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JasonSw2
06-25-2005, 07:57
I intend this post only as a discussion of the concept that this new group of Marines, operating under the SOCOM flag, if you will, are being organized to perform (according to this story, at least) what has traditionally been a USA Special Forces function (although certainly not your only capability).

As a former Marine, I consider myself very much a guest here in your establishment, and intend no offense in this bringing this subject up.

While I am confident in the qualifications of the selected Marines, many coming from our Force Recon units, I find my curiosity piqued as to why this unit mission was selected, and thought this a good place to look for answers, and enlightenment.

I want to ask "Are you guys so busy that you needed the Marines to help out?" but want to ask it without the negativity that so blunt a question implies.

So,... what do ya think? Is this a good thing, a bad thing? Some welcome inter-Department sharing of methods & ideas? Waste of money?

Thanks for sharing your thoughts,

-JasonSw2


snipped from strategypage.com:

U.S. Marines Surrender to SOCOM
by James Dunnigan
June 24, 2005

The U.S. Marine Corps has agreed to turn over a force of 2,500 specially trained marines to SOCOM (Special Operations Command.) Bowing to pressure from the Department of Defense, and SOCOM, the marines are the last of the services to make such a contribution. Created in 1987, SOCOM gained control over army Special Forces (including Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare and special helicopter units), navy SEALs and air force commandoes and special aviation units. But the marines said they had nothing to offer.

The marine SOCOM force will consist of 400 marines trained to provide military instruction for foreign armed forces. This has long been a Special Forces chore, and will still be. But the addition of marine training troops will take some of the pressure off Special Forces to provide this service.

The marines will also provide over a thousand marines trained as "special operations-capable." The marines have been training some of their troops to be "special operations-capable" for over a decade. But SOCOM has different standards, and skill requirements. Once the "special operations-capable" marines are turned over to SOCOM control, SOCOM will provide additional training. As part of this deal, the SOCOM marines will be available for Marine Corps operations when SOCOM doesn’t need them. It’s likely that once SOCOM gets control of these marines, they will keep them busy indefinitely.

Finally, the marines will provide some support units. These will include stuff like dog handlers (and dogs trained for military tasks), some logistical units and an Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.

SOCOM will also keep control over Special Operations Detachment 1, a force of 86 marines trained as commandoes. SOCOM originally wanted as many as 4,000 marines, and the final deal may result in the marines giving up more than 2,500 troops.

Bill Harsey
06-25-2005, 08:16
JasonSw2,
Much of what you reference has already been asked and answered here in other threads. Try "Marine SOCOM" in the search button.

The Reaper
06-25-2005, 08:21
I see no problem as long as the force consists of seasoned, mature NCOs and officers who speak the language, have experience in the area, are culturally aware, have mastery of the subjects they plan to teach, plan to live with the soldiers that they are training, and are fully qualified as instructors.

TR

lksteve
06-25-2005, 08:24
i am not sure the Marine Corps culture is compatible with the mission...

QRQ 30
06-25-2005, 08:58
I agree with T.R. and there is nothing that makes those attributes specific to one Service or another. Taking the "G" from GWOT, there is plenty of room for more units.

QRQ 30
06-25-2005, 09:06
Let me expand a little on my previous. Having worked with marines I'm not sure they can have these attributes. Maybe things have changed. We were located in a corner of the Khe Sahn Combat Base in 1968. The Marines would have nothing to do with indigenous personnel. They would not allow our troops (indig) to enter their compound. U.S. personnel had to take the trash to their dump.

A superior attitude won't work in training foreign troops.

Jack Moroney (RIP)
06-25-2005, 11:55
I see no problem as long as the force consists of seasoned, mature NCOs and officers who speak the language, have experience in the area, are culturally aware, have mastery of the subjects they plan to teach, plan to live with the soldiers that they are training, and are fully qualified as instructors.

TR

I agree, but this is just a part of FID and while training host nation troops can be done by any force meeting the requisite qualifications mentioned above the force itself is going to fall short dealing with all the other aspects that makes FID work such as intel ops, selected civil-military requirements, and joint/combined ops to name but a few challenges. Where as the marines can bring a lot to the table SF will bring the entire meal and leave a tip.

Jack Moroney-I know many marines and have great respect for them, however you might be able to detach the marine from the Corps you will never separate the Corps from the marine.

lksteve
06-25-2005, 14:01
... the force itself is going to fall short dealing with all the other aspects that makes FID work such as intel ops, selected civil-military requirements, and joint/combined ops to name but a few challenges. Where as the marines can bring a lot to the table SF will bring the entire meal and leave a tip.my experience with Uncle Sam's Misguided Children in Somalia left me unimpressed with the Marines as an organization capable of sustaining long-term operations...hell, they don't even have their own medics...how are they going to sustain a force they are training...? they don't have their own engineers...how are they going to construct training facilities...? if it ain't on the boat, where are they going to get stuff from...?
IMNSHO the Marines make a good strike force...but at all levels, and especially the JTF level, they are inflexible, short-sighted, and dogmatic...these are not good characteristics for training foreign troops...

Sacamuelas
06-25-2005, 14:40
JasonSw2,
Much of what you reference has already been asked and answered here in other threads. Try "Marine SOCOM" in the search button.

As Sir Harsey has indicated, some of the issues in this thread have been hashed out before. The search button would have brought up this old thread from earlier this year.

Hopefully, this will prevent some redundancy.
http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=5388&page=1&pp=10&highlight=marine+corps+socom

Tubbs
06-25-2005, 19:44
my experience with Uncle Sam's Misguided Children in Somalia left me unimpressed with the Marines as an organization capable of sustaining long-term operations...hell, they don't even have their own medics...how are they going to sustain a force they are training...? they don't have their own engineers...how are they going to construct training facilities...? if it ain't on the boat, where are they going to get stuff from...?
IMNSHO the Marines make a good strike force...but at all levels, and especially the JTF level, they are inflexible, short-sighted, and dogmatic...these are not good characteristics for training foreign troops...

Having spent two years working in operations, the Marine Corps is not designed for long term operations. We are set up and trained for short 30-60 day operations, that may, or may not be piecemeal based off of a 6 month deployment schedule (not OPSEC, you can find this out on Google). Things like NEO's, TRAP missions, Embassy re-inforcements, Global AT duties, ect. That is why our operational force is designed around the concept of the MEU(SOC). The Marine Corps is not designed to be an occupational force. We cannot and should not do the job of the Army. This includes training indigenous troops. We are not trained to accomplish this type of mission, and lack of training will produce similar results to that of stupidy in a situation where proper training is required to function.
That being said I believe that Force Recon was added to SOCOM for two reasons.
1. To windfall a precieved shortage in trained SF operators brought on by lagging numbers in our armed forces (resulting in lagging SF recruitment).
2. Force Recon is set up to operate reconassance missions that no other branch of SF is designed to do. SEAL's are designed for direct action and amphibious missions, DELTA for AT, army SF (I won't use the GB word :o ) for infiltration and Force Recon for deep recon. Each can function in different operational roles, but they function best in the role they were set up for. Thus adding Force Recon to SOCOM gives the additional capabilities without the hassle of inter agency coordination (which in my limited experience can be quite painfull).

The Reaper
06-25-2005, 19:59
Having spent two years working in operations, the Marine Corps is not designed for long term operations. We are set up and trained for short 30-60 day operations, that may, or may not be piecemeal based off of a 6 month deployment schedule (not OPSEC, you can find this out on Google). Things like NEO's, TRAP missions, Embassy re-inforcements, Global AT duties, ect. That is why our operational force is designed around the concept of the MEU(SOC). The Marine Corps is not designed to be an occupational force. We cannot and should not do the job of the Army. This includes training indigenous troops. We are not trained to accomplish this type of mission, and lack of training will produce similar results to that of stupidy in a situation where proper training is required to function.
That being said I believe that Force Recon was added to SOCOM for two reasons.
1. To windfall a precieved shortage in trained SF operators brought on by lagging numbers in our armed forces (resulting in lagging SF recruitment).
2. Force Recon is set up to operate reconassance missions that no other branch of SF is designed to do. SEAL's are designed for direct action and amphibious missions, DELTA for AT, army SF (I won't use the GB word :o ) for infiltration and Force Recon for deep recon. Each can function in different operational roles, but they function best in the role they were set up for. Thus adding Force Recon to SOCOM gives the additional capabilities without the hassle of inter agency coordination (which in my limited experience can be quite painfull).

Tubbs:

You need to stick to talking about a topic you are familiar with, like the Corps.

There is no shortfall in SF recruiting, and SF has been doing Strat Recon (much deeper than the Marines). SF was established, in part, to do deep penetration missions in Eastern Europe and the USSR in the 50's, with a good number of the missions being SR.

You also need to learn the difference between SF and SOF.

TR

QRQ 30
06-25-2005, 20:02
Force Recon is set up to operate reconassance missions that no other branch of SF is designed to do

I beg your pardon! :mad: Nobody has even come close to accomplishing reconnaisance missions, short and deep penetration as well as SF Recon in MACV SOG and probably today in the GWOT.. Read Secret Commandos and tell me the marines had anything remotely comparable..

Back on the subject, I thought they were going to assign Jarheads to a training roll.

I'm not much for beating the drums or my chest but sometimes I just gotta!! :lifter

Tubbs
06-25-2005, 20:11
Tubbs:

You need to stick to talking about a topic you are familiar with, like the Corps.

There is no shortfall in SF recruiting, and SF has been doing Strat Recon (much deeper than the Marines). SF was established, in part, to do deep penetration missions in Eastern Europe and the USSR in the 50's, with a good number of the missions being SR.

You also need to learn the difference between SF and SOF.

TR

This was just info that I was given by a friend who is still in operations. I am just diseminating it. I am not claiming to be an expert on the subject.

Doc
06-25-2005, 20:12
Having spent two years working in operations....

Force Recon is set up to operate reconassance missions that no other branch of SF is designed to do.

You need to do some more research.


Doc

Tubbs
06-25-2005, 20:14
I beg your pardon! :mad: Nobody has even come close to accomplishing reconnaisance missions, short and deep penetration as well as SF Recon in MACV SOG and probably today in the GWOT.. Read Secret Commandos and tell me the marines had anything remotely comparable..

Back on the subject, I thought they were going to assign Jarheads to a training roll.

I'm not much for beating the drums or my chest but sometimes I just gotta!! :lifter

Hey, I'm just one of the little guys. I'm not about to touch that one. I may have a flair for puttin my foot in my mouth but I'm not that good at it.
Any yes, after they initially reassinged FR to SOCOM they decieded to put them into a role where they would train foreign militarys. I guess due in part to their roel in training the Georgian military.

Tubbs
06-25-2005, 20:17
You need to do some more research.


Doc

I'm going off the wonderfull training I recieved in Ops school. Some of it may be propoganda, but that's how it is on paper as far as I was taught. I'm not here thump my chest or beat a drum for the Corps. Everybody always wants to say that they're are the best and its not in my realm to make that call or to debate it (at least in the world of Special Forces).

D9 (RIP)
06-25-2005, 20:19
i am not sure the Marine Corps culture is compatible with the mission...


Just a comment on the observation regarding the Marine mindset being incompatible w/ the SF mission. There is a relatively large contingent of Marines with me in the course, myself included, and all seem to be integrating quite nicely and accounting for themselves quite well in training. By my last count, we have more former jugheads in Lang School than we do Battboys.

I would agree that the USMC line units are dominated by a culture that has some of the qualities described above (having served in one for 4 years). But I don't see any reason that if a select group is taken out of that environment they cannot adapt themselves to the new mission, even if that means cultural changes within the unit.

From what I've seen being here on Bragg, the 82nd isn't a whole lot less rigid and dogmatic than the USMC, if at all. I don't personally see why Marines would be more incapable of changing their culture to fit the SOCOM mission, than Airborne soldiers joinging SF would have changing their mindset to fit in at group.

Ambush Master
06-25-2005, 20:23
Force Recon is set up to operate reconassance missions that no other branch of SF is designed to do.

Sorry here sport, but QRQ is dead on target !! THE Recon that SF can/HAS/IS providing is way far out there beyond USMC !!! Why ?? We go out with the "Little People" that are indigenous to the theater !!! We get closer and provide far more accurate and timely intel than any USMC unit could ever dream of.

As has been suggested, check out the writings of Maj. John Plaster, much of what he tells about SOG, is being practiced today !!!

Later
Martin

Doc
06-25-2005, 20:34
I'm going off the wonderfull training I recieved in Ops school. Some of it may be propoganda, but that's how it is on paper as far as I was taught. I'm not here thump my chest or beat a drum for the Corps. Everybody always wants to say that they're are the best and its not in my realm to make that call or to debate it (at least in the world of Special Forces).


No chest thumping here, just a realistic observation.

Doc

QRQ 30
06-25-2005, 20:39
D9: I appreciate your post. I have had some contact with marine enlisted men in DLI as well as Vietnam, 29 Palms and Camp Geiger, Here is my assessment of the growth of a marine. The recruit is issued a lobotomy along with his first haircut. (Don't quit now). His head is filled with all of the Gung Ho propaganda he can hold, BTW: You are right the same process was and probably still is part of the two week airborne orientation during reception into the 82d. As the marine grows his lobotomy starts to heal. By the time a marine becomes a staff NCO he is totally squared away and matured. These are the stock from which the SOCOM marines will be drawn -- I hope. I haven't met a marine Staff NCO I didn't respect and usually like.

This is just my personal take and I'd bet that officers go through the same metamorphisis as they progress to field grade. :lifter

Doc
06-25-2005, 20:42
Just a comment on the observation regarding the Marine mindset being incompatible w/ the SF mission. There is a relatively large contingent of Marines with me in the course, myself included, and all seem to be integrating quite nicely and accounting for themselves quite well in training. By my last count, we have more former jugheads in Lang School than we do Battboys.

I would agree that the USMC line units are dominated by a culture that has some of the qualities described above (having served in one for 4 years). But I don't see any reason that if a select group is taken out of that environment they cannot adapt themselves to the new mission, even if that means cultural changes within the unit.

From what I've seen being here on Bragg, the 82nd isn't a whole lot less rigid and dogmatic than the USMC, if at all. I don't personally see why Marines would be more incapable of changing their culture to fit the SOCOM mission, than Airborne soldiers joinging SF would have changing their mindset to fit in at group.



No one is saying they are incompatible. Stick with what you know.


Doc

Tubbs
06-25-2005, 20:49
Sorry here sport, but QRQ is dead on target !! THE Recon that SF can/HAS/IS providing is way far out there beyond USMC !!! Why ?? We go out with the "Little People" that are indigenous to the theater !!! We get closer and provide far more accurate and timely intel than any USMC unit could ever dream of.

As has been suggested, check out the writings of Maj. John Plaster, much of what he tells about SOG, is being practiced today !!!

Later
Martin

All I said is that other branches of SF are not DESIGNED for that mission. Not that they are not CAPABLE of doing it. And what you are talking about sounds to me more like infiltration and subversion missions, not strict recon and surveillance.
I will check out the recomemed literature. Always excited to assimilate new knowledge.

