The GWOT isn't new

[NousDefionsDoc]

1984/03/16 - the Islamic Jihad kidnapped and later murdered Political Officer William Buckley in Beruit, Lebanon

RIP Sir.

Lest we forget.

[lksteve]

1984/03/16 - the Islamic Jihad kidnapped and later murdered Political Officer William Buckley in Beruit, Lebanon



the embassy in Beirut was hit in '82, the Marine barracks in '83...Leon Klinghoffer was killed in '85 or '86...

and of course, the Munich Olympics in '72 still resonates with me...

[Jimbo]

1984/03/16 - the Islamic Jihad kidnapped and later murdered Political Officer William Buckley in Beruit, Lebanon
the embassy in Beirut was hit in '82, the Marine barracks in '83

Both those ops were planned and run by the same guy: Imad Mughniyah

[NousDefionsDoc]

http://www.veteranen.info/~cedarsouthlebanon/hizbullah/imad.eng.htm

[Jimbo]

http://www.veteranen.info/~cedarsouthlebanon/hizbullah/imad.eng.htm

That's him. He's a sweetheart.

There is RUMINT that he had a hand in the 1999 hijacking of the airliner in India, which is regarded by some as the rehersal for the Sept 11th attacks.

More:
http://www.meib.org/articles/0109_l1.htm

If you want to get heartburn, read up on what was going down in the Sudan in the early to mid 90s. Everyone was there. Hizbollah, AQ, even Carlos.

We had very, very few assets on the ground there (Billy Waugh, Cofer Black) given all that was going on.

[NousDefionsDoc]

is the link I posted an ok bio? Interesting about the Indian hijacking.

Agree about the Sudan.

We need to have lunch someday.

[Airbornelawyer]

As we watch current events unfold in Lebanon, I can't help but get a sense of coming full circle.

As we have discussed before on the question of when the war actually began, it depends on how you define the war. The war between modernism and anti-modern totalitarianisms (Fascism, Communism, Islamofascism, etc.) began in the wake of the Russian Civil War, and has been a shooting war at some place in the world since 1931.

The more relevant war with Islamofascism began in the wake of the Islamic Revolution (Inqilab-e Islami) in Iran, the rise of Islamist terrorist groups in Egypt to prominence with the killing of Anwar Sadat, and the rise of Islamist terrorist groups in Lebanon. Over the course of two decades, an earlier generation of Arab nationalist/socialist groups and nations - Ba'athist Syria, the PLO, Nabi Berri's Shi'ite Amal in Lebanon, etc. - lost influence to Islamists or accomodated to them. The fall of the Soviet Union weakened the nationalist/socialist elements even more.

Lebanese Shi'ites drifted away from Berri's Amal into the arms of Hizbullah, which, abetted by Syria and Iran, increased its military strength and provided a network of social services to co-opt the population. The traditional Christian vs. Muslim divide in Lebanon gave way to a complex web of Maronite Catholic and Greek Orthodox factions, Sunni Muslim factions, Druze, Shi'ite supporters of Amal and Hizbullah supporters, with a mishmash of terrorist group names mixed in (many just Hizbullah fronts).

After the Israeli invasion in 1982, and when US, French, Italian and British troops were in Lebanon in the early 1980s, people like Nabi Berri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt were household names (at least among us foreign affairs geeks). For two decades since, they hardly came up. Now, they are in the news again.

It has been commented elsewhere that until September 11, 2001, Lebanon's Hizbullah had killed more Americans than any other terrorist group. More importantly, Hizbullah was al-Qa'ida before al-Qa'ida. Its specialty was the suicide bombing aimed at maximum casualties - the April 1983 US Embassy suicide bombing, the November 1983 suicide bombing of an Israeli HQ in Tyre. Even al-Qa'ida's signature, the simultaneous attack on multiple targets, was pioneered by Hizbullah, with the October 1983 simultaneous truck bombings that killed 241 US Marines, soldiers and sailors and 60 French paratroopers.

Although the Cedar Revolution shows promise, I think Lebanon may be headed toward civil war. Every Lebanese Army officer I served with was itching to fight Hizbullah and reassert control over their country, with Syrian control being the only reason they haven't already. Hizbullah is certainly ready to fight, and the Syrians and Iranians have made sure they have the means. If the Syrians do pull out, they will make sure their proxies remain to do their dirty work.

But Lebanon is just that - a proxy for Syrian and Iranian machinations. They are trying to do the same in Iraq. In winning this war, Damascus and Tehran are just as important as Beirut and Baghdad, if not more so.

[NousDefionsDoc]

That's a good piece AL. Well said.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Agreed. What do you propose to do about it, if anything, beyond what we are already doing? :munchin

[Airbornelawyer]

1. Keep doing what we are doing on the diplomatic and public diplomacy fronts.

2. Keep doing what I hope we are doing on the intelligence and special operations fronts to gather information and upset any Syrian plans to act as puppetmaster from behind the scenes.

