View Full Version : Understanding Terror Networks
The Reaper
06-23-2004, 19:46
[THIS THREAD WAS COPIED HERE SO WE COULD HAVE A SEPARATE THREAD ON THIS BOOK, WHICH WAS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH IN THE ORIGINAL THREAD. I'M DELETING THIS STUFF FROM THE OTHER THREAD TOO. -- RL]
Interesting, but I'll tell you what. I agree with some of what is quoted. However, this book is WAY better and the author does not hide behind Annon: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0812238087/qid=1088042642/sr=8-1/ref=pd_ka_1/104-9380391-9011109?v=glance&s=books&n=507846
This book is up there with HFCUI.
In the first quote the author apparently says that we are fighting a global Islamic insurgency. Then he says that Iraq had nothing to do with it. That is an odd perspective, I think.
Roguish Lawyer
06-23-2004, 20:13
Originally posted by Jimbo
However, this book is WAY better and the author does not hide behind Annon: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0812238087/qid=1088042642/sr=8-1/ref=pd_ka_1/104-9380391-9011109?v=glance&s=books&n=507846
This book is up there with HFCUI.
Well, then. One-click completed!
NousDefionsDoc
06-23-2004, 20:34
Originally posted by Jimbo
This book is up there with HFCUI.
JIMBO! WAKE UP!
HFCUI is still the best, but this one is up there. It is as if this guy read HFCUI and then responded to most sectiosn with well documented answers about AQ. Good stuff.
With all these books, this summer is going to be interesting :)
NousDefionsDoc
06-24-2004, 13:26
Originally posted by Jimbo
HFCUI is still the best, but this one is up there. It is as if this guy read HFCUI and then responded to most sectiosn with well documented answers about AQ. Good stuff.
I put it on my list.
Originally posted by Solid
With all these books, this summer is going to be interesting :)
Put down the books. Step away from the computer. Go outside. Go hit on girls. If you have to be a nerd about it, call it an "elicitation exercise".
I'm already running several of those operations, thankyouverymuch... :D
skipjack
06-24-2004, 17:31
I'm sorry but I don't know what HFCUI stands for? Could someone help me out please? Thank you!
-skipjack
Roguish Lawyer
06-24-2004, 17:57
Originally posted by skipjack
I'm sorry but I don't know what HFCUI stands for? Could someone help me out please? Thank you!
-skipjack
Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies. An SF bible.
skipjack
06-24-2004, 18:04
RL,
Thank you very much!
-skipjack
NousDefionsDoc
06-24-2004, 20:26
Originally posted by skipjack
I'm sorry but I don't know what HFCUI stands for? Could someone help me out please? Thank you!
-skipjack
Dude! You need to hang around here more. LOL
skipjack
06-24-2004, 22:55
I know... too busy dealing with recruiters! lol
Continuing to lurk............
-skipjack
Roguish Lawyer
08-02-2004, 20:45
Originally posted by Jimbo
Interesting, but I'll tell you what. I agree with some of what is quoted. However, this book is WAY better and the author does not hide behind Annon: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0812238087/qid=1088042642/sr=8-1/ref=pd_ka_1/104-9380391-9011109?v=glance&s=books&n=507846
This book is up there with HFCUI.
I just started it and it is incredibly good. I don't see the comparison to HFCUI yet, but I'm just getting started. It starts off with a terrific discussion of the history behind al Qaeda (going all the way back in Islamic history to the philosophical underpinnings of the current train of thought). I finished that chapter, and I'm now in the chapter on al Qaeda's membership. So far it is not really the same kind of book as HFCUI, but that may change.
Jimbo, what else do you recommend?
BTW -- someone ought to move or copy this thread to the books forum so I can split it into a discussion of this book and Reaper's book. This book deserves its own thread. It's giving me all kinds of ideas for new threads about how badly the administration has explained why we are at war. There is a very simple story we can tell, but we are not telling it!!!
OK. Its not really like HFCUI, but it got you to read the book, right?
Roguish Lawyer
08-02-2004, 20:55
Originally posted by Jimbo
OK. Its not really like HFCUI, but it got you to read the book, right?
