Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife

[Jimbo]

Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife by John A. Nagl

Anyone have a copy with which they are willing to part? For under $50.00?

[Roguish Lawyer]

This is close to your price range . . .

http://www.selectbooks.com.sg/titles/33986.htm

[Jimbo]

Fantastic. Thank you.

[Go For Broke]

Interesting read. Short breakdown of the book follows:

In the first part, the author outlines the basis for his comparison of the two conflicts. This basis is the Institutional Learning Cycle and the process of doctrinal change. He further explores the difference between the British military culture / previous conflicts and the American military culture / previous conflicts.

* British
** Regimental system
** Lack (at the time) of formal written doctrine within the British system
** Colonial / policing focus of British military, extending back to American Revolution / War of Independence

* American
** Less regimentally based system
** Formal written doctrine
** Conflicts the American military has participated in / focused on e.g. WW II, Korea, the steps taken to deter the spread of Communism throughout Europe and Asia


Part 2 is an examination of British operations in Malaya.
* Political, Military, and Police activities coordinated and directed from a central point
* Focused on the defense of the country against internal threat
* Task organization small and flexible, changed for the conflict

Part 3 is an examination of US operations in Vietnam
* Political, Military, and Police activities coordinated and directed from numerous organizations
* Focused on the defense of the country against external threat
* Task organization was based on previous conflict / geared for Cold War

Part 4 is a synopsis of parts 2 & 3, and includes a reprinting of his orginal article from Foreign Affairs.

The author was provided access to special collections at the Imperial War Museum, and well as conducted personal interviews with select British and American participants.

All in all, an interesting read although the first part is somewhat dry. This is not a down and dirty AAR read, but does provide some interesting material for discussion / reflection. I would recommend this book, especially for conventional officers / NCOs.

:munchin

V/R,

[NousDefionsDoc]

Read it yet Jimbo?

[jatx]

I just ordered a paperback copy from Amazon for $12, should ship immediately. :lifter

[Roguish Lawyer]

I just ordered a paperback copy from Amazon for $12, should ship immediately. :lifter

LOL -- me too.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0226567702/102-5758831-3954508?v=glance&n=283155&v=glance

[Roguish Lawyer]

Read it yet Jimbo?

:munchin

[Jimbo]

Unfortunately, no.

[Roguish Lawyer]

I just finished it. The new paperback has a brief forward by GEN Schoomaker and a new preface by the author which he wrote after a tour in Iraq. The preface should have been an afterword, since it doesn't make any sense until you've read the book.

Anyway, Nagl does a pretty good job, I think, of using the Emergency in Malaya and the Viet Nam conflict to study military organizations. He concludes that the British did well in Malaya in large part because they were flexible, learned from their mistakes and listened to their troops and junior officers. The Americans, on the other hand, did poorly in Viet Nam because they were totally dogmatic in their doctrine, insisting on using what the author refers to as "Jominian" conventional tactics and strategy despite the non-conventional nature of the conflict. Nagl spends a lot of time discussing the refusal of the American military leadership to listen to junior officers (like LTC John Paul Vann) and others (like various study groups and commissions) who wanted to fight the insurgency using UW.

So I liked it. Pretty academic in tone and approach, but a good read.

[NousDefionsDoc]

insisting on using Jominian conventional tactics
Reaper's gonna kick your ass.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Reaper's gonna kick your ass.

:confused: :munchin

[The Reaper]

:confused: :munchin

You read much Jomini, Counsel?

TR

[Roguish Lawyer]

You read much Jomini, Counsel?

TR

No sir, have not read any. Any suggestions for where to start?

I am repeating the terminology used by LTC Nagel. In fact, I will amend my earlier post to make this clear. That being said, you can delete the term "Jominian" without affecting the substance of my review.

Have you read Nagl's book?

[The Reaper]

"The Art of War" by Baron de Jomini.

For many years, he was considered to be much more relevant than Clausewitz. Jomini was a ardent follower and commander under Napoleon. Clausewitz (though frequently accused of being a Napoleonic disciple) was actually an opponent of Napoleon and was an equally ardent student of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Jomini's premise "To arrive at the decisive point on the battlefield with superior power", was similar to N.B Forrest's, though with a great deal more detail and analysis. His relevant points tend to be buried under a rigid structure of didactic and prescriptive approaches. The two writers did know one another, and debated one another's writings (until the untimely death of Clausewitz).

