View Full Version : Opinion? Modern Warfare: A French View on Counter-insurgency
General anti-Frenchism set aside, what do you think of this book?
Modern Warfare: A French View on Counter-insurgency (1956), by Roger Trinquier
Thanks in advance!
I think its a valuable read. However, NDD will tell you that its not much help reading the memoirs of a loser. The reality is probably somewhere between those two opinions.
I think its a valuable read. However, NDD will tell you that its not much help reading the memoirs of a loser. The reality is probably somewhere between those two opinions.
Sounds reasonable. I think I'll hold out on it, since it's doubtful I'd recognize all mistakes done.
Jack Moroney (RIP)
01-28-2005, 15:11
Any book on the subject has value, however you have to realize that when countries deal with counter-insurgencies (CI) they tend to deal with mistakes revisited rather than lessons learned. A CI program requires an interdisciplinary effort by all government and non-government agencies where the military plays primarily a supporting role in taking the fight to the insurgents and providing security for the populace. The politicos have the leading role because if the insurgency is to be defeated the problems that created the unrest have to be resolved. If only military action is used the insurgents will just go to ground and continue the covert actions to undermine the government and will arise again with overt military actions when the conditions are right for military operations. Keep in mind also that there is no cookie cutter approach to any insurgency as each is different with differing variables and requirements. Reading about the tactics, techniques and procedures from one era may have very little in common with another. For instance, the information technology today provides a whole new set of tools for command and control, psyop support, information warfare, financing, external and internal support, intelligence, etc. that did not exist during the time of the publication you are going to review. So while it will provide you with good insight as to what was effective for that period, it may not provide you with much at the tactical or operational level for any other insurgency. The strategic efforts discussed however, will probably provide you with the information of greatest value in understanding the overall efforts and programs required to deal with an insurgency.
Jack Moroney
First off I haven't read the book.
Now, I have heard so many things over the years in regards to French and British counter-insurgency programs and the value of shock, scorched earth etc. That said, how many countries in North Africa and West Asia still fly the Union Jack or the French Tri-color? In many respects these books are examples of what hasn't worked.
Malaya seemed to have worked.
Malaya seemed to have worked.
Maybe one. Does Malysia still fly the English or French flag. :D
HMMM!!! Algeria, Morocco, French Moroco, Aden, Suez, U.A.E., Indo China, etc. :lifter
That is just off of the top of my head. I'd have to refer to books to get the rest.
No they don't still fly the flag, but those countries that made up Malaya as they are now are not Communist thanks to the Commonwealth intervention. IIRC, the Hearts and Minds concept was born there, too.
I'm going to have to refer to some books too :D
Airbornelawyer
01-28-2005, 18:17
As to several of the comments here, if you are attempting to answer Martin's questions regarding the value of Trinquier's analysis by pointing to French performance in various counterinsurgencies, you are committing a logical fallacy. Consider that he may have been spot on in his analysis, but his superiors did not listen to him. Otherwise you might similarly be forced to dismiss every bit of commentary by US military personnel on Vietnam.
As for what Col. Trinquier actually had to say, formulate your own opinions:
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp
NousDefionsDoc
01-28-2005, 18:41
I think its a valuable read. However, NDD will tell you that its not much help reading the memoirs of a loser. The reality is probably somewhere between those two opinions.
LOL - Am I that predictable? Like The Colonel and AL said, he's worth the read. His superiors didn't appear to have heard him at all.
I haven't read the book, but I have read a lot of his stuff on the internet and in other books. I would read him of you haven't.
Airbornelawyer
01-28-2005, 18:46
BTW, the controversy around Col. Trinquier's work, and the Cliffs' Notes version of it, is that he advocated torturing terrorist suspects.
This is a bit of a reductionist view of his argument, and I would recommend reading the entire work, but especially Chapter 4, before formulating your own opinions.