The Reaper
06-25-2005, 20:51
All I said is that other branches of SF are not DESIGNED for that mission. Not that they are not CAPABLE of doing it. And what you are talking about sounds to me more like infiltration and subversion missions, not strict recon and surveillance.
I will check out the recomemed literature. Always excited to assimilate new knowledge.


Tubbs:

I already told you once to do some research.

Do not post again until you can tell me the five doctrinal missions of SF, the difference between SF and SOF, and why "infiltration" is not a mission.

I hope that your ignorance is not reflective of your inattention to detail.

TR

Doc
06-25-2005, 20:53
All I said is that other branches of SF are not DESIGNED for that mission. Not that they are not CAPABLE of doing it. And what you are talking about sounds to me more like infiltration and subversion missions, not strict recon and surveillance.
I will check out the recomemed literature. Always excited to assimilate new knowledge.


You have no idea.

Doc

Razor
06-25-2005, 20:54
This is very true, D9. However, I think you'd be hearing the same response from guys here if this new FID unit were being pulled from the 82d. I have no doubt that there are Marines out there that would be a perfect fit in this role, just as there would be conventional soldiers, airmen and sailors that would thrive in the environment. As a whole force, however, the USMC in general (or the 82d, or the 3d ID, or the crew of a destroyer) aren't set up in personnel manning, equipment, or training to be experts in FID. Remember that yourself and the former Marines currently doing so well in the Q were specially selected, not just randomly picked from a line unit. Are there enough Marines out there possessing the attributes that this new unit will require for success to fill the unit? I guess we'll soon see.


Just a comment on the observation regarding the Marine mindset being incompatible w/ the SF mission. There is a relatively large contingent of Marines with me in the course, myself included, and all seem to be integrating quite nicely and accounting for themselves quite well in training. By my last count, we have more former jugheads in Lang School than we do Battboys.

I would agree that the USMC line units are dominated by a culture that has some of the qualities described above (having served in one for 4 years). But I don't see any reason that if a select group is taken out of that environment they cannot adapt themselves to the new mission, even if that means cultural changes within the unit.

From what I've seen being here on Bragg, the 82nd isn't a whole lot less rigid and dogmatic than the USMC, if at all. I don't personally see why Marines would be more incapable of changing their culture to fit the SOCOM mission, than Airborne soldiers joinging SF would have changing their mindset to fit in at group.

Tubbs
06-25-2005, 21:01
Tubbs:

I already told you once to do some research.

Do not post again until you can tell me the five doctrinal missions of SF, the difference between SF and SOF, and why "infiltration" is not a mission.

I hope that your ignorance is not reflective of your inattention to detail.

TR

Foreign Internal Defense
Unconventional Warfare
Special Reconaissance
Direct Action
Counter Terrorism

Special Operations Forces are forces that are trained and capable of acting in Unconventional roles in order to accomplish one or more of those five doctrinal missions, or in order to support special forces in one of their mission roles.

"Infiltration" would be inappropriate in this context due to the fact that the mission described would fall under Foreign Internal Defense (which is different) under your doctrinal roles.

The Reaper
06-25-2005, 21:10
Foreign Internal Defense
Unconventional Warfare
Special Reconaissance
Direct Action
Counter Terrorism

One of three so far.

Additional questions, to make it a total of five.

What is the difference between SF and SOF?

Why is "infiltration" is not a mission?

What is the proper definition of Special Reconnaissance?

How does it differ from the reconnaissance that the USMC performs?

Then we will reexamine your earlier statements.

TR

Tubbs
06-25-2005, 21:19
One of three so far.

Additional questions, to make it a total of five.

What is the difference between SF and SOF?

Why is "infiltration" is not a mission?

What is the proper definition of Special Reconnaissance?

How does it differ from the reconnaissance that the USMC performs?

Then we will reexamine your earlier statements.

TR

Special Reconaissance takes place before any military action as a preparation for that action. The recon that FR provides is generally in conjunction with active military action.

I realize now that some of my terms may have been missused in this context. From now on I will take the time to ensure I am using the correct terminology based on your OE.

The Reaper
06-25-2005, 21:26
Special Reconaissance takes place before any military action as a preparation for that action. The recon that FR provides is generally in conjunction with active military action.

I realize now that some of my terms may have been missused in this context. From now on I will take the time to ensure I am using the correct terminology based on your OE.

You are wrong, and not for the first time.

Try again, you still owe four good answers.

Next time you are told to stand down and do some research, I hope that you do.

SF (Special Forces, an ARMY organization) does not leap before they look. Think about it.

TR

Tubbs
06-25-2005, 21:28
Solid copy.

The Reaper
06-25-2005, 21:42
Here is a freebie, to help with one of your questions:

special reconnaissance — Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Also called SR. (JP 3-05)

reconnaissance — A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Also called RECON.

SR is strategic, or operational reconnaissance. Conventional recon is tactical.

Which do you think Marines do, vs. SF?

TR

NousDefionsDoc
06-25-2005, 21:43
Just a comment on the observation regarding the Marine mindset being incompatible w/ the SF mission. There is a relatively large contingent of Marines with me in the course, myself included, and all seem to be integrating quite nicely and accounting for themselves quite well in training. By my last count, we have more former jugheads in Lang School than we do Battboys.

I would agree that the USMC line units are dominated by a culture that has some of the qualities described above (having served in one for 4 years). But I don't see any reason that if a select group is taken out of that environment they cannot adapt themselves to the new mission, even if that means cultural changes within the unit.

From what I've seen being here on Bragg, the 82nd isn't a whole lot less rigid and dogmatic than the USMC, if at all. I don't personally see why Marines would be more incapable of changing their culture to fit the SOCOM mission, than Airborne soldiers joinging SF would have changing their mindset to fit in at group.
They haven't been stressed yet.

The proof is in the doing. I see it ever day. SEALs, LEOs, Rangers, Marines, etc. trying to teach/operate on host nation rules. It's not they can't do it, it's they don't. Anybody can do it. If they have the proper mindset, training, desire, etc. But very few do do it. Why is that? Because it's not for everybody. Just like hitting the beach isn't for everybody. Each group has a culture and it attracts like minded people. That is the essence of its efficiency.

Believe me guys when I tell you, we've been down this road before. Back in the 80s when FID was the Mission and the only Mission, everybody tried to get in on it. I even had to do a Gabe Team for Teddy K because the guys at Lejune told him they could do FID and he wanted to see for himself. Now how a Gabe Team proved to him anything, I have no idea. But it did. All because the USMC up and said, "We can do FID." Well they couldn't.

It is like 7th Group going to the swimming pool for a morning then claiming to be ARC experts. Marines, Rangers, etc are good because they are all alike. It makes them move and think and act as one. SF A Teams are good because they are all different, as are the members. Out of 12 guys, somebody knows how to do whatever needs to be done. SF Teams promote that individuality, as long as you stay within the limits of teamwork. Other units punish it. We do of course, move and think and act as one, when it is time. The old joke about the color of the wife's panties is not far from the truth.

Speaking the language isn't the half of it. It is not just language, it is cultural immersion. It is immersion into the enemy and the good guys. It is treating the little people as equals and if warranted, betters. It is a subordination of ego. It is the best guy in charge, not the ranking guy. It is surgery with a scalpel as opposed to butchery with an axe. (Not saying there isn't a time and place for butchering with an axe.) You almost become a member of the host nation. Almost. they have to truly believe that you care. And the only way to do that is to actually care. Ever wonder why I stayed in the AO after I left the service?

This would work fine if they would listen and admit what they don't know. My guess is they won't.

One thing to keep in the back of your mind: There is only one unit in the entire US arsenal in which you will see a NCO commanding a company or perhaps even a battalion. And most of the time, doing it by proxy in a second or even third language through a HN counter-part. There is no stick usually, and often no carrot. The troop does it by guile and cunning and honesty and caring. And that's what FID is all about.

For you Xers. If you can't or won't do FID, seek life elsewhere.

D9 (RIP)
06-25-2005, 21:46
Great information, and it makes a lot of sense to me. Appreciate the time taken for the response.

BMT (RIP)
06-26-2005, 05:29
NDD hit the nail on the head!!

Let me ask you a question toget you thinking on the right track.

1. Why was the first A- Team sent to VN to work with the 'Yards successful?

BMT

Bill Harsey
06-26-2005, 09:08
They haven't been stressed yet.

The proof is in the doing. I see it ever day. SEALs, LEOs, Rangers, Marines, etc. trying to teach/operate on host nation rules. It's not they can't do it, it's they don't. Anybody can do it. If they have the proper mindset, training, desire, etc. But very few do do it. Why is that? Because it's not for everybody. Just like hitting the beach isn't for everybody. Each group has a culture and it attracts like minded people. That is the essence of its efficiency.

Believe me guys when I tell you, we've been down this road before. Back in the 80s when FID was the Mission and the only Mission, everybody tried to get in on it. I even had to do a Gabe Team for Teddy K because the guys at Lejune told him they could do FID and he wanted to see for himself. Now how a Gabe Team proved to him anything, I have no idea. But it did. All because the USMC up and said, "We can do FID." Well they couldn't.

It is like 7th Group going to the swimming pool for a morning then claiming to be ARC experts. Marines, Rangers, etc are good because they are all alike. It makes them move and think and act as one. SF A Teams are good because they are all different, as are the members. Out of 12 guys, somebody knows how to do whatever needs to be done. SF Teams promote that individuality, as long as you stay within the limits of teamwork. Other units punish it. We do of course, move and think and act as one, when it is time. The old joke about the color of the wife's panties is not far from the truth.

Speaking the language isn't the half of it. It is not just language, it is cultural immersion. It is immersion into the enemy and the good guys. It is treating the little people as equals and if warranted, betters. It is a subordination of ego. It is the best guy in charge, not the ranking guy. It is surgery with a scalpel as opposed to butchery with an axe. (Not saying there isn't a time and place for butchering with an axe.) You almost become a member of the host nation. Almost. they have to truly believe that you care. And the only way to do that is to actually care. Ever wonder why I stayed in the AO after I left the service?

This would work fine if they would listen and admit what they don't know. My guess is they won't.

One thing to keep in the back of your mind: There is only one unit in the entire US arsenal in which you will see a NCO commanding a company or perhaps even a battalion. And most of the time, doing it by proxy in a second or even third language through a HN counter-part. There is no stick usually, and often no carrot. The troop does it by guile and cunning and honesty and caring. And that's what FID is all about.

For you Xers. If you can't or won't do FID, seek life elsewhere.

I've been trying to figure out what these guys do different and how they get it done since early 1980 something (and for anyone new here) starting with the work I was doing for the guy who ran all clandestine operations for the OSS.

In case anyone missed NDD's post, I quoted it again. Pay attention to what all the other Quiet Professionals here wrote too.

If this information was for sale, you couldn't afford it.

lksteve
06-26-2005, 09:13
Just a comment on the observation regarding the Marine mindset being incompatible w/ the SF mission. There is a relatively large contingent of Marines with me in the course, myself included, and all seem to be integrating quite nicely and accounting for themselves quite well in training. By my last count, we have more former jugheads in Lang School than we do Battboys.when i was referring to the Marine Corps culture, i was referring to a corporate entity...individually, yes, there are some very adaptive Marines...i went through training group with three of them...ran into a couple of them a few years later and one of them admitted to having trouble fitting back into the Corps when he returned from SFQC...secondly, i believe the term you are searching for is jarhead, not jughead...

The Reaper
06-26-2005, 09:18
Just a comment on the observation regarding the Marine mindset being incompatible w/ the SF mission. There is a relatively large contingent of Marines with me in the course, myself included, and all seem to be integrating quite nicely and accounting for themselves quite well in training. By my last count, we have more former jugheads in Lang School than we do Battboys.

I would agree that the USMC line units are dominated by a culture that has some of the qualities described above (having served in one for 4 years). But I don't see any reason that if a select group is taken out of that environment they cannot adapt themselves to the new mission, even if that means cultural changes within the unit.

From what I've seen being here on Bragg, the 82nd isn't a whole lot less rigid and dogmatic than the USMC, if at all. I don't personally see why Marines would be more incapable of changing their culture to fit the SOCOM mission, than Airborne soldiers joinging SF would have changing their mindset to fit in at group.

Did you ever consider that the ones who leave the Corps (or the 82nd, or the Batts) for the SFQC are the ones who have different goals, vision, and way of looking at things?

Maybe you were SF guys all along who, for whatever reason, just started off in a different place?

TR

Team Sergeant
06-26-2005, 09:34
SR is strategic, or operational reconnaissance. Conventional recon is tactical.

For those not familiar with the terms “strategic” or “tactical”; the term tactical when used in this context deals with the outcome of a battle. Hence all conventional units employ tactical reconnaissance. Strategic, or “special” reconnaissance deals with the outcome of a war.

Army Special Forces are the only SOF units trained to access denied areas worldwide and stay there indefinitely without external support requirements.

Special Reconnaissance (SR). These are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These actions provide an additive capability for commanders and supplement other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Even with today's sophisticated long-range sensors and overhead platforms, some information can be obtained only by visual observation or other collection methods in the target area. SOF's highly developed capabilities of gaining access to denied and hostile areas, worldwide communications, and specialized aircraft and sensors enable SR against targets inaccessible to other forces or assets. Activities within SR include the following:

1. Environmental Reconnaissance. These are operations conducted to collect and report critical hydrographic, geological, and meteorological information.

2. Armed Reconnaissance. These are operations that involve locating and attacking targets of opportunity, e.g., adversary materiel, personnel, and facilities in assigned general areas or along assigned LOCs. Armed reconnaissance is not conducted for the purpose of attacking specific identified targets.

3. Target and Threat Assessment. These are operations conducted to detect, identify, locate, and assess a target to determine the most effective employment of weapons. This type of operation might include the assessment of the potential effects (to include collateral damage) of a strike or an attack on a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or toxic industrial material site.

4. Poststrike Reconnaissance. These operations are undertaken for the purpose of gathering information used to measure results of a strike.

NousDefionsDoc
06-26-2005, 10:32
when i was referring to the Marine Corps culture, i was referring to a corporate entity...individually, yes, there are some very adaptive Marines...i went through training group with three of them...ran into a couple of them a few years later and one of them admitted to having trouble fitting back into the Corps when he returned from SFQC...secondly, i believe the term you are searching for is jarhead, not jughead...
LOL - he was one. Jug, jar - whatever it takes. LOL

QRQ 30
06-26-2005, 11:00
Folks: I apologize if this is off subject but I think it an appropriate spot and time to post the words of CSM Bill Edge, RIP

"What is so Special About Special Forces"
By: Command Sergeant Major William E. Edge

Whats so special about Special Forces? I've been asked that question for twenty years and answering it for thirteen. To me, this is whats so special about Special Forces:

It's the only combat unit in the Army where enlisted men can and do command troops, in schools as teachers, in guerrilla bands as organizers and leaders, in foreign armies as advisors and leaders. Where else can staff sergeants be assigned as platoon leaders, sergeants first class as company commanders and master sergeants as batallion commanders?

