Marines to Take Over Responsibilities For Training Foreign Forces

[NousDefionsDoc]

From Small Wars Journal

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/apr/sb-marines_to.htm

April 2005

Marines to Take Over Responsibilities For Training Foreign Forces

by Sandra I. Erwin

The Marine Corps will set up a specialized unit dedicated to training foreign troops. The unit—scheduled to begin operations on October 1—will be staffed by up to 400 Marines. It will supplement the training program that had been solely the responsibility of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

By creating this unit, the Marine Corps assumes a permanent role in the training of foreign troops. Previously, Marines had done this on an ad hoc basis. They helped train, for example, military forces in Georgia, Chad and Niger, noted Gen. Michael W. Hagee, commandant of the Marine Corps.

SOCOM sought help from the Marine Corps in this area, Hagee told reporters. The decision to invest in a permanent training unit further recognizes that U.S. forces ultimately benefit from working more closely with foreign troops, Hagee said.

“We believe that this is one of the most important things to do,” he said. “People usually think of special operations forces as the ‘high-end’ operations.” But improving the training of friendly foreign troops eventually could pay off by preventing U.S. military involvement, Hagee suggested. “If we can do much better in ‘phase zero,’ better prepare foreign militaries to handle their own situations, maybe we won’t have to do phases one, two and three.”

The Marines in the training unit will serve in rotations, with the expectation that they will spread their knowledge throughout the Corps when they return to the operational force, Hagee said.

“We never had a unit stood up and devoted to this,” he said. “We think it will help throughout the Marine Corps. Individuals will rotate in and out, and will increase intelligence and knowledge of foreign cultures throughout the Marine Corps.”

The training unit will be based on the East Coast, although the specific location has not yet been determined.

[D9 (RIP)]

There was an article by Robert Kaplan in last month's Atlantic Monthly (link to article preview here (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200504/kaplan)) covering a group of Marines doing FID work in Niger. I wondered at the time whether this was the tip of an iceberg. Apparently so.

Whatever the reasons for this, or the changes it portends in the SOF community, I'm sure the Marines will put their best foot forward. Maybe this will finally be a shoe in for the USMC into a solid role with the SOF community, and at the same time free up some other SOF units for other things.

[Jack Moroney (RIP)]

Whatever the reasons for this, or the changes it portends in the SOF community, I'm sure the Marines will put their best foot forward. Maybe this will finally be a shoe in for the USMC into a solid role with the SOF community, and at the same time free up some other SOF units for other things.

While I am sure that the USMC will do a good job and has done this before, do not assume that this is a SOF mission. Not all trainers or training missions are created equal. This does not mean that the USMC will be doing UW work nor does it mean that they are heavily involved in FID in the classic definition as SF sees or executes the mission. I doubt very seriously that a 400 man unit will be area oriented, culturally prepared or language qualified to the same degree as SF units are for their target countries. Now that is not to say that all SF MTTs/Training missions fall or fell into that category either, but that was a problem with lack of command focus and proper utilization of the force. The fact is that SF are the best trainers in the community and have been used to train everything from ROTC to SWAT teams in what I would consider to be missions not best suited for their talents. The fact of the matter is that while SF units may still be the best to perform these missions and especially in a global scout role to prepare future battlefields and space there are just to few of them and other missions are taking higher priority right now.

Jack Moroney

[Petelink]

This seems like a very overdue extension to the administration's foreign policy. The best way to spread stability and democracy to unstable nations is to engage them. It's always seemed strange to me that this was not a bigger priority throughout the conventional military. It might even make foreign governments more comfortable to host conventional units versus special operations forces.

[NousDefionsDoc]

This seems like a very overdue extension to the administration's foreign policy. The best way to spread stability and democracy to unstable nations is to engage them. It's always seemed strange to me that this was not a bigger priority throughout the conventional military. It might even make foreign governments more comfortable to host conventional units versus special operations forces.
What?

