Stryker

[NousDefionsDoc]

http://www.strategypage.com/gallery/articles/military_photos_2004101123.asp
Check it out

[gits]

NDD The link did not work for me would this be the picture you were trying to link?
http://www.strategypage.com/gallery/articles/military_photos_2004101123.asp

I think your link has a bad URL

[NousDefionsDoc]

Works fine for me, you sure you were holding your mouth right when you clicked on it?

[aricbcool]

What was that? Air-drop mishap? --Aric

[gits]

Wierd... I had my cursor over the url and it showed it as. http://www.strategypage.com/gallery..._2004101123.asp instead of the
strategypage.com/gallery/articles/military_photos_2004101123.asp at the end.

My computer must be playing tricks on me. :eek:

[Hooahman]

I can see it now. I am gonna have to put a band-aid on it for you T. while were going through the Q Lol!!! :lifter :D (TAKE CARE OF THOSE FEET!!!!!) j/k

Thank god that Stryker got 'em all home!!! Hooah!!!!





JB

[uboat509]

I was on another site recently and I read that they have added some type of new armor to the Styker that makes to large to fit into a C130. If that is true then it will be a big problem for the program. If it doesn't fit in the C130 then it does not have the rapid deployment capability that they wanted it for. Has anybody here heard anything about this?

SFC W

[Brother Rat]

What was that? Air-drop mishap? --Aric

Vehicle-Borne IED.

[rubberneck]

I don't really know much about the striker but it seems to me that in order to survive and blast like that it ought to be one tough vehicle. I remember the strikers detractors being highly critical of its survivabilty. I guess stories like this can lay that one to rest.

[sf11b_p]

I guess stories like this can lay that one to rest.

Not if it only survived the blast. Direct hits by anti-armor rounds are a little different from a blast wave, even though it looks like the vehicle took a wallop. An immovable object taking the force of the blast may have been damaged far worse, but the Stryker was moving at 60 mph and rolled by the blast. If you stand back against a wall and take a punch the effect on you is worse than if you'd had a chance to move away from the blow.

The added armor is fitted after arrival. The cage you see in the photo is also added after arrival, something like reactive armor it's supposed to force the explosion of an RPG before it contacts the vehicle.

There's a number of things that have to be done to a Stryker after it rolls off an aircraft and before it's ready to fight.

[NousDefionsDoc]

My understanding is that it will fit in a C130, but it has to be stripped down.

Is the C 130 now the largest A/C in the inventory for RDF?

http://www.strategypage.com/the_war_in_iraq/weapons/20054520.asp

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002232359_stryker06.html

[sf11b_p]

There's a number of issues with airlifting the Stryker, C-130 has the most problems, it can carry one Stryker-. From memory it has to have the remote viewer for the external gun lowered and stowed, the tires had to be deflated some (vehicle too tall), the gun has to be removed, it can't have full fuel, cant be in the same aircraft with it's full crew, spare tire/s, armor, crew baggage, or ammunition load due wieght restrictions for the C-130 to take off. For long flights the C-130 has to be fueled soon after take-off.

There's the C-17s, C-141s and C-5s but to lift one of the Stryker Battalions I remember there's a problem with the number of aircraft required vs available for an RDF lift, I'd have to find the articles again for those details.

There's a big argument the M113 Gavins could have done the job better and cheaper and the Gavins were air-drop capable. There are modifications that make M113s faster and quieter.

The Stryker was done on another forum is why I commented.

CALL report Stryker Brigade CT 1
http://www.pogo.org/m/dp/dp-StrykerBrigade-12212004.pdf

But hey I was all about the M-151s until I drove a HMMV. It just seems for a interim light armor vehicle the modifications needed to make Stryker capable of what it was supposed to be on 0-day will be completed about the same time as it's projected replacement.

[uboat509]

I used to be in the 2ACR back in the early days of the light cav concept. We were told that the light cav concept was General Sulivan's baby and it was extremley unpopular in the armor community (naturaly) and we were told to expect that after he retired we would either be transfered back to heavy cav or outright disbanded. Back then everything was about C130s and in fact our primary mission was supposed to be airland after an airfield siezure and expand the lodgement. Just after I left there in '95 they deployed to Haiti and apparently some people higher up were impressed with how much cheaper, easier and faster it was to deploy couple of Squadrons of HMMWVs vs. a squadron of tanks and bradlys this saving the light cav concept, or so I have been told. My point is that even back then they were searching for a replacement for the HMMWV that would have greater crew protection but still maintain the HMMWVs rapid deployability. The thing about the HMMWV is that we could role right off the bird and straight into the fight. I believe that that was the capability that the infanty community was hoping to to give to the light infantry units when they started the Stryker program. If that is the goal then they have missed the mark. Yes, the Styker provides better crew protection than the HMMWV but that was not the point. How long does it take from when it hits the ground until it is ready to go into the fight? What type of equipment, facilities and personnel are needed to get it ready? There is no question that the Stryker has performed well in Iraq but I wonder how well it would perform in its designated role as an RDF into an area where there is not time, personnel or facilties to get it ready.
I'll get off my box now.

SFC W

[AmericanPride]

My understanding is that it will fit in a C130, but it has to be stripped down.