You dont think three companies of 150 men each and a 40 man scout platoon is a battalion? Why, because they were "Yards, or Cambodians, or Nungs"?

Hogwash. Did you ever hear of the Mike Force? Delta? Sigma? Omega? CCN? Did you ever hear of the Snake teams or the States teams? All of these were led by US Special Forces men and NOT by the bare-chested, snake-eating, guitar-playing, media-induced image of the Green Berets, God-how I hate that term applied to men.

Damn it, a green beret is a hat and nothing but a hat! Special Forces are SOLDIERS! The Special Forces I refer to are the men who worked from Khe San, Ashau, Phu Bai, Kontum, Dak To, Lang Vie and a thousand other places that were denied to the enemy because 12 or 6 US soldiers lived there and dared "Charlie " to come and take it.

And He did, and other Special Forces soldiers and their "Yards, Cambodes, and Nungs" in the Mike force went and fell on him and waged a gut-twisting war on him, no quarter asked, none given. War waged at the bottom of the line--No big 175s, no 8 inchers for cover, Air when you could get it, and we got plenty, usually called in by Sergeants, those lovely big HOBOS and the sleek fast movers all bringing death from the sky to our common enemy.

Special Forces NCOs played such roles. Sixteen Medals Of Honor, more than 50 DSCs. 50% of them posthumously awarded were a partial reward.

The heart of the SF group is the A detachment. 10 Sergeants and two officers. a self contained, do anything group of men. And yet they are the first to tell you it cannot be done with out the support of those unsung heros who man the supply, commo, personnel, psy war, civic action and flight organizations farther back.

You see it really is a team, and the A team is only a part, the blade of the ax. But it takes the whole ax to cut the tree, and thats the real SF, the whole ax. Officers, good men with blisters and cuts from stringing wire, sunburn and bug bites from filling sandbags, bruised shoulders from firing BARs and M1919A6s [oldies but goodies] right there in the mud and blood with their troops.

These officers wore oak leaves and bars, but you could not tell because their shirts were hanging on a tree limb while they sweated with the troops. BlueMax, Splash, Iron Mike, the Greek, Roger P, Bucky, and a blue-eyed black captain with steel nerves were leaders you could respect and never forget.

Hard-eyed Majors who personally led a relief party to rescue a wounded sergeant first class, cut off, lost and pursued by the remnants of an NVA company, and brought him out alive, shot but alive. Lean and mean "slick" pilots who stood that groaning "HUEY" on it's tail to load wounded "Yards" or yanked you out on a McQuire rig for a ride you would not forget. And soft voiced chaplains giving comfort to the dying in a bloody mortar pit in the drenching rain, to a man whose God was probably a spirit.

And the Medics, Ah, those Medics, the eighth wonder of the world. Their routine feats read too much like fiction, but they were more than that, they were also superb riflemen, scouts, killers as well as healers.

That was Special Forces; it wasn't all Sporting Bar and Saigon. Rather it was hard-eyed reality and too much death. We had our crooks and drunks and quitters all to our shame. We also had our GIANTS, and by God, most were enlisted men, there because they wanted to be there. Professionals, now semi-dormant, training as force multipliers, honing their skills. They are few in number but strong in mind and spitit. They await the next call.

Oh, how I will miss them, their friendship, respect, their scorn and hate. Its all part of being special. Mr. Webster defines Special as "distinguished by some uncommon quality, designed or selected for some particular purpose, having an individual character, noteworthy, unique."

And remember, go to any division in the US Army and count the right shoulder patches, you will see that Special Forces cadred out a lot of top notch talent to the rest of the Army. I'm sure you get the point.

Anyway that's how I answer the question.

o Command Sergeant Major
o William E. Edge
o USAJFKCSW


:boohoo The smilie is a tear in my eye, not a boohoo tear.

Roguish Lawyer
06-26-2005, 12:03
They haven't been stressed yet.

The proof is in the doing. I see it ever day. SEALs, LEOs, Rangers, Marines, etc. trying to teach/operate on host nation rules. It's not they can't do it, it's they don't. Anybody can do it. If they have the proper mindset, training, desire, etc. But very few do do it. Why is that? Because it's not for everybody. Just like hitting the beach isn't for everybody. Each group has a culture and it attracts like minded people. That is the essence of its efficiency.

Believe me guys when I tell you, we've been down this road before. Back in the 80s when FID was the Mission and the only Mission, everybody tried to get in on it. I even had to do a Gabe Team for Teddy K because the guys at Lejune told him they could do FID and he wanted to see for himself. Now how a Gabe Team proved to him anything, I have no idea. But it did. All because the USMC up and said, "We can do FID." Well they couldn't.

It is like 7th Group going to the swimming pool for a morning then claiming to be ARC experts. Marines, Rangers, etc are good because they are all alike. It makes them move and think and act as one. SF A Teams are good because they are all different, as are the members. Out of 12 guys, somebody knows how to do whatever needs to be done. SF Teams promote that individuality, as long as you stay within the limits of teamwork. Other units punish it. We do of course, move and think and act as one, when it is time. The old joke about the color of the wife's panties is not far from the truth.

Speaking the language isn't the half of it. It is not just language, it is cultural immersion. It is immersion into the enemy and the good guys. It is treating the little people as equals and if warranted, betters. It is a subordination of ego. It is the best guy in charge, not the ranking guy. It is surgery with a scalpel as opposed to butchery with an axe. (Not saying there isn't a time and place for butchering with an axe.) You almost become a member of the host nation. Almost. they have to truly believe that you care. And the only way to do that is to actually care. Ever wonder why I stayed in the AO after I left the service?

This would work fine if they would listen and admit what they don't know. My guess is they won't.

One thing to keep in the back of your mind: There is only one unit in the entire US arsenal in which you will see a NCO commanding a company or perhaps even a battalion. And most of the time, doing it by proxy in a second or even third language through a HN counter-part. There is no stick usually, and often no carrot. The troop does it by guile and cunning and honesty and caring. And that's what FID is all about.

For you Xers. If you can't or won't do FID, seek life elsewhere.

Great post, NDD. Enjoyed your insight.

I see you learned from your experience with the boat assault. :D

lksteve
06-26-2005, 14:38
LOL - he was one. Jug, jar - whatever it takes. LOLjug, jar, bushel basket...????

Achilles
06-26-2005, 16:10
NDD hit the nail on the head!!

Let me ask you a question toget you thinking on the right track.

1. Why was the first A- Team sent to VN to work with the 'Yards successful?

BMT

Undying loyalty.

The SF men there were the first outside people in the their history to treat them as equals.

Ambush Master
06-26-2005, 16:11
Undying loyalty.

The SF men there were the first outside people in the their history to treat them as equals.


And where might you have learned that tidbit ?!?! :D

Achilles
06-26-2005, 16:20
And where might you have learned that tidbit ?!?! :D


Hmm... :D

C/S PHOENIX 10
07-06-2005, 13:56
Wow where to begin :lifter

USMC-Some of the finest SF soldiers I have ever worked with have been former(oop's once a marine always one) marines. Here in my corner of OEF(4th tour, fresh of a recon mission), the marines have always out shined their army counter parts. By design marines understand small battles/warfare and have done a great job of adjusting to the GWOT or at least here they have. As I have stated in other post, the "Q" has put in the magic stuff in the water and continue to push out some of the finest in the world at "getting it". So I have full trust that it will hold true if/when the marines send their boys through the "Q"(my understanding is that the 400 man unit will go through the "Q"). Hats off to the great job the instructors are doing.

Is there a need for additional SF right now? Well depends who you ask. For myself, my team and other teams in this group, the answer would be hell yes, I would love to share the biscuts and gravy(having said that I had to fight a SWC assignment to get back here again). But as I send guys to schools during our TDY trip to the states, all I hear about is the number of guys that are disguntial because they haven't been to the big dance yet. We can do better at cross leveling work load and this will also keep the force strong with proven combat vets.

Ground true for the fathers of SF(old guys), instructors or men that are just out of the loop. The SF world you think you know are quickly becoming a thing of the past. And the only people we can blame is??? That's right team daddies. More and more I read, observe and witness the destruction of the foundation of SF. First I blame the TS, second the flow of money(GWOT dollars), the surge of new kids, and the command. I will try and paint the picture that I see around me, without pushing opsec.

First example the team sergeant: The SFAUC generation, you see a ton of door kicking bleed over onto ruck teams(oops GMV teams now). Being able to shot, move and communicate is the basic standard that my team lives by(it also is the basics for any indig force too) and if you can do it in an urban invoirment(sp) you can do it anywhere. So my team does spend a good chunk of time working those skill sets, but it is only a stepping stone to the end-state. During any ITC train up all I hear is "my team needs more flat range time" or " shooting schools". Stuff along these lines is the normal now days. Again not saying it is wrong but it is just another stone in the pond. Bottom line most guys nowadays want to be door kickers. We aready have a unit for that, I don't think we need 5 more groups worth. Go to selection if that is you steady gig. I have done a ton of unilateral DA stuff here and it is a great time, but I all so know that it is not going to win the war in the long run, the HN will decide that. I see a lot of miss use of the HN, with the man use being the first line of defense for catching IED, or in earliy days the beleive was that if you have HN in your mounted patrol package or even better on your truck the enemy will not shot you. Just the facts I heard it all!!

Dollars; state of the art this or we need that or if we had this we could do that, I hear this crap all the time. As I look in my ruck(yes some teams still use them, even though we have trucks), I think I said this in another post but VIKING(memeber) was spending he hard earned combat pay to buy a new ruck, a couple of guys from our company said why waste your money, we've never that far from our trucks to need a ruck muchless a new one. Back to my ruck, it's right beside me freshly repacked from a mission. let's see, water, chow, NOD's, radio, bino's, ammo, map marker, recon log, signal stuff and a poncho. Well that's it, better check the packing list to make sure I'm forgetting some peice of hightech stuff, nope NOT MUCH HAS CHANGE IN THE LAST 40 YEARS. I watched a team leave a state side range after the day shoot, because they had NVG's, but didn't have peq-2 issued yet(long story), why waste the time the TS said. We hell how did we ever fight a war at night prior to lasers or NVG's.

Command; I once heard a team tasked to place a BP ISO a large op, the team replied that it would take a couple of hours to get the package in place, because it will be slow moving at night, for the HN doesn't have NVG's, higher reply was why are you taking HN? Team reply, that's what SF does, higher's reply not here, HN is for force pro only!!!!!(not my COC)

I know a lot of you men are throwing the BS flag, but I'm telling you it is true. It is not every team or even most, but it is growing. There are a few of us old school guys that are fighting the flow, but only time will tell.

So as you can see some of the special has been lost along the way, I think that if the proper training is conducted marines would be a great addition to the force.

QRQ 30
07-06-2005, 14:10
the marines have always out shined their army counter parts.

Who? What? When? Where? How? That's a mighty all encompassing statement pardner!! :confused:

C/S PHOENIX 10
07-06-2005, 14:38
First of all, lets not pull a news reporter angle on this, my statement was,"Here in my corner of OEF(4th tour, fresh of a recon mission), the marines have always out shined their army counter parts. By design marines understand small battles/warfare and have done a great job of adjusting to the GWOT or at least here they have."

Having said that I'll explain my observations the best I can here.

After 4 trips with some returning to the same location, I've watched conventionial forces roll in and out. The marines accepted their piece of the pie and made it happen. Not tring to down play the army capabilities, just stating numerous observations. Here in this piece of the GWOT, the mission of the conv. guys is not a very rewarding one or even remotely linked to there METL. The ability to adapt from the desire to conduct a BN movement to contact(go with what you know) to, as I read in the paper stablization(sp) operations such as providing security for CA units, escort local officials, present patrols and such. All of the tasks, that as memeber of an Infantry BN from CDR to PVT would make Patton roll over in his grave. Love to give more details, but you understand the deal.

QRQ 30
07-06-2005, 14:50
I see the problem as you are comparing conventional marines to conventional Army troops. The subject was SOF and as a result I presumed that the marines ALWAYS outshined SF.

If we wan to go to conventional I can do that too. I associated with the 1st Cav and USMC in I Corps in Vietnam. The marines were good troops and so were the 1st Cav and other army units. I wouldn't put one above the other except for one thing, marines are trigger happy. I was mortared three times by marines at Khe Sahn even though my operation was coordinated with the marines.

C/S PHOENIX 10
07-06-2005, 14:58
I see where you're coming from now, I was alittle taken back. You are correct the marines are still quick with the trigger, but once they got there feet on the ground and started seeing the big picture man they made it happen. I would say the quickest of them all are the Ranges sorry to say, I have some great little stories, with not so pretty endings. Just to many young kids with to much freedom.

C/S PHOENIX 10
07-06-2005, 15:03
I tell ya, I would love to get up with some of the "fathers" and share some stories. My father(SF Vietnam vet too) and I had such a good time tossing around the no S%^T it really happened stories. You guys would not believe how simular of a war Afg is to Vet. The terrian is much different, but all of the issues are still there.

NousDefionsDoc
01-09-2006, 15:18
MarSOC: Just Call Them Marines

Fred L. Schultz

Proceedings, January 2006

The commanding general of the controversial new Marine Corps Special Operations Command--seen here in Iraq, greeting Marines of Gun 6, Battery M, 4th Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment last year—talks to Proceedings.

Not long after he was tapped to lead the first leatherneck contingent into the nation's Special Operations Command, Brigadier Geneal Dennis J. Hejlik was asked by Marine Commandant Michael Hagee if he had settled on a catchy nickname for his troops. General Hejlik nodded.

"Marines," he replied.

Later that day, General Hejlik (pronounced Hey-lik), in an exclusive interview with Proceedings, outlined his plans for the new unit, known as the Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MarSOC).

He also expressed support for the decision to finally make the Marines part of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCom), a move long opposed by the Corps. From time to time, he revealed bits and pieces about himself. One thing was evident. He travels light. He showed up with a staff of none.

Over lunch at an Irish restaurant here in Annapolis, the 58-year-old career infantryman laughingly recalled how he found out about the new job. Transferred from California to Quantico, he and his wife, Sandy, were having dinner at a restaurant the night before they were to move into new quarters at the northern Virginia Marine base. His cell phone rang. He took it outside, returned an hour later.

"Where are we going now?" his wife asked. Her husband had been a Marine for 35 years. They had been married for all of those years. She knew something was up.

So long, Quantico. Hello, Camp Lejeune.


An Iowa farm boy, General Hejlik enlisted in the Marines in 1968. He got out four years later as a sergeant and headed off to Minnesota State University, Mankato, just across the border from his home state. On graduation day 1975, he received a diploma and a commission in the Corps.


He has since taken on a wide array of Marine assignments, getting his hands dirty with logistics and weaponry as well as earning a Master's degree from the Naval War College. He served as senior military fellow at the influential Council on Foreign Relations and was two-hatted as deputy commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Iraq. Especially important in light of his new assignment, he also was chief of staff and director of the Center for Policy, Training, and Readiness at SOCom, of which his new command will soon be a part.