[Peregrino]

Some of us in 7th Gp (edit - with 7th Gp backgrounds, got to remember I'm retired now) still remember the experiments using RA drill instructors in El Salvador. :( Personally, I'm sure the Marines will be more successful. After all, they've got an illustrious history of meeting their challenges (and the drive not to let that heritage down!). Time to dust off the Haiti and Nicaragua AARs from the 30's. This is one time I'm glad there's somebody of quality to step up to the plate and grab a share of the pie. It's not like there isn't enough to go around. FWIW - Peregrino

[NousDefionsDoc]

I have a mixed opinion about this, mostly because of something I saw years ago. In my opinion, and it is just that, the very thing that makes the USMC the USMC also gets them in trouble at times and can be a HUGE pain in the ass for the rest of the Spec Ops Community. The Marine leadership has been known to make claims regarding this type of work on The Hill. And usually immediately after, the community has to go through (again) the process of "proving" to the meddlers with the checkbooks that every round peg is indeed in their own little round hole.

Everybody thinks they can do FID. After all and as in so many things, the omote appears to be very simple. You have skills, just go impart them. And as in so many things, they never truly understand the ura - they don't even know it is there. They don't understand that it has taken 60 years and thousands of little lessons learned and mistakes and lives to make it look "easy". SF wasn't given the little round hole of FID - SF carved that hole with its teeth.

Now there are scenarios that one may look at and say, "Well, we don't need SF troops to do that." Anybody can teach these guys how to march, BRM, etc. But experience has shown otherwise. I will not name the specifics I saw during my time so as not to start a pissing contest with those of other units or services.

The operational tempo waxes and wains. This will open a Pandora's Box of claims and justifying down the road on the next wain. And USASOC will likely lose a pound of flesh because they allowed copies to be made of the keys to that door. Lessons already learned will have to be re-learned and at the end of the day, nothing will have changed.

[Trip_Wire (RIP)]

I have a mixed opinion about this, mostly because of something I saw years ago. In my opinion, and it is just that, the very thing that makes the USMC the USMC also gets them in trouble at times and can be a HUGE pain in the ass for the rest of the Spec Ops Community. The Marine leadership has been known to make claims regarding this type of work on The Hill. And usually immediately after, the community has to go through (again) the process of "proving" to the meddlers with the checkbooks that every round peg is indeed in their own little round hole.

Everybody thinks they can do FID. After all and as in so many things, the omote appears to be very simple. You have skills, just go impart them. And as in so many things, they never truly understand the ura - they don't even know it is there. They don't understand that it has taken 60 years and thousands of little lessons learned and mistakes and lives to make it look "easy". SF wasn't given the little round hole of FID - SF carved that hole with its teeth.

Now there are scenarios that one may look at and say, "Well, we don't need SF troops to do that." Anybody can teach these guys how to march, BRM, etc. But experience has shown otherwise. I will not name the specifics I saw during my time so as not to start a pissing contest with those of other units or services.

The operational tempo waxes and wains. This will open a Pandora's Box of claims and justifying down the road on the next wain. And USASOC will likely lose a pound of flesh because they allowed copies to be made of the keys to that door. Lessons already learned will have to be re-learned and at the end of the day, nothing will have changed.

I agree with what you said here. :munchin :munchin

[The Reaper]

Agree with NDD.

I was at Special Forces Command when the Air Force stood up a "FID Squadron".

First thing they did was to pass a tasker down through USSOCOM tasking SF to provide them with SF personnel to translate, interact, and stay out in the boonies with the indig while they returned every night to their hotels in the capital cities.

Some people just don't get it.

You can have language skills, and subject matter expertise, and still not be able to do FID.

TR

[Mac]

CJTF-HOA had some of the Marines teaching Djaboutians, and our FORCEPRO, 3rd Inf. (Old Gaurd) were training Ethiopians. Granted, most of this was basic soldier skills (IMT, BRM, movement to conact, IAD's, patrolling, land nav, etc.). I did get a chance to observe some of it. Mixed feelings about it. While the troops who were teaching, for the most part, seemed to have perpared the classes well and could walk thru it, there were some difficulties with the native troops. Not that they would try to make it difficult, but I saw alot of difficulties with troops who didnt understand the nuiances of getting the locals to understand and cooperate, let alone learn and excell. Language was not the only barrier. Teaching them takes a level of instructor development and maturity that PFC Snuffy (God bless him) just doesnt have. The older NCOs had a better time with it, but I still saw problems.
We have to send men to school to be able to teach US troops (ie- Drill Sgts.), why should we expect troopers with no experience or training to excell at FID? Dealing with foreign troops, who may not even be cooperative, isnt something you can learn through hip pocket training. I can understand the shortages in SF for these missions, especially with the commitments that have taxed everyone, but short term solutions often lead to long term problems. If its GOING to happen (right or wrong), I would think (or hope) the Marines will have given these men at least some instructor training, language assests, cutural awareness, and FID doctrine. I dont agree that this is the answer. The professions who reside here were the ones who made the mistakes, learned from them and taught those who came after the right way to do it. Is it really necessary to repeat those again?

Just the .02 from a non-tabbed observer.....

[Psywar1-0]

I forsaw something like this back when they let the Marines in on the MTI mission in 95.

I continue to see it today when you have a FID JTF here in my back yard that has almost zero SOF members other than CA and Psyop.

As much as I love my Bros from PR, just cause you have a ranger tab and speak the lingo, perhaps even spent a tour at SOA, you havnt got the institutional exp to do the job.

[ktek01]

From what I saw first hand, in my AO anyway. First the AD Army trained the local ICDC unit, then they moved and the Marines came in and took over that mission, a few months later they moved an Army NG unit took over that mission. There was an ODA in the same area, but they were kept busy doing other things.

While this allowed the ODA to carry out another mission, the lack of continuity seemed to greatly slow the pace at which that ICDC unit was brought up to speed. New trainers every few months, most having no previous FID experience, each having to learn when they hit the ground, and then moving to another AO just about the time they were starting to get the AO and the mission figured out. I will say that the Soldiers and Marines did an outstanding job with what they had, but I think it that ICDC unit would have been brought up to speed a lot quicker if they had an ODA training them, or at least the same trainers for the duration of their training.

[504PIR]

Not to bring up old stuff, but I recall not to long ago USMC was standing up Det 1. They were going be apart of Spec Ops, spent a bunch of money and stood up a great bunch of operators. Well they are disbanding now.....

You can go back to the CAP in Veitnam-very effective program...disbanded, correct me if I'm wrong within 36 months of standing up.

Marine Raiders...Same deal

Marine Parachute Bn...disbanded as well

Force Recon is always being downsized, increased, intergrated and sometimes fighting for its existance in the Corp.

Marines are a great bunch of fighters, but I believe that the leaderships is really only interested in being a predominantly Infantry force with a seaborne forced-entry capabilty. The main reason they have their airwings is to support that landing force. If it does not support that mission or somehow connected to it-their leadership don't want it.

I'm sure they will gladly make copies of themselves ie ROK or Thai Marine Corp as an example. But FID as big part of their mission, I don't think so. It may be this commandant's (General Hagee) pet project...well Det 1 was the last commandant's pet project too.

Thats how I see it. Back to lurking

[D9 (RIP)]

I agree with all that was said. Not the best role for the USMC, and I think there will be the usual friction as a branch that is obsessed with tradition and the status quo has to move into what is traditionally unconventional (at least my USMC standards).

When I said the Marines will put their best foot forward, I should have clarified. I mean that the Marines who get to do this assignment, I would imagine, will be extremely eager for the chance. At least when I was in the USMC, the rank and file of the USMC infantry salivated over this kind of thing all the time. I have no doubt that anything like this will meet with the usual retarding resistance from the USMC leadership.

Not saying they'll do it as well as SF at all, just saying they'll try their best as this would be a peach assignment for most jugheads I would think.

[NousDefionsDoc]

D9, I don't think anybody misunderstood your post. I have no doubt you are correct - they are professionals, they will put their best foot forward at all times. It is not the troops in the trenches that are the issue. I could take a Marine Rifle squad and in a year's time, make acceptable LATAM FID guys out of them. Will they be given that year with somebody that has done it and really wants them to succeed?

504 - where did you hear Det 1 was being disbanded? The rumor I heard is the opposite.

[504PIR]

I first heard it in a over beers with a buddy from SEAL Tm 4.

Then somebody posted an article from Marine Corps Times in the General Discussion back in late Jan? Off the top of my head I don't remember the thread's name. Also a thread on Socnet as well.

Another amigo was BSing with a couple of their NCOs last month. Said pretty much the same thing.

I think its wasteful after all that sweat and work standing them up to shut them down. Not like there is a shortage of work for them.

