The Reaper
06-30-2015, 17:32
Interesting read.
TR
Reorganization is Imperative to Fixing Special Forces' Bent Unconventional Culture
by Fletcher Schoen
Journal Article | June 29, 2015 - 7:43pm
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reorganization-is-imperative-to-fixing-special-forces%E2%80%99-bent-unconventional-culture
Reorganization is Imperative to Fixing Special Forces' Bent Unconventional Culture
Fletcher Schoen
Almost everyone in the Special Operations Community recognizes the importance of Unconventional Warfare (UW) in the current environment of persistent conflict and domestic budgetary constraints. Yet, the full spectrum of UW capabilities has been underappreciated both as a mission area and corresponding capability set. As a result U.S. Army Special Operations Command's (USASOC) capability to execute the UW mission has declined, particularly in denied and hostile environments where UW operations are hardest to conduct. USASOC's Commander, General Cleveland, has recognized the decline in UW capabilities. In June, 2014 he stated, "We need to address a key capability gap for "high-end" UW. By "high-end" UW we mean the full range of conditions for unconventional warfare."[i] Part of the blame for this critical gap lies with USASOC itself, which-until it began the reorganizations outlined in the ARSOF 2022 vision-had not organized effectively for UW missions. Without dedicated UW organizations the high operational tempos and larger force requirements of the last 14 years diluted the language skills and personnel selection processes that make the Special Forces (SF) capable of operating unconventionally. The changing makeup of the force and the requirements of two long campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan bent SF's organizational culture away from the unconventional approach and degraded UW capabilities. SF's organizational culture has come to value direct action. Because USASOC has not, until now, organized to build UW skill sets and capabilities and has sacrificed aspects of the selection and language requirements that made SF effective at UW it will have a difficult time rebuilding the prestige of the indirect approach solely through reorganization. Without reorganization and further identification and selection of a dedicated UW force USASOC risks entrenching a SF organizational culture that devalues the UW mission with deleterious efforts on UW capabilities.
(Cont. at link above)
G'day Reaper,
I read that article this morning and was having a think about posting it here, but thought best to leave it to a QP to initiate it.
A couple(and a couple more) things that stand out to me:
1)The author is infantry, not SF. Is that a disadvantage by NOT being inside the SF community in writing this article, or possibly an impartial person making valid points(some of which have been found on this forum)?
2)While ubiquitous, instant, global communication capability has surely added value to ODAs on the ground around the world, has it also potentially HURT ODAs(and potentially the conduct of UW campaigns) in the form of micromanagement, tactical/operational latitude and freedom of maneuver, and job frustration/satisfaction of team members?
Setting aside the advantages of ubiquitous global coms offer, would an ODA in the 1950's/60's possess advantages over an ODA today in a UW environment due to those same coms(or lack of equivalent coms ubiquity/persistence back then)?
Does the ubiquity/persistence of coms play a significant role in the "conventionalization of unconventional SF"?
3)Is the Office of Special Warfare mentioned in the article a modern rough analoq of the Special Operations Research Office that existed briefly in the early days of US Army SF? I found mention of that by a QP here elsewhere in SWJ: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/thoughts-on-the-future-of-special-operations?page=1
I haven't found much of anything about SORO from back then, nor OSW today, and I'm not trying to be cheeky and probe inappropriately, to me they both "smell" like something similar along the lines of a hub for high level UW doctrine/policy development and fusion.
If that's the case, is that still insufficient?
How much of the UW problem revolves around having a very high level UW "champion" at both the .MIL chain of command and at the Executive level?
4)Reading the article and reading on this forum helps provide a superficial understanding from the outside looking in.
Both this article and this forum have provided many examples and opinions of the perceived need for SF to "get back to its roots".
How important is the "root" of talent spotting?
Does talent spotting(as was successfully done in the past) for SF still exist en masse?
Do the far lower numbers of raw material soldiers moving thru the machine negate the cost/value of talent spotting(as I've read occurred in old Airborne Courses)?
Is it possible to conduct effective cost/value talent spotting on civvie street?
5)Am I reading it wrong? 1 out of 4 SF battalions focused on UW?
Wasn't the intent of SF supposed to be 100% UW?
Does this "75% shift"(if that's the case) warrant consideration for a return to a "civilian org hiring uniformed personnel" like the OSS?
