[MtnGoat]

In 2008 I was deployed to a country and we had many different National Level VIPs come a visit us due the sensitivity of our Mission. One thing I took away from this trip was that SF Commanders, SOCENT, CENTCOM, and National Level people never want to give what Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld call Ground Commander control in their decisions being made. I feel that today no SF Commanders will let ODAs leadership due what they feel they need to do. We see this in different ways in Afghanistan.

To bring to point, 2001 to 2003 in Afghanistan we had ODA manning numbers as low as 6 men on an ODA. ODBs with 6 men on them with maybe 3 extra Support MOSs. So if back then we have ODAs being Ground Commanders for their AOR within a “JSOA” and controlling Guerilla Forces with these numbers. Back then these ODA/ODBs broke down into 2, 3 4 man cells control their respective Guerillas Forces and lead attack and dropped bombs on Taliban Targets. But for the last three years ODAs have to roll out "50 man" strong.

I see today where ODA Commanders can’t say I’m going to go to this village and then this village. ODA manning levels most are at a certain number level so you can go do a set mission. I have said this before; ODAs in Afghanistan typically don’t make long day patrols and are now being told what and even where you will go patrol. Not even three years ago ODAs would load up Extra HUMMVE or a trailer and have locals roll out with them to visit different areas. We use to use ASGs to help out with security, but were told we could use them because there were hired as security forces and couldn’t be used in offensive operations. But today were have ODAs being the lead on programs include the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Community Outreach, Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3), Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), Community Defense Initiative (CDI), Local Defense Initiative (LDI), Village Stability Platform, Village Stability Operations (VSO), Afghan Local Police (ALP) Initiative, and others. Many of the same things we were doing three to five years ago but under each ODAs own naming or “program”. But today are we saying ODA leadership needs to be told were they need to patrol to and what to do when they get there? If we are, then we are opening a box for not only of Leadership, but for every young NCO coming to an ODA. If we say we can still do UW, and I truly believe we can, then I feel SF Commanders need to let ODA leadership do what they want for their OWN AOR. We live there not on KAF or BAF. Just because you’re the SF Commander and you read our SITREPS, remember back to your days and a TM Leader, you didn’t put everything in those SITREPS because of whatever reason. I know typically you want to “Feel out” the situation.

I think UW battlefield would play out like some of these programs which are no longer in effect due to politics within the United States military and diplomatic community, opposition of some entities of the Afghan government, lack of funding, divergent views on the use of 'militias' or Guerilla Forces, or because the programs simply did not work well because of the leadership on the ground didn’t want to do them.

The long-term Unconventional Warfare (Environmental) success of these kind of Military initiatives with a local bottom-up approaches depend on a number of things going right in Afghanistan. I will use Afghanistan as the Template “model” for current model for Unconventional Warfare. One important factor is the ability of the Department of State to field personnel as a part of the "civilian surge" on the battlefield that will work in the USSF Teams. The DoS Support Teams can assist in Unconventional Warfare Environmental programs like the Village Stability Program efforts. USSF teams (likely ODBs) will need to know how to tying to get district headquarters into the rural villages so that services such as justice, law, order, security, and development are provided in each village.

In Afghanistan some of these programs have been described as "bottom-up", the fact remains that the central government has to approve the program. All of the funding is funneled through a corrupt Ministry of Interior through the province and district headquarters, if there is a district center in the given area. As with all programs with any country, every Governmental Level skims money, supplies and equipment off the top. Iraq USSF teams saw their Military Partnered SF Officers take half (Steal) of the US Ammo and then come back from leave with new cars or whatever. In Afghanistan you Provincial level officials and Afghan National Police (ANP) exert their influence in the decisions about funding, selection of ALP members, and locations to stand up ALP elements. Then Karzai picks who he wants to be provincial governors; many times the post going to the highest bidder, a family member, or political ally. In turn, the provincial governor gets to appoint his own sub-governor (district leader). This contributes to an ineffective and corrupt provincial and district leadership.

Do we need an Infantry Platoon to pull our Security? Can we not do what we did in the earlier days of Afghanistan or Vietnam days? Raise and control our own Guerilla Force? Can we do what we did with ASGs and do it with locals?