Essentially, he argued (or accepted) that terrorism was the face of modern warfare, and it was pointless to treat terrorists as common criminals. Instead, they should be treated as soldiers, albeit ones who do not obey the rules of the soldier's code and are therefore unable to benefit from its protections (i.e., unlawful combatants):The terrorist claims the same honors [of a soldier] while rejecting the same obligations. His kind of organization permits him to escape from the police, his victims cannot defend themselves, and the army cannot use the power of its weapons against him because he hides himself permanently within the midst of a population going about its peaceful pursuits.
But he must be made to realize that, when he is captured, he cannot be treated as an ordinary criminal, nor like a prisoner taken on the battlefield. What the forces of order who have arrested him are seeking is not to punish a crime, for which he is otherwise not personally responsible, but, as in any war, the destruction of the enemy army or its surrender. Therefore he is not asked details about himself or about attacks that he may or may not have committed and that are not of immediate interest, but rather for precise information about his organization. In particular, each man has a superior whom he knows; he will first have to give the name of this person, along with his address, so that it will be possible to proceed with the arrest without delay.
No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his secret from him. Then, as a soldier, he must face the suffering, and perhaps the death, he has heretofore managed to avoid. The terrorist must accept this as a condition inherent in his trade and in the methods of warfare that, with full knowledge, his superiors and he himself have chosen. Once the interrogation is finished, however, the terrorist can take his place among soldiers. From then on, he is a prisoner of war like any other, kept from resuming hostilities until the end of the conflict.
He goes on to argue against senseless or unnecessary violence, but advocates not shrinking from, shall we say, sensible or necessary violence (and what is war but sometimes necessary violence?):Although violence is an unavoidable necessity in warfare, certain unnecessary violence ought to be rigorously banned. Interrogations in modern warfare should be conducted by specialists perfectly versed in the techniques to be employed.
The first condition for a quick and effective interrogation is to have interrogators who know what they can ask the terrorist under questioning. ... The interrogators must always strive not to injure the physical and moral integrity of individuals. Science can easily place at the army's disposition the means for obtaining what is sought.
But we must not trifle with our responsibilities. It is deceitful to permit artillery or aviation to bomb villages and slaughter women and children, while the real enemy usually escapes, and to refuse interrogation specialists the right to seize the truly guilty terrorist and spare the innocent. And while Col. Moroney makes a very good point - most of Col. Trinquier's analysis is based on specific French experience in WW2 as the insurgent and in Indochina and Algeria as the counterinsurgent - a lot of what he observes has a familiar ring. Consider this passage in the light of Fallujah:In the light of present events, we can imagine in its broad outlines the unfolding of future aggression:
A few organized and well-trained men of action will carry out a reign of terror in the big cities. If the goal pursued is only to strew the streets nightly with a certain number of anonymous corpses to terrorize the inhabitants, a specialized organization would have no difficulty, within the framework of existing laws, in escaping the pursuit of the police. The numerous attacks being committed nightly in our large cities, which are nothing other than a prelude to facilitating the creation and training of an important warfare organization, demonstrate in a tangible way the inadequacy of a traditional police force against modern terrorists. Whenever a broad attack is unfolded, the police run the risk of being quickly overwhelmed.
In the countryside, and particularly in the hilly regions such as the Massif Central, the Alps, or Brittany, the population has no permanent protection. Small bands could easily block traffic through difficult passes by killing the passengers of the first two or three automobiles. A few brutalities, such as savagely executed preventive assassinations in the surrounding villages, will cow the inhabitants into providing for the maintenance of the bands and will discourage them from giving useful information to the authorities.
Occasional police operations timidly carried out with inadequate forces will fail pitifully. These failures will encourage a goodly number of adventurers to team up with the original outlaws, who will rapidly develop into rebels.
In this fashion, immense zones will be practically abandoned to our adversaries and will be lost to our control. The way will be open to the guerrilla. With terrorism in the cities and guerrillas in the countryside, the war will have begun. This is the simple mechanism, now well known, which can at any instant be unleashed against us.
'Fess up time. I really shouldn't comment since I am totally ignorant of the fact. Many have cited the violence and "no quarter" tactics of the Brits and French as the answer and I can say that is hogwash. :rolleyes: