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The Reaper
08-13-2005, 09:48
Gents:

Got this from a buddy.

TR


Gen McCaffrey's Report (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: None

MEMORANDUM FOR: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Subject: Trip Report - Kuwait and Iraq - Saturday, 4 June through Saturday,
11 June 2005

1. PURPOSE: This memo provides feedback reference visit 4-11 June 2005 by
General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) to Kuwait and Iraq.

2. SOURCES:

1.. General George Casey, Commander, MNF-I - one-on-one discussions and
Staff Briefings.
2.. LTG JR Vines, Commander MNC-I - one-on-one discussions and Staff
Briefings.
3.. LTG Dave Petreaus, Commander, Multinational Security Transition
Command - one-on-one discussions/briefings.
4.. LTG Robin Brims, (UK Army), Deputy Commanding General of MNF-I -
one-on-one discussions.
5.. Charge d'Affairs James Jeffrey - office call one-on-one with U.S.
Embassy Iraq.
6.. MG Tim Donovan (USMC), Chief of Staff, MNF-I - one-on-one discussions.
7.. MG Steve Johnson (USMC), Acting Commanding General, II MEF -
one-on-one discussion and staff briefing.
8.. BG Peter Palmer and BG John Defreitas - MNF-I Operations and Intel
Briefings.
9.. MG Rusty Findley (USAF) and Colonel Bill Hix - MNF-I Campaign Action
Plan Brief.
10.. BG Tom Bostick - Army Corps Engineers. Gulf Region Division Brief.
11.. MG William Webster, Commanding General, Multi-National Division
Baghdad - General Officer Briefing and 3rd ID Battle Staff briefing.
12.. 2nd Brigade 3rd ID Commander and Staff Briefing. Baghdad security
operations.
13.. Ambassador Ahraf Oazi and UN Iraq Delegation - Lunch Meeting with
Special Representative to the Secretary General of the UN in Iraq.
14.. MG Robert Heine, Acting Director IRMO (US Embassy Reconstruction
Program officer) - one-on-one discussion/briefings.
15.. MG Hank Stratman - Political-Military-Economic Brief, US Embassy.
16.. MG Eldon Bargewell, Joint Contracting - one-on-one discussions.
17.. Field Visit. US Marine Infantry Battalion. Fallujah.
18.. Field Visit. US Army Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Vicinity Tikrit.
19.. Briefing Iraqi Army Brigade Commander. Fallujah.
20.. Briefing by U.S. Army Embedded Training Team. Fallujah ISF Army
brigade.
21.. Briefing USMC Embedded Trainer. Fallujah Police.
22.. Briefing U.S. Army Captain. Embedded Training Team. ISF Army
Infantry Battalion-Vicinity Tikrit.
23.. Briefing Iraqi Army Colonel. ISF Training Center. Vicinity Tikrit.
24.. Lunch discussions. Iraqi Army Battalion XO, S3, SGM. Vicinity Tikrit.
25.. Live Fire Demo/Briefing. Iraqi Army Commando Battalion.
26.. Demo/Briefing Iraqi Police ERU (Emergency Response Unit).
Baghdad.
27.. Field Sensing Session. US Army combat division. Fifteen U.S.Army
Company Grade Officers.
28.. Field Sensing Session. US Army combat Battalion. Junior Enlisted
Soldiers.
29.. Field Sensing Sessions. U.S. Army/Navy/Air Force/Marine Senior
NCO's.
30.. Discussion Sessions. Two U.S. Contractor Teams (Logistics and
Security) -- Senior Leadership

3. THE BOTTOM LINE---Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom: June
2005:

1st - US Military Forces in Iraq are superb. Our Army-Marine ground combat
units with supporting Air and Naval Power are characterized by quality
military leadership, solid discipline, high morale, and enormous individual
and unit courage. Unit effectiveness is as good as we can get. This is the
most competent and battle wise force in our nation's history. They are also
beautifully cared for by the chain-of-command -- and they know it. (Food,
A/C sleeping areas, medical care, mental health care, home leave,
phone/e-mail contact with families, personal equipment, individual and unit
training, targeted economic incentives in the battle area, visibility of
tactical leadership, home station care for their families, access to news
information, etc).

2nd - The point of the US war effort is to create legitimate and competent
Iraqi national, provincial, and municipal governance. We are at a turning
point in the coming six months. The momentum is now clearly with the Iraqi
Government and the Coalition Security Forces. The Sunnis are coming into the
political process. They will vote in December. Unlike the Balkans-the
Iraqis want this to succeed. Foreign fighters are an enormously lethal
threat to the Iraqi civilian population, the ISF, and Coalition Forces in
that order. However, they will be an increasing political disaster for the
insurgency. Over time they are actually adding to the credibility of the
emerging Iraqi government. We should expect to see a dwindling number of
competent, suicide capable Jihadist. Those who come to Iraq--will be rapidly
killed in Iraq. The picture by next summer will be unfavorable to
recruiting foreigners to die in Iraq while attacking fellow Arabs.

The initial US/UK OIF intervention took down a criminal regime and left a
nation without an operational State.

The transitional Bremer-appointed Iraqi government created a weak state of
warring factions.

The January 2005 Iraqi elections created the beginnings of legitimacy and
have fostered a supportive political base to create the new Iraqi Security
Forces.

The August Iraqi Constitutional Referendum and the December-January election
and formation of a new government will build the prototype for the evolution
of an effective, law-based Iraqi State with a reliable Security Force.

January thru September 2006 will be the peak period of the insurgency
-- and the bottom rung of the new Iraq. The positive trend lines following
the January 2006 elections (if they continue) will likely permit the
withdrawal of substantial US combat forces by late summer of 2006. With
250,000 Iraqi Security Forces successfully operating in support of a
government which includes substantial Sunni participation--the energy will
start rapidly draining out of the insurgency.

3rd - The Iraqi Security Forces are now a real and hugely significant
factor. LTG Dave Petreaus has done a brilliant job with his supporting
trainers.

169,000 Army and Police exist in various stages of readiness. They have
uniforms, automatic weapons, body armor, some radios, some armor, light
trucks, and battalion-level organization. At least 60,000 are courageous
Patriots who are actively fighting. By next summer--250,000 Iraqi troops
and 10 division HQS will be the dominant security factor in Iraq.

However, much remains to be done. There is no maintenance or logistics
system. There is no national command and control. Corruption is a threat
factor of greater long-range danger than the armed insurgency.
The Insurgents have widely infiltrated the ISF. The ISF desperately needs
more effective, long-term NCO and Officer training.

Finally, the ISF absolutely must have enough helicopter air mobility (120+
Black Hawk UH 60's) --and a substantial number of armored vehicles to lower
casualties and give them a competitive edge over the insurgents they will
fight. (2000 up-armor Humvee's, 500 ASV's, and 2000 M113A3's with add-on
armor package)

4. Top CENTCOM Vulnerabilities:

1st - Premature drawdown of U.S. ground forces driven by dwindling U.S.
domestic political support and the progressive deterioration of Army and
Marine manpower. (In particular, the expected melt-down of the Army National
Guard and Army Reserve in the coming 36 months)

2nd - Alienation of the U.S. Congress or the American people caused by Iraqi
public ingratitude and corruption.

3rd - Political ineptitude of Shia civil leadership that freezes out the
Sunnis and creates a civil war during our drawdown.

4th - "The other shoe" - a war with North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, Iran, or
Cuba that draws away U.S. military forces and political energy.

5th - The loss or constraint of our logistics support bases in Kuwait.
Clearly we need constant diplomatic attention and care to this vital Ally.
If Kuwait became unstable or severely alienated to US Military objectives in
the region-then our posture in Iraq would be placed in immediate fatal
peril.

6th - Open intervention by Iranian intelligence or military forces to
support rogue Shia Iraqi insurgency. (Assassination of Sustani-armed
rebellion by Sadr)

7th - Continued under-manning and too rapid turnover in State Department
inter-agency representation in Iraq.

8th - Lack of continuity in CENTCOM strategic and operational senior
leadership. The CENTCOM military leadership we now have is a collective
national treasure.

