This is how you put an end to the BS!

[NousDefionsDoc]

A Gruesome Find, With a Difference
Seven Bodies Discovered in Ramadi Belonged to Followers of Zarqawi

By John Ward Anderson
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, March 19, 2005; Page A16

BAGHDAD -- When more than 80 bodies, many of them slain Iraqi police officers and soldiers, were found last week at four sites in Iraq, a fifth gruesome discovery attracted little notice.

In the violent city of Ramadi, a center of insurgent activity 60 miles west of Baghdad, the bodies of seven men were found neatly lined up in an unfinished house on the western outskirts of town, according to witnesses. Each had been shot in the head or torso. Some witnesses said the bodies were then secretly buried in a local cemetery.
Witnesses said they never went to the local police or foreign military forces to report finding the bodies, fearing that they would be accused of complicity in the slayings or that the killers would return to punish them for talking.

"I feared telling the Iraqi army because they would detain me and accuse me of being involved in the killings," said Ali Omar, 32, a motorcycle mechanic who found the bodies on the morning of March 12. Instead, he went to Ramadi Hospital and told an emergency room doctor about his discovery, but the doctor refused to get involved. "He told me, 'Why bring problems on yourself? Leave them until they find them,' " Omar said.

Witnesses also said the event went unreported because the dead men were foreigners, all Sunni Muslims and members of al Qaeda in Iraq, the radical group headed by Abu Musab Zarqawi that is at the forefront of the insurgency. Now that details of the slayings have surfaced, Zarqawi is vowing revenge.

"My cousins are the ones who killed them," said Jabbar Khalaf Marawi, 42, a former army officer and Communist Party member in Ramadi. Marawi said the slayings were carried out by members of his Dulaimi clan in retaliation for the killing of a clan leader -- Lt. Col. Sulaiman Ahmed Dulaimi, the Iraqi National Guard commander for Ramadi and Fallujah -- by Zarqawi's group last Oct. 2.

Dulaimi and three bodyguards were traveling through Khaldiyah, a small town east of Ramadi. When their vehicle slowed to navigate a series of concrete blocks placed in the road by U.S. forces, it was suddenly surrounded by a large group of armed men, according to witnesses interviewed at the time. The bodyguards were shot and killed on the spot, and Dulaimi was abducted, they said.

His body was found two days later in a youth center on the shores of Tharthar Lake, 20 miles north of Khaldiyah. Both his legs were broken in multiple places, his fingernails were removed, razor slashes were etched across his back and he had two bullet wounds in his chest, according to his autopsy report.

A statement by Zarqawi's group asserted responsibility for the killing, accusing Dulaimi of being an "agent . . . who works for the Americans." The statement said he had "confessed" to giving U.S. forces information about weak spots in the guerrillas' defenses in southern Fallujah.

Five months later, Omar, the motorcycle mechanic, was walking his three daughters to school. Because of heavy rain, they took a detour through a largely abandoned part of Ramadi's Tamim neighborhood, which had become a hideout for insurgents who fled the November offensive in Fallujah. As they passed an unfinished house, Omar said, they were hit by the unmistakable odor of death. After dropping off his girls, he said, he went back to investigate.

Omar said he found the dead men inside the house. Each appeared to be in his early thirties; all had long beards and were dressed in the traditional dishdasha gown favored by mujaheddin, or holy warriors.

After being rebuffed at the hospital, Omar said, he went to the local mosque, where the imam asked to be led to the scene.

Upon arriving, "the preacher immediately said he knew the people. He said they were from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria mujaheddin," Omar recounted. "He prayed and asked God for mercy. Then he turned his face to me and said, 'Your mission is over. Thank you, you can go home.' "

Omar Karim, 32, said he was with a group of about 10 men at the Right Mosque when the imam, whom he identified as Yassim Abdul Latif, came in "and told us there are some dead bodies belonging to mujaheddin brothers who were killed by agents of the occupiers, and we have to put them in coffins and bury them." They collected the bodies and returned with them to the mosque, Karim said.
more
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48179-2005Mar18.html

Terrorists fear nothing more than their own TTPs being used against them. Paramilitary/vigilante groups scare the piss out of them. I say good on the clan.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Good post.

[The Reaper]

Right-wing paramilitaries?

United Self-defense Forces?

Does this sound familiar?

TR

[NousDefionsDoc]

Terrorizing the terrorists.

[The Reaper]

Terrorizing the terrorists.

Couldn't happen to a nicer bunch of people.