I am away from my copy, but here is a bit of info on it.

Book Description

The Art of War by Baron De Jomini was considered by most military experts of the day, at the time of the American Civil War, to be the definitive work on strategy and warfare. Even today, it is highly regarded as a seminal work in the development of strategy.

Antoine Henri de Jomini was one of Napoleon’s most capable generals. He contributed to almost all of Napoleon’s major battles. Napoleon regarded him so highly he made him Baron De Jomini. At the close of the Napoleonic wars De Jomini became General and Aide de camp for the Tsar of Russia. His first-hand accounts and rigorous analysis of important battles is still a major resource on tactics, strategy and warfare.

Excerpted from The Art of War by Baron de Jomini - Special Edition by Antoine Henri De Jomini, G. H. Mendell, W. P. Craighill. Copyright © 2005. Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

From the SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.

"DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR.

The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely military branches,-viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto unrecognized, might be termed Diplomacy in its relation to War. Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it should have a place in a work like this.

To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:-
1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.
3. Grand Tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering,-the attack and defense of fortifications.
6. Minor Tactics.

It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering.

Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable."

I have not read Nagl's book yet.

If Nagl meant that Jomini was a Napoleonic traditionalist who felt that war was a formal "scientific" pursuit, and whose writings convey much more a black and white approach, he may be right. Clausewitz was much more of a revolutionary "war as an art" thinker. His works require close study to appreciate the subtleties. Both bear study by the serious warrior.

"Cave ab homine unius libri."

TR

[tk27]

Jomini's Art of War is available for free at Project Gutenberg. (http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=97953)
(An excellent resource, the site has many books that may be of interest to board members; Sun Tzu (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/132), Thucydides (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/7142), Clausewitz (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/1946), Hobbes (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/3207), Kipling (http://www.gutenberg.org/browse/authors/k#a132), Conrad (http://www.gutenberg.org/browse/authors/c#a125), etc)
Pardon the interuption.

[Martin]

Thank you, Sir TR.

Martin

[NousDefionsDoc]

Excellent analysis Sir. Simply outstanding.

RL, the thing about both of these classics is they were written for their professional peers. A certain amount of practical experience is both assumed and required.

There are quite a few people walking around that cannot explain the difference between strategy and tactics, much less recognize, develop or implement either.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Excellent analysis Sir. Simply outstanding.

RL, the thing about both of these classics is they were written for their professional peers. A certain amount of practical experience is both assumed and required.

There are quite a few people walking around that cannot explain the difference between strategy and tactics, much less recognize, develop or implement either.

If you read the Nagl book, you'll see that he argues that Jomini's central premise, that destruction of the enemy's forces is how you win wars, became the mantra of the U.S. army to its detriment in Viet Nam. Conventional generals wanted to overwhelm the enemy and beat the living daylights out of them with superior force. They used lots of artillery and bombing which resulted in collateral damage to the population and their hearts and minds. His point was that you don't use a sledgehammer in UW, you use a scalpel. He says that's not what Jomini had in mind.

Of course, lacking practical experience, I may have it wrong. :munchin

[NousDefionsDoc]

I am still working Jomini, but Clasusewitz recognizes war with limited objectives and even states they will be much more frequent than total war.

As for Vietnam, I believe the FOGs did indeed destroy the Viet Cong as a significant fighting force and the South had to be taken by the largest conventional invasion since WWII or perhaps Korea. And only then managed to take it because we cut off support to the ARVN for political reasons. Hardly a case in point. Please, feel free to correct me if I am wrong anyone (AL :p ).

Having not been there, take it with a grain of salt, but I believe Vietnam was at least two conflicts in one. There was the insurgency and then there was a basically conventional conflict with the NVA. And since it was two, one can hardly wrap up an analysis into "We failed because we fought a conventional war against an unconventional enemy." The conflicts also varied greatly over time and area from what I can gather.

I have the book and will start it as soon as I finish the one on Lettow.

[The Reaper]

If you read the Nagl book, you'll see that he argues that Jomini's central premise, that destruction of the enemy's forces is how you win wars, became the mantra of the U.S. army to its detriment in Viet Nam. Conventional generals wanted to overwhelm the enemy and beat the living daylights out of them with superior force. They used lots of artillery and bombing which resulted in collateral damage to the population and their hearts and minds. His point was that you don't use a sledgehammer in UW, you use a scalpel. He says that's not what Jomini had in mind.