This is correct, I left 1/25th a little over a year ago. We had many problems with them (most of which are not written about in all the fantastic write-ups). The good majority of the men don't care for the vehicles, but some do (mostly the die hard mech guys).

sf11b p- you are also correct, the vehicle isn't close to combat ready when it hits the ground due to the reasons you stated. The only exception being you dont deflate the tires, they are on a hydraulic type set up and the vehicle has to be completely lowered.

I don't care much for due to those facts AND the fact that I feel helpless riding around inside a tin can(and a number of other reasons I wont ramble and list on here), and the enemy is only stupid for so long when they realize that the soldiers WILL come out of the back ramp. I lost one of my best friends from back at Lewis due to this very reason. They just waited for him to come out the back door.

AP

[24601]

From what they guys have said after they got back from Lewis, a lot has changed in a year.

[Archangel]

WOW! Glad the troops survived with just some ringing in the ears. :eek:

[The Reaper]

My understanding is that it will fit in a C130, but it has to be stripped down.

Is the C 130 now the largest A/C in the inventory for RDF?



Don't you get it?

The Army has to design its weapons systems around 50 year old USAF cargo plane designs and limitations.

No chance of them spending money on a new Tac Lift bird when they need 200 or so fighters to defeat whatever is on the enemy's horizon.

Don't expect an A-10 replacement either, unless it can dogfight and do air superiority and deep strike as well.

TR

[Roguish Lawyer]

Don't you get it?

The Army has to design its weapons systems around 50 year old USAF cargo plane designs and limitations.

No chance of them spending money on a new Tac Lift bird when they need 200 or so fighters to defeat whatever is on the enemy's horizon.

Don't expect an A-10 replacement either, unless it can dogfight and do air superiority and deep strike as well.

TR

Would you like us to get a new tac lift bird and an A-10 replacement?

[The Reaper]

Would you like us to get a new tac lift bird and an A-10 replacement?

Did I not make that clear?

I would also mention that they should be higher priority, are far cheaper, and both are currently older (A-10 selected in 1973, production ended in 1984; C-130 A-10 selected in 1954, production continues) than the F-15/16s that are being replaced by the F-22.

TR

[Roguish Lawyer]

Did I not make that clear?

I would also mention that they should be higher priority, are far cheaper, and both are currently older (A-10 selected in 1973, production ended in 1984; C-130 A-10 selected in 1954, production continues) than the F-15/16s that are being replaced by the F-22.

TR

I think I understand who is against this, but who is promoting the idea and why aren't they succeeding? Seems like now is a good time to pursue it. I would think Rumsfeld would go for it too . . . :munchin

[The Reaper]

I think I understand who is against this, but who is promoting the idea and why aren't they succeeding? Seems like now is a good time to pursue it. I would think Rumsfeld would go for it too . . . :munchin

AF leadership (almost all fighter jocks), the military aircraft manufacturers, and the elected representatives who benefit from the hugely expensive projects like the F-22.

It is being built because the Russians built the Su-35, and we will build the F-22, then they will build something better, ad nauseum.

TR

[jon448]

I think I understand who is against this, but who is promoting the idea and why aren't they succeeding? Seems like now is a good time to pursue it. I would think Rumsfeld would go for it too . . . :munchin
RL,
From what I've read it is mostly the defense contractors who want the newer fighters or all of the new useless technology because they cost a hell of a lot more to develop and produce then some new lifter and a new close air support aircraft. They hire the right lobbiests(sp?) who tell various congressmen oh if you don't support this project then your state/discrict is going to lose jobs. And what real congressman cares if the actual project will be put to good use or is even needed when it could cost him his job because of an economic downturn in his area.

[Roguish Lawyer]

AF leadership (almost all fighter jocks), the military aircraft manufacturers, and the elected representatives who benefit from the hugely expensive projects like the F-22.

It is being built because the Russians built the Su-35, and we will build the F-22, then they will build something better, ad nauseum.

TR

But who is on your side and why aren't they striking the iron while it's hot?

[The Reaper]

But who is on your side and why aren't they striking the iron while it's hot?

I am sure that they are pressing, and the AF is saying that this is an atypical mission, all future wars will be decided by air power.

Quiz questions.

1. What did Sec Def do during his stint in the service?

2. Who is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

3. Where is the Sec Army and how long has he been on the job? Who had the position before him?

4. How often have you seen Sec Army or Chief of Staff, Army with the SecDef?

Not going to open the debate here, but look up Scott Peters' article from yesterday. I do not want to post it here.