Maximum publicity.

Kill one, scare 10,000.

TR

[Roguish Lawyer]

Right-wing paramilitaries?

United Self-defense Forces?

Does this sound familiar?

TR

I was going to say that 7th Group lessons may help in Iraq, but thought better of it. Seemed to me like suggesting that we pit the Ba'ath party against the Shiites, which of course is problematic in this context. :munchin

[NousDefionsDoc]

I was going to say that 7th Group lessons may help in Iraq, but thought better of it. Seemed to me like suggesting that we pit the Ba'ath party against the Shiites, which of course is problematic in this context. :munchin

No, I am suggesting that they go all medieval on that ass. Do a little research on Salvador Mancuso and the Castaño family. They understand how to deal with terrorism.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Do a little research on Salvador Mancuso and the Castaño family. They understand how to deal with terrorism.

AUC -- fight fire with fire.

Maybe we need another thread, but are the AUC "good guys" or bad guys with whom our interests are presently aligned? :munchin

[NousDefionsDoc]

They don't exist much anymore. They are surrendering and re-inserting in droves.

Carlos Castaño is probably dead, although I would want to see the body. Mancuso will come in eventually. It is a temporary state, though, because the Gs are killing them after they re-insert. They're going to have to go back out to stay alive.

[Roguish Lawyer]

They don't exist much anymore. They are surrendering and re-inserting in droves.

Carlos Castaño is probably dead, although I would want to see the body. Mancuso will come in eventually. It is a temporary state, though, because the Gs are killing them after they re-insert. They're going to have to go back out to stay alive.

Can you answer the question if I ask it in the past tense? I don't know much about what has gone on down there, but my impression was that they were just as involved in the cocaine trade as the rebels.

[Sacamuelas]

."the preacher immediately said he knew the people. He said they were from Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria mujaheddin," Omar recounted. "He prayed and asked God for mercy

... at the Right Mosque when the imam, whom he identified as Yassim Abdul Latif, came in "and told us there are some dead bodies belonging to mujaheddin brothers who were killed by agents of the occupiers, and we have to put them in coffins and bury them." They collected the bodies and returned with them to the mosque, Karim said.


NO comments on this? What exactly did the "religious" leader portray to these people about these dead terrorists? :mad: I don't know, while it is a good article that gives hope in one realm of the war, it is still provides an interesting confirmation of what our guys are facing over there concerning the islamic leadership and their principles.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Can you answer the question if I ask it in the past tense? I don't know much about what has gone on down there, but my impression was that they were just as involved in the cocaine trade as the rebels.
Not rebels - terrorist insurgents. Yes, some of the AUC and ACCU were involved in the drug trade - at first to finance the war effort. Many of them are very, very nasty customers. But there was a time when their villes were the only ones in Colombia one could walk around in at night.

[magician]

this template has worked in the past.

it will be....I hate to say that it will be interesting....but, as a political scientist, I will be observing the secondary and tertiary impacts of these activities.

[boat guy]

Saca,
I agree completely and found the same comment interesting. It is truly sad to see that many Islamic clerics are still supporting the root of instability in their nation. I certainly hope that more "agents of the occupier" will be able to succeed in their attempts to quell the violence bessetting the innocents long enough for us to establish that nation as a stand alone.
I have often wondered what the effect of a Pershing like treatment of insurgents (at the hands of Iraqs own) would yield. As long as the terrorising of the terrorists does not result in a corrupted force in itself I can only see a benefit from the above action.

[Airbornelawyer]

Some extra background/context:

1. Most Sunni imams in Iraq were appointed by the Ba'athists. They were organized in the immediate aftermath of the regime's collapse into an organization called the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq (Hayat Ulama al-Muslimiin fii-l-'Iraq). These imams are not simply the local religious leaders; they are a tool of the insurgency. They should be treated as such - coalition forces have arrested a few and a few others have been assassinated, so someone is treating them thusly, but at other times we treat them like they represent a legitimate voice of Sunni Arabs.

2. The Dulaimi (or Dulaymi) are one of the most powerful Sunni Arab tribal federations in Iraq. They are heavily concentrated around Fallujah and Ramadi. The Dulaimi federation was a rival of Saddam Hussein (and his Tikriti federation) at various times, including a large revolt in 1995, but other Dulaimis benefitted from the regime (and one of Saddam Hussein's current lawyers is Khalil ad-Dulaimi). Certain smaller tribes have also allied with foreign Islamists to advance their own interests against the major Sunni Arab tribal federations (Dulaimi, Jubburi, Shammari), following a pattern smaller tribes also followed under the Ba'ath regime, so Dulaimi opposition to the terrorists is primarily about defending their own interests.