6)Would a SF soldier in the 50's/60's been allowed to stay in the unit if they didn't develop and retain high levels of foreign language and intercultural skills?
I thought broad and deep foreign language and intercultural skills was the unique point of difference and foundation upon which SF's conventional and esoteric skills were built?
Sorry for the long diatribe.
Thanks for your consideration.
While the author does make some valid points regarding the DA vs UW mindset focus, I disagree with the overall message and tone of the article. I fear his article is already behind the power curve, as GEN Cleveland and ARSOF 2022 have begun the shift and we are already beginning to see the sea change. Here are the main issues/disagreements I have:
For someone who has not (apparently) spent any time on an ODA or in the Regiment in any capacity, Mr. Schoen (not sure of his rank) has no problem painting the entire Regiment with a very broad brush. Specifically, that we have all become a group of uneducated gorillas with no language skills, who can only pull triggers and kick in doors, and have not done a lick of any kind of Special Warfare since 9/11. I personally know several people (and I am sure there are many others on this board) who participated in OEF-P, VSO, and the Afghan Commando missions. While not UW, those missions were FID and COIN centric, which do tend to test language, cross cultural skills, and the non-kinetic realm. And before anyone dogs me for questioning someones opinion because they are non-SOF, or an academic, or whatever, if you are going to write an article specifically about the culture, mindset and capabilities of an organization, you'd better have first hand knowledge and experience if you expect to be taken seriously.
Speaking of personal experience, I find the authors choices of quotes from “author’s conversation” (vii), “author’s observation”(x), and “author’s colleagues in the SOF community” (xvii), to be cherry picked and one sided. While I have no doubt that the author heard these quotes from SF soldiers, I do not believe they are representative of the current attitude amongst the Regiment. Everyone knows at least one guy who talks like that (I know I do), and while it does not make him a bad SF soldier, it does not reflect the mindset of the rest of the team. While Mr. Schoen freely quotes from SF soldiers, I believe he has forgotten (or never heard) one of the older adages that I was first taught: “We are here to work ourselves out of a job.”
Which brings me to my next issue: Not having known LTC (Ret) Schwalm or read his book, I can almost guarantee his quote about “an armed version of the Peace Corps….we are killers” is taken waaay out of context. Putting aside the easy “SF soldiers are trained as soldiers first” argument, last time I checked, UW was “activities to enable a resistance or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power”, which, by definition will require killing at least a few people. Going back to the whole “work ourselves out of a job” mantra, I don’t want to be the first one through the palace gates, so yeah, I’m going to train somebody else to breach that gate and pull that trigger.
Regarding his quotes on language, his information and stats are out of date (studies from 2003 and 2010). I am receiving constant pressure for everyone to get their 120 hours of language yearly, and I think the new 1st SFC(A)(P) policy of needing a current 1/1 score to attend schools is a good idea. As far as the whole DLPT vs OPI debate, the DLPT is a test designed for DoD linguists. I’d much rather have a guy who can score a 1+/1+ on the OPI rather than a 2+/2+ on the DLPT. Why? Because I need someone who can tell my host nation/resistance force to keep their weapon on safe instead of telling me “what attitude was the news article trying to convey about the new government policy?”.
As far as his opinion on the OSW and the 4th BNs, I will simply say that they are not the only ones focused or capable of conducting UW. The Regiment as a whole is most definitely focused on UW. Executing UW is a team effort, no single organization/section can claim to own it. (Especially the SEALs. They need to keep their flippers out of UW. :D)
In closing, I agree with Mr. Schoen’s basic premise, that over the past decade and a half of war, USASOC and the Regiment have shifted focus from UW. However, I fear we disagree to what extent. I will say I think GEN Cleveland has done an incredible job re-focusing not just the Regiment on UW, but also USASOC as a whole in order to support it. From Group down to the ODA, we are constantly being told to “return to our roots”, and asked “how does this improve your Special Warfare skills?”. Will we see changes overnight? No, but from my perspective we are headed down the right path.
This is an article that may have more relevant 5-10 years ago (the same dates as some of the statistics he references) written by someone who is apparently not qualified and not in the field. This is not uncommon WRT articles written about SOF. There are countless things in the article I take issue with not the least of which is the premise.