TR

[Roguish Lawyer]

1. What did Sec Def do during his stint in the service?

Mr. Rumsfeld attended Princeton University on academic and NROTC scholarships (A.B., 1954) and served in the U.S. Navy (1954-57) as an aviator and flight instructor. In 1957, he transferred to the Ready Reserve and continued his Naval service in flying and administrative assignments as a drilling reservist until 1975. He transferred to the Standby Reserve when he became Secretary of Defense in 1975 and to the Retired Reserve with the rank of Captain in 1989.

http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/rumsfeld.html


2. Who is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs??

Gen. Richard B. Myers

http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/chairman.html


3. Where is the Sec Army and how long has he been on the job? Who had the position before him? ?

Oooh, nice trick question.

http://www.army.mil/leaders/Secarmy/Secarmy.htm

Francis Harvey, card-carrying member of the Military-Industrial Complex

http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/sa/biography.html

The majority of Secretary Harvey’s career has been spent with corporations that provided products and services to the federal government, particularly the Department of Defense, and included a year of Government Service. He has been involved in over 20 major defense programs across the entire spectrum from undersea to outer space, including tanks, missiles, submarines, surface ships, aircraft and satellites. In addition, he was a member of the Army Science Board in the late 1990s, traveling to numerous Army installations, and participated in early studies that helped define the Future Combat System. Secretary Harvey also served for one year as a White House Fellow and assistant in the immediate office of the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, in the late 1970s.

Prior to his appointment as the Secretary of the Army, Secretary Harvey held various professional, management and executive positions within the Westinghouse Corporation from 1969 to 1997, including President of the Electronics Systems Group, President of the Government and Environmental Services Company, and Chief Operating Officer of the multi billion dollar Industries and Technology Group. Most recently Secretary Harvey was a Director and Vice Chairman of Duratek, a company specializing in treating radioactive, hazardous, and other wastes, as well as a member of the board of several other corporations.



4. How often have you seen Sec Army or Chief of Staff, Army with the SecDef??

Me, never. But I take from your comment that he is rarely, if ever, seen.


Not going to open the debate here, but look up Scott Peters' article from yesterday. I do not want to post it here.

Continuing to look. Where was it?

[Roguish Lawyer]

I understand your point, but someone should be stepping up on these issues. Rumsfeld seems to be rational, not anti-Army.

Were you unhappy about Crusader?

http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2003/09/01/rumsfeld_army_leaders_in_discord/

Rumsfeld, Army leaders in discord
By Robert Schlesinger, Globe Staff, 9/1/2003

WASHINGTON -- In nearly three years with President Bush as commander in chief, the US Army has led the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the repressive regime in Iraq. But in the halls of the Pentagon, its leaders are losing bitter battles to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld that have broad implications for national security and the future of the nation's half-million soldiers.

Rumsfeld and the Army leadership have clashed on issues ranging from the number of troops in Iraq to the size of the overall force needed to defend America.

Rumsfeld's critics say the skirmishing is taking a toll on the Army, with casualties that include the loss of a prized weapons system last year, the resignation of Army Secretary Thomas White last spring, and, in recent weeks, the retirement of four top generals, with more expected in the coming months.

"You look at Rumsfeld, and beyond all the rationale, spoken and unspoken, he just dislikes the Army. It's just palpable. . . . You always have to wonder if when Rumsfeld was a Navy lieutenant junior grade whether an Army officer stole his girlfriend," said Ralph Peters, a former Army intelligence officer who writes on national security issues.

But other military specialists applaud Rumsfeld's willingness to challenge a staid Army bureaucracy. "The sense that the Army is being made to feel uncomfortable about its future role in war and being made to justify how land power is used, I think that's a good thing," said James Carafano, a retired Army lieutenant colonel now with the conservative Heritage Foundation.

To fix the problems he sees, Rumsfeld has tapped Air Force Secretary James G. Roche, a self-described "loud, boisterous, funny, in your face" former naval officer, as the next secretary of the Army. If the Senate confirms Roche this month, he will bring a military outlook in sync with Rumsfeld. But he also has clashed with Rumsfeld, and could become the kind of ally the Army needs to end the feud.

Either way, Roche has a chasm to bridge. One retired Army general, speaking on condition of anonymity, said he often hears Rumsfeld compared with Vietnam-era Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, a former auto industry executive who was similarly intent on imposing his own stamp on the military bureaucracy.

"I widely hear the comparison to McNamara, normally with the caveat that he's much worse than McNamara," the general said.

The rupture between Rumsfeld and his top Army generals stems from a combustible combination of clashing personalities and policy differences. The early battle lines were drawn over Crusader, an $11 billion mobile artillery system that Rumsfeld and his allies argued was suited for pounding Soviet armor on the plains of Germany during the Cold War era, but not fighting 21st-century terrorists and guerrilla forces.

In the spring of 2002, the Army rallied its congressional allies in a highly public fight that culminated with Rumsfeld killing the program. Rumsfeld has pushed the armed forces to be able to deploy and move quickly to strike targets of opportunity.

The speed vs. power trade-off surfaced during planning for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, when Army officials argued in favor of battle plans emphasizing heavy armor moving inexorably to victory. Rumsfeld insisted on plans that focused on speed as force, accentuating joint operations where, for example, close air support in many places replaced artillery barrages.

The frictions were exacerbated by personality differences. Rumsfeld places a premium on loyalty, which made the Army's apparent end-run attempt on Crusader all the more damaging. But close observers remain puzzled why Rumsfeld and Eric K. Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, clashed; dating to the Clinton administration, Shinseki, despite resistance from his service, made transformation the hallmark of his tenure.

Nevertheless, when Shinseki testified earlier this year before a congressional panel that securing postwar Iraq would require hundreds of thousands of troops, Pentagon leaders publicly called his estimate "wildly off the mark." The absence of anyone from the Office of the Secretary of Defense at Shinseki's June retirement was widely noticed.