[NousDefionsDoc]

It is truly sad to see that many Islamic clerics are still supporting the root of instability in their nation.
It's how they stay in power

[boat guy]

NDD,
My original statement really reflects a disgust at the lack of logical application of political science on behalf of the Sunnis (opposition types specifically). Given their prewar power in the country it would follow that they would support the temporary occupation to enable the legitimization of their control in the free country. Barring all religious issues, retaliation demands, and fatwas against the US that they must show to keep face, it makes sense to me that they would use this as a means to assert the Sunni control of Iraq. Control which we are continually denying to those attempting to use the insurgency as its means to power.

Your comment however sparked a specific question....

Understand the rationale based upon Ba'athist rule, however, now it would seem to me that their position of authority would be guaranteed by either the Mullahs or their followers or both. Understand also the Sunni opposition to the occupation, interim govt etc. In this case though, if the Dulaimi mullahs are opposed to the insurgents then why the conflict. The imams garner the support of the population by virtue of their "descent" (whether actual or appointed) from Muhammad. Where is the power broker coming from in Ramadi right now.

[jbour13]

It's good to see these kinds of stories come out. Makes me all warm and fuzzy to see these goons getting some of there own methodology. :D

I'd say the author of this message did a good job of not pointing the finger at Islam as a whole but eluded to the fact that the insurgents are getting their support from these so called "clerics".

[NousDefionsDoc]

NDD,
My original statement really reflects a disgust at the lack of logical application of political science on behalf of the Sunnis (opposition types specifically). Given their prewar power in the country it would follow that they would support the temporary occupation to enable the legitimization of their control in the free country. Barring all religious issues, retaliation demands, and fatwas against the US that they must show to keep face, it makes sense to me that they would use this as a means to assert the Sunni control of Iraq. Control which we are continually denying to those attempting to use the insurgency as its means to power.

Your comment however sparked a specific question....

Understand the rationale based upon Ba'athist rule, however, now it would seem to me that their position of authority would be guaranteed by either the Mullahs or their followers or both. Understand also the Sunni opposition to the occupation, interim govt etc. In this case though, if the Dulaimi mullahs are opposed to the insurgents then why the conflict. The imams garner the support of the population by virtue of their "descent" (whether actual or appointed) from Muhammad. Where is the power broker coming from in Ramadi right now.

I'm by no means a SME. But my guess is that because they are a minority, they fear will be done to them what they would do to others.

I think the "against the insurgents" is on a personal/tribal level in this case. Not to mention national, as Zarqawi is not Iraqi. It may be a simple case of Hanlon's Razor on his part. I never misunderestimate family ties and revenge as a motive for sea change after living in LATAM so long. The Castaño family basically destroyed the ELN and brought the FARC to their knees because the FARC wouldn't give their father's body back after they murdered him.

[Cincinnatus]

What's "Hanlon's razor"?

[NousDefionsDoc]

What's "Hanlon's razor"?
Hanlon's Razor (http://www.google.com)

[NousDefionsDoc]

Hanlon's Razor - “Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.”

[BMT (RIP)]

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/I/IRAQ?SITE=NCFAY&SECTION=HOME

NDD looks like the locals are acting up!!

:munchin

BMT

[NousDefionsDoc]

Wonder what has changed?

[BMT (RIP)]

WAG!!!
They are attempting toget money and food from the local shopkeepers!!

BMt

[NousDefionsDoc]

So you think they are not heeding Mao and Che's admonishment to "pay as you go"?

[Airbornelawyer]

I don't want to overemphasize tribalism, but given its hold in the Middle East (and elsewhere) we have at times tended to underemphasize it.

Note that the Ramadi police official quoted in BMT's article is also a Dulaimi, like the assassinated Iraqi National Guard official cited in NDD's original article. Surf the web for articles on the voting in Fallujah. Note that on the few occasions that names of those who participated are given, they are often also Dulaimis. Perhaps this is some indication that the coalition is having some success winning over this tribal federation.