Your recommendation is enough. Especially after this one. It is truly awesome. It's got me wanting to go read the primary sources, for pete's sake. :)
Roguish Lawyer
08-02-2004, 21:04
Originally posted by Jimbo
You'll notice that in the dust jacket, the author is mentioned to have been in the foreign service. Notice they don't say which foreign service: http://216.109.117.135/search/cache?p=%22marc+sageman%22+cia&ei=UTF-8&n=20&fl=0&u=straitstimes.asia1.com/storyprintfriendly/0%252C1887%252C251002%252C00.html&w=%22marc+sageman%22+cia&d=C8B2B55257&icp=1
I figured as much.
Seriously, anyone who wants to learn about al Qaeda should read this book. The first chapter alone is worth the purchase price.
Roguish Lawyer
08-04-2004, 08:48
OK, I finished it yesterday. The title is wrong. There is only one network discussed in the book -- al Qaeda al Jihad. It should be called something like "Understanding al Qaeda: Origins, Structure and How to Take it Down."
I liked it a lot. Interesting questions raised by the book.
arrgh...you learn nothing. Read:
Nexus http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0393041530/qid=1091636690/sr=8-1/ref=pd_ka_1/103-9146573-6367028?v=glance&s=books&n=507846
and
Social Network Analysis http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0761963391/qid=1091636750/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/103-9146573-6367028?v=glance&s=books
and then re-read it. One of the main points of the book is that AQ is made up of several networks: The Leadership, the Maghreb group, the Indonesian group, and the Arab group.
Pay particular attention to a concept (Wasserman's) called Strength of Weak Ties.
I can't find anything more than the abstract on the web, but if you can, read 'Emergent Clique Formation in Terrorist Recruitment'
Paper: Emergent Clique Formation in Terrorist Recruitment
Authors: Nina Berry, Teresa Ko, Tim Moy, Julienne Smrcka, Jessica Turnley, Ben Wu
Abstract: The Seldon project represents a multi-disciplinary approach to developing organization software for the study of recruitment and group formation. The need to incorporate aspects of social science added a significant contribution to the vision of the resulting Seldon toolkit. The unique addition of an abstract agent category provided a means for capturing social concepts like cliques, gangs, schools, mosque, etc. in a manner that represents their social conceptualization and not simply as a physical or
economical institution. This paper provides an overview of the Seldon toolkit and terrorist model developed to study the formation of cliques, which are the primary recruitment entity for terrorist organizations.
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 11:56
Originally posted by Jimbo
I can't find anything more than the abstract on the web, but if you can, read 'Emergent Clique Formation in Terrorist Recruitment'
Paper: Emergent Clique Formation in Terrorist Recruitment
Authors: Nina Berry, Teresa Ko, Tim Moy, Julienne Smrcka, Jessica Turnley, Ben Wu
Abstract: The Seldon project represents a multi-disciplinary approach to developing organization software for the study of recruitment and group formation. The need to incorporate aspects of social science added a significant contribution to the vision of the resulting Seldon toolkit. The unique addition of an abstract agent category provided a means for capturing social concepts like cliques, gangs, schools, mosque, etc. in a manner that represents their social conceptualization and not simply as a physical or
economical institution. This paper provides an overview of the Seldon toolkit and terrorist model developed to study the formation of cliques, which are the primary recruitment entity for terrorist organizations.
This sounds very interesting.
Marc Sageman, the author of the book RL mis-interpreted is involved in the above project.
More on the effort:
What factors shape the formation of terrorist groups involved in Global Jihad that are sponsored by Islamic fundamentalists? Analysis of data on known characteristics and patterns of 170 terrorists involved in Al Queada attacks suggests that clique formation is the critical element in the evolution towards terrorism. We explored the formation of cliques as self-organizing, adaptive networks using the Project Albert simulation tools. Our conceptual model assumed that such cliques form spontaneously from below without strong leadership or recruitment from above when away from family. To test this hypothesis, we built an agent-based model that tested whether alienated agents would self-organize into cohesive groups due to a shared sense of alienation from the surrounding population, and if so, what external factors might influence the group formation. In addition to alienation, these agents were ascribed a violence characteristic, which affected their affinity towards each other and, thus, the tendency to form groups.
