The Reaper
08-13-2005, 09:48
Gents:
Got this from a buddy.
TR
Gen McCaffrey's Report (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: None
MEMORANDUM FOR: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Subject: Trip Report - Kuwait and Iraq - Saturday, 4 June through Saturday,
11 June 2005
1. PURPOSE: This memo provides feedback reference visit 4-11 June 2005 by
General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) to Kuwait and Iraq.
2. SOURCES:
1.. General George Casey, Commander, MNF-I - one-on-one discussions and
Staff Briefings.
2.. LTG JR Vines, Commander MNC-I - one-on-one discussions and Staff
Briefings.
3.. LTG Dave Petreaus, Commander, Multinational Security Transition
Command - one-on-one discussions/briefings.
4.. LTG Robin Brims, (UK Army), Deputy Commanding General of MNF-I -
one-on-one discussions.
5.. Charge d'Affairs James Jeffrey - office call one-on-one with U.S.
Embassy Iraq.
6.. MG Tim Donovan (USMC), Chief of Staff, MNF-I - one-on-one discussions.
7.. MG Steve Johnson (USMC), Acting Commanding General, II MEF -
one-on-one discussion and staff briefing.
8.. BG Peter Palmer and BG John Defreitas - MNF-I Operations and Intel
Briefings.
9.. MG Rusty Findley (USAF) and Colonel Bill Hix - MNF-I Campaign Action
Plan Brief.
10.. BG Tom Bostick - Army Corps Engineers. Gulf Region Division Brief.
11.. MG William Webster, Commanding General, Multi-National Division
Baghdad - General Officer Briefing and 3rd ID Battle Staff briefing.
12.. 2nd Brigade 3rd ID Commander and Staff Briefing. Baghdad security
operations.
13.. Ambassador Ahraf Oazi and UN Iraq Delegation - Lunch Meeting with
Special Representative to the Secretary General of the UN in Iraq.
14.. MG Robert Heine, Acting Director IRMO (US Embassy Reconstruction
Program officer) - one-on-one discussion/briefings.
15.. MG Hank Stratman - Political-Military-Economic Brief, US Embassy.
16.. MG Eldon Bargewell, Joint Contracting - one-on-one discussions.
17.. Field Visit. US Marine Infantry Battalion. Fallujah.
18.. Field Visit. US Army Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Vicinity Tikrit.
19.. Briefing Iraqi Army Brigade Commander. Fallujah.
20.. Briefing by U.S. Army Embedded Training Team. Fallujah ISF Army
brigade.
21.. Briefing USMC Embedded Trainer. Fallujah Police.
22.. Briefing U.S. Army Captain. Embedded Training Team. ISF Army
Infantry Battalion-Vicinity Tikrit.
23.. Briefing Iraqi Army Colonel. ISF Training Center. Vicinity Tikrit.
24.. Lunch discussions. Iraqi Army Battalion XO, S3, SGM. Vicinity Tikrit.
25.. Live Fire Demo/Briefing. Iraqi Army Commando Battalion.
26.. Demo/Briefing Iraqi Police ERU (Emergency Response Unit).
Baghdad.
27.. Field Sensing Session. US Army combat division. Fifteen U.S.Army
Company Grade Officers.
28.. Field Sensing Session. US Army combat Battalion. Junior Enlisted
Soldiers.
29.. Field Sensing Sessions. U.S. Army/Navy/Air Force/Marine Senior
NCO's.
30.. Discussion Sessions. Two U.S. Contractor Teams (Logistics and
Security) -- Senior Leadership
3. THE BOTTOM LINE---Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom: June
2005:
1st - US Military Forces in Iraq are superb. Our Army-Marine ground combat
units with supporting Air and Naval Power are characterized by quality
military leadership, solid discipline, high morale, and enormous individual
and unit courage. Unit effectiveness is as good as we can get. This is the
most competent and battle wise force in our nation's history. They are also
beautifully cared for by the chain-of-command -- and they know it. (Food,
A/C sleeping areas, medical care, mental health care, home leave,
phone/e-mail contact with families, personal equipment, individual and unit
training, targeted economic incentives in the battle area, visibility of
tactical leadership, home station care for their families, access to news
information, etc).
