Saudi Arabia

[NousDefionsDoc]

I'm not really up on the strategy for Saudia Arabia and by no means I am a SME on the AO. I would be interested, given that most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi, in hearing thoughts on our current strategy there.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Great thread, NND. I wish the poll had an option for "I don't know," because I don't think I know enough about what's really going on to answer.

Frankly, I'm concerned that anyone on this board who does know what's really going on won't be willing to post anything.

[Edit: was going to fix the typo above, but I'll leave it as is -- "No Negligent Discharge" LOL]

[lrd]

I'm interested, also. My other half spent a lot of time over there, but I think things have changed since then. It would be helpful to me if someone could lay out the basics of our current strategy to provide a starting point for our discussion.

FYI -- The Jan/Feb '04 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS has a good article, The Saudi Paradox by Michael Scott Doran, which discusses the tensions and battles taking place between Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Nayef (Interior Minister).

[Valhal]

Have you read the book Sleeping With The Devil by former CIA operative Robert Baer?

[lrd]

Originally posted by Valhal
Have you read the book Sleeping With The Devil by former CIA operative Robert Baer? I haven't. I guess I need to run back to the library. :)

I've been browsing around here: http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/

[Airbornelawyer]

That site, the Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, is a pro-Saudi site (some would call it a shill, but that is not really an argument per se). There are also some UK-based anti-Saudi sites (some of which go so far as to refuse to call the country Saudi Arabia, as that in their minds legitimizes the House of Saud). Also, if you want a synopsis of Robert Baer's thesis, read this May 2003 Atlantic Monthly piece: http://foi.missouri.edu/evolvingissues/fallhouseofsaud.html

There are some good resources on Saudi politics and related topics, but few are dispassionate. I would suggest getting a good base of knowledge through a more objective source like a Library of Congress' database of the US Army Country Studies/Area Handbook Program. The Saudi Arabia Area Handbook is dated as of December 1992, so some of the current events information is outdated, but the historical background, geography, social and ethnic composition, etc. are still accurate. Even most of the economic and governmental information is still accurate, given the conservative nature of the Kingdom. It doesn't have anything about the Consultative Council, or Majlis al-Shura, which was created in 1993, but that body is relatively powerless anyway. The area handbook is here: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/satoc.html

Because of the study's timeframe, it does not effectively address the most important issue regarding the Kingdom, which is the demographic timebomb. Saudi Arabia has been pushing a policy of "Saudi"ization of its workforce, expelling or reducing the number of foreign workers and encouraging Saudis to take jobs they previously did, and also encouraging growth in the non-oil production sector, with requirements for Saudi employment. This policy has had mixed success.

The policy is imperative, however, because of the demographic problem. Saudi Arabia has had a phenomenal population explosion (not surprising given the absence of contraception, legal polygamy, and the example of King Abd al-Aziz, who had some 45 sons). The growth rate is estimated by the CIA to be 3.27% (compared to 0.92% in the US and a world average of 1.17%). The median age for males is 20.9 years (for the US, it is 34.5 years). Median ages around 20 are far more typical of Third World countries. Also, 42.3% of Saudi Arabia's population is below 15 years old (twice the US proportion), so the problem is only getting worse. There are literally thousands upon thousands of Saudis in their teens and early twenties with absolutely no prospects, but who have been raised with the expectation that prosperity was their birthright.

It is these purposeless and alienated Saudis, inculcated as well with the extreme Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, who were and are the fertile recruiting ground for al-Qa'ida. They are also, ironically, among the Arabs most familiar with the West, as many young Saudis go away to school, especially in the US (the Saudi government has more US Ph.D.s than the US government). But like Sayyid Qutb in an earlier era, they return despising the West for its "decadence" and despising the regime for its alliance with the West.

This simmering discontent is, if not ignored, underestimated by too many Western analysts focusing on the shifting power relationships in the royal family. Like Kremlinologists of old, they pore over press releases and photos of national events, receptions for visiting dignataries or trips abroad, searching for signs of who is "in" and who is "out" based on proximity to the King or Crown Prince. All of that divination may be a waste of time if the whole royal family ends up in exile or dead.

Next installment: I waste your time. Lrd mentioned the Foreign Affairs piece on the tensions between Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Naif. I will tell you more than you ever wanted to know about the whole royal family power structure (albeit not nearly as much as you can find if you dig out there).

