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D9 (RIP)
06-25-2005, 20:23
This article was in a recent LA Times discussing the Iraq insurgency and why it lacks several key characteristics of historically successful efforts. Thought it may be interesting to hear the experts comment on the accuracy of Max Boot's analysis:

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-boot23jun23,0,7995736.column

magician
06-26-2005, 05:30
I think that it is hazardous to rely too much on comparisons with earlier insurgencies. While insurgents, just like counterinsurgents, examine historical examples, they do so to divine what was effective, and what was less effective, and they then modify and adapt old lessons to new environments. As part of this process, they learn to exploit new technology.

I am not saying that examining earlier insurgencies cannot be instructive. It can be so. But each insurgency is unique, none are amenable to cookie-cutter approaches, and savvy experts quickly try to discern the unique conditions inherent in each particular case. All insurgencies must be analyzed within their peculiar cultural milieu.

In the case of the insurgents in Iraq, and I use that description in a qualified fashion, as there is no monolithic, unified, coherent insurgency, per se, I think that the primary points of departure from historical predecessors include the role of radical Islam as an overarching context, and the adaptation of evolved technology.

Where this article is concerned, I also differ with Max Boot in how he assesses certain other factors.

Mr. Boot states that "the rebels lack a unifying organization, ideology and leader." Caution is mandated here. The fact that insurgents in Iraq apparently lack what Mr. Boot terms "a unifying organization" is not, in this case, so much a weakness as a favorable quality for them. The fact that there is no unified insurgent command means that there is no central target for intelligence services to penetrate, there is no headquarters which can be detected and destroyed, decapitating the insurgency in one fell swoop. Iraqi insurgents are disparate and distributed.

Accordingly, intelligence efforts must untangle a snarl of intermeshed, dynamic, opportunistically temporary relationships, stressing both our methods of analysis, our methods of information dissemination, and our ability to coordinate our own threat assessments and our responses to them.

I disagree that Iraqi insurgents lack "an ideology." I think that radical Islam, and a species of Arab nationalism, are running amok in Iraq, as well as in feeder countries next door, elsewhere in the region, and globally, in every community worldwide where radical clerics preach in favor of Jihad. Many countries, two of them sharing borders with Iraq, serve as reservoirs of Jihadis, moral support, expertise, and funding. I do not, at this time, consider Iran as one of those countries.

As for the lack of a unifying leader, what role would Mr. Boot ascribe to that played by Al Qaeda and Sheik Usama? The leader, in this case, is more a symbol, than an actual battlefield general, but again, this rebounds, in this case, in favor of the insurgents. Each cell, or cluster of cells, has its own Sheik, and it must be remembered that tribal relationships in this region of the world are trans-national. Of more pertinence, is the ancient schism between Shia and Sunni, and the separatism of the Kurds. It is becoming increasingly clear that we are confronting a predominately Sunni insurgency, and it is supported and abetted by predominately Sunni allies.

Mr. Boot points out that Shia and Kurds in Iraq generally do not support the insurgency, which increasingly has a Sunni face, and this is a good thing. But dismissing this virulent Sunni minority, implying that it lacks adequate "mass" to succeed, misses a couple of crucial points.

Firstly, the Sunni insurgents use of technology enables them to bring several "force multipliers" to bear, magnifying significantly their impact and reach. I refer, primarily, to the IED, and to the VBIED. Being organizationally small in size, small in numbers, is not a handicap. Far from it. In this case, it is a virtue, and it makes the insurgents more difficult to penetrate, to detect, to track, and to anticipate. As long as the few have the ability to exploit technology, organizational mass and size is a poor criteria. The insurgents do not have to have a large militia, or large formations under arms. They just have to have a very few very smart, very devious specialists, whose expertise can be disseminated throughout the various regional and metropolitan cells. Where mass does come into play is, the Sunni insurgents absolutely require a continuous flow of useful idiot recruits who will commit suicide delivering a VBIED to its target.

Mr. Boot also forgets to remember that the various Sunni tribes in the region span several nations, and their allegiances are not confined by national borders. Guy has posted here previously the distribution of Sunnis throughout the Middle East, and indeed, the world. It is irrelevant how few in number the Sunni insurgents are in Iraq, if they are merely the focus of a far wider population, encompassing significant communities in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and other countries. This is where the money, and the suicide recruits, are originating. The old regime "dead-enders" from Sadaam's intelligence service, and the Syrian specialists, are the ones who bring the technical expertise to bear.