The model has the following classes of agents: lost boys (alienated youth), general populace, strong influencers, and family members, who are either ìmoderateî or ìviolentî. The desire to find others ìlike meî creates movement towards a ìmeeting placeî where lost boys may randomly encounter these agents, as well as other lost boys. Population agents either increased or decreased lost boy alienation but did not impact violence. Strong influencers can impact both violence and alienation. Direct contact with a family member decreased lost boy alienation, and violence was either increased or decreased, based on the family member type.
The results showed that cliques did form, but that the loyalties based on association were fairly fluid and dependent on physical space and timing associations. This paper will discuss the modeling features, the results of the model, what has been learned, and what additional modeling scenarios and variables should be further explored.
No, I am not a nerd.
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 12:19
Yes you are, but that's irrelevant to the current conversation. We should start a new thread.
Useful link for helping to understand some of this.
http://www.irit.fr/COSI/training/complexity-tutorial/complexity-tutorial.htm
I have heard of many kinds of small network research before, from metabolic engineering to economic models, but I havent seen anything come out of it that went beyond the hype. Am I missing something?
'small world' or 'network'? Small-worlds are types of networks.
Originally posted by Jimbo
'small world' or 'network'? Small-worlds are types of networks.
Sorry. I have read about networks, including a familiarity with small-world studies. It has been explained to me that small-world networks fall into two categories... "aristocratic" and "egalitarian". I wonder if Sageman's group has been able to show which of these the Global Salafi Jihad falls into. When I have a minute I will look into it.
If the fatwas are part of an emergent property of the network, rather than being a property of a particularly robust node (in terms of connection), that would be interesting. Just a thought.
Sorry. I have read about networks, including a familiarity with small-world studies. It has been explained to me that the nodes of small-world networks fall into two categories... "aristocratic" and "egalitarian". I wonder if Sageman's group has been able to show which of these the Global Salafi Jihad falls into. When I have a minute I will look into it.
If the fatwas are part of an emergent property of the network, rather than being a property of a particularly robust node (in terms of connection), that would be interesting. Just a thought.
This reminds me of many of the essays from Walter Reich's compliation on the Origins of Terrorism.
Does the Sageman 'terrorist clique formation' model offer 'end states' for cliques which form and do not become terrorist because of differing factors? Do these cliques disassemble because the factors which create the 'group think' consolidation motion within terrorist groups do not exist?
Thank you, this is very interesting.
Solid
Originally posted by pulque
If the fatwas are part of an emergent property of the network, rather than being a property of a particularly robust node (in terms of connection), that would be interesting. Just a thought.
I'm not sure I understand how the fatwas would be an emergent property.
Originally posted by Solid
Does the Sageman 'terrorist clique formation' model offer 'end states' for cliques which form and do not become terrorist because of differing factors?
Yes, he does. Read the book.
Originally posted by Jimbo
I'm not sure I understand how the fatwas would be an emergent property.
According to Sageman's testimony to The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States , which he states is based on his group's research, the previous strategy of the GSJ was reversed by the fatwa of UBL, turning the fighting from near to far. The goal is to reinstate the fallen Caliphate, in other words, religion.
As the United States would never allow this to happen, the global jihad must defeat this country. It needs to "inflict the maximum casualties against the opponent, for this is the language understood by the West" and "concentrate on the method of martyrdom operations" as the most efficient in terms of damages and least costly to the jihad.
I need to think more about this, but it seems that a reversal of strategy such as this could be an emergent property of the GSJ small-world network if it were indeed true that the US "would never allow this to happen".
Models would need to be run.
Eitehr that or it was a pragmatic decision after the effects od getting kicked out of Sudan, the failed assassination of the Egyptian President, the rejection by the Kuwatis of a AQ Muj force to rout Saddam in GW 1 and the effect of Zawahiri (who always prefered attacking the far enemy) all converging.