His tour at SOCom, headquartered in Tampa, Florida, means he's no stranger to the snake-eater community, and his familiarity with the organization no doubt played a role in his selection to head the estimated 2,500-member Marine unit now being organized.

In his most recent combat tour, his brigade took on radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia in the fall of 2004 for control of the Islamic holy city of An Najaf. In this battle, General Hejlik's troops lived up to his widely quoted promise to "whack 'em."

After the shooting stopped, he returned to the command center in Fallujah, where his boss, Lieutenant General James T. Conway, the expeditionary force commander, greeted him as if bestowing knighthood.

"Marines, ladies and gentlemen, soldiers, sailors, airmen—The Lion of Najaf!"

The title stuck, and General Hejlik says it's all General Conway's fault.

When he spoke with us, at lunch and later at Naval Institute headquarters in Beach Hall, the general was relaxed and seemed to enjoy the interview. But he also had a sense of purpose, points he wanted to convey, and a good idea of how he wanted his new command to look, even at this early stage.

The Marines are anything but charter members of the Special Operations Command. For many years after Congress created the force in 1986, the Corps doggedly resisted contributing troops to it.

For those 20 years, a parade of commandants insisted that there was no need for such an affiliation, asserting that all Marines by definition were capable of special operations. The Marine leadership also maintained that the Corps, because of its small size, could not afford to detach any troops to another outfit. The leadership further feared that prized Marine units such as Force Recon would be prime targets for cherry picking if SOCom were licensed to do so.

Behind the Corps' about-face was a growing need to beef up and replenish special operations forces in the midst of draining wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the continuing terrorist threat, along with a strong push for the Marines to get with the program from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. After a year and a half of negotiations, a meeting on 28 October 2005 among Secretary Rumsfeld, General Hagee, and the SOCom combatant commander, Army General Bryan D. (Doug) Brown, closed the deal.

While General Hejlik believes that senior leaders across the services think the move "is a good thing, good for the country, and good for prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism," it has drawn opposition, both internally and externally. "With continued education," he said, "this will be a win-win for all."

"One of the things that really makes me nervous," General Hejlik said, "is the word 'special.' All Marines are special, all Marines are equal, and all Marines are riflemen." He intends to address this concern, because he doesn't want any Marine being treated differently from a special forces Marine.

He also said he does not expect residual hostility to the move to adversely affect recruiting for his special ops unit. On the contrary, he said, the new command already has an abundance of volunteers.

"The thing we have to be careful with," he stressed, "is that they're Marines, first and foremost." Marines who volunteer must come out of operating forces and will undergo a rigid assessment and selection process. Selectees will train to a standard similar to Army Ranger training. "What exact standard that is has not been fully determined," General Hejlik conceded.

The new command will consist of a Marine special operations regiment of two special forces battalions. A total of nine Marine special operations companies (four on the east coast and five on the west coast) will form the combat core of the command, and each will be from 85 to 110 strong. The force will be split, 75% to 25%, between command, regimental, and battalion headquarters at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and a battalion headquarters at Camp Pendleton, California.

NousDefionsDoc
01-09-2006, 15:19
To complement the special operations companies, two other principal components will be a support unit of radio, communications, and intelligence specialists, and a foreign military training unit, both based at Camp Lejeune.

The foreign training unit will consist of 430 Marines who will train military forces from around the world that lack such training, such as those from some of the poorer central African nations.

Special operations groups will deploy with Marine expeditionary units (MEUs) that already have troops capable of special operations on board amphibious ships. As special operations companies are organized within these groups, the existing Maritime Special Purpose Force—a unit capable of conventional or selected maritime special missions—will be phased out.

Special operations companies will be separable but not separate from expeditionary units, while specific command-and-control relationships are being worked out.

"Right now, it's kind of the best of both worlds," General Hejlik said. "We work with the MEU, but we belong to SOCom as a component. That will fill part of the capability gap. Special operations have suffered a little bit, because the Global War on Terrorism has worn them a little thin."

For those concerned about what all this bodes for the future of Force Reconnaissance, the Marines' elite deep-penetration units and the Corps' answer to special ops in the past, General Hejlik assured that it "will be alive and well. The core of the company will be a Force Recon platoon, which will retain all of its specialized skills, such as deep reconnaissance, advanced communications, precision shooting, and specialized insertion and extraction capabilities."

The general expects his new command to work regularly with Army Rangers and Green Berets. But Marines will be treated as Marines, he said, right down to their gear and weaponry.

"If I'm an 03-21 reconnaissance Marine, I will come with my helmet, my flak jacket, my rucksack, and my warfighting gear. My weapon could be an M-4, M-16A-4, or 9-mm, but if the mission requires special equipment, SOCom will supply it. Hands down, SOCom has the most efficient and proficient acquisition process in the Department of Defense."

Marines have been working with the Special Operations Command since the 1980s, "so this is not a new thing," General Hejlik said.

"In my own experience, the special operations in Najaf and Fallujah were well organized and very interoperable," he emphasized. "The Global War on Terrorism has forced everyone to take a fresh look at the way they fight irregular warfare, which has no rules. This is why special forces have become such sought-after commodities."

General Hejlik said his new command originally was going to be part of a reconnaissance unit that would complement the Special Operations Command. "That's where Det. One [Marine Special Operations Detachment One, set up as proof of the concept that Marines were suited for special operations] came from," he said. But he thinks this new arrangement will be much more effective.

Negotiations prior to the establishment of the Marine Special Operations Command in October were characterized in some press reports as difficult and long. General Hejlik agreed that they were long and acknowledged one major difficulty:

"The difficult part was the cultural aspect. There are always going to be soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen who want things to stay the way they are. They say, 'Let's not change for change's sake.' But this is not the case; change here is necessary. We want to get the Marine Corps fully involved in the.war on terrorism. We want to complement SOCom and fill in some of the gaps. This is the right thing to do. I'm an optimist at heart and by trade, and I think this will work."

General Hejlik learned two major lessons from his most recent service in Iraq. He found that a special operations force borders on the unique, "small in size but packing a great big punch. What such a force brings to the battlefield is much more than just trigger pullers," he said. Lesson two was that today's conventional soldiers or Marines are better trained, better led, and better equipped than any he has seen.

"When you combine conventional war fighters with a Marine special operations team, the culture and the war-fighting ethos are the same, and you've got a force that's unbeatable."

Mr. Schultz is Senior Editor of Proceedings.

Blatantly stolen from GG

Jack Moroney (RIP)
01-09-2006, 15:26
Sounds like an upgraded clone of Carlson's Raiders.

NousDefionsDoc
01-09-2006, 15:29
Roger that Sir. I noticed where he discussed the unit for an hour on his cell phone with Buddha or some other diety. I hope his cell phone is more secure than mine.

Copperhead6
01-19-2006, 02:57
I feel that they must be seasoned NCOS and Officers the last thing we need in SOCOM is a bunch of yahoo Joes running around that for one is going to only end in disappointment and number 2 it is also going to create some drama for us as a whole. if we do decide ot take the Marines "under our wing" if you will i would make a reccomendation that they come froma unit such as FAST Company which is a group of specialty Marines they are highly Trained in CQB and Small unit tactics that to me would make the best use of the Marines and the greatest advantage for us as a whole.

NousDefionsDoc
01-19-2006, 17:27
I feel that they must be seasoned NCOS and Officers the last thing we need in SOCOM is a bunch of yahoo Joes running around that for one is going to only end in disappointment and number 2 it is also going to create some drama for us as a whole. if we do decide ot take the Marines "under our wing" if you will i would make a reccomendation that they come froma unit such as FAST Company which is a group of specialty Marines they are highly Trained in CQB and Small unit tactics that to me would make the best use of the Marines and the greatest advantage for us as a whole.
Worked quite a bit with Marines have you?

skibum
01-19-2006, 20:20
FAST may have more/better training in CQB, prisoner control, room clearing, etc., but the majority of trigger pullers there are prives and lance coconuts fresh out of SOI, NOT "seasoned NCOs." The seasoned NCOs are filling NCO billits, so there aren't that many. Now, I understand (2nd - 3rd hand info) that there are more seasoned, experienced Marines and corpsmen in the Force Recon Companies, and it sounds like there will be a "Force Recon" platoon in each assault company, so maybe that's what you are referring to.

I think there will be a fairly long and interesting development process, and I wish I could be part of it. I bet, though, that what the force eventually shakes out to be is not what it is on paper right now. Heck, it might not even last; there are plenty of senior Marines who just hate the whole concept. I think it's a fairly decent second step, the MARSOC DET-1 being the first. I think the final product (if any) will resemble this outfit as much as this outfit resembles Det-1.

skibum
01-19-2006, 20:35
And, of course, he's repeating the line, "all Marines are special, all Marines are equal." I won't contradict him, but does he think my career E-3 radioman (a grunt-type, not a comm-type) can replace the engine on a Harrier? I'm sure, that as trained observers, most here have noticed that the Corps put a General in charge of the outfit, not a lance criminal or boot Lt. And the core of the assault companies will be a "Force Recon" platoon, not a graves registration platoon, or a platoon of BAMs from the 3rd gynecological regiment. I'll stop before I get really going.

Jack Moroney (RIP)
01-19-2006, 20:36
[QUOTE=Copperhead6]I feel that they must be seasoned NCOS and Officers the last thing we need in SOCOM is a bunch of yahoo Joes running around that for one is going to only end in disappointment and number 2 it is also going to create some drama for us as a whole. QUOTE]

So if I correctly understand you, you would prefer to have a more seasoned and mature troop like the one that has developed this site:


copperhead6 my space web page

NousDefionsDoc
01-19-2006, 20:51
And, of course, he's repeating the line, "all Marines are special, all Marines are equal." I won't contradict him, but does he think my career E-3 radioman (a grunt-type, not a comm-type) can replace the engine on a Harrier? I'm sure, that as trained observers, most here have noticed that the Corps put a General in charge of the outfit, not a lance criminal or boot Lt. And the core of the assault companies will be a "Force Recon" platoon, not a graves registration platoon, or a platoon of BAMs from the 3rd gynecological regiment. I'll stop before I get really going.
Don't get all lathered up Jarhead.;)

Copperhead, Copperhead,
The Colonel Sir asked you a question. And we'll be waiting for the answer...

Fine question it was too, Colonel Sir. Simply splendid.

I have yet another question - What is a B4 SQI? No lo conozco.

skibum
01-19-2006, 21:21
Not TOO lathered up.

Admit it: "3rd gynecological regiment" is pretty f-ing funny.

To a jarhead, I mean.

NousDefionsDoc
01-19-2006, 21:39
Absolutely hilarious.

CPTAUSRET
01-19-2006, 21:47
Absolutely hilarious.


To a jarhead, I mean.


Indubitably!

LongWire
01-29-2006, 08:23
Okay I'm Oconus right now, and currently doing FID in support of OIF. So a couple of weeks ago we have a VIP visit from another Country, who is being accompanied by some US Military advisors, one of whom is a Master Gunnery Sgt.

If you know anything about Arab Countries than you know that their leaders get alot of face time billboarded everywhere. This country's leader is no exception, and is quite a recognized figure even on Fox News, or CNN....you get the picture.

So the entourage is all gathered around the front of the compound we are at, and on the front of the HQS building is this Country's Monarch, who happend to be a member of this very unit.

Anyways, Master Gunns in not a hushed voice decides to ask who the "Semi-Caucasion looking Guy on the Building Is?"............Can I tell you that rapport is often a fragile thing, and is painstakingly gained, and maintaned on a daily basis. Its stuff like that that paints us as all Asshole Ugly Americans. Luckily the guys we are with know whats what.

Can we get at least an Area Study or something before we go blowing others hard work in just a few words. Try watching the news or something!!!!!!!!
I Love my job, but you vets can tell me the deal, did it always come down to those supporting (or more like not supporting)you, blowing what you had established so that you had to work even harder to maintain rapport?

You gotta love the beuracracy sometimes. The guys up top want results, but dont often understand that their actions, and inactions, send ripples down to the lowest level so that you have to end up fixing those problems when you had a full plate already?

Okay I'm done venting

NousDefionsDoc
01-29-2006, 08:41
It happens all the time Longwire. I had one complain a while back (not a Marine) because a General kept us waiting five whole minutes to see him. The General didn't know what time we would be there and in one of the hottest areas in the country, not to mention he has a brigade to run.

Visitors rarely take the time to learn anything at all about the target country. Shame too. The other thing is they don't realize they are visitors, no matter how long they are there.

Here's another one: Huge program set up without a site survey. Nobody even understood for years how the units being trained were T,O&Ed or how they operated. Never even asked to see an org chart.

It would be nice if they would at least learn to say "Good morning" in the host country language.

Rapport is a beautiful and misunderstood thang.

Signed,
Apologizing Proudly

LongWire
01-29-2006, 08:51
I guess I was just shocked more than anything.............I mean despite regional differences between the different countries (these guys were inbound from another middle eastern country)...........You could have taken a stab in the dark at who's picture that was up on the wall, its not Rocket Science!!!!!!!

BMT (RIP)
01-29-2006, 09:07
Guys this shit ain't gonna WORK!!!

USMC BG in charge say's "we'll train our men and deploy. They will stay with the unit 2-3 years and return to unit's to train others. I should of said other MC unit's not MARSOC units.
:munchin
BMT
FOG

The Reaper
01-29-2006, 09:22
One of the funniest things I have ever seen was a Marine Major shaking a HN General's hand downrange and tried out one of the few Spanish phrases he thought he knew.

"Me gusto MUCHO!"

The GO scraped him off and ran away quickly, spent the rest of the trip making sure that the Major got nowhere near him.

I think that the Marines will take a few years learning what they do not know, and a lot of country teams will be requesting that they not return for FID again.

TR

NousDefionsDoc
01-29-2006, 09:28
LOL - yes Sir, one of those phrases where inverting the words changes the meaning entirely...

Doc
01-29-2006, 09:33
The Corps has it's place but it ain't FID. Been there, seen that and it wasn't pretty. One quick example; 2 Marine CPTs trying to tell/force a HN COL what he's going to do. It didn't work. HN COL played with them like a Cat plays with a mouse and won. It takes years to do this sort of job and two seconds to blow it.

MtnGoat
02-14-2006, 10:30
Wow where to begin :lifter

USMC-Some of the finest SF soldiers I have ever worked with have been former(oop's once a marine always one) marines. Here in my corner of OEF(4th tour, fresh of a recon mission), the marines have always out shined their army counter parts. By design marines understand small battles/warfare and have done a great job of adjusting to the GWOT or at least here they have. As I have stated in other post, the "Q" has put in the magic stuff in the water and continue to push out some of the finest in the world at "getting it". So I have full trust that it will hold true if/when the marines send their boys through the "Q"(my understanding is that the 400 man unit will go through the "Q"). Hats off to the great job the instructors are doing.