Of course, lacking practical experience, I may have it wrong. :munchin

I believe that Jomini would have advocated the heavy application of that conventional force in North Vietnam against military and political targets there in a relatively unrestricted manner. That would have likely included a massive conventional attack across the DMZ, amphibious landings along the coast, mining of Haiphong harbor, interdiction of the transport lines from neighboring countries into North Vietnam, and an unrestricted air campaign throughout the North.

The RVN did not fall to an insurgency. From 1968 on, it was primarily a conventional struggle with the North Vietnamese Army. On that April day in 1975 when another nation's flag flew over Saigon, it was not the VC that raised it, but the conventional forces of the NVA. The tanks that drove into the city were not manufactured in North Vietnam, but imported from elsewhere. Did the NVA win the hearts and minds of the South, or terrorize and enslave them, finally conquering by a conventional military operation?

IMHO, from your description, he is trying to draw some flawed parallels by assuming that the entire encounter was a UW op, that Jomini would have been prevented from applying military force directly to the NVA, and that insurgents won the war. I disagree with all of those premises.

Of course, I haven't read his book, or served in VN, so I may have it wrong as well.

TR

[Airbornelawyer]

I haven't read Nagl's book, but from what RL says he seems to be repeating what is the classic criticism of US strategy in Vietnam: that under GEN Westmoreland there was too much focus on attrition, trying to draw the enemy into a decisive battle where superior American firepower could be brought to bear, in essence repeating many of the mistakes made by the French. Under GEN Abrams, the strategy changed, with greater emphasis on building up the capacity of the ARVN and on pacifying the countryside.

The Viet Cong were destroyed as an effective guerrilla force during the Tet Offensive, but might have been able to rebuild their cadres had Vietnamization and pacification not undermined their ability to operate in the countryside. Thus, while on the surface the war after 1968 still looked like conventional fighting between US infantry units and NVA regulars, the real victory was being won behind the scenes by SF units, CAP Marines, advisors building up ARVN, etc. This victory, unfortunately, would be squandered when Congress abandoned South Vietnam in 1974.

A quick Google shows this article, which I just skimmed, but seems to summarize this thesis: http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume2/august_2004/08_04_02pf.html

[The Reaper]

AL:

Great read, thanks!

Looks like I need to add a few more books to the list.

The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, edited by Lieutenant Colonel T. N. Greene; the US Army's 1966 PROVN Study; and Lewis Sorley's A Better War, published in 1999; Andrew J. Birtle's U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941; and The Prairie Traveler, Captain Randolph Marcy.

TR

[Roguish Lawyer]

Yes, Dave, and he says the change in strategy came too late.

[NousDefionsDoc]

AL,
That thesis fails to address the NVA. It is good as far as it goes, just doesn't go far enough.

[NousDefionsDoc]

RL,
I'm just about finished with "Soup". I'll finish it Monday night, I only need the last chapter. Get your FAK out and gloves on.

[Roguish Lawyer]

RL,
I'm just about finished with "Soup". I'll finish it Monday night, I only need the last chapter. Get your FAK out and gloves on.

Roger, wilco. :munchin

[Razor]

You forgot "Over and out". :cool:

[NousDefionsDoc]

Ok, I've finished it. Over all it was a good book. Lot of detail on Malaya. I understand he did not want to do an in depth analysis, it would have been huge. But as is so often the case, in not going more into depth, he over simplifies.

One of the things that really gets me is while he harps on the US Army in Vietnam insisting on preparing for a conventional invasion, he neglects to admit that this is exactly what ended up happening.

It is my belief that Vietnam was actually two wars - one an insurgency and another basically a conventional conflict against the NVA. The critique should have been they prepared for the latter while not fighting the former, not that they lost the former and that was it. And he neglects to mention that at the end of the day, the fight Westmoreland envisioned was exactly what came to pass and that the ARVN did much better than expected.

He has a touch of Anglophile. He makes Malaya out to be a series of perfect people in the positions and everything going along smooth as glass - nobody will ever convince me that was the case.

He goes on and on about the USMC CAP, while completing neglecting the Army's, primarily USSF, contribution on the insurgency side. He also ignores the rest of the USMC's adherence to the conventional war strategy and only focuses on CAP - which in my understanding was a tiny piece of the USMC presence.

The summary in the last couple of chapters was in my mind the best part of the book.