Most recently, a handful of Army three-star generals retired, prompting speculation that Rumsfeld was conducting a purge.

"It's a major purge. Blood is flowing out of the Pentagon," said David Hackworth, a retired Army colonel who writes a syndicated column.

An Army spokesman said that the retirements were not unusual and that 13 three-star generals are expected to retire this year.

The truth appears to lie in the middle. "This is not a large number of generals to be retiring," said Loren Thompson, a defense specialist at the libertarian Lexington Institute. "However, it is striking how many of them are out of the weapons purchasing part of the bureaucracy. Either by design or by coincidence, that means that when the Army gets a new secretary there will be very few people in senior positions who have a sense of ownership of the weapons programs."

But the reaction illustrates the antagonism toward Rumsfeld.

Ironically, the low expectations could help Roche. "You lead by being inclusive," Roche said in a recent interview.

Those who have worked with Roche in his career -- 23 years in the Navy, a brief stint as a Democratic staff member on Capitol Hill, 18 years at Northrop Grumman -- say he is suited for the Army job. They say his style involves intellectual rigor and intense questioning, but also applying an open mind and a willingness to make a service's case if it is legitimate.

At Northrop Grumman, Roche opposed building Lockheed's F/A-22 in favor of ordering more Northrop-built B-2 bombers. Last year, when word spread that Rumsfeld's lieutenants were targeting the F/A-22 for cancellation, Roche went to see Rumsfeld and, according to sources familiar with the meeting, delivered an audacious message: Tell me if the fix is in, Roche said, and I'll salute smartly and follow orders -- but if I think it's a bad decision I'll quit.

Roche had gone several rounds with his own staff, rejecting and refining arguments to save the fighter until he had a case he felt was intellectually defensible to make before Rumsfeld. In the end, Roche won the argument: The F/A-22 program continues.

Roche declined to comment on the story, but said: "I agree with a number of Don's rules. One is if no one's yelling at you and if you're not in trouble with somebody, then you're not doing your job. And the other is be prepared to go home on any given day."

Rumsfeld is reputed to be close-minded, but many defense specialists say his intolerance is limited to people who cannot forcefully back up their arguments. Roche is reputed to be the same way -- but with a wit that is not as caustic as that of Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld "respects push-back, particularly from people who know they've got something to lose," said Thompson. "It's an interesting contrast. . . . The Army secretary never confronted the secretary of defense. The Air Force secretary did. These were both over weapons systems. The Army secretary is long gone and the Air Force secretary is destined to replace him."

[The Reaper]

Review:

1. A pilot.

2. GEN Myers, a pilot.

3. Francis Harvey, card-carrying member of the Military-Industrial Complex, who was appointed after a gap of well-over a year in which the predecessor was sacked, the replacement (former Sec AF, for crissakes) was canned, the interim SecArmy should have gotten the job, but did not, all during a time of war with the Army carrying the burden. Where is the respect?

4. Sec Army is out a lot, as is the CSA. Neither have appeared with SecDef very much, which tells me something. Do you see GEN Myers with SecDef much? Who has his ear?

I like GEN Myers, but do not think he has much of an idea what it is like to live in the dirt and be in ground combat, much of it urban. That means he has little idea what they need.

Pissed over Crusader? Not particularly. Crusader, Commanche, the AGS, and a ton of other Army force mod projects, yes. What major AF program has been canceled lately?

TR

[Roguish Lawyer]

So I guess we haven't eliminated inter-service rivalry as a problem in DOD, eh? ;)

[The Reaper]

So I guess we haven't eliminated inter-service rivalry as a problem in DOD, eh? ;)


More like a problem with parochialism and greed.

TR

[Sacamuelas]

TR-
Forgive my ignorance, but who exactly in the current administration chose to buck the standard general officer system and appoint the current CSA (Gen Peter J. Schoomaker) out of retirement? I thought it was Rumsfeld who valued results and a real world operator experience ahead of politics and standard practice of promoting whoever was 'in line" . I understood that to mean that the current CSA was hand-picked by SecDef and therefore, his opinions important to policy whether or not being seen in public or not.

[The Reaper]

TR-
Forgive my ignorance, but who exactly in the current administration chose to buck the standard general officer system and appoint the current CSA (Gen Peter J. Schoomaker) out of retirement? I thought it was Rumsfeld who valued results and a real world operator experience ahead of politics and standard practice of promoting whoever was 'in line" . I understood that to mean that the current CSA was hand-picked by SecDef and therefore, his opinions important to policy whether or not being seen in public or not.

I personally believe that GEN S was recommended and selected by someone at or above the SecDef level to return to the job due to a lack of candidates who were acceptable to SecDef, or who would accept the job if it were offered.

I think that GEN S walks a fine line with the SecDef between telling the truth when asked, and doing what he is told to do without drama or comment. I have worked for him twice before and feel that he is a good man for the job.

The time comes for us all, however when you must fall on your sword over an issue. I hope that he has that quality when he needs to.

Read MacArthur's account of his battle with FDR over the National Guard.