Is there a need for additional SF right now? Well depends who you ask. For myself, my team and other teams in this group, the answer would be hell yes, I would love to share the biscuts and gravy(having said that I had to fight a SWC assignment to get back here again). But as I send guys to schools during our TDY trip to the states, all I hear about is the number of guys that are disguntial because they haven't been to the big dance yet. We can do better at cross leveling work load and this will also keep the force strong with proven combat vets.

Ground true for the fathers of SF(old guys), instructors or men that are just out of the loop. The SF world you think you know are quickly becoming a thing of the past. And the only people we can blame is??? That's right team daddies. More and more I read, observe and witness the destruction of the foundation of SF. First I blame the TS, second the flow of money(GWOT dollars), the surge of new kids, and the command. I will try and paint the picture that I see around me, without pushing opsec.

First example the team sergeant: The SFAUC generation, you see a ton of door kicking bleed over onto ruck teams(oops GMV teams now). Being able to shot, move and communicate is the basic standard that my team lives by(it also is the basics for any indig force too) and if you can do it in an urban invoirment(sp) you can do it anywhere. So my team does spend a good chunk of time working those skill sets, but it is only a stepping stone to the end-state. During any ITC train up all I hear is "my team needs more flat range time" or " shooting schools". Stuff along these lines is the normal now days. Again not saying it is wrong but it is just another stone in the pond. Bottom line most guys nowadays want to be door kickers. We aready have a unit for that, I don't think we need 5 more groups worth. Go to selection if that is you steady gig. I have done a ton of unilateral DA stuff here and it is a great time, but I all so know that it is not going to win the war in the long run, the HN will decide that. I see a lot of miss use of the HN, with the man use being the first line of defense for catching IED, or in earliy days the beleive was that if you have HN in your mounted patrol package or even better on your truck the enemy will not shot you. Just the facts I heard it all!!

Dollars; state of the art this or we need that or if we had this we could do that, I hear this crap all the time. As I look in my ruck(yes some teams still use them, even though we have trucks), I think I said this in another post but VIKING(memeber) was spending he hard earned combat pay to buy a new ruck, a couple of guys from our company said why waste your money, we've never that far from our trucks to need a ruck muchless a new one. Back to my ruck, it's right beside me freshly repacked from a mission. let's see, water, chow, NOD's, radio, bino's, ammo, map marker, recon log, signal stuff and a poncho. Well that's it, better check the packing list to make sure I'm forgetting some peice of hightech stuff, nope NOT MUCH HAS CHANGE IN THE LAST 40 YEARS. I watched a team leave a state side range after the day shoot, because they had NVG's, but didn't have peq-2 issued yet(long story), why waste the time the TS said. We hell how did we ever fight a war at night prior to lasers or NVG's.

I know a lot of you men are throwing the BS flag, but I'm telling you it is true. It is not every team or even most, but it is growing. There are a few of us old school guys that are fighting the flow, but only time will tell.

So as you can see some of the special has been lost along the way, I think that if the proper training is conducted marines would be a great addition to the force.

Well said PHOENIX 10!

Look the whole MARSOC thing has been coming. But what your talking about PHOENIX 10 is so ture about teams and the TS. You have Groups standing up new teams just so they can sent whole companies to do things they usually don't do. Why maybe its a bullet for a NCOER or OER, I don't know.

MARSOC will stand up at the end of the month, start to run a course along the line of whatever force they like in the future. The futrue, lets see five to tens years we'll see a fifth Branch. - SOC Branch. Reagan years!?! Let see.

Everyone wants into the roles that everyone is looking to SOF, SOC whichever way they (you) call it. SOF/SOC has always had the money, the Marines didn't play in the ninities why. Not their thing maybe. They saw the money they lost and they stood up MEU(SOC) and now the need of GWOT; there is more money. Yes I see it as a money thing - not a role.
Some SOF do see it as a "Role play", SF has always been the UW warriors, they can never change, 50(+) years of training and Experience.


Berg Heil

NousDefionsDoc
02-16-2006, 18:33
Three main components: direct-action companies under a Marine Special Operations Regiment; a Foreign Military Training Unit; and a Marine Special Operations Support Group. Officials expect MarSOC will reach full operational capability by 2010.

The first FMTU teams, which are based at Lejeune, are training and will deploy starting in May.

The first Marine Special Operations Company - there will be nine direct-action MSOCs under the Marine Special Operations Regiment - will organize in May, train with the Lejeune-based 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and deploy later this year. The first West Coast-based spec ops company is slated to join the 13th MEU in September.

Under current plans - outlined to senior leaders during their quarterly "executive off-site" on Jan. 18 and remaining in flux as working group studies and reviews continue - the nine direct-action companies will fall under two Marine Special Operations Battalions. Those battalions report to the Marine Special Operations Regiment.

Besides the direct-action companies and FMTUs, plans also call for the establishment in July of a Marine Special Operations Support Group, which will provide battalions with a range of specialized skills, from security and K-9 teams to communications, intelligence and logistics.

Marine Special Operations Command

Under current plans, the MarSOC will be broken into three main sections:

Marine Special Operations Regiment

1st Marine Special Operations Battalion

Four Marine Special Operations Companies

1st Special Missions Training Branch

2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion

Five Marine Special Operations Companies

2nd Special Missions Training Branch

Small Craft Company

Foreign Military Training Unit

Alpha Company

12 teams

Bravo Company

12 teams

Marine Special Operations Support

Support Company

ANGLICO Platoon

Security Platoon

Communications Platoon

Intelligence Company

CI/HUMINT Platoon

SIGINT Platoon

Analysis Platoon

Logistics Company
\Marine Corps Times

Jack Moroney (RIP)
02-16-2006, 20:04
Interesting organization. Guess they ran out of space for their photo battalion:D

NousDefionsDoc
02-16-2006, 22:02
It will be interesting to see the TO&E slots for ranks on those training teams. With 24 of them, I can't imagine they will be led by Os.

I believe the Commandant also stated something about upping the USMC by 5k bodies as well.

MtnGoat
02-24-2006, 16:34
Rumsfeld Welcomes New Marine Special Ops Command.

http://www.wral.com/news/7403276/detail.html

NousDefionsDoc
02-28-2006, 20:09
from National Defense Magazine

March 2006

Corps' Trainers Target 'Ungoverned' Areas of World

CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C.— The first element of the Marine Corps’ new special-operations command already is scrambling to tackle its mission—to help prepare the soldiers of under-developed nations to defend themselves against terrorists.

The foreign military unit, as it has been dubbed, was established in October 2005, said its operations officer, Maj. Herman Glover. Ultimately, it will include 430 Marines and Navy medical corpsmen. The unit will be organized into a headquarters element, four companies built around two-dozen 11-man teams and a standards and training cadre. The companies will focus on specific regions where cultures and languages are similar, Glover said.

“We want to operate in ‘Phase Zero’ countries, Third-World locations where things haven’t gone totally wrong yet.” These include countries in Asia, Africa and South America, he said. Thus far, Glover said, 10 nations have indicated an interest.

Training foreign military personnel has been a core assignment for special operators at least since 1952, when the Army’s Special Forces were founded. But the pace of that training has grown significantly in recent years as part of emerging U.S. counter-terrorist operations. In 2004, in addition to fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, special operators participated in more than 50 joint combined-exercise training events with other nations around the world.

Marines have begun relieving them of some of that burden. In 2002, Marine Corps Forces Europe took over the training of military units in the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. Since then, Marines have provided schooling for soldiers in wide swaths of Africa, Asia and South America.

The FMTU will centralize and focus those efforts and coordinate them more closely with the U.S. Special Operations Command, Glover explained.

Teams will deploy to host nations for periods ranging from six weeks to three months, he said. They will teach basic infantry and counter-terrorist tactics. Among the subjects will be:

• Individual skills, such as marksmanship with individual and crew-served weapons, hand-to-hand combat, first aid and tactical communications.

• Small-unit tactics, including coastal interdiction, patrolling, offensive and defensive operations, urban shooting skills and civil affairs.

• Anti-terrorism and force protection, such as access control and unit self-defense.

• Support functions, including basic logistics and casualty evacuation.

• Leadership and law of land warfare.

The idea, Glover said, is to enable host-nation forces to target and deny safe haven to terrorists in largely ungoverned parts of the world, such as Africa’s Pan Sahel region, parts of Central Asia and South America’s Andes Mountains.

The FMTU is recruiting mature Marines who can work independently, knowing that their actions can have strategic implications, he said. In fact, the first two teams, which began training in August 2005, are made up entirely of non-commissioned officers with at least one overseas deployment in an infantry unit and foreign language capability.

Once they join the FMTU, Marines will be expected to stay three to five years—a relatively long tour of duty—Glover said. “We will invest a lot of time and money to teach them those skills, and we want to get our money’s worth.”

After their tours in the FMTU is over, Marines can either go back to a regular Marine unit or transfer to another MARSOC element, such as one of the special-operations battalions or the support group.

Teams begin with six months of schooling, a process of “training the trainers,” he said. They learn the use of all standard Marine small arms and crew-served weapons, demolitions, martial arts, first aid, vehicle operations, tactical planning, fire-support techniques and the art of advising foreign military personnel.

The FMTU also plans to teach its members how to use and maintain foreign military weapons and how to pass those skills to their students in other lands. “We want our teams to teach soldiers from other countries how to use the weapons they already have—not ours’,” Glover said.

For use in these classes, the unit is in the process of borrowing foreign weapons from Special Forces at nearby Fort Bragg, he said. Included are the AK-47 assault rifle and RPK light machine gun, both developed by the Soviet Union, plus the Fusil Automatique Leger (light automatic rifle), manufactured by Fabrique National, of Belgium. All fire 7.62 mm rounds, the NATO standard.

In addition, to help its teams function independently in foreign lands, the FMTU is working with the Corps’ new center for advanced operational culture learning to teach language skills and regional awareness. (see related story)

The first team is scheduled to deploy this summer to an undisclosed country in Africa. The FMTU plans to train eight teams a year.

-Harold Kennedy

Jack Moroney (RIP)
02-28-2006, 20:38
Teams begin with six months of schooling, a process of “training the trainers,” he said. They learn the use of all standard Marine small arms and crew-served weapons, demolitions, martial arts, first aid, vehicle operations, tactical planning, fire-support techniques and the art of advising foreign military personnel.



So somewhere in here they have gone thru and developed an area study, language and cultural training;)

The Reaper
02-28-2006, 20:53
from National Defense Magazine

March 2006

Corps' Trainers Target 'Ungoverned' Areas of World


The FMTU also plans to teach its members how to use and maintain foreign military weapons and how to pass those skills to their students in other lands. “We want our teams to teach soldiers from other countries how to use the weapons they already have—not ours’,” Glover said.

For use in these classes, the unit is in the process of borrowing foreign weapons from Special Forces at nearby Fort Bragg, he said. Included are the AK-47 assault rifle and RPK light machine gun, both developed by the Soviet Union, plus the Fusil Automatique Leger (light automatic rifle), manufactured by Fabrique National, of Belgium. All fire 7.62 mm rounds, the NATO standard.

-Harold Kennedy

In addition to the point the Colonel makes, Harold needs to tell the Corps's "special marines" to order more ammo, because the 7.62mm "NATO standard" round for the FAL will not fit in any of the other non-NATO weapons he named.

TR

crazyjake123
09-07-2007, 17:25
I hate to bring up an old thread like this I just wanted to throw my .02 in if you don't mind. I can't agree with you guys more on everything you have said about the Corps. I was a Jarhead from 02-06 and deployed 3 times to the sand box. We are very much limited by how conventional of a force the Marine Corps is. I was very much lucky to have flexible leadership that adopted and loved UW. We used indig. forces as much as possible, used Iraqi vehicles seized from HVT Raids to drive out our cordon teams so not to trip our surprise, and we worked with an ODA from 5th group quite often that our command learned a lot from. I would love to throw the ODA number out to see if any of the guys from it are here, I'm not sure how the OPSEC works though so just let me know if I can.
Basically, many of us Marines have switched over to the SF because we saw, liked, and wanted the way you all operate. From my company alone I have 2 friends that are in the Q course right now, and I hopefully will be following sooner than later. Marines are great in large battles and conventional warfare but USA SF wins wars and are true force multipliers. That is my true drive to be in your ranks. Thanks you guys for what you do, and all the great info on this site. Let me know if I can post that ODA number to see if any of the guys are on here.

J.N.

ReconDoc242
09-25-2007, 12:12
Just wanted to make a few quick points on this topic. Having been a member of the Marine Recon Community, I want you guys to understand what we are and what our position really is.
MARSOC/Det1 was originally created to represent the Marine Corps within JSOC. This was something that members of the Recon Community have wanted for a long, long time(mostly because it would give us access to more funds....and therefore, better toys, more training, etc). Remember, the Marine Cops is not a distinct branch of the military, they are a subdivision of the Navy(and therefore do not have their own funding. USMC funding comes from the Navy).
Non-Recon Brass in the Corps are very resistant to the idea of MARSOC and this is for 2 reasons(in my opinion):
1. Individuality within the Corps is generally disencounraged. The idea that any Marine is elite compared to another is offensive to the Non-Recon Brass. The belive that regardless of training or misssion, all Marines are "elite"(a bunch of crap in my opinion).
2. Marine Brass have a serious problem with the concept of having an Army Brass commanding Marines.
That being said, the need for a specially trained force within the Corps has always existed. The Recon Community was formed to meet theses needs in the 50's by General Chesty Puller and Col. Bruce Meyers out the Raider Bn and Combat swimmers/UDT plattoons of WWII.
Ever since then Marine Recon have been performing SR, Recon, and DA missions under the command of the Corps.
Recon Marines are volunteers, much like you men. In order to call yourself a Recon Marine, you need to have at a minimun, graduated from Jump School, Dive School, SERE, and Recon School. This is considered our "Basic Pipeline".
Also if you are a Navy Corpsman(medic) you must also graduate from dive medicine school and the entire 18D before you are considered a SARC.
Once you are a Recon Marine you are assigned to either a Recon Bn. From there you begin advance training(i.e. MFF). Most guys who get "schooled out" during their Bn time go on to assignments in Force Recon.
Recon Bn. perform conventional and SR for the Marine Division. Force performs the same mission as Bn. with the difference that they tend to do more DA missions. Force reports to the MEU commander.
These men are invited to try out for MARSOC. They go tru various boards and PT tests as part of their evaluation. The ones that are selected join MARSOC/Det1 and go on to more advance training.
Recon Marines specialize in what they do. Now I am not saying they can do it better then SF, nor am I saying that SF can do it better. All I am saying is that there is a great difference between a Recon Recon Marine and a Regular Marine. Just as their is a difference between an SF soldier and a conventional one.