Originally posted by Jimbo
Eitehr that or it was a pragmatic decision after the effects od getting kicked out of Sudan, the failed assassination of the Egyptian President, the rejection by the Kuwatis of a AQ Muj force to rout Saddam in GW 1 and the effect of Zawahiri (who always prefered attacking the far enemy) all converging.
I agree. It's either a pragmatic decision, or its a "rule of the game".
Roguish Lawyer
08-04-2004, 17:32
Originally posted by Jimbo
arrgh...you learn nothing. Read:
Nexus http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0393041530/qid=1091636690/sr=8-1/ref=pd_ka_1/103-9146573-6367028?v=glance&s=books&n=507846
and
Social Network Analysis http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0761963391/qid=1091636750/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/103-9146573-6367028?v=glance&s=books
and then re-read it. One of the main points of the book is that AQ is made up of several networks: The Leadership, the Maghreb group, the Indonesian group, and the Arab group.
Pay particular attention to a concept (Wasserman's) called Strength of Weak Ties.
No, I learned all of that. This is just semantics. To me, there is one big network which is a group of smaller sub-networks. Hubs and nodes. I get it.
My point is that he did not discuss non-global Salafi jihad terrorist networks. He makes this quite explicit in the beginning of the book. The other only networks he discusses are for purposes of comparison, like the studies of imprisoned members of German and Italian terrorist groups -- and also the Moonies.
One other thing: for someone like me, who knows very little about al Qaeda relative to others on this board, the book does much more than just discuss this clique theory. I understand why it is important and apparently your focus, but there is much more to this book for someone like me.
Roguish Lawyer
08-04-2004, 17:33
Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
This sounds very interesting.
It is. Get off your ass, buy the book and read it already! LOL
Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
No, I learned all of that... I get it.
I hope you know I was just messing with you.
To my knowledge there is no other kind of jihad going other than the Salafi one. The Shia brothers have been on board for a while.
Now, tell me why AQ and the Iranian Revolution are similar.
Man, I hate this crap. Do you understand how much I would rather be concentrating on making a layline? But then some asshole 'expert' has to go and take the position that AQ and Hizballah have 'profound ideological differences'.
Roguish Lawyer
08-04-2004, 18:04
Originally posted by Jimbo
I hope you know I was just messing with you.
To my knowledge there is no other kind of jihad going other than the Salafi one. The Shia brothers have been on board for a while.
Now, tell me why AQ and the Iranian Revolution are similar.
Man, I hate this crap. Do you understand how much I would rather be concentrating on making a layline? But then some asshole 'expert' has to go and take the position that AQ and Hizballah have 'profound ideological differences'.
Well, I do now! :o
I know little about Shias and the Iranian revolution, but I will guess and beg for indulgence (and correction) if I am way off:
It seems to me that the ultimate goals of the Salafi jihad and the Iranian revolution are essentially the same -- the imposition of Sharia everywhere. I also suspect that the students in Iran came together in groups of "bunch of guys" in the manner Sageman describes.
The model has the following classes of agents: lost boys (alienated youth)
I recently caught David Kay on CSPAN giving a talk called New Threats to U.S. Security, in which he emphasized the demographics of 50-70 failed states in the world as contributing to terror.
---
I wondered why I hadn't heard those figures before, so I looked up some on the CIA world factbook. Some striking differences between US and the failed states. I'd rather find current figures for category 0-25 yrs and 25-64 years though.
Here are a few examples:
IRAQ
0-14 years: 40.3%
15-64 years: 56.7%
65 years and over: 3%
AFGHANISTAN
0-14 years: 44.7%
15-64 years: 52.9%
65 years and over: 2.4%
SOMALIA
0-14 years: 44.7%
15-64 years: 52.7%
65 years and over: 2.7%
SUDAN
0-14 years: 43.7%
15-64 years: 54.1%
65 years and over: 2.3%
CONGO
0-14 years: 48.2%
15-64 years: 49.3%
65 years and over: 2.5%
US
0-14 years: 20.8%
15-64 years: 66.9%
65 years and over: 12.4%
CHINA
0-14 years: 22.3%
15-64 years: 70.3%
65 years and over: 7.5%
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 18:55
Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
It is. Get off your ass, buy the book and read it already! LOL
Well, it ain't like there's a Barnes & Noble on every street corner down here college boy. I'll get it next load.