General Abizaid's value to the War effort based on his credibility to US
Military Forces --and ability to communicate and relate to the Iraqi
emergent leadership-- cannot be overstated.

The combination of a three-star tactical Headquarters (LTG John Vines is the
most experienced and effective operational battle leader we have produced in
a generation) - and an in-country four-star strategic commander (Gen George
Casey) has improved the situation from the overwhelmed, under-resourced
Bremer-Sanchez ad hoc arrangement.

LTG Dave Petreaus has done a superb job building the ISF.

Relationships are everything in this campaign. We need to lock in our
senior team for the coming 24 months.

Suggest that the three key US/Coalition military HQS of Casey-Petreaus-Vines
need to stop unit rotation and go to individual replacement rotation.

The very senior U.S. military leadership needs their families based in a
Kuwait compound with periodic visits authorized. (We did this with General
Abrams and his senior leaders during the final phase of Vietnam.)

The Reaper
08-13-2005, 09:48
5. The Enemy Threat:

1st - The Iraqi Insurgency threat is enormously more complex than Vietnam.

There we faced a single opposing ideology; known enemy leaders; a template
enemy organizational structure; an external sanctuary which was vital to the
insurgency to bring in fighters, ammunition, resources; and relative
security in urban areas under Allied/Vietnamese Government control.

Iraq is much tougher. The enemy forces in this struggle are principally
Sunni irredentists-- but there is also a substantial criminal class
determined to murder, rob, kidnap and create chaos.

We also face a small but violent foreign Jihadist terrorist element.
These terrorists do not depend on foreign sanctuary. They can arm
themselves with the incredible mass of munitions and weapons scattered from
one end of Iraq to the other.

Finally, Iraq is encircled by six bordering nations -- all of whom harbor
ill-will for the struggling democratic Iraqi state.

2nd - On the positive side of the ledger:

High Sunni voting turnout and political participation in December will
likely set the conditions for the down hill slide of the insurgency.

The insurgency can no longer mass against Coalition forces with units
greater than squad level -- they all get killed in short order by very
aggressive US/UK combat Forces. The insurgents have been forced to
principally target the weak links-- the Iraqi Police and innocent civilians.
This will be a counter-productive strategy in the mid-term. It has been
forced on them by the effective counter-insurgency operations and
information operations of Coalition forces.

Insurgents now have a reduced capability to attack Coalition forces by
direct fire: 80% (+) of the attacks are carried out with standoff weapons or
suicide bombings (mortars, rockets, IEDs).

Suicide IED attack is enormously effective. However, it will soon likely
become a fragile tool. The Jihadists will begin to run short of human
bombs. Most are killed or die while carrying out missions which are
marginally effective. This must be a prime enemy vulnerability for
Coalition information warfare operations.

We must continue to level with the American people. We still have a
five-year fight facing us in Iraq.

3rd - The Fallujah Situation:

The city has huge symbolic importance throughout Mideast.

Unrealistic expectations were raised on how rapidly the Coalition could
rebuild.

The City appears to be an angry disaster. Money doesn't rebuild
infrastructure - bulldozers and workers and cement do. The Coalition needs
an Iraqi/Coalition effort principally executed by military engineers --and
thousands of Iraqi workers--to re-build the City. We need a "Pierre
L'Enfant" of Fallujah.

Police stations are planned but barely started. The train station is mined
and the trains do not function. Roads must be paved. We need to eliminate
major signs of US caused war damage, etc.

6. Coalition Public Diplomacy Policy is a disaster:

1st - The US media is putting the second team in Iraq with some exceptions.
Unfortunately, the situation is extremely dangerous for journalists. The
working conditions for a reporter are terrible. They cannot travel
independently of US military forces without risking abduction or death. In
some cases, the press has degraded to reporting based on secondary sources,
press briefings which they do not believe, and alarmist video of the
aftermath of suicide bombings obtained from Iraqi employees of unknown
reliability.

2nd - Our unbelievably competent, articulate, objective, and courageous
Battalion, Brigade, and Division Commanders are not on TV. These commanders
represent an Army-Marine Corps which is rated as the most trusted
institution in America by every poll.