Comparative ignorance of the tribes is apparent in this February 12, 2005 article (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/12/international/middleeast/12sunnis.html?ei=5090&en=0322e1b520a4dbec&ex=1265864400&partner=rssuserland&pagewanted=print&position=) in The New York Times on Sunni participation (or lack thereof) in the elections. The first person quoted is Abdullah Muhammad al-Ajili, a 46-year old produce seller "simmering with resentment" who didn't vote. Left unmentioned is that the Albu Ajil (or Ajayl) is a tribe within the Tikriti federation which benefitted greatly from their relationship with Saddam Hussein's Albu Nasir tribe of the same federation.

The same article quotes a Sunni in Mosul who also didn't vote, but only because he decided to vote too late and couldn't find a polling place - "Dr. Majeed Alwan al-Sammarae, 41." The Samarrai' are a small independent tribe from east of Tikrit who have had an on-again-off-again relationship with the Tikritis. Wafiq al-Sammarai was a former chief of intelligence under Saddam Hussein who fled into exile, while Ayham al-Sammarai is Minister of Electricity in the current interim government.

The three biggest Sunni tribal federations are the Dulaimi, Jubburi and Shammari (not counting the Muntafiq, whose leadership is Sunni but almost all of whose tribes are Shi'ite). The Dulaimi and the Shammari are the most strategically important to the coalition, as the Dulaimi tribal zone extends from Baghdad's western suburbs to the Syrian, Jordanian and Saudi borders, while the Shammari are on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border in the north, west of Mosul. The interim president, Ghazi al-Yawar, is a Shammari sheikh.

Tactically important tribal federations and tribes include the Tikriti, the Ubaydi (large numbers of whom were settled in Kirkuk as part of Saddam Hussein's Arabicization of the region) and the Janabi. The latter is a relatively small tribe with Sunni and Shi'ite members but one skillfully used by both Ba'athists and Islamists. A tribal leader is Sheikh Abdullah al-Janabi, the self-proclaimed "Emir of Fallujah" until going into hiding after the November 2004 coalition recapture of the city. Other Janabis serve in the interim government, including Minister of State Adnan al-Janabi.

As soldiers past and present, we are actually probably better equipped to understand tribalism than a lot of others, since we live(d) in a form of it. Lines of loyalty that go "family first," then extended family, house, clan, tribe, tribal federation, are not dissimilar to platoon/team first, then company, battalion, regiment/group, division, branch, etc.

[ktek01]

NDD,

Your comment however sparked a specific question....

Understand the rationale based upon Ba'athist rule, however, now it would seem to me that their position of authority would be guaranteed by either the Mullahs or their followers or both. Understand also the Sunni opposition to the occupation, interim govt etc. In this case though, if the Dulaimi mullahs are opposed to the insurgents then why the conflict. The imams garner the support of the population by virtue of their "descent" (whether actual or appointed) from Muhammad. Where is the power broker coming from in Ramadi right now.


Your looking at it as strictly religious, or strictly political, way more complicated then that. As NDD pointed out, never misunderestimate the role of family, and in that area also the role of tribe, clan, nationality, and even Ali Baba. The Ba'athists of Iraq may work with the Ba'athists of Syria when it helps their cause, doesnt mean they feel any loyalty or bond with them, and that they wont sell them out when that helps their cause.. The Shi'ites of Iraq in many cases do not like the Shi'ites of Iran, and many Iraqi's Ive spoken to absolutely hate their Hashemite neighbors to the West. The Saddam Ba'athists are Sunni, and so are the Kurds, but the two are worlds apart. Very complicated issue.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Good post AL. You too Ktek Thanks.

[Team Sergeant]

I don't want to overemphasize tribalism, but given its hold in the Middle East (and elsewhere) we have at times tended to underemphasize it.



The only reason the Russians and the Afgans fought so long was the Afgan tribalism. I think it took seven years to unite the Afgan tribes, and when we did the Russians were on the run. And as soon as the last Russian stepped off Afgan soil they once again were fighting among themselves.

Some of us understand it quite well AL. :rolleyes:

TS

[Cincinnatus]

Sneaky,

Damn! Ya got me on the Google link. You and Gomez both seem overly fond of that one. LOL!

That sentiment, albeit rendered somewhat differently, is an old favorite of mine. Never heard it described as "Hanlon's Razor" before. I love learning new stuff.

[Airbornelawyer]

The only reason the Russians and the Afgans fought so long was the Afgan tribalism. I think it took seven years to unite the Afgan tribes, and when we did the Russians were on the run. And as soon as the last Russian stepped off Afgan soil they once again were fighting among themselves.

Some of us understand it quite well AL. :rolleyes:

TS
Afghanistan's tribes have never been united.

