GreenSalsa
06-23-2016, 09:03
From Hy Rothstein in the current Special Warfare magazine. I am frankly amazed such "blasphemy" made it into the SWCS publication. :D
"Three senseless and ultimately harmful “urban legends” that have become almost bedrock special operations beliefs are:
One. The 5th SOF truth: “Most Special Operations Require non-SOF assistance.”
Two. The belief that optimizing Special Operations necessitates “interdependence”
with the conventional military and the interagency.
Three. The belief that SOF can educate conventional leaders sufficiently to allow, when needed, Special Operations-centric campaign plans to emerge and be executed under the command of a Special Operations HQ.
Belief One: The 5th SOF truth — “Most Special Operations Require non-SOF assistance.” This “truth” is pointless. Almost every undertaking requires some degree of external involvement. For example, conventional forces need outside assistance to move troops and equipment. On the other hand, successful conventional operations will rarely require SOF assistance and most special operations do not require non-SOF assistance to the extent that it becomes an imperative for successful action. In fact, any outside assistance must be minimal and by exception only...
Belief Two: The belief that optimizing special warfare necessitates “interdependence” with the conventional military and the interagency. This priority in ARSOF 2022 (and highlighted in other documents as well) is also senseless. First, interdependence means dependence. It is very different from interoperability. Why would any organization link its success to dependence on another organization, especially when lives are at stake? Also, a task force should be structured only after the mission is clearly understood. Interdependence puts the cart before the horse by
engineering “in,” conventional formations regardless of mission requirements. Furthermore, the cost for interdependence means a larger footprint on the ground that can delegitimize an ally and just about guarantee that a special operation will be turned into a conventional mess...
Belief Three: The belief that SOF can educate conventional leaders sufficiently to allow, when needed, special operations-centric campaign plans to emerge and be executed under the command of a Special Operations HQ. The fallacy of this belief should be visibly obvious even to Stevie Wonder. SOF have never been in the lead regardless of the accommodations made between senior special operations and conventional commanders over the last 12 years. Professional Military Education institutions have avoided seriously incorporating special operations requirements into their curricula despite significant special operations resource investments at Army schools. The Command General Staff College does insist, however, that each section have a SO officer as a “training aid” for their conventional students. Conventional leaders are rightfully concerned about the education of conventional leaders. SO leaders who attempt to “educate the conventional force” by saturating conventional PME institutions with SOF fail to change conventional thinking and undercut their responsibility to properly educate SOF for SO requirements...."
Rest of the article here at the back of the magazine:
http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2901Jan-June%20Special%20Warfare2016.pdf
"Three senseless and ultimately harmful “urban legends” that have become almost bedrock special operations beliefs are:
One. The 5th SOF truth: “Most Special Operations Require non-SOF assistance.”
Two. The belief that optimizing Special Operations necessitates “interdependence”
with the conventional military and the interagency.
Three. The belief that SOF can educate conventional leaders sufficiently to allow, when needed, Special Operations-centric campaign plans to emerge and be executed under the command of a Special Operations HQ.
Belief One: The 5th SOF truth — “Most Special Operations Require non-SOF assistance.” This “truth” is pointless. Almost every undertaking requires some degree of external involvement. For example, conventional forces need outside assistance to move troops and equipment. On the other hand, successful conventional operations will rarely require SOF assistance and most special operations do not require non-SOF assistance to the extent that it becomes an imperative for successful action. In fact, any outside assistance must be minimal and by exception only...
Belief Two: The belief that optimizing special warfare necessitates “interdependence” with the conventional military and the interagency. This priority in ARSOF 2022 (and highlighted in other documents as well) is also senseless. First, interdependence means dependence. It is very different from interoperability. Why would any organization link its success to dependence on another organization, especially when lives are at stake? Also, a task force should be structured only after the mission is clearly understood. Interdependence puts the cart before the horse by
engineering “in,” conventional formations regardless of mission requirements. Furthermore, the cost for interdependence means a larger footprint on the ground that can delegitimize an ally and just about guarantee that a special operation will be turned into a conventional mess...
Belief Three: The belief that SOF can educate conventional leaders sufficiently to allow, when needed, special operations-centric campaign plans to emerge and be executed under the command of a Special Operations HQ. The fallacy of this belief should be visibly obvious even to Stevie Wonder. SOF have never been in the lead regardless of the accommodations made between senior special operations and conventional commanders over the last 12 years. Professional Military Education institutions have avoided seriously incorporating special operations requirements into their curricula despite significant special operations resource investments at Army schools. The Command General Staff College does insist, however, that each section have a SO officer as a “training aid” for their conventional students. Conventional leaders are rightfully concerned about the education of conventional leaders. SO leaders who attempt to “educate the conventional force” by saturating conventional PME institutions with SOF fail to change conventional thinking and undercut their responsibility to properly educate SOF for SO requirements...."
Rest of the article here at the back of the magazine:
http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW2901Jan-June%20Special%20Warfare2016.pdf