TR

[Sacamuelas]

I personally believe that GEN S was recommended and selected by someone at or above the SecDef level to return to the job due to a lack of candidates who were acceptable to SecDef, or who would accept the job if it were offered.

TR
Interesting. I had always viewed Rumsfeld as the force behind the reform in the Army.

I assume you would be referring to Vice President Cheney? I doubt the President would have had much personal experience with prior Army leaders that would be strong enough to overrule the momentum of the status quo in the promotion process. Dick Cheney probably has that personal experience necessary to feel confident enough in a selection to put it forth as a policy decision.

Mr. Cheney's experience as SecDef was during Just Cause and Desert Storm time frame(1989 -1993). That would form his working relationship back then with GEN S during that time frame since the current CSA "returned as the Commander, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment - D from June 1989 to July 1992".

Again, interesting point of view that I had not thought about before this. :cool:

[The Reaper]

IIRC, GEN Shinseki was the Commander of the 1st Cav during the Army's 1990s Louisiana Maneuvers and was experienced at digitization and modernization.

He was appointed by the Clinton Administration and initiated the transformation when he was appointed in 1999.

Sec Rumsfeld embraced the transformation (I suspect because of the savings by leaving the heavy force behind and the lessened requirements for movement) and initially supported GEN Shinseki. See ADM Cebrowski.

IMHO, GEN Shinseki lost favor by arguing the war plan for Iraq and fighting for a larger ground force earlier in the deployment schedule. The Crusader fight did not help. He sealed his doom when he truthfully told Congress his best estimate of the requirements for post-war stabilization operations in Iraq. He was canned shortly after that. To my view, GEN Shinseki spoke the truth (when asked) and said that the Emperor had no clothes, and was viewed therefore as not a team-player.

If OIF was to have been won on the cheap, as was Afghanistan, they should have used SOF (SF, really) to arm, train, and organize the resistance forces in Iraq and supported them with air power. Conventional forces should have followed the insurgency and stabilized the country. This would have taken longer, but been less costly and more conducive to post-war stability. The loss of the 4th ID on the Northern Front should have been a show-stopper for the conventional war. We are suffering its aftermath now.

The Army has lost much, gained little, and been shaken to its core by this war. SecDef continued to try to downsize the Army and cancel programs when it was clear that this war would be won by bloodied men standing on dirty ground. He should have gone through the AF Staff in a Night of the Long Knives, canceled major USAF programs, and cut their budget and end strength heavily. The rewards should have gone to the Army and Marines with increased end strength and additional equipment, like uparmored HWWMVs.

I like him as a person, but think he is a member of the military-industrial complex and has bought into the "air power can win wars" program too heavily. He has been willing to employ SOF, and we were rewarded for good results, not necessarily because he likes SOF.

You guys need to do some research and study.

I am not a fan of the Stryker, BTW.

TR

[Trip_Wire (RIP)]

I would have to agree with GEN Shinseki's estimate of troop power needed after the war in Iraq.

I will always bare a dislike for him for taking the Black beret away from the Rangers, especially since we were the first (Korean War) Rangers to wear them, even though not approved by the conventional Army. :mad:

I have mixed emotions on the Stryker vehicle, especially, the fact that it doesn't seem to do all it was designed to do. I'm a fan of the heavy tank myself!

The Marines and South Africa seem to have better luck with their light armored wheeled vehicles. :munchin

[Roguish Lawyer]

You guys need to do some research and study.

Is there a syllabus for this course? :munchin

[Sacamuelas]

http://www.army.mil/cmh/reference/CSAList/CSAList.htm

[Airbornelawyer]

IIRC, GEN Shinseki was the Commander of the 1st Cav during the Army's 1990s Louisiana Maneuvers and was experienced at digitization and modernization.

He was appointed by the Clinton Administration and initiated the transformation when he was appointed in 1999.

Sec Rumsfeld embraced the transformation (I suspect because of the savings by leaving the heavy force behind and the lessened requirements for movement) and initially supported GEN Shinseki. See ADM Cebrowski.

IMHO, GEN Shinseki lost favor by arguing the war plan for Iraq and fighting for a larger ground force earlier in the deployment schedule. The Crusader fight did not help. He sealed his doom when he truthfully told Congress his best estimate of the requirements for post-war stabilization operations in Iraq. He was canned shortly after that. To my view, GEN Shinseki spoke the truth (when asked) and said that the Emperor had no clothes, and was viewed therefore as not a team-player.

If OIF was to have been won on the cheap, as was Afghanistan, they should have used SOF (SF, really) to arm, train, and organize the resistance forces in Iraq and supported them with air power. Conventional forces should have followed the insurgency and stabilized the country. This would have taken longer, but been less costly and more conducive to post-war stability. The loss of the 4th ID on the Northern Front should have been a show-stopper for the conventional war. We are suffering its aftermath now.

The Army has lost much, gained little, and been shaken to its core by this war. SecDef continued to try to downsize the Army and cancel programs when it was clear that this war would be won by bloodied men standing on dirty ground. He should have gone through the AF Staff in a Night of the Long Knives, canceled major USAF programs, and cut their budget and end strength heavily. The rewards should have gone to the Army and Marines with increased end strength and additional equipment, like uparmored HWWMVs.