Our efforts were to form a coalition of mujahideen parties that could effectively fight the Soviets. We were hamstrung by Afghan politics, but also by Pakistani interference. Pakistan banned all but 5 of the 60 or so parties that formed among Afghan refugees in the wake of the Soviet invasion (a 6th party was a splinter faction of one of the original 5, and a 7th party was formed initially as an umbrella for these 6, and became its own party later). All leftist parties, such as the Maoist Shula-ye Javed and any social democrats, were banned, as well as any Shi'ite parties (a coalition of Shi'ite parties would be formed in Iran) or explicitly ethnic parties.

The 5 parties were divided into 2 "fundamentalist" or Islamist parties - Hezb-e Islami (Party of Islam) and Jami'at-e Islami (Islamic Society), a predominantly Tajik group - and 3 traditionalist parties - Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement), Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli (National Liberation Front) and Mahaz-e Melli-ye Islami (National Islamic Front).

Harakat had its power base among the Pushtun tribes, and operated in the field through a network of tribal leaders and village religious teachers, or maulawis (its leader was a maulawi, Maulawi Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi). Jabha was the most traditionalist, and its leader was a soft-spoken Sufi, Prof. Sibghatullah Mojadedi. Mahaz, or NIFA, was the most Western-oriented, and had its power base among former officers of the Afghan Army, though its leader was also a Sufi, Pir Sayyed Ahmed Gailani.

Hezb and Jami'at, the two Islamist parties, drew strength from Afghans for whom tribe had lesser meaning - non-Pushtuns, especially Tajiks, in the latter case and de-tribalized Pushtuns from the north and the cities in the former. Hezb soon split into two factions - Hezb-e Islami Hekmatyar, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Hezb-e Islami Khalis, led by Maulawi Mohammed Yunus Khalis. Khalis' faction had its strength among village religious leaders. Jami'at, while it had a number of Pushtun and Uzbek commanders in the field, was a heavily Tajik group. Its leader was the former chair of the faculty of Islamic law at Kabul University, Burhanuddin Rabbani.

The seventh party was formed as an umbrella movement - the Islamic Unity for a Free Afghanistan (Ittehad-e Islami bira'ye Azad-e Afghanistan) - under Prof. Abdurrab ur-Rasul Sayyaf. Sayyaf's movement was initially heavily underwritten by the Saudis, and the party became the 4th Islamist party.

Of course, what happened in Peshawar and what happened on the battlefield were only partly related. The Pakistanis disfavored the traditionalist parties for two reasons: (i) all favored a return of the king, Zahir Shah, who had pushed the concept of Greater Pushtunistan, threatening Pakistani control of the NWFP, and (ii) Islamism was growing in the Pakistani officer corps due to the influence of Pakistan's Islamist movement, the Jamaat-e Islami. As a result, Harakat's early power withered under Soviet attacks and a lack of resupply, while NIFA, whose stable of former officers gave great press briefings, lacked the resources to take action in country. Jabha was always a small party.

Pakistani intelligence made sure Hekmatyar received the lion's share of aid to the mujahideen, but Hekmatyar was unpopular and his commanders were never very effective. The most effective commanders in the field were affiliated with Jami'at and Hezb-e Khalis. The most famous of these was Ahmed Shah Massoud, a Tajik known as the "Lion of the Panjshir" (Panjshir is the name of the valley where he was from and where he fought, but it means "five lions" so his nickname also meant the Lion of the Five Lions).

The Communists drew their main strength from de-tribalized Pushtuns, especially in Kabul. Tribe played something of a role - many Communist leaders were Ghilzai Pushtuns, while the monarchy had been dominated by Durrani Pushtuns - but among most Communists, tribe was a bourgeois notion at best. The Communists did take advantage of tribe to divide and conquer, though, paying off the Jowzjan tribal militias among the ethnic Uzbeks to keep the northwest of the country relatively quiet. Also, although tribe was not a big issue, a number of top Communists, such as Hafizullah Amin and Mohammad Rafi', were from the Kharoti tribe of the Ghilzai tribal family (as is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who flirted with the Communists in his student days).

The Taliban also de-emphasized tribe, except for tactical purposes, but were a heavily Pushtun organization. Taliban leader Mullah Omar was from the Hotak tribe of the Ghilzai tribal family, and had fought in Hezb-e Khalis in the Afghan-Soviet War.