Razor
09-25-2007, 12:53
ReconDoc, I don't think you'll find any argument here that Recon Marines are well-trained, professional warriors. The main point of contention is the role and expectations of the new Foreign Military Training Unit. While the Marines have had great success in training and employing Recon units with SR and DA capabilities, creating a FID specialist is a very different task that requires a great deal of resources, time and experience. Its taken the Army, and more specifically Special Forces, over 50 years to refine the process, and there's a reason the SF training program takes a year or more to complete. Even after finishing the initial training, it can take several years of operational experience (primarily in FID) before an SF soldier is considered proficient in his FID capabilities. In one of the above cited articles, the FMTU's ops officer, MAJ Glover, alludes to a 6 month training program, followed by a 3-5 year tour of duty, after which an FMTU Marine either returns to the FMF or moves to the DA-focused side of MARSOC, which is a completely different animal from FID. As I mentioned, this a a very tightly compressed timeline for producing someone well-trained for FID missions, and while Marines are no doubt very good troops, why would the Marine Corps believe it can short-change the training and experience requirements the Army has developed and proven over half a century, and expect an equivalent result? This isn't a dig at the abilities of the individual Marine, but rather at the questionable thought-processess driving policy at HQMC.

All this isn't to say that Marines are incapable of performing FID. Rather, if HQMC would consider a longer, more comprehensive training program, followed by keeping a FID-trained Marine in units capitalizing on his training for most, if not the rest of his career, I think you'd find that Marines are up to the task of professional FID. Lord knows there's more than enough work out there for all that can do it.

ReconDoc242
09-25-2007, 13:03
i totally agree with you Razor.

Irishsquid
09-26-2007, 08:25
I'm not SF. I'm Navy. My experience with FID is nonexistant. I worked in a support role for SF. I watched and observed, but was never trained. I'm not qualified to make a call on any of that.

MARSOC, on the other hand, I've worked with, and while they didn't seem like a bad unit per se, the "seasoned NCOs and Officers," mentioned earlier were not present. The impression I got was that all the line units tried to keep their best people and send their marginal performers to MARSOC.

They all seemed like kids straight out of boot camp. I saw a little bit of rank here and there, but most of the guys I saw were LCPL at most.

ReconDoc242
09-26-2007, 13:08
I'm not SF. I'm Navy. My experience with FID is nonexistant. I worked in a support role for SF. I watched and observed, but was never trained. I'm not qualified to make a call on any of that.

MARSOC, on the other hand, I've worked with, and while they didn't seem like a bad unit per se, the "seasoned NCOs and Officers," mentioned earlier were not present. The impression I got was that all the line units tried to keep their best people and send their marginal performers to MARSOC.

They all seemed like kids straight out of boot camp. I saw a little bit of rank here and there, but most of the guys I saw were LCPL at most.

Shipmate you must be a bit mistaken. To even be elegicbe for an invite to the try outs you need to be a CPL or above with a minimum of 2 years experience in either a Recon Bn, Force, or Anglico.

Irishsquid
09-26-2007, 17:49
I dunno...they said they were MARSOC...but they all seemed considerably younger than my 23 years...and I know I'm young as shit. I know several of them introduced themselves to me as LCPLs. Then again they may very well have been support guys trying to pass themselves off to everyone as "high speed," hoping for a roll in a bunker with one of the females...they had just come off the USS Shreveport.



Edited to add: On the other hand, after thinking about it, my observations also probably weren't spot-on. The only ones I interacted with were on the "smokedeck."

mark46th
10-13-2007, 16:48
The ability of SF NCO's to command troops scared the hell out of Regular Army officers during the Vietnam war. Indigenous troops were formed into companies and battalions with Special Forces senior NCO's in command, providing training, supplies and running combat ops. To this day, I think this is one of the reasons the Regular Army officers are jealous of SF and are doing everything possible to put USASF out of business.

The best thing that could happen to SF is to be taken out of SOC's chain of command and be put back under the aegis of the Department of Defense, away from all the SOC red tape and nonsense. Let SF do what they are intended to do without all the publicity and BS that comes with SOC.

CosaNostraUSMC
10-13-2007, 18:31
I'm neither SF nor Recon...I'm a Marine rifleman. I did, however, have a chance to attend the Army's Ranger school. I noticed while I was at that school, that, the Marine Corps does waste it's school seats. If I remember correctly, their were 5 of us in the class...2 of us were from line companies, 2 from H&S, and 1 was from the Recon community.

How does that apply to the current topic?

Well, I think that there's always been a problem with the way that Marine Recon has been told to "stand up and stand down". The other Marine was spot on in his assesment here, that, individualsim or eliteist attitude is highly disouraged and frowned upon in the Corps. The man on your left and right, and Marine Air overhead has always been our strength. Hence the zoomies wearing camo helmets and flying low. It's the same thing behind the concept, every Marine is a rifleman, and individual units are not advertised with crests and flashes.

IMHO, Recon has been grossly mismanaged...and the FIXRECON initiative of the 90's was a huge indicator of how much the units were in operational disarray, because of internal Corps politics. Furthermore, I believe that, the GWOT has put the US' SOF units into a precarious position, where the folks on a certain "hill" want a larger SOF pool to pull units from, but they want it at the expense of good old fashioned, hard core training. Polits pressure the Pentagon/DoD side of the house to stand up a larger SOF force, numerically speaking, and then dangle the funding carrott in their face to induce the desired outcome.

As many of you QPs have said, you can't rush the type of training that one goes through to indoctrinate them into such an operational role.

So, what does the Pentagon do? They can't make the foks on the hill with the checkbook wait, and they can't just rush men through "a course". Natrually, they do what we're seeing now, and that is, to take men who have proven their desire to accomplish a mission, at any cost, and absorb them into the SOC side of the house. It just so happens, that, it was a group from the Marines.

I do believe this was Recons way to solidify it's standing in the SOF community, as being "validated", while simultaneously saving themselves from once again being reduced to some Marine brass' political agenda for promotion...as their now likely a subordinate of SOC and not the Commandant of the hours chess piece.

Recon has always gotten the short end of the stick in the FMF, as far as I'm concerend, and that's just my opinion. I think the MARSOC decission was out from a few key points.

A. It was a way to increase the strained SOF community, with qualified candidates while USMC gaining entrance at that table in a legitimate sense, which can prove to help the Corps' own recruitment and retention efforts with a widely publicized, high speed low drag unit.

B. It was a also a way for Recon to exercise and ensure, self preservation within the FMF, both numerically and fiscally, which has always been a major issue.

C. It was a way for the Corps to continue it's trying to stay ahead of the "curve" when it comes to our brand of warfare, and the composition of the FMF as a whole.

I think MARSOC is a good idea, as long as the higher ups stay the course, and allow the men of MARSOC to train at a level that will encourage, promote and sustain operational readiness and have a positive impact on the overall operational outcome of SOC and any contingencies that they may be involved in.

Retention of NCO/SNCOs within Recon, who have operational experience, has also always been a huge issue. In an already small Corps, when a billet opens up for a SNCO, you have an even smaller pool to choose the successor from. You want the best SNCO for the job and oftten SNCOs are taken out of one MOS and put into another MOS simply because of the need to fill that slot with "A" SNCO. While this may help the greater Corps, it hurts the small Recon unit. This is where what's best for the Corps is best for the Marine mindest comes into play.

Most Marines with any knowledge of the Recon community will tell you, that, Recon has always been used as a pawn for that era's CMC, to endorse his idea of Recon's role in our Corps. Recon has been activated, deactivated, structurally augmented and revised, numerous times over the past 60 years.

What we're seeing now, is Marine Commandant Gen. Conway's ideas as to how Recon should operate, as well as the FMF as a whole, in a way that he feels best fits the current operational trends; based on present day contigencies/intel/operations. All this while trying to foresee the evoloution of these trends and subsequently develop a Corps to best handle future threats, without having to address the issue AFTER or AT the point of concern. HQMC has always been good at this idea of planning for future trends, and it's easy to impliment everchanging training and doctrine in such a small force, in comparisson to a large Army.

At the same time, MARSOC will have it's niche and should not be forced into a role that is contradictory to, or does not suit it's operational capabilities.

All in all, as a Marines, Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen, we go where we're told, with our equipment and knowledge from training, and do what must be done. Sometimmes the leash is on, other times it's off.

As I said, I'm no SF type, but I do think along these lines...it's not so much the training (even though it's a major factor) that sets the SOF side apart from the conventional side, rather it's the men who prove their willingness and ability to learn that skill and operate at that level. SOF, I would like to think, are comprised of and subsequently built around it's individuals...the cream of the crop. MARSOC, SF, SEALS, PJ's...their all comprised of men who have the intensity, motivation, and discipline to get the job done.

In the end, you get the ball and wanna win one for your team, and have everyone come home.

Hopefully MARSOC will be viewed as an augmentation to an already elite line of SOF, another tool in our countries kit, and not seen as a replacement or someones toy.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I'm going to hijack myself for a moment here.

Something I just thought of, is that, INDOCS are often used as tools by a Line Cos COC to judge the worth and talent of it's men. I've seen a lot of jarheads get the green light to participate in a Recon indoc, only to have the COC not sign-off on their release from the subordinate unit afterwards. Usually, these guys are our shit hot, team and/or squad leaders...the unit wants to retain them to boost it's own performance.

If you go to a Scout Sniper indoc and pass, you're usually let go of the subordinate unit, because you're still staying operational within that Co or Bn. Where as Recon orders will get you a first class ticket out of the Regiment all together.

That's one of the fundamentla differences, and the biggest I think, when it comes to the Marines and the Army. From what I've seen and heard, the Army promotes those types of moves to boost your career or enhance your skillset. The Marines are always exercising self preservation and wanting to promote leadership and training at the lowest levels, at least that's what the COC has in store for you...whatever is good for the Co or Plt, is good for the individual Marine.

Mission accomplishment comes before troop welfare. It's part of our doctrine. Heck, the only reason I got a slot at Ranger school was because, A: I was qual'd to go...and...B: my COC knew I would become a force multiplier at the Plt level upon my return. I was expected to pass on the knowlege gained from the school to my Squad. The squad members would teach other squad's members and so on and so forth. We're seeing this same effect now in OIF/OEF, with Arabic and Pashtun language classes. A select few Marines, usually team leaders, will learn basic phrases, customs and courtesies...then diseminate this info to the rest of the unit at the Plt level.

Trip_Wire (RIP)
10-13-2007, 19:03
Hi,

A well written opinion CosaNostraUSMC!

It would be easier to read; however, if you used paragraphs and separate them with a one line space. :munchin

CosaNostraUSMC
10-13-2007, 19:14
In my experience, the FMTU is not too far off, from the type of foreign cross-training and exercises that a MEU/MEF SOTG conduct during a 6 month pump.

Exercises COBRA GOLD, FOAL EAGLE, CARAT...immediately come to mind. JTFHOA is also recalled in example.

Conduct ship to shore operations, link up with indigenous armed forces (usually the host nations Marine counterparts), hit the field with the host nations force, cross train with them in their back yard, and then board the ship again.

When I was on my float, we hit about a dozen coutries in a 6 month window and trained with that countries Marines, or equivalent force, before steaming back to Okinawa and returning CONUS at the end of the tour.

Now, we didn't go through a course or pipeline to get us to that point, although we would surely have benefitted from one, but it was possible for us to operate effectively (at that level and for all intensive purposes) gaining knowledge of the host countries geography, terrain, internal politics and issues, weapons, and tactics.

CosaNostraUSMC
10-13-2007, 20:51
Hi,

A well written opinion CosaNostraUSMC!

It would be easier to read; however, if you used paragraphs and separate them with a one line space. :munchin

It's been revised into something other than a huge ass paragraph.

Sorry. Between typing as fast as I was thinking, trying not to miss my points, AND my son trying to perfom some sort of weird shit (I have no clue what 2 year olds are thinking some times) I over looked the fact that I had built a huge and possibly unreadable...frankenstein's bride...paragraph...thing...if you wanna call it that.

CosaNostraUSMC
10-13-2007, 21:17
We are very much limited by how conventional of a force the Marine Corps is.

I'm not trying to sling any mud here, but what Marine Corps were you in?

Do you remember what a MEU(SOC) is? Do you know how they train during their work-up and their mission capabilities when deployed?

i.e.; 26 MEU cycle. (and this is indicative of all MEUs)

Work-Up Period:
Training during the six-month work-up period is often referred to as "crawl, walk, run."

The Marines and Sailors progress through curriculum and exercises that teach individual, small unit, and unit tactics while integrating the separate MEU elements into a cohesive, flexible and powerful force.

The work-up period includes training in the following areas:
Amphibious Operations, Mechanized and Helicopter-borne Raids, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Humanitarian Assistance, and Urban Operations.

Exercises conducted during the work-up period include:
ESG - MEU Integration Training (ESGINT), Training in an Urban Environment Exercise (TRUEX), Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX), and the MEU Certification Exercise (CERTEX).

Deployment:

Following the work-up, the MEU deploys for six months to U.S. European and Central Commands' areas of responsibility.

During this time, the MEU is a forward-deployed, self-sustaining force that the combatant commanders can direct to accomplish a variety of special operations and conventional missions their areas of responsibility. The missions may include:

* Conventional Operations (Amphibious Assaults and Raids)
* Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)
* Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR)
* Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
* Security Operations
* Peace Enforcement
* Reconnaissance and Surveillance
* Airfield/Port Seizure

There are seven MEU's in the Marine Corps, three on each coast of the United States and one in Okinawa, Japan. The East Coast MEUs maintain a near-constant presence in the Mediterranean region. Each MEU follows a similar work-up/deployment cycle.

I don't believe that we are at all limited or of an un-flexible nature operationally. Quite the contrary, it's our unconventional size, when compared to a large Army, that allows us to be a versatile force within a conventional AO.

While MEU(SOC)s and ACMs can do a multitude of tasks well, they aren't always enough to defeat an enemy, especially at the high end of the conflict spectrum. When confronted by a numerically superior foe bent on denying U.S. forces access into a theater, regional CINCs may require a first-on-the-scene, sea-based MAGTF -- larger and more capable than the MEU(SOC) -- that can force its way ashore and pave the way for follow-on joint forces. This role is filled by a specially-configured MEF, embarked aboard amphibious assault ships.

The current Navy amphibious force is being reshaped to provide 36 modern amphibious ships, including 12 large assault ships, that can each carry a sizable, mixed complement of helicopter, tilt-rotor and V/STOL aircraft. This force will provide the means to form 12 multi-purpose ARGs. These ARGs will support the peacetime deployment of MEU(SOC)s and, when necessary, combine to form a larger task force capable of transporting the amphibious MEF to combat.

We can scale it up a notch to the MEF level of operations, and get into a full-blown MAGTF, which is hardly a "rigid" level of operations. The build up is nearly indentical, as individual units who have completed their build-ups usually end the cycle with CAX, and training at the highest levels, numerically speaking with regards to Units and personnel involved.

Look at a MEFs mission by definition:

Deploy and employ expeditionary ready, air-ground task forces in response to Component Commander taskings to operate in Joint/Combined Operations, to conduct small scale contingencies and win in combat.

Note that it's again, pertaining to the conducting of, SMALL SCALE CONTINGENCIES and not LARGE BATTLES.