I like him as a person, but think he is a member of the military-industrial complex and has bought into the "air power can win wars" program too heavily. He has been willing to employ SOF, and we were rewarded for good results, not necessarily because he likes SOF.

You guys need to do some research and study.

I am not a fan of the Stryker, BTW.

TR
I like SOF as much as, if not more, than the next guy, but the essential problem for OIF planning was WMDs. A UW plan would have developed relatively slowly, allowing the Iraqi regime to move to safer places the WMDs everyone believed they had in bulk and in readily deployable condition. "Shock and awe", among other goals, was meant to so destabilize Iraqi command and control that they would have been paralyzed, allowing suspected WMD sites to be rapidly secured (physically or otherwise).

As for the numbers of conventional forces required, actual experience demonstrated that Franks' proposal, which was midway between Rumsfeld's AF-heavy, light-ground option and Shinseki's DS II, worked. A force of about 10-12 brigades accomplished what that many divisions would have been needed to do in 1991. The size of post-invasion occupation forces remains the big bone of contention. I think all actually agreed that a 200,000-300,000-man force would be required, but the Administrationm failed to anticipate (and plan for) the collapse of Iraq's own security forces and the failure of other countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria to contribute to the coalition. Thus US forces, aided by an insufficient number of other coalition forces, were forced to fill a bigger gap until new Iraqi forces had been trained.

Regarding Shinseki, his command of 1CD in 1994-95 probably influenced his thinking, but his role in Bosnia, first in a planning capacity as DCSOPS and then in a command role as COMSFOR, probably played a greater role. The Kosovo CF also contributed. He saw an Army unchallenged on the conventional heavy battlefield and equally powerful at the other end with its light and SOF forces, but lacking anything in between.

At the time, I recall noting that the US had a huge 3-division force "in between" - the USMC - but apparently that wasn't good enough for the Army.

[The Reaper]

Interesting commentary, AL.

We failed to secure any significant stocks of WMD or conventional weapons and munitions on our shock and awe tour, so what did that buy us?

I believe that the failure to bring the war to the the north of Iraq from Turkey, especially in the Sunni triangle, allowed the populace to delude themselves as to what had happened and after Baghdad/Saddam fell, permitted members of the armed forces and Baathist enforcers there to cache their gear, disappear and return to torment us later. The failure to strike them hard and follow up with a presence greater than the airborne and SOF forces permitted the Iraqi forces to melt rather than staying to fight (and die). The reality will never be known though.

I failed to cover the rest of GEN Shinseki's career, but it merely reinforces the point that he was well into transformation before Sec Rumsfeld and RADM Cebrowski arrived.

Your point about the Corps is well made, though a Marine Division is vastly larger and different in organization from an Army Division.

TR

[NousDefionsDoc]

If I understand you correctly Reaper, I agree.

I think we mis-calcuated the schwerpunkt. It wasn't Baghdad. Probably not much we could have done about it, given the Turks wouldn't let us in. But given hindsight and the tribal nature of what came after, the war began when we took Baghdad, which didn't mean as much as we apparently thought at the time.

[CommoGeek]

A couple of points, RE: the USAF:
1) A recent AF Times article, the cover, had some 13 3-stars and above or civilian equivilent that were retiring or had their promotions held up. This came in the wake of Roche's departure. I don't believe in coincidence.

2) Some AF leaders had the benefit of a rabbi in their careers. While this isn't news, consider that even after GW1 and Kosovo there are 4 star AF leaders that didn't fly a single combat sortie in those wars. One, the USAFE CDR didn't get an operational tour until he was a MAJ:
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5435

CENTAF's didn't have an operational tour until he was a CPT but he did fly OV-10's:
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio_print.asp?bioID=4836&page=1

PACAF's CDR had a tour as an A-7 pilot in SEA.
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5789

Vice Chief of the AF, not until he was a MAJ:
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6545

Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, 1 tour/ year prior to making MAJ:
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5812

Commander, Air Education and Training Command (the AF TRADOC), not until a CPT and he had to transfer to B-52's:
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5062

Air and Space Operations, F-4 vet from Vietnam:
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6051

By now you may be wondering, "What is CG's point?" I didn't cherry pick this list, look at the AF senior leadership. Most of them did not have any operational tours until late in their careers. When other pilots were doing the deed, when Army O's were running platoons and companies, when Naval O's were making cruises the current AF leadership was teaching new 2LT's how to fly and those guys were cherries themselves.

I do not think that your leadership is truly in touch with reality when their formative years as flying officers was spent teaching or on a staff somewhere.

Would you trust an infantry MAJ that spent his first 9 years in uniform as an O running Basic Training companies?

http://www.af.mil/library/afchain.asp

[Airbornelawyer]

Interesting commentary, AL.

We failed to secure any significant stocks of WMD or conventional weapons and munitions on our shock and awe tour, so what did that buy us?

I believe that the failure to bring the war to the the north of Iraq from Turkey, especially in the Sunni triangle, allowed the populace to delude themselves as to what had happened and after Baghdad/Saddam fell, permitted members of the armed forces and Baathist enforcers there to cache their gear, disappear and return to torment us later. The failure to strike them hard and follow up with a presence greater than the airborne and SOF forces permitted the Iraqi forces to melt rather than staying to fight (and die). The reality will never be known thoughAs to the first, as you know, hindsight is 20/20. Of course, if Saddam did have stockpiles of WMDs and/or precursors, and those ended up in Syria, then your second observation becomes even more cogent.