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 18:57
Originally posted by pulque
I recently caught David Kay on CSPAN giving a talk called New Threats to U.S. Security, in which he emphasized the demographics of 50-70 failed states in the world as contributing to terror.
---
I wondered why I hadn't heard those figures before, so I looked up some on the CIA world factbook. Some striking differences between US and the failed states. I'd rather find current figures for category 0-25 yrs and 25-64 years though.
Here are a few examples:
IRAQ
0-14 years: 40.3%
15-64 years: 56.7%
65 years and over: 3%
AFGHANISTAN
0-14 years: 44.7%
15-64 years: 52.9%
65 years and over: 2.4%
SOMALIA
0-14 years: 44.7%
15-64 years: 52.7%
65 years and over: 2.7%
SUDAN
0-14 years: 43.7%
15-64 years: 54.1%
65 years and over: 2.3%
CONGO
0-14 years: 48.2%
15-64 years: 49.3%
65 years and over: 2.5%
US
0-14 years: 20.8%
15-64 years: 66.9%
65 years and over: 12.4%
CHINA
0-14 years: 22.3%
15-64 years: 70.3%
65 years and over: 7.5%
What is that, age?
So the result is that young people start shit?
Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
What is that, age?
So the result is that young people start shit?
young people start shit, and there arent enough older people to be there for them and get them to not start shit. a critical mass of young people starting shit, and you've got a clique, and a bunch of nodes.
think about what its like to be young.. you remember :D
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 19:15
So its age?
Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
So its age?
There is something up regarding age. the median age can be expected to vary depending on age expectancy / survival rates, but WHY are the populations age structures so vastly different for failing states, when compared to successful and developing states?
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 19:52
I meant the numbers you posted.
I would say because all of those countries except for China have been at war, civil war, had famines, droughts, etc. You don't get to live very long in those environments. health care for the aged is probably a factor as well, they spend what they have on their fighters.
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 19:54
Plus, the aged probably can't evacuate in time to avoid the genocides.
Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
I meant the numbers you posted.
I would say because all of those countries except for China have been at war, civil war, had famines, droughts, etc. You don't get to live very long in those environments. health care for the aged is probably a factor as well, they spend what they have on their fighters.
The numbers I posted are percentage of people in a given category of years of age.
I included China as a non-failing state, along with US.
Spending health care on fighters doesnt explain why half of the population is under 14.
Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
Plus old people can't run as fast, easier prey.
That is the truth!
So we agree that its possible that conflict in the failing states is resulting in these demographics.
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 20:02
Originally posted by pulque
That is the truth!
So we agree that its possible that conflict in the failing states is resulting in these demographics.
Of course. Probably more women than men as well.
Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
Of course. Probably more women than men as well.
strangely not.
I looked up a few, and the M/F ratios are almost balanced, especially in ages 0-64.
IRAQ
0-14 years: 40.3% (male 5,198,966; female 5,039,173)
15-64 years: 56.7% (male 7,280,167; female 7,094,688)
65 years and over: 3% (male 357,651; female 404,046) (2004 est.)
Afghanistan
0-14 years: 44.7% (male 6,525,929; female 6,222,497)
15-64 years: 52.9% (male 7,733,707; female 7,346,226)
65 years and over: 2.4% (male 334,427; female 350,891) (2004 est.)
SUDAN
0-14 years: 43.7% (male 8,730,609; female 8,358,569)
15-64 years: 54.1% (male 10,588,634; female 10,571,199)
65 years and over: 2.3% (male 490,869; female 408,282) (2004 est.)
CONGO
0-14 years: 48.2% (male 14,122,237; female 14,008,654)
15-64 years: 49.3% (male 14,097,301; female 14,646,285)
65 years and over: 2.5% (male 590,262; female 853,191) (2004 est.)
SOMALIA
0-14 years: 44.7% (male 1,860,451; female 1,849,484)
15-64 years: 52.7% (male 2,197,572; female 2,176,762)
65 years and over: 2.7% (male 94,905; female 125,427) (2004 est.)