When the MEF deploys to a contingency in theatre, it will employ the following in it's AO while carrying out operations:

The Ground Combat Element (GCE) of a MEF is normally a Marine division reinforced with other appropriate FMF units. The Marine Division includes three infantry regiments, an artillery reginment, a tank battalion, an assault amphibious vehicle battalion, a light armored reconnaissance battalion, and a combat engineer battalion. The division fights using combined arms tactics and can tailor itself to meet the demands of any mission - from operations other than war to major theater warfare.

The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of a MEF is a Marine aircraft wing, task-organized to conduct all six functions of tactical air operations. The wing is organized and equipped to operate from ships, permanent airfields ashore, or expeditionary airfields. The Marine Aircraft Wing conducts the complete range of air operatins in support of the MEF, to include anti-air warfare, offensive air support, assault support, aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare (including active and passive electronic countermeasures), and control of aircraft and missiles. As a collateral function, the wing may also provide units that operate as an integral component of Navy carrier air wings onboard aircraft carriers.

The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) of a MEF is the FSSG. The organic battalions of the FSSG provide the full range of CSS functions to include maintenance, transportation, deliberate engineering, supply, health services, and other services (e.g., postal, disbursing, law enforcement). The Force Service Support Group provides sustained combat service support above and beyond the organic capabilities of subordinate MAGTF combat service support elements. It provides a full range of medical, dental, maintenance, supply, motor transport, and engineer capabilities.

There are three standing MEFs: I Marine expeditionary force (I MEF), based in southern California and Arizona; II Marine expeditionary force (II MEF), based in North and South Carolina; and III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), based in Japan and Hawaii. Each standing MEF consists of a permanent CE and one Marine division, MAW, and FSSG. These major commands constitute the primary reservoir of combat capabilities from which MAGTFs are sourced.

The size and composition of a deployed MEF can vary greatly depending on the requirements of the mission. It can deploy with not only its own units but also units from the other standing MEFs, the Marine Corps Reserve, or the other Services and the Special Operations Command. A MEF typically deploys by echelon with 60 days of sustainment. The lead echelon of the MEF, tailored to meet the specific mission, is designated the MEF (forward) (MEF(FWD)) and may be commanded by the MEF commander personally or by a designated commander. The MEF(FWD) prepares for the subsequent arrival of the rest of the MEF or other joint or combined forces. However, the deployment of the MEF( FWD) does not necessarily mean that all the forces of the standing MEF will follow. This would occur only if the entire MEF were required. MEFs may conduct sustained operations ashore upon completion of an amphibious operation or by deploying from the sea, land, or air and linking up with maritime prepositioning ships carrying equipment and supplies.

The amphibious MEF consists of up to two-thirds of the MEF's full combat power. It is equipped with the necessary assault amphibious vehicles, landing craft, and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to conduct opposed ship-to-objective movements. When it arrives in theater, the MEF can either absorb on-scene MEU(SOC)s into its overall structure, employ them independently in support of the overall forcible entry operation, or employ them in support of other operations designated by the theater CINC.

The amphibious MEF remains the only means for self-sustainable forcible entry into a region in which U.S. forces are being denied access. It can seize and hold airfields and ports to enable the introduction of follow-on MEF or joint forces. Once this is accomplished, the MEF can remain in theater to conduct main or supporting attacks during joint campaigns. In the future, when equipped with advanced amphibious assault vehicles, air-cushioned landing craft, and tilt-rotor aircraft, it will be capable of projecting combat power from the sea -- 25 to 75 miles over the horizon -- directly against the decisive objectives for inland. This concept, known as operational maneuver from the sea, will make the amphibious MEF an even more flexible, potent instrument of joint combat power.

As a singular national capability, an amphibious MEF serves as a key "swing force" in the case of multiple theater operations. In other words, it would engage in one theater, and once follow-on joint forces are established, it would backload, reconstitute itself, and proceed to engage enemy forces in the next theater.

I was very much lucky to have flexible leadership that adopted and loved UW. We used indig. forces as much as possible, used Iraqi vehicles seized from HVT Raids to drive out our cordon teams so not to trip our surprise, and we worked with an ODA from 5th group quite often that our command learned a lot from. Marines are great in large battles and conventional warfare but USA SF wins wars and are true force multipliers.

The above statement directly contradicts your first statement, our Corps' structural/operational organization and doctrine, and I'm quite confused now, as to your thinking process. Can you clarify?

Trip_Wire (RIP)
10-13-2007, 21:19
It's been revised into something other than a huge ass paragraph.

Sorry. Between typing as fast as I was thinking, trying not to miss my points, AND my son trying to perfom some sort of weird shit (I have no clue what 2 year olds are thinking some times) I over looked the fact that I had built a huge and possibly unreadable...frankenstein's bride...paragraph...thing...if you wanna call it that.


LOL!

It reads a lot better now thanks! :D

coverteast
10-31-2007, 10:42
I just returned from training Marines in various subjects and had time to talk to them after hours. They (the ones you are referring to) are where SF was 40 years ago with the exception of newer technology. If you could see their make up at the go team level you would flash back to when you first entered SF in the 60's. Why the duplication is beyond me.

coverteast
10-31-2007, 10:47
Bt the way.....these Marines I was working with are the ones you were referring too......none of them came from Force Recon

NousDefionsDoc
10-31-2007, 11:34
cover,
check your PMs

coverteast
10-31-2007, 12:39
Will do.......by the way those Marines were all NCO's, some with a lot of experience. Can they do the job? I believe so with the right training and the time in required to do the tasks.....One problem however, when they get promoted they get moved out of the unit (according to the officer that was there) which creates a constant need for new NCO's to come in and go through the same training the previous ones went through....This does not bode well for the go teams.

f50lrrp
10-31-2007, 18:28
I went through the MATA Senior NCO Course at Fort Bragg in 1969 with a handful of Marines (all Force Recon). They were dedicated, fit, knowedgable and very intent on doing a good job when they arrived in RVN as advisors.

The one characteristic that they all displayed was an unbending attitude that there was only "THE CORPS WAY" to do things. Every time an instructor would point out that the Vietnamese would actually command and run the show, the Marines would chime in that the VN Marines would have to do it the US Marine way. Most of the Marines scored well on tests involving weapons, tactics, strategy and hard military subjects but low to failing on exams having to do with culture, customs and language.

I dobt that today's Marines have changed much.

Mike

CosaNostraUSMC
11-02-2007, 17:34
F50:

Good habits die hard...if at all.

Thanks! :lifter

lksteve
11-02-2007, 18:51
Good habits die hard...if at all.I do not see inflexibility as a positive attribute in a special operations environment...

CosaNostraUSMC
11-03-2007, 18:32
lksteve:

I was speaking as to, our doctrine, in general, with regards to conducting combat operations, i.e.; possesing above average proficiency in the area of weapons (specifically, marksmanship), tactics, strategy and hard military subjects, as referenced by, F50LRRP.

Furthermore, as F50LRRP has pointed out, and many will agree, they were dedicated, fit, knowedgable and very intent on doing a good job when they arrived

The same persons will also agree, that, The one characteristic that they all displayed was an unbending attitude that there was only "THE CORPS WAY" to do things. I think this "attitude" or "cultural way of thinking", if you will, while seemingly comes off as "inflexible", actually enables us to be quite good at what "we" do, not to be confused with what "others" do, and that in turn makes us a "flexible" force, in our mindset.

I'm not sure if that makes much sense, or if it came across "right".

I guess the easiest way to explain our culture is, fanatically indifferent; we like to do things the way we do, because we were taught that way, and our methods, while usually "low-tech or crude", render proven results, historically speaking.

Now, as for how that will play out, in regards to MARSOC's role as a member of SOF, that's yet to be proven at a relevant level, with regards to actually being a part of SOC/SOF.


Speaking from personal experience, I can say that, our confidence is often viewed as arrogance, which is a reputation that preceeds us in most instances.

My response to F50LRRP, was in a sense, that same confidence, wrapped in sarcasm.

Everyone knows, that, we have the tendancy to come of as, well...a little rough around the edges when it comes to, indigenous culture, customs, and languages in country. Hopefully, this chink in our armor is addressed at the appropriate levels, and corrective action taken to ensure our (the Corps') work in SOF is not counter-productive or politically incorrect.

Advise if I should adjust, left and right lateral aim, and by all means it's a done deal. And that's a honest response, no sarcasm there. Or [I]there either.

Merlyn
11-04-2007, 14:12
I had some contact with the Marine Force Recon folks attached to SOG in the '67-68 timeframe.

A major problem with the otherwise good troops was that they had difficulty in responding to the Chief SOG's (then COL Singlaub) policies, probably because he was U.S. Army Special Forces.

In an interview held years later, a Marine--Wesley Rice--who went on (I think) to flag rank said words to the effect that, although MACV-SOG was okay, it didn't help him to be a better Marine.

That exemplifies the attitude problem.

The problems SOG had with the Marines at 3 MAF in getting helicopter support took four star intervention to partially correct.

I'm not sure that the Marines belong in joint service units, much less special operations units.

Merlyn
11-04-2007, 15:11
The events at Lang Vei, and the refusal of the Marines at Khe Sanh to come to the aid of that besieged camp, also demonstrates the "readiness" of the Marine Corps to work with the other services.

Although I have known and liked a number of Marines I worked with in joint service exercises and assignments, I think the Corps' attitude is almost invariably hidebound and archaic.

Irishsquid
11-07-2007, 22:15
My experience with them was in HOA...and as I said...I never went operational with them...I never worked WITH the FMTU...I just talked to them when they came through the JSOTF compound...the more I think about it, the more I'm thinking the guys I was talking to were the support guys, trying to play the "badass" angle to get laid in a bunker lol. I withdraw my former opinion due to lack of experience with the actual operators.

To any MARSOC operators out there, please accept my sincerest apologies.

TheLion03
11-08-2007, 14:51
Is anyone willing to give these Marines a chance within SOCOM. It is early on in the program and maybe in the next few years the community will see them change in thier approach to thier mission.

I understand the stigma about Marines and thier attitude but there is always a chance for change.

While they are taking funds away from other SOF units. They are still trying to complete a mission they were given by thier Chain of Command. I think in the next few years they will either learn where thier short-comings are and adjust to get on target. OR The program will be shelved and more effort put into MSOB

The Reaper
11-08-2007, 15:00
I do not see a problem with people relating their personal experiences with the Marines. It is understood that those observations are snapshots, yet taken as a whole, they may be indicative of something.

There has been a lot of trash talking on the Corps' side as well over the past 20 years. Now it is time to walk the walk.

Frankly, based on 20+ years in SF, I do not see how the Marines can do the same missions (and more) with some very junior kids who have a limited amount of experience at the non-kinetic aspect of SOF, especially with the plan to rotate them in and out of SOF, but time will tell.

The question that I have is what do they bring to the plate, other than bodies competing for funds and a limited number of infil platforms?

Clearly, someone thought that there was value added, now the Corps needs to demonstrate it.

TR

Jack Moroney (RIP)
11-08-2007, 15:19
The question that I have is what do they bring to the plate, other than bodies competing for funds and a limited number of infil platforms?

Clearly, someone thought that there was value added, now the Corps needs to demonstrate it.

TR

Exactly!

TheLion03
11-08-2007, 19:43
There was a point in time where SF was brand new to the world. Maybe then they had the same problems and look how things have turned out.

Bringing bodys to the fight is always the first step. The next step is thier training, and i know that is not up to par by SF standards but Marines in general have always shown they can adapt to different situations. This is no different.

I think the Marines who make it past selection will be more than able to handle the small part of the FID pie they will be given. On top of this they will be able to relieve some of the deployments that are putting pressure on other SOF Forces

lksteve
11-08-2007, 20:08
There was a point in time where SF was brand new to the world. And the new guys on the block brought OSS folks like Aaron Bank and others to fill the unit, men with experience in the field of endeavor SF was created for...these guys had performed SF-type missions in Occupied France, Norway, Asia...there was a nucleus of experienced men to draw on...:munchin

Jack Moroney (RIP)
11-08-2007, 20:09
. On top of this they will be able to relieve some of the deployments that are putting pressure on other SOF Forces

Define your understanding of FID and what exactly you think the role of any force might be, be it Marine, SF, or and conventional branch of the military be it in the Army, Airforce, or the other component of the Marine Corps-the Navy:D. I think you do not really understand the complete scope of this mission, but then I may be wrong. By the way, FID in itself may also include direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaisance,CT and a host of collateral activities depending on the scenario with which you are presented. Now I have no doubt, that somewhere in there, there is a mission profile for the Corps and it will lie more in the direct action mode and possibly some training for selected host nation forces along basic combat skills but it will not be along the more complex integration of the military with other host country agencies and ministries as a start. But training a host nations soldiers to fight the battle is not the same as getting into his head and developing levels of rapport and the multitude of systems and networks it takes to get the job done for the long haul. Working with host country military forces where they are deeply ingrained in the political process and every facet of a country's life that is struggling to suppress an insurgency requires a level of sophistication, cultural awarness, and skill sets that take a level of experience and maturity not found in the grade levels normally associated with a conventional combat force. A Special Forces team, just by its make up, is already a combined arms team with combat support and combat service support capabilities and skills with force multiplier capabilities that just will not be matched by any other organization. They already know that they will have to find and destroy an underground, isolate and change the loyalty of an auxillary, and find and destroy the guerrilla and they know that it will all have to be done following some very broad guidelines known as the SOF imperatives.

TheLion03
11-08-2007, 20:36
Well Sir my understanding of the Marine's role in FID will not come close to what SF does. By this i mean anything more than training host Nations in what they need in order to conduct operations. I understand i may be wrong on this but they are not asking the Corps to help these men complete operations just get them ready in order to do it themselves. The places they are sending these selected Marines are places where UW missions will be left to someone else, namely MSOB. The advisors are there to do just that advise, not in the same way SF does but just to teach modern combat skills and mission planning.

I understand there is a mindset and level of humility involved. But no one is asking the Marine Corps to take on more than they have in the past. Every MEU(SOC) has had Marines training members of different nations in squad tactics ect... This is in fact its own form of FID correct?

Ill be the first one to say SF has more training and history on the issue, BUT why is there no room for the Marine Corps. Why cant we try and help out the country. Times change and I am a firm believer that the Marine Corps is perfectly able to deal with FID. not every Marine is a walking version of Full Metal Jacket.

Jack Moroney (RIP)
11-08-2007, 20:48
Well Sir my understanding of the Marine's role in FID will not come close to what SF does..

My point exactly. They are serving the roll of trainers, they are not performing FID. I think perhaps we are mixing anchors and arrows here, but you cannot have folks standing tall claiming that they have a capability for FID (and all its encompassing aspects) when they, in fact, are training soldiers to fight. Is that mission important, certainly. Is it FID no. We have enough problems with folks standing up and claiming to be Special Forces when in fact they are Special Operations Forces. We do not need to start muddying the water by having folks claim that they can perform FID as a mission and should be resourced to do so when in fact they are performing a task that is also performed as part of FID but is not FID. It is kind of like taking the pressure off someone brain by using an anti-inflamatory and comparing it to someone having to put a shunt in to drain the fluid and calling both brain surgery.

The Reaper
11-08-2007, 21:47
The Colonel is right.