[boat guy]

There is something a little disquieting about the posts here. The USMC did not ask for this mission and it is not their leadership which has created a pet project in FID. Word I have is that they were not asked by SOCOM, but directed to take on this project. SOCOM falls under title 22 and as such is limited by state department when it comes to the number of personnel in country. The USMC being title 10 is not subjected to the same regulation. They will receive no funding for this porject from SOCOM. Just as they received no funding for Det 1. Additionally they will not be allowed any manning increase for the bodies. The idea behind the shift is not to take away anyones niche, but rather to allow SOCOM personnel, who have many round holes, to continue in the filling of those holes which are of higher import and cannot be filled by anyone else. While I do know that the Corps is already accruing knowledge from lessons learned, I would find it very hard to believe that they would pull an Air Force stunt and ask for augmentation. The USMC will put their best foot forward on this and I am sure that they will be quite successful.

504, the CAP (http://www.capmarine.com/) were quite successful. Were around from 65-71.

[Sinister]

Title 22? What crack are you smoking? " [edit by admin] :lifter Have a nice day"

[stanley_white]

I wonder if this mission for the USMC is another thing being prosecuted under the "Theater Security Cooperation" or TSC umbrella?

Can someone please tell me the difference between TSC and FID?

I always heard the TSC buzzword thrown around but never saw it specifically in action.

Is TSC the concept but FID is it in action on the ground?

Interested in some replies...

[Airbornelawyer]

TSC is just that, an umbrella. It covers a spectrum of military-to-military contacts for a variety of purposes. FID is a more specific category of activity with a more specific purpose, helping a nation deal with internal instability/insurgency.

In Europe, for example, TSC is mainly concerned with interoperability, confidence-building measures, bringing former Warsaw Pact countries up to NATO standards, etc. rather than FID. Right now, I think Georgia is the only place in Europe where we are doing FID (and Marines have been part of that for several years, BTW). I don't know if I would characterize US activities in the Balkans today as FID.

[boat guy]

Sinister and all,
Sorry for the lack of clarity. I was not as it seemed in my post, saying that the governing directive for SOCOM falls under Title 22, but rather that the training mission carried out by SOF (Title 10 forces) is regulated by the Embassy (title 22). While Title 10 section 167 and 2011 are the governing directive for SOF training with foreign countries, both dictate that the primary purpose must be to train US assets. When the primary intent of the training is for the foriegn force, the pot of money is different and the forces are then regulated under Title 22. Even during the conduct of JCETs the Embassy is almost always involved and maintains some degree of control. The mission that the USMC will undertake will not be subjected to the same. They idea is that they will be able to maintain autonomy from the Embassy as a title 10 FMTU. This may require law changes, no one knows just yet, but it will not necessarily slide in as TSC and it will NOT be FID.

[RAT]

Not to bring up old stuff, but I recall not to long ago USMC was standing up Det 1. They were going be apart of Spec Ops, spent a bunch of money and stood up a great bunch of operators. Well they are disbanding now.....



I am sure that there are others here more in the know than me. As NousDefionsDoc said I heard the opposite as well.

As for the Marines doing this... IMHO Bad idea. We have taught FID in the past but the Corps is NOT the Unit for this. This is your (SF's) back yard. We do not have near the TO&E for this mission. We need to stickwhat we are good at. Reconnaissance and light infantry. MHO...

RAT OUT!!!

[504PIR]

Hopefully my information is dated, as I have been out of the loop for the last month. Southwest Missouri is not a hub of military activity.

We need to keep'm.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Article (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/07/AR2005050700980.html)

Larger Special Operations Role Being Urged on Marines
Corps Plans New Force of Foreign Military Training Units but Balks at Ceding Its Elite Teams

By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, May 8, 2005; Page A07

With conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan tying up many U.S. Special Operations forces, the Pentagon has found itself short of the elite teams it typically deploys around the world for specialized combat missions and for training foreign militaries, defense officials say.

To help fill the gap, the Marine Corps has stepped forward with a decision to establish a standing force of "foreign military training units" by this autumn. The units -- 24 teams, each with 13 members -- will be given special instruction in foreign languages and cultural awareness and tailored for assignments in one of four regions: the Middle East, Europe, the Pacific or Latin America.

That is the easy part.

The hard part comes in another move under consideration that would have Marines play an even greater role in special operations beyond "low-end" overseas training missions. This would involve using more Marines in "high-end" anti-terrorist actions and other combat operations requiring exceptional skills.