As to the second, though, if the question is what operational plan would have been better, the lack of a northern front does not change things. The failure there was political. Had the Turkish parliament approved the deployment of 4ID from the north, the plan would have been implemented along the same principles as GEN Franks applies without the division, only with another axis of advance. It still would have been the middle road strategy Franks preferred, i.e., neither Rumsfeld's airpower/SOF model nor Desert Storm redux.

In terms of forces actually employed, the difference turned out to be less stark: five airborne battalions (2 from the 173rd and 3 from the 82nd) were rushed in to supplement the 4-division force in the south (3ID, 1MEF, 101, 1 UK Armoured). These five airborne battalions obviously were far lighter and less lethal than the 9 maneuver battalions of 4ID, but they did mitigate the loss somewhat (while only 173rd went directly to the north, the brigade from the 82nd went to the so-called Sunni Triangle west of Baghdad and allowed 3ID to move a brigade north of the city to what was to have been 4ID's main objective).

I do agree wholeheartedly on "shock and awe" not being all that shocking. We may have impressed professional military folk with our precision, and destroyed his command and control, but as you note, we failed to crush the enemy's will. Large numbers of Iraqis simply did not perceive themselves as having been defeated, and many Iraqi towns never even saw US forces until well after the fall of Baghdad (1-325 AIR did not arrive in Fallujah until mid-April 2003, about a week after the fall of Saddam's statue in Firdos Square). However, it is fair to say the Iraqi Army was well and truly shocked and awed. Most simply stayed in garrison or melted away, with only a few Army and RG units actually standing up and fighting (the SRG and paramilitaries, by contrast, did fight, but suicide charges against armor proved to be a less than optimal use of resources).

[The Reaper]

AL:

I know that you already are aware of this, but other than firepower, what is the primary difference between light and heavy forces once on the ground in the AOR?

What could the 4th ID have done that the 173rd could not?

TR

[Airbornelawyer]

AL:

I know that you already are aware of this, but other than firepower, what is the primary difference between light and heavy forces once on the ground in the AOR?

What could the 4th ID have done that the 173rd could not?

TRFrankly, what 4ID could do that the 3rd Herd couldn't could fill volumes. 4ID is the most capable division in the Army. I didn't mean to suggest that the 173rd (and 2 BDE/82 ABN) made up for the loss of 4ID in the north, only that they ameliorated somewhat an otherwise bad situation.

In any event, 173rd's AOR was not what would have been 4ID's. As I understand it, 4ID's main role would have been to cross at the Habur border crossing and drive down Highway 2 to Mosul, bypassing the city to get on Highway 1 for the drive down through Salah-ad-Din province to the Sunni heartland north of Baghdad (the Bayji-Tikrit-Samarra-Balad-Baghdad corridor). They also would likely have relieved 3-75 at Haditha Dam (a straight shot down Highway 19 from Bayji). The 173rd would have been attached to 4ID. All of the Iraqi forces (I Corps and V Corps) on the Green Line bordering Iraqi Kurdistan would simply have been bypassed, except the 16th Infantry Division in the way north of Mosul, which would have been sliced through.

Without 4ID, 173rd was OPCON'd to CFSOCC (was this the first time a JSOTF commanded an infantry brigade?). They dropped or landed at Bashur AB on Highway 3 and moved southwest to Irbil. Their operations appear to mainly have been, first, to secure Highway 2 west to Mosul and south to Kirkuk, and then to secure the oil fields and airbases near Kirkuk. They also supported SF in attacking the camps of Ansar al-Islam. They were augmented with a small amount of the heavy stuff (TF 1-63rd Armor with C/1-63 AR's Abrams and B/2-2 IN's Bradleys), but not enough to conduct serious heavy operations. SOF and the peshmerga didn't have armor, either (a contrast, BTW, with Afghanistan: while the popular image is of SF and Afghans on horseback, the Northern Alliance had armor, artillery and motorized infantry as well).

Other than recon, I don't think the 173rd ventured down to Highway 1 during the major combat operations phase. The regular army troops of I Corps and V Corps just melted away, while the Republican Guard either deployed south to Baghdad or got crushed in a badly executed counterattack on Kirkuk.

With 4ID driving south, Salah-ad-Din province would have seen some heavier fighting, and places that became insurgent hotbeds like Samarra and Bayji might have had a different outlook on life. I'm not sure if the other axis - west from Baghdad to Fallujah and Ramadi - would have been affected the same way, but generally many more in the Sunni heartland would have known defeat earlier on.

By the way, do you know the symbolism behind the 4ID patch?

[Airbornelawyer]

If I understand you correctly Reaper, I agree.

I think we mis-calcuated the schwerpunkt. It wasn't Baghdad. Probably not much we could have done about it, given the Turks wouldn't let us in. But given hindsight and the tribal nature of what came after, the war began when we took Baghdad, which didn't mean as much as we apparently thought at the time.To the extent the Schwerpunkt was geographical, I think Baghdad remains it. The failure to quickly establish ourselves to the west and north in the Sunni heartland, either due to lack of forces or miscalculations about the aftermath, doesn't necessarily change that.