It isn't just about the training.

You have to be able to live and breathe FID.

How many of these SOF Imperatives does your average MARSOC guy do on a regular basis:

Understand the operational environment
Recognize political implications
Facilitate interagency activities
Engage the threat discriminately
Consider long-term effects
Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations
Anticipate and control psychological effects
Apply capabilities indirectly
Develop multiple options
Ensure long-term sustainment
Provide sufficient intelligence
Balance security and synchronization

Look at some of the political discussions here, particularly about host nation relations. Most of it is at a fairly senior grad school or even State Department level of thinking.

I think that the selection, maturity, intelligence, and experience of the average SF NCO makes a big difference.

But what do I know?

TR

TheLion03
11-08-2007, 22:09
ROGER THaT SIR.

I understand what you are saying but my last thing is this. Is it not a good thing that the Marine Corps is trying to put one foot in front of the other and complete these missions.

Should there not be someone else out there to help shoulder the burden that SF has because of all the wonderful time away the GWOT entails

Razor
11-08-2007, 23:40
Should there not be someone else out there to help shoulder the burden that SF has because of all the wonderful time away the GWOT entails

Absolutely, but the skill level of that "help" goes a long way in determining if the "help" is being helpful, or harmful. As I said before, this isn't a slam on the individual Marine--if HQMC decides to put Johnny Jarhead through a rigorous selection process, spends a significant amount of time and money to train him, and then keeps him in assignments where he builds upon that skill set for several years, then Johnny will be helpful. Anything less (the current USMC plan) is like sending 10 year olds with buckets and garden hoses to fight a hazmat warehouse fire. Can you see the issue now? Help doesn't simply equal bodies--it requires bodies with a specific skill set.

The Reaper
11-09-2007, 06:28
ROGER THaT SIR.

I understand what you are saying but my last thing is this. Is it not a good thing that the Marine Corps is trying to put one foot in front of the other and complete these missions.

Should there not be someone else out there to help shoulder the burden that SF has because of all the wonderful time away the GWOT entails

I have seen conventional soldiers quickly undo years of good FID work. Better no team than the wrong team.

It takes language skills, area expertise, and leadership with a lot of FID experience to be successful. Going to a school or two and doing training missions for a couple of years before going back to the force to do conventional tasks is not making good FID personnel.

It will be years before we will know the answer to your question, and it will be expensive.

When I was your age, I thought that my conventional infantry unit could do it all as well.

I hope this turns out well for everyone, but I would not have chosen this course of action.

TR

CosaNostraUSMC
11-10-2007, 16:30
Gentleman...you all know my stance on this topic, as I've posted it in detail, and we all know who (what "department") was pulling the strings on this project.

I know, based on my own mind set (at least, the mind set the Corps issued me:D) what I'm capable of given the oportunity to train or attend a course. Marine culture is one of, a love of competition, both in and out of the Corps. You send a squad to compete, inter-USMC, against another Co., Bn., Regiment., Div.; we want to beat the snot out of the other squad AND will train at any level necessary to accomplish this. You send one of us to a school or a course, and we want to be the honor grad of that class, not merely pass it on average. Mediocrecy, in my opinion, has never been an option for most of us.

Now, I'm in no way saying, that, every Marine can pass a "Q course" or equivalent, if there is such a thing...BUT (and it's a BIG ASS BUT)...the "kids" that you see in the Corps today have the mental discipline and where with all to want, not only to be in this sort of situation, but to excel and push that envelope.

FID? I don't jack shit about FID...no offense...as it was never a part of my mission, and the Corps never gave me any training with regards to it; whether classroom or practical. I do know, that had I been in a unit where FID was a factor, you can bet the farm I would learn that part of the trade. Not just learn even...I would really push myself to UNDERSTAND it. My mindset, with regards to operational knowledge, is indicitive of the current mindset, of most of the "kids" in the Corps; who're involved in conventional operations currently.

Maybe I'm out of line here, but I think that anyone, in any unit, is a man of sorts when he's been on the 2-way range...regardless of his unit's mission or doctrine. Sending rounds down range is all the same, at the personal level, is it not?

As far as MARSOC, I think the jury's still out on this one. It'll be a while before we see how they stack-up in the scheme of things.

I stated before, that, if they're (the MARSOC units and it's men) are given the ability to really, I mean REALLY, have access to the sort of training that you folks do, and they're allowed to maintain in their new fields for the duration...fostering and nurturing this new creature for future generations...then there's no way they can have anything BUT a positive impact on America's SOF.
I mean, gents, you take the kind of mental can-do attitude that Marines have, coupled with physical ability, and you put them into a situation to obtain some gold old fashioned training (such as a Q course) really arming them at a level of education that is required for this sort of mission...there's no way they'll fail our country. Period.

If the higher up, pupet string pullers on a certain hill, deny them that access to needed training, then, we all know they will fail; out from a reason other than not being able to hack it or what have you.

FID, UW, Recon, DA, it's all relevent to the skills one has, and the unit's mission.

The Corps is gonna be there, in SOF, whether they get the right training to belong there or not. Might as well train them then.

"Quality is better than quantity"...seems I heard that somewhere before. We operate, in part, the way we do because of that statement. We're not for everyone, and like it that way, as I suspect most SF members think they're not for everyone either. If the Corps was the size of the Army, with similar composition, than we would be logistically, tactically, and technically inefective...or other wise fucked. I believe this is why we're seeing the Army, as a whole, having been re-organizing itself, to be more "EXPEDITIONARY". So, I think it makes sense, where the next group of SOF members was to come from.

If I look at Special Operations types, i.e.; SF, SEALs, PJs, Rangers, MARSOC, I see one thing. Individuals who were willing to put up with anything and everything under the sun to be where they are. Ultimately, you played all the fuck-fuck games they could throw at you, and learned the skills needed to graduate your respective course and go on to become operators. You talked the talk and walked the walk, right?

Our wash out rate, rate of attricion is what it is for a reason. I'm not trying to compare SF to a conventional Marine force. Rather, mindsets here.

It takes that same type of desire and dedication, no matter what anyone says, to become a Marine...other wise we all would have joined the Army.

That's in no way a knock.

Is it for a lack of tactical or technical proficiency, unprofessionalism, being undisciplined, physically unsat or mentally unaware, or in some fashion so indcotrinated in our own ways that we're incapable of learning new tricks of the trade, that we're the only members of a conventional force that can go into another branch and by pass the whole boot camp. Are those same reasons cited as the reason why we're intrusted with the defense of our Nation's forward most Democratic outposts, as Embassy Guards.

I believe our only downfall is being too good, or too eager to do what we do best at times. It feeds into our cocky stigma, of being unable to play well with others, just as sure as I'm inserting a foot in mouth with this rant of sorts.

We are rough around the edges, we break and smash and do whatever we need to, to accomplis the mission. My worry now is, how do we tone that down, and still remain effective in such a new role. Most of you might go as far as agreeing, that, we're good at what we do, because of our diregard for those in the way of the goal. Be that as it may, we get things done, for that reason alone, because we take out all the other nonsense in the equation.

So, how do you take a force, and members of that force, who were indoctrinated to opereate at such a level and thinking, and re-train them to think as some of you do?

I believe that is the real issue and question at hand, and if that's answered at an unbiased level then we should see great things from these men, and they will prove themselves just as you men have.

I hope there's a good ending to this, because, ultimately we're all on the same team in the end. We just play differently.

Again, I have nothing but admiration for you, QP's, and wish you all the safest of times.

Jack Moroney (RIP)
11-10-2007, 20:25
Gentleman times.

Well that about sums it up completely. Thank you for making your point and substantiating ours.:D

CosaNostraUSMC
11-10-2007, 20:40
The Colonel is right.

It isn't just about the training.

You have to be able to live and breathe FID.

How many of these SOF Imperatives does your average MARSOC guy do on a regular basis:

Understand the operational environment
Recognize political implications
Facilitate interagency activities
Engage the threat discriminately
Consider long-term effects
Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations
Anticipate and control psychological effects
Apply capabilities indirectly
Develop multiple options
Ensure long-term sustainment
Provide sufficient intelligence
Balance security and synchronization

Look at some of the political discussions here, particularly about host nation relations. Most of it is at a fairly senior grad school or even State Department level of thinking.

I think that the selection, maturity, intelligence, and experience of the average SF NCO makes a big difference.

But what do I know?

TR

I understand what you're saying, 100%, and you have the credentials and expeience to make those statements, there's no doubt about that.

How much of the subject matter at hand, did you have knowledge of, in your pre-SF days, as compared to after you graduated the Q Course?

Let's take it a bit further.

How much how much of the subject matter at hand, did you have knowledge of after graduating the Q course, as compared to today?

Learning is an evoloutionary process, is it not? On going, right? So at best we're always more intelligent at the end of a process or time period.

I've never been through your pipeline or the Q course. My take on it is this, if I may be so bold...

The pipeline/Q course strikes me as a path, to learning and comprehension of all the things that you mentioned above. It'structure, regimen, and cadre are all with purpose. To facilitate the selection and teaching of what you folks know, unto others who've proven similar traits and qualities.

1980: take a person, subject him to the full gambit of your course, he passes and goes on to operate for a few decades, thus building on the base that you've provided him and becoming ever more valuable, he will reach his "PEAK WORTH" operationally at the end of his career, right? Given everything he's seen and done in those decades. But, given the formula that you folks have established at your course, I would say that you can and do replicate these results, correct?

So, at best, the guy who went through in era "A" is better adept the subject matter, than the guy who went through in era "B", simply because he's been in the field longer; thus his continuing education of the subject at hand.

The revolving door of knowledge, type thing.

My thing is this, who's to say, that, with time the MARSOC guys will not understand what you understand...IF...they are trained as you were and operated at that level to continue their training?
As I see it, training at any level, for anything, never ceases if one is to be outstanding in his trade.

Again, not knocking anyone here, just trying to say that if we compare, arrows to arrows, or anchors to anchors, in a controlled environment, which I think military training is to a point, then the results will be the same over time.

The only difference IS time in that case, and time will tell.

Pops told me once, "Everything comes out in the wash".:munchin

Max_Tab
11-11-2007, 03:31
I understand what you're saying, 100%, and you have the credentials and expeience to make those statements, there's no doubt about that.

How much of the subject matter at hand, did you have knowledge of, in your pre-SF days, as compared to after you graduated the Q Course?

Let's take it a bit further.

How much how much of the subject matter at hand, did you have knowledge of after graduating the Q course, as compared to today?

Learning is an evoloutionary process, is it not? On going, right? So at best we're always more intelligent at the end of a process or time period.

I've never been through your pipeline or the Q course. My take on it is this, if I may be so bold...

The pipeline/Q course strikes me as a path, to learning and comprehension of all the things that you mentioned above. It'structure, regimen, and cadre are all with purpose. To facilitate the selection and teaching of what you folks know, unto others who've proven similar traits and qualities.

1980: take a person, subject him to the full gambit of your course, he passes and goes on to operate for a few decades, thus building on the base that you've provided him and becoming ever more valuable, he will reach his "PEAK WORTH" operationally at the end of his career, right? Given everything he's seen and done in those decades. But, given the formula that you folks have established at your course, I would say that you can and do replicate these results, correct?

So, at best, the guy who went through in era "A" is better adept the subject matter, than the guy who went through in era "B", simply because he's been in the field longer; thus his continuing education of the subject at hand.

The revolving door of knowledge, type thing.

My thing is this, who's to say, that, with time the MARSOC guys will not understand what you understand...IF...they are trained as you were and operated at that level to continue their training?
As I see it, training at any level, for anything, never ceases if one is to be outstanding in his trade.

Again, not knocking anyone here, just trying to say that if we compare, arrows to arrows, or anchors to anchors, in a controlled environment, which I think military training is to a point, then the results will be the same over time.

The only difference IS time in that case, and time will tell.

Pops told me once, "Everything comes out in the wash".:munchin


You stated it perfectly, and that's the problem most of us see with the MARSOF program. There is no long term learning. I guy is in the unit for 3-4 years, than he leaves. In 3-4 year's your just beginning to realize how much you don't know.

Just my .02

Pete S
11-11-2007, 04:41
You stated it perfectly, and that's the problem most of us see with the MARSOF program. There is no long term learning. I guy is in the unit for 3-4 years, than he leaves. In 3-4 year's your just beginning to realize how much you don't know.

Just my .02

Its not only MARSOC, it a pretty standard practice in the Marines. There's quite a bit of moving around from unit to unit, especially in the Staff NCO's ranks.

I thought that MARSOC was exempt from this because they were considered a critical MOS, similar in practice to EOD.

CosaNostraUSMC
11-11-2007, 11:55
MAXTAB: Roger that.

Its not only MARSOC, it a pretty standard practice in the Marines. There's quite a bit of moving around from unit to unit, especially in the Staff NCO's ranks.

I thought that MARSOC was exempt from this because they were considered a critical MOS, similar in practice to EOD.

PETE: It is a true problem. Marine Corps is already a small force as is. When you look at, first...second...third reenlistments, you see how competitive it really gets. First re-up is easy peasy. Second, a little less your choice. Third is almost by invitation only. SNCO rank is predominately, a billet position, within the Corps. If there isn't a job for you, you aren't getting promoted, thus you're either voluntold to EAS or denied a re-up.

At the stage of E-6 and up, you're almost guaranteed a ticket to a new MOS, let alone a new Unit. SNCO is a grooming rank, where the Corps begins to look more at, it's needs, as opposed to your wants. I think if one stays in for that amount of time though, you're wants are really the Corps' needs though.

I misunderstood what TR was saying, and I understand most QPs thought on this topic now. We all agree, that, this internal-turnover rate, is dangerously counterproductive to the Corps and any type of SOF mission.

I know that this is an issue, that, the Corps is trying to address currently. My younger brother is approaching EAS. Having come off his last combat tour, he's ready to seperate. This is a trend the Corps is feeling the effects from. The monitor offered him and the other NCOs, a re-up deal that was QUITE nice; 72k lump sum re-up bonus, choice of duty station and 3 year non-deployable status, must remain in your MOS for that time. The recruitment and retention officer told them, that, the Corps is feeling the effects of it's current leadership i.e.; SNCOs, who's only combat experience was Desert Storm...4 days....which pails in comparrison to what the Non-NCOs of OIF/OEF saw in their first 4 years.

The Corps realizes, that, these young men have seen alot of shit in 2, 3, and 4 tours...and that shit is invaluable real time experience, which you can't teach anyone and can only be learned the hard way. So, they want to keep as many of them around and around for a while, hence the non-deployment clause (don't re-up something of value simply to deploy it and risk it's demise), and groom it's future leadership with guys that have such experience.

I don't know, if they're doing this for MARSOC types or not, I hope they are. Either way, I think this new trend of thinking will surely trickle over to the MARSOC side of the house.

Who knows, maybe MARSOC will evaporate, back into the Corps, all together,

Just as Marine Recon has done, time and time again, in the past.

Seems as if, it's a constant numbers game, and as I stated before; a Commendants pension for boredum.