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 20:12
Well, the females are most among the older in all but one. If they keep going the females will eventually probably outnumber the doods.
Originally posted by NousDefionsDoc
Well, the females are most among the older in all but one. If they keep going the females will eventually probably outnumber the doods.
Easily attributable to the higher life span expectancy of females vs males, as seen the world over.
Ask the widow's son.
Roguish Lawyer
08-04-2004, 20:31
NDD:
1. Tell me what you need and I will supply it through the same channel I used before, assuming he's still willing.
2. This thread needs to be split at least once, and maybe twice. I believe you are one of only four with the power to make it happen.
Your humble servant,
RL
NousDefionsDoc
08-04-2004, 20:35
I got a hook, but thanks. I'll split it tomorrow just let me know where. Me and The Kid were the Naked Warriors this morning and I'm smoked. 'Night.
There are a number of factors that are at play in someone's deciding to become a terrorist. Age is the most peripheral of them. The most key factor is identity. Who do they identify with? What does their identity mean in the social context where they operate? Is their identity defined as against something or for something?
These population bulges only come into play when there is not enough work or educational opportunities at home for the bulk of the people. This causes them to seek jobs or schooling elsewhere, often in places (Canada, France, and Germany) where they are seen as the minority, or are otherwise discriminated against. The sense of isolation draws them toward others like them, but often adds an element of resentment, which could either be enlarged or shrunk depending on who the individual meets at the local hang out for that ethnicity/national origin/religion.
Edited because I can't spell after drinking ale.
More good resources:
http://www.orgnet.com/hijackers.html
This is a really good one:
http://llk.media.mit.edu/projects/emergence/
Originally posted by Jimbo
I can't find anything more than the abstract on the web, but if you can, read 'Emergent Clique Formation in Terrorist Recruitment'
PS, a google search for "Emergent Clique Formation in Terrorist Recruitment" yielded the full paper in pdf form
:)
Originally posted by pulque
PS, a google search for "Emergent Clique Formation in Terrorist Recruitment" yielded the full paper in pdf form
:)
Which is here. (http://www.cs.uu.nl/~virginia/aotp/papers/seldon-aaai-final.pdf)
Or converted to html by google. (http://www.google.se/search?q=cache:Q93Nz7S5bWkJ:www.cs.uu.nl/~virginia/aotp/papers/seldon-aaai-final.pdf+Emergent+Clique+Formation+in+Terrorist+R ecruitment&hl=sv)
AngelsSix
08-27-2004, 05:42
Okay, since I will be over here in hell for Christmas, will one of you send me your copy when you get finished with it??? PLEEEASE?!!!:cool: :D
Originally posted by AngelsSix
Okay, since I will be over here in hell for Christmas, will one of you send me your copy when you get finished with it??? PLEEEASE?!!!:cool: :D
PM me.
Sorry for resurrecting an old thread, but this seems like the right place. Mods, please move it if it belongs in one of the split-offs...
Trading Cricket for Jihad
By DAVID BROOKS
Published: August 4, 2005
Nothing has changed during the war on terror as much as our definition of the enemy.
In the days after Sept. 11, it was commonly believed that the conflict between the jihadists and the West was a conflict between medievalism and modernism. Terrorists, it was said, emerge from cultures that are isolated from the Enlightenment ideas of the West. They feel disoriented by the pluralism of the modern age and humiliated by the relative backwardness of the Arab world. They are trapped in stagnant, dysfunctional regimes, amid mass unemployment, with little hope of leading productive lives.
Humiliated and oppressed, they lash out against America, the symbol of threatening modernity. Off they go to seek martyrdom, dreaming of virgins who await them in the afterlife.
Now we know that story line doesn't fit the facts.
We have learned a lot about the jihadists, from Osama bin Laden down to the Europeans who attacked the London subways last month. We know, thanks to a database gathered by Marc Sageman, formerly of the C.I.A., that about 75 percent of anti-Western terrorists come from middle-class or upper-middle-class homes. An amazing 65 percent have gone to college, and three-quarters have professional or semiprofessional jobs, particularly in engineering and science.