3. Build up the Lebanese Army as a counterweight to Syria and Hizbullah. On paper, the Syrians, Egyptians and Saudis have large armies equipped with modern weapons (in the Syrian case, relatively modern, as they are a generation or two behind). The Lebanese Army, however, is qualitatively the best Arab army there is. It has what the others lack: capable, dedicated NCOs and officers.

4. Undermine the Ba'athist regime in Damascus to bring about its collapse, if possible. Overthrow it, if necessary. Work on Turkey and Jordan diplomatically to step up pressure. With a free Iraq and a free Lebanon, and pro-Western governments in Amman and Ankara, Syria will be boxed in.

5. Ultimately, the twin nests of Islamofascism are in Riyadh and Tehran, the Wahhabi Sunni version in the former and the Khomeinist Shi'ite version in the latter. I am hopeful that non-coercive means will work - Iran's mullocracy is extremely unpopular with the generally pro-Western Iranian masses - but I cannot say that I am optimistic.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Two follow-up questions, Counselor:

1. What, if anything, should Israel's role be in Lebanon?

2. Where are you buying me drinks this evening?

[Airbornelawyer]

Two follow-up questions, Counselor:

1. What, if anything, should Israel's role be in Lebanon?

2. Where are you buying me drinks this evening?

1. As little as possible. As much as they hate Hizbullah and Syria, even Lebanon's Christians are not especially fond of Israel. Behind the scenes, Israel can provide good intel on Hizbullah and Syria.

2. Are you in these parts?

[Roguish Lawyer]

2. Are you in these parts?

Yes.

[dennisw]

One os the things we can do which seems to be overlooked is related to Saudi Arabia. In Natan Sharansky's book The Case for Democracy he theorizes that the Saudis are so afraid of the Radical Islamist and that they might overturn the Saudi apple cart that they, the Saudis, are funding the spread of the Wahhabi religion or terrorism.


We need to nip this situation in the bud in order to cut off a major portion of the funding going to these folks.

[Doc]

AL,

I just want to say that I dig reading what you post.

Thanks,

Doc

[Jimbo]

Hizbullah is certainly ready to fight, and the Syrians and Iranians have made sure they have the means.

I disagree. IJO and certain commanders are willing to fight. Nasrallah is not.

[Airbornelawyer]

"Ready" and "willing" aren't the same thing, but I take your point. However, even on the latter I'm not so sure I agree. Hizbullah is not like a Lebanese SCIRI, willing to store their weapons and participate politically, but more like a Lebanese Hamas. The "struggle" is their raison d'etre. Nasrallah supported Sadr, not Sistani (though he tried to mend some fences after Sadr's failure).

Of course, the Lebanese Army might not take on Hizbullah, despite what its soldiers are itching for. A worst case scenario for us is one that, unfortunately, might have a certain attraction for Lebanese political leaders. That is to make a deal with Hizbullah so they can use them in exactly the same way Syria has used them, as a proxy to keep pressure on Israel.

However, Syria's motive in this regard was two-fold: (i) to preserve the Arab struggle against Israel as the sine qua non of pan-Arabism, which is the basis of Ba'athist political philosophy, and (ii) to keep up pressure on Israel in the hopes of getting the Golan Heights back.

As to the former, I don't know of a major Lebanese political figure who cares about pan-Arabism. With Saddam Hussein's fall, Syria's Ba'athists are about the only pan-Arabists left. Still, the traditional divert-your-people's-attention-away-from-domestic-problems-by-focusing-on-Israel tactic of Arab leaders, while weaker today, has its attractions, so some Lebanese might favor keeping Hizbullah around for that purpose.

As to the latter, the Lebanese don't care about the Golan Heights. I am also not sure if many Lebanese care about the Shebaa Farms, the manufactured claim to justify making Hizbullah's continued fight with Israel a Lebanese issue. I understand Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader, has stated that he thinks the Shebaa Farms is a Syrian issue unless the Syrians can prove otherwise.

A question for us is whether we should tolerate a Lebanese deal with Hizbullah. Israel allows the PA to play the same game with Hamas, but takes on (and takes out) Hamas when necessary. Hamas has only incidentally killed Americans, but as noted Hizbullah has killed more Americans than any other terrorist group except AQ. We have a personal stake in dealing with Hizbullah, regardless of what other Lebanese factions desire.

[Jimbo]

I agree with virtually everything you wrote, except for the part about Hizballah willing to come into the fold. I agree that PART of the group will never stop fighting. Others, though, have worked very hard at making Hizballah a 'legitimate' voice of the Shiite minority.

Organizationally, I see Hizballah being more similar to the IRA prior to the IRA/RIRA split than to HAMAS.

[Peregrino]

AL - I make a motion unto the general populace (of this board) to change your label from "Nitpicker". We'll leave the actual designation up to the (unwashed) masses :munchin but the points you've been making are hardly in the "nit" category. All-in-all a worthy analysis of a situation we have to pay a lot more attention to. Personally, I think we should overtly encourage/assist them - with more than paltry diplomatic pressure on Syria. If Lebanon were to recover from its current troubles and return to its pre-civil war status it would be another opposing influence countering the Islamist goals of a region dominated by fundametalist movements. Just my .02 - Peregrino

[Team Sergeant]

Posted For Jimbo......