2nd - The point of the US war effort is to create legitimate and competent
Iraqi national, provincial, and municipal governance. We are at a turning
point in the coming six months. The momentum is now clearly with the Iraqi
Government and the Coalition Security Forces. The Sunnis are coming into the
political process. They will vote in December. Unlike the Balkans-the
Iraqis want this to succeed. Foreign fighters are an enormously lethal
threat to the Iraqi civilian population, the ISF, and Coalition Forces in
that order. However, they will be an increasing political disaster for the
insurgency. Over time they are actually adding to the credibility of the
emerging Iraqi government. We should expect to see a dwindling number of
competent, suicide capable Jihadist. Those who come to Iraq--will be rapidly
killed in Iraq. The picture by next summer will be unfavorable to
recruiting foreigners to die in Iraq while attacking fellow Arabs.
The initial US/UK OIF intervention took down a criminal regime and left a
nation without an operational State.
The transitional Bremer-appointed Iraqi government created a weak state of
warring factions.
The January 2005 Iraqi elections created the beginnings of legitimacy and
have fostered a supportive political base to create the new Iraqi Security
Forces.
The August Iraqi Constitutional Referendum and the December-January election
and formation of a new government will build the prototype for the evolution
of an effective, law-based Iraqi State with a reliable Security Force.
January thru September 2006 will be the peak period of the insurgency
-- and the bottom rung of the new Iraq. The positive trend lines following
the January 2006 elections (if they continue) will likely permit the
withdrawal of substantial US combat forces by late summer of 2006. With
250,000 Iraqi Security Forces successfully operating in support of a
government which includes substantial Sunni participation--the energy will
start rapidly draining out of the insurgency.
3rd - The Iraqi Security Forces are now a real and hugely significant
factor. LTG Dave Petreaus has done a brilliant job with his supporting
trainers.
169,000 Army and Police exist in various stages of readiness. They have
uniforms, automatic weapons, body armor, some radios, some armor, light
trucks, and battalion-level organization. At least 60,000 are courageous
Patriots who are actively fighting. By next summer--250,000 Iraqi troops
and 10 division HQS will be the dominant security factor in Iraq.
However, much remains to be done. There is no maintenance or logistics
system. There is no national command and control. Corruption is a threat
factor of greater long-range danger than the armed insurgency.
The Insurgents have widely infiltrated the ISF. The ISF desperately needs
more effective, long-term NCO and Officer training.
Finally, the ISF absolutely must have enough helicopter air mobility (120+
Black Hawk UH 60's) --and a substantial number of armored vehicles to lower
casualties and give them a competitive edge over the insurgents they will
fight. (2000 up-armor Humvee's, 500 ASV's, and 2000 M113A3's with add-on
armor package)
4. Top CENTCOM Vulnerabilities:
1st - Premature drawdown of U.S. ground forces driven by dwindling U.S.
domestic political support and the progressive deterioration of Army and
Marine manpower. (In particular, the expected melt-down of the Army National
Guard and Army Reserve in the coming 36 months)
2nd - Alienation of the U.S. Congress or the American people caused by Iraqi
public ingratitude and corruption.
3rd - Political ineptitude of Shia civil leadership that freezes out the
Sunnis and creates a civil war during our drawdown.
4th - "The other shoe" - a war with North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, Iran, or
Cuba that draws away U.S. military forces and political energy.
5th - The loss or constraint of our logistics support bases in Kuwait.
Clearly we need constant diplomatic attention and care to this vital Ally.
If Kuwait became unstable or severely alienated to US Military objectives in
the region-then our posture in Iraq would be placed in immediate fatal
peril.
6th - Open intervention by Iranian intelligence or military forces to
support rogue Shia Iraqi insurgency. (Assassination of Sustani-armed
rebellion by Sadr)
7th - Continued under-manning and too rapid turnover in State Department
inter-agency representation in Iraq.
8th - Lack of continuity in CENTCOM strategic and operational senior
leadership. The CENTCOM military leadership we now have is a collective
national treasure.
General Abizaid's value to the War effort based on his credibility to US
Military Forces --and ability to communicate and relate to the Iraqi
emergent leadership-- cannot be overstated.
The combination of a three-star tactical Headquarters (LTG John Vines is the
most experienced and effective operational battle leader we have produced in
a generation) - and an in-country four-star strategic commander (Gen George
Casey) has improved the situation from the overwhelmed, under-resourced
Bremer-Sanchez ad hoc arrangement.
LTG Dave Petreaus has done a superb job building the ISF.
Relationships are everything in this campaign. We need to lock in our
senior team for the coming 24 months.
Suggest that the three key US/Coalition military HQS of Casey-Petreaus-Vines
need to stop unit rotation and go to individual replacement rotation.
The very senior U.S. military leadership needs their families based in a
Kuwait compound with periodic visits authorized. (We did this with General
Abrams and his senior leaders during the final phase of Vietnam.)
