There is no doubt of the courage of the 1/11 th on that day. One minor correction needs to be made. I'll pursue it. However, if anyone here has an idea of how to do so, I'll gladly take advice.
The unit rescued was not C Co. 2/8 Cav. C Co. had taken up a joint position with the 1/11 the day before since both units were operating in the same area and the 1/11 offered hot chow and a visit with some old friends. Neither unit needed orders to move out when it was learned how bad the situation was for the unit that had wandered into a regimental HQ and whose commander lacked the sense to back out.
Other moments from those two days include:
A Conscientious Objector medic, new to C 2/8 who had been in the field for less than a week, not terribly trusted by the others in the company because of his CO status. When the 4.2 mortar that was firing H&I fire had a round barely leave the tube before falling back into the track and detonating, said CO medic took off at a dead run. He ran from one position to another, covering the entire perimeter, putting gut on ground just long enough to make sure everyone was OK, before getting up to regain his run and dive even with ammo from the track cooking off. There were no questions about him after that night.
The M113's seemingly managing to knock down every damned red ants nest while enroute from the overnight position to the location of the unit that actually was rescued. Accompanying personnel were *not* amused.
The 1/11 tree-felling exercise upon arrival at the NVA HQ, as the Sheridans and APC's went on line. Using grape shot and some jacked-up M60's they turned a light forest into a fallen log-jam.
A hand coming out the drivers hatch on a Sheridan, opening a mermite can, and said hand going back down into the hatch with a can of coke. At the time, funny as hell. The 8 track tapes blaring a la "Apocalypse Now", added to the atmosphere.
With armored cav unit and infantry on line, the mass confusion (but quick reaction) as the NVA went through well-developed tunnels and came up behind the US line. RPGs everywhere and shrapnel flying like mosquitoes in the everglades at night.
The orderly withdrawal after the unit originally in contact was safely brought out of their positions. That troop of the 1/11 was tight, well led and well organized. The orderly nature was remarkable because it seemed each member of the 1/11 had memorized the faces of their "grunts", the foot soldiers riding on their particular track. Each TC checked names, faces, and numbers before breaking formation. A great fear, I think, of leaving someone behind, much appreciated by the ground-pounders.
And, finally, the separation of the dead and wounded in a clearing as helicopters came into the clearing that the three units occupied, a click or so away from the contact area.
Incoming medivacs that looked llke they could have been a simultaneous lift for an entire company, except for the red crosses.
I don't know the total number of dead and wounded, between the three units. Wounded included at least half of the rescuing 1st Cav troups who rode into battle in the 1/11 tracks. I do recall that, with each unit having nearly a full complement of officers, one LT was left after the medivacs, essentially a battalion commander for the night. Doing the math, there was probably a total of company left out of three that were engaged.
Damn, if I had a bottle of scotch about now......