Whether they have moved to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, England or France, these men are, far from being medieval, drawn from the ranks of the educated, the mobile and the multilingual.
The jihadists are modern psychologically as well as demographically because they are self-made men (in traditional societies there are no self-made men). Rather than deferring to custom, many of them have rebelled against local authority figures, rejecting their parents' bourgeois striving and moderate versions of Islam, and their comfortable lives.
They have sought instead some utopian cause to give them an identity and their lives meaning. They find that cause in a brand of Salafism that is not traditional Islam but a modern fantasy version of it, an invented tradition. They give up cricket and medical school and take up jihad.
In other words, the conflict between the jihadists and the West is a conflict within the modern, globalized world. The extremists are the sort of utopian rebels modern societies have long produced.
In his book "Globalized Islam," the French scholar Olivier Roy points out that today's jihadists have a lot in common with the left-wing extremists of the 1930's and 1960's. Ideologically, Islamic neofundamentalism occupies the same militant space that was once occupied by Marxism. It draws the same sorts of recruits (educated second-generation immigrants, for example), uses some of the same symbols and vilifies some of the same enemies (imperialism and capitalism).
Roy emphasizes that the jihadists are the products of globalization, and its enemies. They are detached from any specific country or culture, he says, and take up jihad because it attaches them to something. They are generally not politically active before they take up jihad. They are looking to strike a vague blow against the system and so give their lives (and deaths) shape and meaning.
In short, the Arab world is maintaining its nearly perfect record of absorbing every bad idea coming from the West. Western ideas infuse the radicals who flood into Iraq to blow up Muslims and Americans alike.
This new definition of the enemy has seeped into popular culture (in "Over There," the FX show about the Iraq war, the insurgent leaders are shown as educated, multilingual radicals), but its implications have only slowly dawned on the policy world.
The first implication, clearly, is that democratizing the Middle East, while worthy in itself, may not stem terrorism. Terrorists are bred in London and Paris as much as anywhere else.
Second, the jihadists' weakness is that they do not spring organically from the Arab or Muslim world. They claim to speak for the Muslim masses, as earlier radicals claimed to speak for the proletariat. But they don't. Surely a key goal for U.S. policy should be to isolate the nationalists from the jihadists.
Third, terrorism is an immigration problem. Terrorists are spawned when educated, successful Muslims still have trouble sinking roots into their adopted homelands. Countries that do not encourage assimilation are not only causing themselves trouble, but endangering others around the world as well.
E-mail: dabrooks@nytimes.com
I have been waiting for my local library to get a copy of Understanding Terror Networks for over a year so I can read it. :rolleyes: -pulque
NousDefionsDoc
01-15-2006, 20:02
I forgot to post here. I have Jimb's recommend and have studied it. I agree, it is excellent. Surprisingly easy to read as well. Should be required reading for Special Operations personnel.
Thanks Jimbo
magician
01-16-2006, 03:11
Thanks for resurrecting this thread. I missed it the first time.
Most interesting discussion, gentlemen.
One of the academics whose work falls in this area, Kathleen Carley, may be more familiar to some of you in Tampa now.
brownapple
01-06-2008, 00:40
Thanks for resurrecting this thread. I missed it the first time.
Most interesting discussion, gentlemen.
Same here. Interesting indeed.
warrottjr
01-07-2008, 00:50
The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians (http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0375760741/ref=sib_fs_top/002-0042701-2232024?ie=UTF8&p=S01D&checkSum=kA%2BKkso0y3m1MoisCS1dcPtCFLWTph4nL%2FJqk %2FjGhO0%3D#reader-link)
"Long before the deliberate military targeting of civilians as a method of affecting the political behavior of nations and leaders came to be called terrorism, the tactic had a host of other names. From the time of the Roman republic..."
I just bought Understanding Terror Networks here (http://product.half.ebay.com/_W0QQprZ30223122QQcpidZ1203439308)
Also, if you looking for HFCUI it is also here (http://product.half.ebay.com/_W0QQprZ2386756QQcpidZ1124489138)