He complains about the leadership's inability to adapt to a less than conventional conflict in Europe and refusing to accept COIN as the most probable course of action and therefore focusing on it. I would further simplify - if you know COIN is your most likely scenario, STOP PROMOTING ARMOR OFFICERS TO CofS! People are a product of their training. I offer it is assinine to train an officer his entire adult life to lead a armored division into the Fulda Gap and then expect him to adapt to LIC on the fly.

I have nothing against armor or even heavy infantry. But those wars while overwhelming, come along every how often? In the meantime, we will fight 100 COIN fights for every great war.

He tries to tie Mogadishu in, my understanding of the issues there is that they were "others".

He also tries to make a case that the entire Army has to adapt to COIN - and I disagree with that. The problem in Vietnam IMIO was the escalation and the use of non-UW assets to fight UW. The task needs to be assigned to the units that have it in their battle book. The english may not have that luxury, we do.

He makes a valid point that we are making the same mistakes in Iraq. The time line is reversed IMIO. In Vietnam, we started with an insurgency that led to a conventional conflict. In Iraq, we fought the conventional that led to an insurgency. In the first case, I think the answer was to fight the initial fight with Spec Ops and then pile on conventional whern the Norht jumped. In Iraq, we did a fine job of dealing with the conventional, then tasked armor and heavy infantry to stay on and "adapt" to UW. Doesn't work. Mindsets are different.

In summary, a good book. Well worth the read. But not the final solution.

IMIO=In My Ignorant Opinion.

[NousDefionsDoc]

The other thing he doesn't really touch on is the difference in the respective enemies. The english had an advantage in Malaya - they were not fighting natives, but rather Chinese communists, also seen as foreigners by many.

In Vietnam, it was very easy to make the case that we were the only outsiders and therefore garner support from many quarters. Size of the battlefield and general scope were also huge considerations. In Malaya, it was easy to put one many in charge of all aspects. Not so much in Vietnam.

He is right in saying that we have to get the civilian agencies involved in COIN concurrently with the military.

I would have liked to see him compare Malaya with El Salvador - that to me would have been a better analysis. Or Iraq, although the verdict is still out. Bremer as Briggs rather than Westmoreland as Briggs.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Well done, NDD. Are you expecting me to disagree with what you've written?

[NousDefionsDoc]

You and Jomini, yes. :p

That was just off the top as it were. There are many more things, but I don't want to spoil it for those that haven't read it.

[NousDefionsDoc]

Nobody disagrees?:munchin

[Roguish Lawyer]

I have copied TR's excellent Jomini review to its own thread.

[alfromcolorado]

During some research for work I came across quotes and comments on a book called "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam" by John A Nagl.

It has some pretty interesting ideas in it on COIN and the US Army's history of COIN in RVN. Actually, pretty damning. Some interesting support for the CIA and SF's early efforts with Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program and the later USMC Combined Action Platoon (CAP) effort.

Would appreciate any observations and comments from anyone who read this book, especially those who served during this time.

[Slantwire]

During some research for work I came across quotes and comments on a book called "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam" by John A Nagl.

It has some pretty interesting ideas in it on COIN and the US Army's history of COIN in RVN. Actually, pretty damning. Some interesting support for the CIA and SF's early efforts with Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program and the later USMC Combined Action Platoon (CAP) effort.

Would appreciate any observations and comments from anyone who read this book, especially those who served during this time.

Al,

I've not yet read the book. That said, I think this thread (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=5135) might interest you.

V/R,

[alfromcolorado]

Al,

I've not yet read the book. That said, I think this thread (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=5135) might interest you.

V/R,

Good thread thanks. I was hoping for some veteran info and am seeking thoughts at other sites also.

[Trip_Wire (RIP)]

Quote:

"To make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife" -TE Lawrence.

[Roguish Lawyer]

During some research for work I came across quotes and comments on a book called "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: COIN Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam" by John A Nagl.

It has some pretty interesting ideas in it on COIN and the US Army's history of COIN in RVN. Actually, pretty damning. Some interesting support for the CIA and SF's early efforts with Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program and the later USMC Combined Action Platoon (CAP) effort.

Would appreciate any observations and comments from anyone who read this book, especially those who served during this time.

Al, if you use the search button, you'll find that there already are developed threads on lots of books like this one.

[alfromcolorado]

Al, if you use the search button, you'll find that there already are developed threads on lots of books like this one.