Mr. Boot also states that the Iraqi insurgents have not been able to hold large areas of contiguous territory. Again, in their case, for them, this is a good thing. Their safe areas are in Syria, in Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, and all that they need to be able to do inside Iraq is intimidate enough people to avoid compromise in a specific neghborhood. And again, the small cellular structure of their fighting units enables them to maintain a low profile, and evade detection.

Mr. Boot also derides the lack of large-scale insurgent offensives. I have to sigh at this. In the age of terrorism, one thing that should be abundantly apparent is that one sufficiently horrendous act can have as much, if not more, impact than any number of "rebel offensives." It was not, for example, a "large-scale offensive" that literally evicted the United Nations from Iraq in November, 2003. It was one adroit, deft, and yes, massive, hit.

The fact that Iraqi insurgents are able to detonate multiple VBIEDs every day tells the tale. The fact that spectacular attacks have failed, like the one attempted at Ab Ghraib, misses the point. Yes, it is good that this attack failed. No doubt about it. Yes, it is good that we have been able to thwart many such attacks. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that VBIEDs are exploding on a daily basis now, we are now in a war of attrition, and we have to ask ourselves how to realign our resources to prevent them, and needless to say, it is crucial that we outlast them.

I do not fundamentally quibble with the rest of Mr. Boot's analysis. I agree that it is critical that Iraqis, en masse, went to the polls and voted, despite the threats of the insurgency. More than anything else, this unmasked the insurgents, I believe, and helped Shia and Kurds understand that they are separate, powerful, internally unified constituencies. The popular vote made clear that the insurgents were Sunni, and it revealed the role played by their clerics, both inside Iraq and outside.

In sum.....I would say that it is exceedingly difficult to erect a viable, robust democracy in a country with no tradition of it, particularly when security costs suck up a good 50% of all infrastructure improvement expenditures. There is no doubt that America is committed, however, and at this point, I do not see that America has any alternative but to see this task through to completion, no matter how long it takes, and no matter the cost.

In order to do this, we have to get smarter ourselves, and our hide-bound military institutions need to adapt faster, and deploy new solutions to the battlefield more rapidly. We also need to take the gloves off with Syria, and we need to get busy inside Saudi Arabia, ideally in a covert and clandestine manner. I do not think that we need to go to war with Syria, but I do think that smart bombs need to rain down upon certain buildings in Damascus and elsewhere, and I think that certain folks need to encounter cruise missiles with their names on them.

As for our efforts inside Iraq itself.....I have said it before here: I think that the large units need to pull out, and the small, specialized units need to remain, and they need to remain embedded in Iraqi units, and they need to have a low profile. If the insurgents do not have large American units to attack, perhaps they will return home to their mosques to pray and preach about America's role in the world. Better that they talk at home, and argue amongst themselves, than filter into Iraq and learn how to build VBIEDs.

Peregrino
06-26-2005, 06:24
Magician - Excellent analysis. All the insurgents have to do is break the American will. Personally, I don't think that's going to be difficult. Watching the expresssions and listening to the tone as the news anchors discussed the VBIED that killed the female Marines was illuminating. Once we're out of the picture, it'll be a civil war and they'll sort it out to our detriment. I'm reading "The Sling and the Stone" now. I would recommend this book to any of you who want to improve your understanding of 4GW (4th Generation Warfare). More of these "pundits" ought to look at it before they start pontificating. It might improve their accuracy. My .02 - Peregrino

lksteve
06-26-2005, 10:00
the situation in Iraq is not so much the result of internal rebellion as it is one of external agitation...i can't think, off the top of my head, of outside agitators having much success in circumstances like this...of course, the one situation that comes to mind is Che in Bolivia...that ended well...

The Reaper
06-26-2005, 10:09
Better to kill those who want to die for Allah there than here.

What do the libs think the jihadists will do once the situation in Iraq is settled?

If the media reported on this war the way they did in WW II, we would be seeing much better popular support for the war. They are going after the CoG here, as Peregrino noted, the will of the American people. They are spinning it as negatively as possible to promote their agenda. Sadly, they will also be the first to point the finger at others for not doing enough once the next big attack occurs here.

TR