An Evolving Assessment
Why did the CIA change its view of the relationship between Sudan and Saddam's Iraq?
by Stephen F. Hayes & Thomas Joscelyn
07/27/2005 12:23:00 AM

AMONG THE MANY unresolved issues of the former Iraqi regime's support for terrorism, few are more potentially important than the activities throughout the mid to late 1990s of Iraqi military officials and chemical weapons specialists in Sudan.

The Clinton Administration, along with a host of Sudanese opposition groups and nonproliferation experts, alleged that Iraqi chemical weapons experts were advising Sudanese military and intelligence officials on the development and production of chemical weapons. This is significant for two reasons, one obvious and one less obvious. First, any Iraqi activity on chemical weapons development inside or outside of Iraq would have constituted a serious violation of U.N. resolutions. Second, throughout much of the 1990s, the Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation (MIC) and Sudanese intelligence were virtually inseparable from al Qaeda. If the Iraqis were providing WMD technology to these elements of the corrupt Sudanese regime--led by Hasan al Turabi, who was openly sympathetic to Osama bin Laden--they were effectively providing it to al Qaeda. Even the most determined skeptics of an Iraq-al Qaeda connection concede this point.

So what, exactly, were these Iraqis doing in Sudan? For clues, we turn to unclassified reports from the CIA on WMD proliferation from 1998-2003.

1998: "Sudan has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, Sudan obtained help from other countries, principally Iraq. Given its history in developing CW and its close relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well."(Document released by the CIA in conjunction with a FOIA request; not available on the Internet.)

1999: "In the WMD arena, Sudan has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, it has obtained help from entities in other countries, principally Iraq. Given its history in developing CW and its close relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well."

2000: "In the WMD arena, Sudan has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, it has obtained help from entities in other countries, principally Iraq. Given its history in developing chemical weapons and its close relationship with Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well."
2001: "Sudan, a party to the CWC, has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. It historically has obtained help from foreign entities, principally in Iraq. Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well."

2002: "Chemical and Biological. Sudan has aspired to develop a chemical warfare capability since the 1980s and probably received technical assistance from Iraq. Allegations of CW activities in Sudan were not confirmed. Sudan is a party to the CWC, but has only declared the possession of riot control agents. Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well

2003: "Chemical and Biological. Although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the US is working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to seek capabilities from abroad."

The language evolves over the six-year period. In 1998, the CIA stated categorically that Sudan had received assistance on chemical weapons from Iraq. The agency repeated the claim in 1999, citing the "close relationship" between Baghdad and Khartoum. In 2000, the language was almost exactly the same. In 2001, however, the CIA reporting seems to allow for the possibility that the Sudanese worked on chemical weapons with others, but that these entities were "principally in Iraq." By 2002, the agency was hedging, saying only that the Sudanese "probably received technical assistance from Iraq" and noting that "allegations of CW activities in Sudan were not confirmed.

And in 2003, Iraq had disappeared altogether from unclassified CIA assessments. What accounts for these changes? Remember, the Clinton Administration repeatedly cited Iraqi assistance on chemical weapons in Sudan to justify the U.S. strikes on the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant on August 20, 1998. Although the targeting of al Shifa touched off a heated debate inside the intelligence community (and in the world press), Clinton Administration officials and senior intelligence officials continued to stand by their claims of Iraqi WMD activity in Sudan. Unnamed intelligence officials spoke of telephone intercepts between senior Iraqi chemical weapons officials and executives at suspected sites in Sudan. This continued through last year, when William Cohen, secretary of defense under Bill Clinton, testified to the 9/11 Commission that he had seen intelligence that included reports that senior al Shifa officials "traveled to Baghdad to meet with the father of the VX program" in Iraq. In an interview with The Weekly Standard last year, John Gannon, the former chairman of the CIA's National Intelligence Council, stood by the reporting on Iraq and Sudan. "The consistent stream of intelligence at that time said it wasn't just al Shifa. There were three different [chemical weapons] structures in the Sudan. There was the hiring of Iraqis. There was no question that the Iraqis were there." Although the Bush Administration has said virtually nothing in public on these issues, several senior officials tell The Weekly Standard that they have seen no reason to question the reporting on Iraqi activity in Sudan. So, what is the truth about Iraqi WMD activity in Sudan? It is interesting to note that the reports were prepared by the CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, the notoriously politicized CIA office that sent Joe Wilson to Niger "on its own initiative" after his wife recommended him for the job. The significant language changes come in 2002, as the Bush Administration was preparing to make its case for war in Iraq, and in 2003, as that war was being fought.

Does the CIA now have reasons to doubt its earlier reporting? It is certainly possible and perhaps even likely that new reporting--not politics--explains the fact that the stronger language came as the Clinton Administration warned of the Iraqi threat and the weaker language came as the Bush Administration sought to eliminate it. But it would be helpful to know more.

Declassifying the original reports--ever mindful of sources and methods--would go a long way to answering these questions.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Sometimes people forget intelligence can be as much art as science. Good article. Thanks.

PS - I'm stealing it.