3rd - We are not aggressively providing support (transportation, security,
food, return of film to an upload site, etc) to reporters to allow them to
follow the course of the war.

4th - Military leaders on the ground are talking to people they trust
instead of talking to all reporters who command the attention of the
American people. (We need to educate and support AP, Reuters, Gannet,
Hearst, the Washington Post, the New York Times, etc.)

7. SUMMARY:

a.. This is the darkness before dawn in the efforts to construct a viable
Iraqi state. The enterprise was badly launched --but we are now well
organized and beginning to develop successful momentum. The future outcomes
are largely a function of the degree to which Iraqi men and women will
overcome fear and step forward to seize the leadership opportunity to create
a new future.

b.. We face some very difficult days in the coming 2-5 years. In my
judgment, if we retain the support of the American people --we can achieve
our objectives of creating a law-based Iraqi state which will be an
influencing example on the entire region.

c.. A successful outcome would potentially usher in a very dramatically
changed environment throughout the Middle East and signal in this region the
end of an era of incompetent and corrupt government which fosters
frustration and violence on the part of much of the population.

d.. It was an honor and a very encouraging experience to visit CENTCOM
Forces in Iraq and Kuwait and see the progress achieved by the bravery and
dedication of our military forces.


Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: None

Roguish Lawyer
08-13-2005, 18:21
Fascinating and extremely well-written. I am deeply impressed by how concisely he (or his staff) writes. I will be interested to read the posts that follow.

CRad
08-13-2005, 19:42
I am not a McCaffrey fan but he says a couple of things that make really good sense.

a.. This is the darkness before dawn in the efforts to construct a viable
Iraqi state.

8th - Lack of continuity in CENTCOM strategic and operational senior
leadership. The CENTCOM military leadership we now have is a collective
national treasure.

the first one needs to be articulated to the American people in no uncertain terms. I would say a catchphrase such as "support the soldier; support the mission" would be a good starting point.

That continuity thing he talks about can't be stressed enough and I think he hit the nail on the head with it.

Cathy
08-15-2005, 13:05
Thank you.

I'm glad I got to read that.

CRad you're absolutely right, this is the kind of information I would like to have, but where is a simple Missouri housewife going to find unvarnished information.

The Reaper
08-15-2005, 13:18
CRad you're absolutely right, this is the kind of information I would like have, but where is a simple Missouri housewife going to find unvarnished information.

On PS.com, obviously. :D

TR

CPTAUSRET
08-15-2005, 13:21
On PS.com, obviously. :D

TR

INDUBITABLY!

aricbcool
08-15-2005, 18:33
TR,

Thanks for posting this.

One question I have:

He mentions concern over ""The other shoe" - a war with North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, Iran, or Cuba that draws away U.S. military forces and political energy."

Why mention Cuba? Barring OPSEC violations, is Cuba something we should be worrying about?

My first thought is the instability that Castro's death (which could come any time) could bring to the region. Even that wouldn't necessarily bring war...

Right?

--Aric

EDIT Just realized how I might have come across. I am not second guessing the General. I am genuinely interested in why Cuba is mentioned. :) /EDIT

NousDefionsDoc
08-15-2005, 18:55
No. No need to worry about either Cuba or Venezuela.

Doc
08-15-2005, 19:15
Thank you.

I'm glad I got to read that.

CRad you're absolutely right, this is the kind of information I would like have, but where is a simple Missouri housewife going to find unvarnished information.

Welcome aboard Cathy.

Please follow the link below and post an introduction about yourself please.

http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?p=90634#post90634

Doc

Tubbs
08-15-2005, 19:27
This is a very interesting report.
It has been a while since I was in Iraq, however, the numbers on police and military over there seem grossly inflated. It sounds like they just took a sign up roster and published that with no regard to the number actually trained and functional. Am I totally off base with this one, or did I just misread the report?
I also worry that they put too much faith in the legitimacty of this government to stop the violence and insurgency. History is rife with countries that had legitimate governments and still were torn apart by civil war and strife. Even our own.
I don't think that the administration is misinforming us, I just think that sometimes they have on rose colored glasses.
What do the rest of you think?