Guilford, CT.
Good book on mantracking. Inspirational stories with information on tactical and SAR tracking. Particularly good info on team member roles on a tracking team.


- Kearney, Jack. 1999. Tracking: a Blueprint for Learning How. Pathways Press, El Cajon, CA
Good book on training trackers, and full of lots of exercises. Written by a seasoned Border Patrol tracker.


- Liebenberg, Louis, Adrian Louw, Mark Elbroch. 2010. Practical Tracking: A guide to following footprints and finding animals. Stackpole Books.
Good book on trailing animals. It includes animals from both North America and South Africa. Anecdotal with a lot of lessons to learn from


- Speiden, Robert. 2009. Foundations for Awareness, Signcutting and Tracking. Nature Awareness and
Tracking School, LLC. Christiansburg, VA.
Excellent book on the fundamentals of mantracking. Geared toward SAR cases, but one of the better man-tracking guides available. Gives a solid foundation with basic, but thorough information

Originally Posted by Bushranger

well, as I am not US military, I try to learn by myself... I have some wildlife tracking books, and Scott Donelan Tactical Tracking, which is really good, but is here some available material like books, websites etc. on which I should definately get my hands on? Of course I go outside and track, but I would appreciate any other source of knowledge, thanks for any help.

1. In addition to your library, find books relating to primative skills and anthropology.

2. Get outside.

3. visit, http://www.primitive.org Check out the articles in the back issues.

A very, very good source, trust me.

[exsquid]

MtnGt:

I think you are a little high on your estimate, not much but a little. I figured it at $25,853.37 (FY2009) w/ the course being funded. Adding in another $10K to cover TTOS's cost, I think $35K should cover it.

x/S

[Golf1echo]

In talking with a military partner, he mentioned he had been to the Malaysian Tracking School and thought his RNZIR Unit trackers at 6 weeks was a better course. Currently JTF-2 are sending some folks there but talks are happening with USMC FR. The course covers combat Tracking and intelligence gathering aspects. We once had a close relationship with same.