Got this from a buddy.
TR
Gen McCaffrey's Report (UNCLASSIFIED)
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: None
MEMORANDUM FOR: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Subject: Trip Report - Kuwait and Iraq - Saturday, 4 June through Saturday,
11 June 2005
1. PURPOSE: This memo provides feedback reference visit 4-11 June 2005 by
General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.) to Kuwait and Iraq.
2. SOURCES:
1.. General George Casey, Commander, MNF-I - one-on-one discussions and
Staff Briefings.
2.. LTG JR Vines, Commander MNC-I - one-on-one discussions and Staff
Briefings.
3.. LTG Dave Petreaus, Commander, Multinational Security Transition
Command - one-on-one discussions/briefings.
4.. LTG Robin Brims, (UK Army), Deputy Commanding General of MNF-I -
one-on-one discussions.
5.. Charge d'Affairs James Jeffrey - office call one-on-one with U.S.
Embassy Iraq.
6.. MG Tim Donovan (USMC), Chief of Staff, MNF-I - one-on-one discussions.
7.. MG Steve Johnson (USMC), Acting Commanding General, II MEF -
one-on-one discussion and staff briefing.
8.. BG Peter Palmer and BG John Defreitas - MNF-I Operations and Intel
Briefings.
9.. MG Rusty Findley (USAF) and Colonel Bill Hix - MNF-I Campaign Action
Plan Brief.
10.. BG Tom Bostick - Army Corps Engineers. Gulf Region Division Brief.
11.. MG William Webster, Commanding General, Multi-National Division
Baghdad - General Officer Briefing and 3rd ID Battle Staff briefing.
12.. 2nd Brigade 3rd ID Commander and Staff Briefing. Baghdad security
operations.
13.. Ambassador Ahraf Oazi and UN Iraq Delegation - Lunch Meeting with
Special Representative to the Secretary General of the UN in Iraq.
14.. MG Robert Heine, Acting Director IRMO (US Embassy Reconstruction
Program officer) - one-on-one discussion/briefings.
15.. MG Hank Stratman - Political-Military-Economic Brief, US Embassy.
16.. MG Eldon Bargewell, Joint Contracting - one-on-one discussions.
17.. Field Visit. US Marine Infantry Battalion. Fallujah.
18.. Field Visit. US Army Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Vicinity Tikrit.
19.. Briefing Iraqi Army Brigade Commander. Fallujah.
20.. Briefing by U.S. Army Embedded Training Team. Fallujah ISF Army
brigade.
21.. Briefing USMC Embedded Trainer. Fallujah Police.
22.. Briefing U.S. Army Captain. Embedded Training Team. ISF Army
Infantry Battalion-Vicinity Tikrit.
23.. Briefing Iraqi Army Colonel. ISF Training Center. Vicinity Tikrit.
24.. Lunch discussions. Iraqi Army Battalion XO, S3, SGM. Vicinity Tikrit.
25.. Live Fire Demo/Briefing. Iraqi Army Commando Battalion.
26.. Demo/Briefing Iraqi Police ERU (Emergency Response Unit).
Baghdad.
27.. Field Sensing Session. US Army combat division. Fifteen U.S.Army
Company Grade Officers.
28.. Field Sensing Session. US Army combat Battalion. Junior Enlisted
Soldiers.
29.. Field Sensing Sessions. U.S. Army/Navy/Air Force/Marine Senior
NCO's.
30.. Discussion Sessions. Two U.S. Contractor Teams (Logistics and
Security) -- Senior Leadership
3. THE BOTTOM LINE---Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom: June
2005:
1st - US Military Forces in Iraq are superb. Our Army-Marine ground combat
units with supporting Air and Naval Power are characterized by quality
military leadership, solid discipline, high morale, and enormous individual
and unit courage. Unit effectiveness is as good as we can get. This is the
most competent and battle wise force in our nation's history. They are also
beautifully cared for by the chain-of-command -- and they know it. (Food,
A/C sleeping areas, medical care, mental health care, home leave,
phone/e-mail contact with families, personal equipment, individual and unit
training, targeted economic incentives in the battle area, visibility of
tactical leadership, home station care for their families, access to news
information, etc).