In 2001-02, we did a moderately good job of recognizing and using tribal loyalty. The Taliban tried to play the Pushtun card, noting that the opposition was dominated by non-Pushtun Tajiks and Uzbeks, as well as Shi'ites (also non-Pushtun). The OEF coalition countered by making contacts with various Pushtun tribes in Taliban-controlled areas, offering some bribes, others power. Some efforts ended in failure or ambush, but others worked. The most famous was getting the Popolzai tribe of the Durrani to join the anti-Taliban forces through the efforts of Popolzai leader Hamid Karzai.

And Popolzais weren't just any other tribe. Ahmad Shah, the father of the Afghan nation ("baba-ye mellat") and king from 1747 to 1772, was from the Sadozai clan of the Popolzai. He gave his nickname, Durr-e Durrani (Pearl of Pearls) to the Abdali Pushtun tribal family, who are now called Durrani Pushtuns. Sadozai Popolzais ruled Afghanistan until 1929, when power passed to their cousin clan, the Mohammadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe, another Abdali/Durrani tribe (Mohammadzai Barakzais dominated Afghanistan until the Communist coup in 1978).

There is an Afghan proverb that mirrors what was said in an earlier post. "Me against my brother; me and my brother against my cousin; me, my brother and my cousin against the world."

[Team Sergeant]

You are right AL, I forget sometimes you are an attorney.

Unite was the wrong word, a cessation of hostilities toward each other is all I meant. (Which gave those in power the ability to kick out the Russians.)

Pakistan “interference”, hard to believe….. something I recall for every dollar we sent to the mujahideen funneled through the Pakistanis, $1000 went to the Pakistanis. While the president and everyone else was raising cane about the millions involved in Iran-Contra billions were being funneled through the Pakistanis earmarked for the mujahideen.

[Airbornelawyer]

You are right AL, I forget sometimes you are an attorney.

Unite was the wrong word, a cessation of hostilities toward each other is all I meant. (Which gave those in power the ability to kick out the Russians.)

Pakistan “interference”, hard to believe….. something I recall for every dollar we sent to the mujahideen funneled through the Pakistanis, $1000 went to the Pakistanis. While the president and everyone else was raising cane about the millions involved in Iran-Contra billions were being funneled through the Pakistanis earmarked for the mujahideen.ISI controlled where the money and weapons went, and they favored Hekmatyar. We worked hard to get that changed and at various points thought we had, but certain agencies, charged with actually overseeing deliveries, lied to our faces.

Despite this, Hekmatyar, an ineffective leader, never could do more than be a spoiler. The Pakistanis tired of him and he eventually made his own alliances (and betrayals of them) during the civil war of the early 1990s, while Pakistan built up the Taliban.

[magician]

gentlemen, thank you for a wonderful thread.

[BMT (RIP)]

I read an interesting news article the other day about the Kurd areas in Iraqi. Arabs are going North looking for work! Lot's of investment money is going into the Kurd areas.

BMT

[Airbornelawyer]

Iraqi Army Raid Nets 3 Tons of TNT, 121 Terrorism Suspects (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/20050328_321.html)

The article covers highlights of activities all over Iraq, but the Iraqi raid is the top story. Troops of the Iraqi Army’s 8th Division conducted a raid near Jurf al-Sakher on March 25, 2005. The Iraqis detained 121 suspects and siezed 3 tons of TNT, "624 rifles, 250,000 light ammunition rounds, 22,000 medium rounds, 193 rocket-propelled-grenade launchers, 300 RPG rockets, 27 82-mm mortar tubes, and 155 82-mm mortar rounds." - I don't know what they mean by "light" vs. "medium" ammo; I assume it is mostly 7.62mm and 12.7mm, but maybe 5.45mm, 5.56mm, 9mm and 14.5mm as well.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Iraqi Army Raid Nets 3 Tons of TNT, 121 Terrorism Suspects (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/20050328_321.html)

The article covers highlights of activities all over Iraq, but the Iraqi raid is the top story. Troops of the Iraqi Army’s 8th Division conducted a raid near Jurf al-Sakher on March 25, 2005. The Iraqis detained 121 suspects and siezed 3 tons of TNT, "624 rifles, 250,000 light ammunition rounds, 22,000 medium rounds, 193 rocket-propelled-grenade launchers, 300 RPG rockets, 27 82-mm mortar tubes, and 155 82-mm mortar rounds." - I don't know what they mean by "light" vs. "medium" ammo; I assume it is mostly 7.62mm and 12.7mm, but maybe 5.45mm, 5.56mm, 9mm and 14.5mm as well.

Sounds like we are doing pretty well. :munchin