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a-3-7
12-18-2005, 09:51
Indonesia

This is a summary of an ad-hoc counter terrorism seminar held by a Singapore based institution on the subject of Violence and Terrorism.
General Conclusions



1. The threat remains for the foreseeable future unchanged.

2. The general conclusion remains in place the period up to the Chinese New Year being a possible target window.

a. A second agreed thought amongst the experts remains in place with JI and its operative cells recycle on a 12-month operational plan concept.

b. Another common view held is the view of JI will remain silent until the end of 2006 and re-emerge. This view is faced by the views held that JI has entered in a more active role.

c. A third view feels that JI does not have the capability to carry out similar bombings like the one in Bali in 2005. Future devices be crude.


3. The so-called “Bali project” documents circulated in the Australian media consists of a letter from Azahari reporting to Noordin Mohammed Top expressing the future potential lists of “thoughts” on what to do next.

4. Two notes emerged in the seminar.



a. One Azahari was likely shot and killed by two bullets to his lungs. Observers noted that the killing was not intended but the force entering the house were understandable afraid of the terrorists were trying to blow themselves up and therefore provided extensive suppressive fire which killed Azahari Husin.



b. Secondly, some members of the cell were identified as homosexuals. The notable comment on this information was the reaction by Noordin Mohammed Top after the death emerging considerable agitated.



c. Linguists of various intelligence services considered this fact as a possible increase in hate attacks in the near term future as some members of the remaining terror cells were emotionally attached. This could lead, in one expert’s view, to irrational attacks to revenge the death of Azahari. If this takes place, a likelihood of the terror groups making tactical decision and resulting in tactical mistakes could occur.



Target choices



1. The participants felt and we concur, the preferred choices of targets are soft targets per se. Technical and canine applications are the key to deterrence as the sophistication of devices does prevent JI to carry out attacks.



2. One view held about the botched Australian embassy bombing was that the speed the vehicle was traveling with the attackers being afraid the embassy used technical counter measures to set off the device earlier.



3. The walk-ins with hand carried explosive devices remain in this moment of time the preferred and expected type of method. The recent success does support the thought process to continue this type of operation. The recent interception of 2 tons (!) of explosives should however point out the fact of the JI supply chain is very much active and continuing to bring various explosive material components into Indonesia.

4. The recruitment effort and supply chain of JI and its terror affiliates continues to be little understood. A shift in anti terror measures focusing on this aspect will be/is the focus by various intelligence activities.



5. The role of the future JI leadership and its capability to rebuild an operational cell to carry out future bombings will show and tell the true capability and threat to this region.



Security Measures



1. The current investment by various clients in particularly dealing with semi public places such as hotels, resorts, or shopping malls must understand the continuous seriousness of the security environment in Bali.



2. A technical integrated vehicle sniffer system has entered the market and is recommended to be installed. This unit consists of a scanning of the vehicle, electronically sniffing of the vehicle and keeping the data bank in record for future purposes. We recommend moving to this type of equipment as the threat can be moved and refocused by human security measures. This type of equipment removes/reduces the human error aspect.



3. With the hardening of security measures the bombers will move increasingly to public targeting. A shift in this attack could result in emotional attacks choosing the targets not because traditional selection patterns but more because of irrational behavior.



4. Focus should be given the clear understanding of business owners if they are not serious about the investment in security for facilities they will become a target. The quality of security measures are the key of deterring or detecting an attack. It is NOT only a human security presence it increasingly will become an aspect but the quality of technology and understanding of the terrorist mind in Indonesia.



5. The following profile was defined as being one of the indicators for security organization to look out:



a. 24 – 35 year single walking male carrying a sling bag, back pack

b. Loose shirt with bulging belt area (some of the devices were installed and triggered on the belt area)

c. West Java or Eastern Javanese accent

d. Medium built, medium long hair

e. Walks in pairs and split or walks alone

f. Neutral color dress (no bright colors)



6. The profile of surveillance remains unchanged:



a. Motorcycle surveillance carried out over a prolonged period of time. Teams often operate in two men teams loitering around the target area.

b. Surveillance or suspected surveillance teams should be approached and challenged. The surveillance teams so far were not armed. This could change in the future.

c. Snap shot surveillance on the day of the operation always included sudden checking of targets for changes in security posture, behavior and observation. The active use of a perimeter Counter surveillance team to monitor loitering, photographic review of digital photos to record and verify facial identification or motor cycle police license plates has often resulted in deterrent of an attack.



7. A counterstrategy should include:



a. Active perimeter patrolling and visible recording of all vehicles, motor cycles and unusual persons appearing on the property.

b. Use of technical solutions being integrated in the locations. The emerging technology is cost effective.

c. Maintain an active threat profile and seek out suspicious persons fitting the profile. The objective is to get the message out to any potential adversary you are actively monitoring your assets.



Conclusions



1. The overall Counter Terrorism effort by the Indonesian government is applauded by many observers, however it is a strategic battle not an immediate victory. The

coming months will indicate how much the group was damaged by the killing of Azahari and who else is out there to take up the battle.



2. The role of Dul Matin in the Philippines, Noordin Mohammed Top and the emerging commanders of the fights in Poso and Ambon are to be watched closely. The

supply chain continues to exist.



3. The report issued by the Crisis Group of in the last two months the two Malaysians had formed an armed group, Thoifah Muqatilah, or Combat Unit is being

monitored . In our view this is not a new development but an execution of original JI combat operations. Therefore the death of Azahari could have been a

significant blow to dwart a more aggressive expansion of this militant wing but the recruitment of young Indonesians from outside the Jemaah Islamiah network

and adding some of these new recruits into the militant wing who are veterans of recent Muslim-Christian conflicts in other parts of the country was agreed being a

concerning development.



4. Participants were undecided whether this was a new armed wing of Jemaah Islamiyah or a separate organization as expressed by the Crisis Group. In our view we

feel Thoifah Muqatilah is a radical splinter of the main direction part of the overall but independent strategy of Jemaah Islamiyah.



5. Notable was the view expressed that many within JI thought the 2005 Bali bombings attacks on civilians represent a misreading of Islam. We feel the known

disagreement within the ranks of JI could result in continuing informing on each other with the authorities. Although this is a good signs the more radical elements will be pushed further into secrecy and deception.



6. Any attack in either Bali or Indonesia will be watched on meaning, capabilities and effectiveness. The uneasiness may subdue with an uneventful passing of the

holiday season however the guard should not be let down. Claims by government officials of the fight being over are generally seen as too early.



7. Business leaders need to understand Indonesia has an active terror movement. The fight is far from over and the success so far has been in the after the fact

apprehension of terrorists. The preventive denial of recruitment, training space and supply remains for the time being a threat.

Roguish Lawyer
12-18-2005, 15:34
Great report! Thanks for sharing.

G
12-18-2005, 17:50
Excellent report. Appreciated.

G