2nd - The point of the US war effort is to create legitimate and competent
Iraqi national, provincial, and municipal governance. We are at a turning
point in the coming six months. The momentum is now clearly with the Iraqi
Government and the Coalition Security Forces. The Sunnis are coming into the
political process. They will vote in December. Unlike the Balkans-the
Iraqis want this to succeed. Foreign fighters are an enormously lethal
threat to the Iraqi civilian population, the ISF, and Coalition Forces in
that order. However, they will be an increasing political disaster for the
insurgency. Over time they are actually adding to the credibility of the
emerging Iraqi government. We should expect to see a dwindling number of
competent, suicide capable Jihadist. Those who come to Iraq--will be rapidly
killed in Iraq. The picture by next summer will be unfavorable to
recruiting foreigners to die in Iraq while attacking fellow Arabs.
The initial US/UK OIF intervention took down a criminal regime and left a
nation without an operational State.
The transitional Bremer-appointed Iraqi government created a weak state of
warring factions.
The January 2005 Iraqi elections created the beginnings of legitimacy and
have fostered a supportive political base to create the new Iraqi Security
Forces.
The August Iraqi Constitutional Referendum and the December-January election
and formation of a new government will build the prototype for the evolution
of an effective, law-based Iraqi State with a reliable Security Force.
January thru September 2006 will be the peak period of the insurgency
-- and the bottom rung of the new Iraq. The positive trend lines following
the January 2006 elections (if they continue) will likely permit the
withdrawal of substantial US combat forces by late summer of 2006. With
250,000 Iraqi Security Forces successfully operating in support of a
government which includes substantial Sunni participation--the energy will
start rapidly draining out of the insurgency.
3rd - The Iraqi Security Forces are now a real and hugely significant
factor. LTG Dave Petreaus has done a brilliant job with his supporting
trainers.
169,000 Army and Police exist in various stages of readiness. They have
uniforms, automatic weapons, body armor, some radios, some armor, light
trucks, and battalion-level organization. At least 60,000 are courageous
Patriots who are actively fighting. By next summer--250,000 Iraqi troops
and 10 division HQS will be the dominant security factor in Iraq.
However, much remains to be done. There is no maintenance or logistics
system. There is no national command and control. Corruption is a threat
factor of greater long-range danger than the armed insurgency.
The Insurgents have widely infiltrated the ISF. The ISF desperately needs
more effective, long-term NCO and Officer training.
Finally, the ISF absolutely must have enough helicopter air mobility (120+
Black Hawk UH 60's) --and a substantial number of armored vehicles to lower
casualties and give them a competitive edge over the insurgents they will
fight. (2000 up-armor Humvee's, 500 ASV's, and 2000 M113A3's with add-on
armor package)
4. Top CENTCOM Vulnerabilities:
1st - Premature drawdown of U.S. ground forces driven by dwindling U.S.
domestic political support and the progressive deterioration of Army and
Marine manpower. (In particular, the expected melt-down of the Army National
Guard and Army Reserve in the coming 36 months)
2nd - Alienation of the U.S. Congress or the American people caused by Iraqi
public ingratitude and corruption.
3rd - Political ineptitude of Shia civil leadership that freezes out the
Sunnis and creates a civil war during our drawdown.
4th - "The other shoe" - a war with North Korea, Venezuela, Syria, Iran, or
Cuba that draws away U.S. military forces and political energy.
5th - The loss or constraint of our logistics support bases in Kuwait.
Clearly we need constant diplomatic attention and care to this vital Ally.
If Kuwait became unstable or severely alienated to US Military objectives in
the region-then our posture in Iraq would be placed in immediate fatal
peril.
6th - Open intervention by Iranian intelligence or military forces to
support rogue Shia Iraqi insurgency. (Assassination of Sustani-armed
rebellion by Sadr)
7th - Continued under-manning and too rapid turnover in State Department
inter-agency representation in Iraq.
8th - Lack of continuity in CENTCOM strategic and operational senior
leadership. The CENTCOM military leadership we now have is a collective
national treasure.
General Abizaid's value to the War effort based on his credibility to US
Military Forces --and ability to communicate and relate to the Iraqi
emergent leadership-- cannot be overstated.
The combination of a three-star tactical Headquarters (LTG John Vines is the
most experienced and effective operational battle leader we have produced in
a generation) - and an in-country four-star strategic commander (Gen George
Casey) has improved the situation from the overwhelmed, under-resourced
Bremer-Sanchez ad hoc arrangement.
LTG Dave Petreaus has done a superb job building the ISF.
Relationships are everything in this campaign. We need to lock in our
senior team for the coming 24 months.
Suggest that the three key US/Coalition military HQS of Casey-Petreaus-Vines
need to stop unit rotation and go to individual replacement rotation.
The very senior U.S. military leadership needs their families based in a
Kuwait compound with periodic visits authorized. (We did this with General
Abrams and his senior leaders during the final phase of Vietnam.)