Yeah, I am seeing that. I don't come here often enough and should more... I am also a fairly late comer. Member since 2008 due to too much overseas work and not getting the word until late in the game for this site. I don't spend a LOT of time on these forums and much that time is spent at other sites since I am retired and busy with other things.

But since this thread is reinvigorated... Maybe I will post some comments to what is already here.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Yeah, I am seeing that. I don't come here often enough and should more... I am also a fairly late comer. Member since 2008 due to too much overseas work and not getting the word until late in the game for this site. I don't spend a LOT of time on these forums and much that time is spent at other sites since I am retired and busy with other things.

But since this thread is reinvigorated... Maybe I will post some comments to what is already here.

Excellent! We are glad to have you here.

[alfromcolorado]

I think the American Viet Nam War was essentially unconventional from the North Vietnamese perspective. They were using the Maoist "protracted people's war" and the three phases were fluid. If one phase wasn't working it was nothing for them to adjust. Even location had its variations.

The US's mistake was to train the ARVN to conventional war, expecting an invasion from the north in the style of the North Koreans. The Vietnamese knew better than to attempt this.

They used the people's war and adjusted accordingly. The fact that they had "titled" formations of regiments and divisions doesn't detract from the fact that they used guerrilla tactics and depended on the population of SVN for their logistical support.

Throughout the American Indochina War the north supported THEIR formations in the south. We called them Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese called them formations of their army. WE made a distinction that the Vietnamese didn't make.

The formations in the south miscalulated and were smashed during the Tet Offensive.

The fact that more troops needed to come south and participate in the insurrection was just what the Vietnamese had to do.

Pacification worked when the US used it. It was either ignored during the Westmoreland years or too little too late in the Abrams years.

It is unfortunate that we, the United States, decided to take our basketball and go home when things were actually starting to work. But one of the tactics of the people's war is to wear out the opponent's will to fight. They achieved that end before we changed our tactics completely.

It is a shame that with all the COIN experience in our history that we forgot much of it in Vietnam.

I think it is good that the military is trying to learn those lessons again and not doing a bad job of it.

[Richard]

For Vietnam, do they discuss the important issues of:


RVN/DRVN popularly held views of reunification
RVNs lack of Constitution
RVNs lack of popularly elected leaders and weak support of govt


Richard's $.02 :munchin

[The Reaper]

Al:

I think that describes the first part of the war, when the VC were still active.

After Tet '68, the VC were for all intents and purposes, wiped out. Many credible sources state that this was the intention of the North when they encouraged the VC to rise up. The North then transitioned to a more conventional fight, as Mao laid out for his third phase of the insurgency.

Both the Easter Offensive in 1972 and the final invasion in 1975 were conventional, and the ARVN had really not focused adequately on a conventional threat. Nevertheless, the '72 invasion was stopped, largely with American air power, which we failed to provide, along with logistical support (as we had promised) when the final attack came.

South Vietnam fell to conventional attack, by a conventional Soviet-style combined arms army. Not an insurrection.

I agree that we lost our national will, and that is our center of gravity.

TR

[alfromcolorado]

Al:

I think that describes the first part of the war, when the VC were still active.

After Tet '68, the VC were for all intents and purposes, wiped out. Many credible sources state that this was the intention of the North when they encouraged the VC to rise up. The North then transitioned to a more conventional fight, as Mao laid out for his third phase of the insurgency.

Both the Easter Offensive in 1972 and the final invasion in 1975 were conventional, and the ARVN had really not focused adequately on a conventional threat. Nevertheless, the '72 invasion was stopped, largely with American air power, which we failed to provide, along with logistical support (as we had promised) when the final attack came.

South Vietnam fell to conventional attack, by a conventional Soviet-style combined arms army. Not an insurrection.

I agree that we lost our national will, and that is our center of gravity.

TR

I agree that the post US involvment was conventional in all respects. As you stated, phase 3. But the Vietnamese used phases 1 and 2 to end our involvement. Thus, our COIN or, more importantly, our lack of it, helped to accomplish their goals during their insurgency phases.

When we applied COIN tactics in SVN they worked. The conventional tactics never did. IF we had fought from the beginning against an insurgency we MIGHT have accomplished our aims.

(Does this mean that the only tool in the toolbox of the American armed forces should be COIN... NO. As always, we need to avoid fighting the last war and figure out what kind of war we are in at the time while keeping a flexible and varied training program.)