View Full Version : U.S. pilots' hands tied in war against ISIS

03-12-2015, 10:24
'We have to apply air power like a thunderstorm, not like a drizzle'
Read more at http://www.wnd.com/2015/03/u-s-pilots-hands-tied-in-war-against-isis/#v4dEgPADvI5FBooD.99

Susan Rice probably has to approve each strike.


03-12-2015, 11:39
The main frustration for pilots is that while they are authorized to carry out their pre-planned missions, they are not permitted to exercise their own judgment if they spot an enemy convoy or even witness the Islamic State committing barbaric acts against innocent victims.

I'm throwing down the "bullshit" card on "Chris," if there really is a "Chris," being able to witness "the Islamic State committing barbaric acts against innocent victims" from a fast mover at altitude.

For Deptula, the solution is simple: Trust the pilots.

“You need to delegate execution authority and engagement authority to the individual who has the greatest situational awareness at the time, and that’s the pilot who can clearly see and discern what is going on,” he said.
Since when does one man in one cockpit in one airplane have "the greatest situational awareness at the time."

For those who so quickly forget:



This is not just military theory for Deptula. He said that strategy was very effective while he served as Joint Task Force commander during Operation Northern Watch, a mission enforcing no-fly zones in Iraq in 1998 and 1999.

“Instead of having my pilots have to ask, ‘Mother, may I?’ for engagement authority, I delegated to them engagement authority based within the context of the pre-brief rules and the degree of certainty of what they were engaging,” Deptula explained.

Yeah, and how did that work out for two Blackhawk helicopters and 26 dead military and civilians in 1994.


03-13-2015, 11:02
A buddy of mine confirmed a few of these points. Most fast movers are using SNIPER pods that give them ISR like capabilities. He's personally watched feeds from these fast movers showing villagers getting massacred. Couldn't do anything about it. By the time they received authorization to drop, the bulldozer was covering the mass grave.

I agree with not allowing pilots to drop blind. ISIL and Pesh all look alike from 10K. Without getting clearance from a GFC, we'll wind up killing partner forces. What we need is authority to get delegated lower on the totem.

03-17-2015, 15:51
I am here as part of one of only two medevac teams supporting Operation Inherent Resolve.

I will tell you in my 21 plus years of active service and many previous deployments to both Afghanistan and Iraq, Ive never seen such a disjointed operation at so many levels before.

The state dept is calling the shots here in Iraq, and there is little to no logistical support for Soldiers, Marines and Airmen on the ground here.

My Forward Support Medevac Platoon, is here as part of an AH-64 task force that is severely hamstrung with the most restrictive ROE I have ever seen....even when being engaged from the air.

Things here are awful, as we depend on a british based security compound to provide food, quarters and security, as the current BOG will not allow for anything more than a shell of a Task Force.

This place could very well turn into the Alamo anyday. Nobody here understands why we cant get support for the most basic aviation parts, petroleum products, tools etc....

Its a real shit show here....

03-18-2015, 13:59
If only there were AAR's and lesson's learned from previous applications of airpower.


Some interesting quotes:
Commander of the U.S. military contribution, Admiral Ellis, offered a good start when he declared in his after-action briefing to Pentagon and NATO officials that luck played the chief role in ensuring the air war’s success. Ellis charged that NATO’s leaders “called this one absolutely wrong” and that their failure to anticipate what might occur once their initial strategy of hope failed occasioned most of the untoward consequences that ensued thereafter.
- These included the hasty activation of a joint task force,
- a race to find suitable targets,
- an absence of coherent campaign planning,
- lost opportunities caused by the failure to think through unpleasant excursions from what had been expected.
Once most of the combat returns were in, it became clear that few allied kills were accomplished against dispersed and hidden VJ units in the KEZ. Not only that, allied air power had been unable to protect the Kosovar Albanians from Serb terror tactics, a problem that was further exacerbated by the stringent rules of engagement aimed at minimizing collateral damage and avoiding any NATO loss of life.
Ruling out [a ground offensive from the start] …. was a colossal strategic mistake, in that it gave Milosevic the freedom to act against the Kosovar Albanians and the power to determine when the war would be over. The opportunity costs incurred by NATO’s anemic start of Allied Force without an accompanying ground threat included
- Failure to exploit air power’s shock potential
- Instill in Milosevic an early fear of worse consequences yet to come
- Encouraged the VJ troops to disperse and hide while they had time
- virtual carte blanche it gave Milosevic for accelerated atrocities in Kosovo
- The relinquishment of the power of initiative to the enemy.