Wilson D. Miscamble, C.S.C,
The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan Cambridge Essential Histories (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) ISBN-13: 978-0521735360.
In this well-written work, Miscamble draws upon
his previous work on Truman, as well as more recent scholarship, and forcefully argues that Truman's decision
must be understood within the context of the Second World War. Truman sought to spare the lives of American servicemen--not to intimidate the Soviet Union. Miscamble repeatedly rakes 'revisionist' historians (in particular, Gar Alperovitz and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa) who argue that Truman practiced "atomic diplomacy" at the Potsdam Conference, that the use of the bombs was unnecessary, and that the Japanese were on the verge of surrender in the summer of 1945.
Miscamble also subtly excoriates those who justify the morality of Truman's decision in contemporaneous debates. Miscamble is especially skillful at skewering those who belong to the "Japs had it coming" school of thought.
While I agree with many of Miscamble's central arguments and appreciate his focus on operations in the Pacific War, I think he falls into the same trap as those revisionists he seeks to refute. Much of his argument that the use of the bombs saved millions of lives is (fortunately) counter-factual. Just as we can never know for certain what would have happened had the United States pursued the preferred policies of the revisionists, we can never know for certain what would have happened had the United States invaded Japan. History is the study of what happened, not what might have happened--but didn't.
Also, Miscamble leaves open the door for numerous revisionist counter-arguments. What does it say for Roosevelt and Truman that they did not do more to integrate the developing scientific and military knowledge about nuclear weapons into America's grand strategy? Or that FDR took no steps to establish a set of firm policies that he could hand off to his successor? Or that Truman deferred the conduct of American foreign policy to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, who viewed statesmanship from a politician's point of view? Or that Truman and Byrnes failed to appreciate the extent of Stalin's ambitions in Eastern Europe?
Moreover, while Miscamble is not as strident as Robert Maddox or D. M. Giangreco, his tone is significantly sharper than he intimates in his introductory remarks. In this respect, Miscamble repeats a significant misstep of the earlier debates over the Cold War as well as a common mistake in military historiography (upon which the crux of his argument relies). That is, he often crosses the line between "Here's the evidence that supports the efficacy of a controversial decision" into the netherworld of "[So and so] was right all along." The latter realm is not, IMO, the historians' domain.
Despite these and other concerns, I strongly recommend this work to those who want a brief overview of the ongoing historiographical debates over the decisions to use the atomic bombs, the end of the Pacific War, and the start of the Cold War, as well as to those who question the vitality of professional academic history.