The sticking point is whether to compel the Marines to cede their specialized units to the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), something the fiercely self-reliant Corps -- unlike the Army, the Navy and the Air Force -- has long refused to do.

SOCOM was established in 1986 to end the practice of creating and using Special Forces on an ad hoc basis. The command today oversees the organizing, training and equipping of such highly skilled troops as the Army Rangers and Green Berets, the Navy SEALs and the Air Force AC-130 gunship fleet. The Marines, by contrast, have preferred to retain control of their specialized teams and lend them to SOCOM only as needed.

That kind of time-sharing arrangement may no longer be tenable for SOCOM. In the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the command's role has expanded to include responsibility for managing the war on terrorism -- and with that has come a need for more troops under its direct management. While SOCOM plans to increase its ranks by 2,300 troops over the next four years, up to a new total of about 52,000, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has made clear he also wants the Marines more involved with the Special Command.

A meeting in February involving Rumsfeld, Marine Corps Commandant Michael W. Hagee and Army Gen. Bryan D. Brown, the head of SOCOM, resulted in no deal. The two generals are scheduled to present a new proposal to Rumsfeld later this month.

Although the Marines see themselves as a general-purpose force, they have developed some capacity to conduct special operations, ranging from the emergency evacuation of noncombatants to the stealthy capture of enemy fighters. These capabilities are frequently included in the expeditionary units the Marines regularly deploy.

In recent years, to relieve some of the strain on SOCOM, the Marines have taken on several missions outside the traditional scope of the sea-based service. For instance, they have led a task force in the Horn of Africa, set up in late 2001 to hunt down al Qaeda cells and other terrorists and now focused on providing security assistance and other training to countries in that volatile area. For the invasion of Iraq, the Marines lent SOCOM a Special Operations group known as Detachment 1, a year-long experiment that has become a prototype for the more permanent integration now under discussion.

Still, the idea of a marriage continues to stir some resistance on both sides.

"The Special Operations folks say the Marines had a chance to join SOCOM years ago and didn't, and now they are only after SOCOM's funding and, besides, they are too hard to work with," said one senior Marine officer who has been involved in the issue. "The Marine naysayers, on the other hand, say we're a general-purpose force. They worry that if we do this with SOCOM, we're going to diminish our forces and end up only a shadow of our former selves in a few years."

[NousDefionsDoc]

Hagee, speaking to defense reporters in February, indicated his reluctance to establish a subordinate command for Marines under SOCOM, similar to what has been done for Army, Navy and Air Force units.

"I have to be honest," he said. "I don't like headquarters upon headquarters upon headquarters."

At the same time, he said he is committed to finding the "most efficient and effective way to get" Marine capabilities to SOCOM, envisioning perhaps a combination of "continuous and ad hoc" arrangements.

What facilitated the foreign training initiative was the absence of any requirement to tie forces to SOCOM. The move also built on a history of Marine training missions, including recent ones in such places as sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet republic of Georgia, according to several Marine officers authorized to discuss the new organization.

These past missions, however, tended to be assembled on an ad hoc basis, with Marines being drawn from whatever active-duty or reserve troops were available, the officers said. Once formed, the units would receive crash courses in the relevant language and cultural conditions. Little continuity existed between missions.

Under the new plan, the preparation will be more structured and extensive, and the units will stay together for multiple deployments.

"We're institutionalizing and formalizing what was normally done by your basic average infantry company or platoon or battalion," said Lt. Gen. Jan C. Huly, the deputy Marine commandant for plans, policies and operations.

This approach resembles how the "A teams" of the Army's Special Forces are developed. These teams have traditionally performed most U.S. foreign military training. But Huly and other Marine officers said the intention is not to replace the Army teams, merely augment the effort.

The Marine units, although about the same size as the Army teams, will not be as highly skilled. Lacking the specialists in engineering, medicine and communications who serve on the Army teams, the Marines will focus on teaching basic infantry skills, the officers said.

Just where the new Marine teams will be sent has yet to be decided. But the Pentagon's revised "national defense strategy," issued in March, emphasized the need for more foreign military training as a way of bolstering other nations against the spread of terrorist networks and preventing local conflicts from mushrooming into major crises that can precipitate greater U.S. military involvement.

[The Reaper]

Should be an article about this in Marine Corps Times this week or next.

TR