Baghdad contains a quarter of Iraq's population and is the central hub of its transportation network. With the exception of Muqtada as-Sadr's occasional Shi'ite militia activity, the insurgency is almost entirely confined to Baghdad and its suburbs and three axes leading from these suburbs - west to Ramadi, NNW to Bayji and Mosul and NNE to Baqubah. If you recall the study last year by that PMC (SOC-SMG), they found that around 40% of all attacks on coalition and Iraqi security forces were in Baghdad alone. If you look beyond Baghdad's governorate border itself, you find that about 75-80% of all attacks were within a 50 mile radius of Baghdad.

On the Shi'ite side, recall that Sadr's main base of support is also in Baghdad, and when he tried to foment an uprising in the predominantly Shi'ite cities of the south, he garnered almost no support and saw his forces crushed by coalition troops.

[odoylerules]

By the way, do you know the symbolism behind the 4ID patch?

The word “Ivy” is a play on the Roman numeral four, IV. Ivy leaves are symbolic of tenacity and fidelity, the basis of the Division’s motto, “Steadfast and Loyal”.

Special thanks to globalsecurity.org.

[jbour13]

I would have to agree with GEN Shinseki's estimate of troop power needed after the war in Iraq.

I will always bare a dislike for him for taking the Black beret away from the Rangers, especially since we were the first (Korean War) Rangers to wear them, even though not approved by the conventional Army. :mad:

I have mixed emotions on the Stryker vehicle, especially, the fact that it doesn't seem to do all it was designed to do. I'm a fan of the heavy tank myself!

The Marines and South Africa seem to have better luck with their light armored wheeled vehicles. :munchin

TW,

I'll agree that the Black Beret was a F***-up on his part. It was a recruiting tool, plain and simple. The initial recruiting videos opened up with the lines of "Elite forces around the world were the beret as a symbol of accomplishment and pride!".

I was told, and have not been able to confirm this, that the original color of the Ranger's headgear was tan. I know that around the '96-'97 timeframe they thought of issuing a beret (of what color, who knows) to all troops. This may not have been Shinseki's idea to start with but did come to fruition under his command. I understand the symbolism of the beret, but I don't see it as a functional uniform item. Not being Ranger qualified and never having worn the scroll I cannot begin to imagine the frustration.

My NCOIC at my last duty assignment was a 2nd Battalion vet from GW1. I listened to his constant rambling about the black beret being issued to soft skillers like myself. He's now a RI at Benning and has finally quit nagging since he has the tan one.

Shinseki had to use the tools available to meet recruiting goals, I just see it as wrong to use your neighbors tools without returning the favor or acknowledging it's significance.

[TF Kilo]

The stryker isn't God's gift to the infantry, but it's a decent vehicle with serious survivability.

I think they could have done something better. I think they could get more airlift aircraft or newer more powerful longer range stuff instead of new fighters. Air superiority is big, yes, but what countries that are a threat have an airforce that can handle what we have RIGHT NOW?


Getting boots on the ground wins wars, not bombing into the stone age. Cavemen live in caves and you have to go knocking on their door to clear them out... I remember something I was a part of that proved boots on the ground was a better answer than a smart bomb th AF said could knock out the facility..

We went, got the toys, left with them and demolished the facility.

The air force and their 2000lb smart bomb... missed.

Nuff said :)

[Airbornelawyer]

The word “Ivy” is a play on the Roman numeral four, IV. Ivy leaves are symbolic of tenacity and fidelity, the basis of the Division’s motto, “Steadfast and Loyal”.

Special thanks to globalsecurity.org.
Oh, that's the official story...


The real symbolism? Four lieutenants pointing north.

[Trip_Wire (RIP)]

[QUOTE=jbour13]TW,

I was told, and have not been able to confirm this, that the original color of the Ranger's headgear was tan. I know that around the '96-'97 timeframe they thought of issuing a beret (of what color, who knows) to all troops. This may not have been Shinseki's idea to start with but did come to fruition under his command. I understand the symbolism of the beret, but I don't see it as a functional uniform item. Not being Ranger qualified and never having worn the scroll I cannot begin to imagine the frustration.

I'll agree with the fact that the beret is sort of usless in the field, but given the choice, I'm sure most Rangers would gladly take the Black one back and give the Army at large their Tan one.

As I stated in my message, we (Korean War Airborne Rangers) were the first to wear the black beret as Rangers. We were also the first AIRBORNE Rangers. WWII Ranger BNs were not airborne troops.

I'm not aware of any Rangers in WW II wearing a tan beret or any other color ; however, if they were to wear one it most likely be a Green one, based on their training with British Commandos, etc. (I thought that I heard somewhere, that the 1st Ranger BN were authorized by the Brits to wear the Commando beret; however, it wasn't authorized by the US Army or COL Darby.)

I have never heard of the Rangers wearing a Tan beret, until the last fiasco with Gen. Shinseki. I doubt, that British SAS is real happy about the Tan Beret for Rangers. :munchin