Dave

[lrd]

Originally posted by Airbornelawyer
That site, the Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service, is a pro-Saudi site (some would call it a shill, but that is not really an argument per se). It's definately one-sided.

Thanks for the links and post, Dave. My husband dealt with the Saudi military, off and on, from 1990 to 2002. His experiences provided a different picture than that presented to the public then or now. I'll check out the area handbook, and look forward to your next post.

[Valhal]

That was an awesome post, I too will look forward to your next installment.

Mark

[Roguish Lawyer]

Originally posted by Airbornelawyer
Next installment: I waste your time. Lrd mentioned the Foreign Affairs piece on the tensions between Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Naif. I will tell you more than you ever wanted to know about the whole royal family power structure (albeit not nearly as much as you can find if you dig out there).


Can't wait. Hardly a waste. What you do for a living now, THAT's a waste! LOL

[Valhal]

Originally posted by lrd
FYI -- The Jan/Feb '04 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS has a good article, The Saudi Paradox by Michael Scott Doran, which discusses the tensions and battles taking place between Crown Prince Abdullah and Prince Nayef (Interior Minister).

Just bought it. There are some other interesting articles as well.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Just read Baer's article. All I can say is, "Holy ^%$#!"

[Airbornelawyer]

Ok, the royal family. As noted, the Foreign Affairs piece mentions a rivarly between Prince Naif and Crown Prince Abdullah. Now alliances in the Kingdom shift as often as the sands (how is that for a tired and easy cliche?), but at essence the main rivalries/factions are threefold: the Sudairis, the Crown Prince and his allies, and the "Free Princes". However, within the Sudairis, for example, there are shifting factions and rivalries as well, and there is another non-Sudairi faction that is often closer to them, that of the Foreign Minister.

Who are these people?

The father of modern Saudi Arabia, King Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, has a very fitting name. He apparently had 43-45 sons (and a number of daughters that don't really matter in Saudi society), 40 or so of whom reached adulthood and 29 of whom are apparently still alive. Those who are living range in age from Muhammad ibn Abd al-Aziz, who if he is still alive is 93 (I can't confirm one way or the other) to the relative whippersnapper Hammud ibn Abd al-Aziz, aged 56.

The most important clique among these brothers and half-brothers are the "Sudairi Seven". "Sudayri" in this context refers to the descendants of 'Abd al-Aziz through one of his of his wives, Hussa bint Ahmad Sudayri. Their seven sons are:

Fahd, Prime Minister, Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (he eschews the title "King")
Sultan, Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Aviation and Inspector General
'Abd ar-Rahman, Deputy Minister of Defense and Aviation and Inspector General
Naif, Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the Civil Defense Council
Salman, Governor of Riyadh Region
Ahmad, Deputy Minister of the Interior
Turki, a businessman and "philanthropist" with no official government positionAlso, a cousin of the Sudairi Seven through their mother is Saad bin Nasir al-Sudayri, the Secretary General of the National Security Council.

The next most important clique is that of the Crown Prince. Abdullah has no full brothers, and maintains his power base through alliances with other half-brothers and through the tribes (especially the northern tribes of his mother's family).

The "Free Princes" today have little power. They were a group that advocated democratic reforms in the early 1960s, while King Sa'ud ruled. When Saud was deposed in 1964, they were allowed to return from exile, but they haven't exerted much influence since. The "leader" of the group, Prince Talal, is the UNESCO Special Envoy for Water. Prince Talal's son Alwaleed bin Talal became prominent when Rudy Guiliani refused his gift to the 9-11 fund.

The Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, is sort of in his own wing. He is the son of King Faisal, and thus a grandson of Abd al-Aziz. His brother Turki was Chief of General Intelligence until August 2001, when he was replaced by someone closer to Crown Prince Abdullah, Prince Nawwaf ibn Abd al-Aziz. Turki has retuned to prominence however, having become Ambassador to the UK in March 2003. Another brother, Khalid, is a regional governor.

Sudairi factions

While generally the Sudairi Seven are close, meeting regularly, they have their own rivalries. Foreign Affairs cites Prince Naif, who as Interior Minister has become prominent in the fight against terrorism inside the Kingdom. And Salman, as Governor of Riyadh, has the most prominent of the regional power bases (and his son is Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Natural Resources).

Prince Sultan, having control of the armed forces, also has a powerful base. He is reckoned at being third in power after the King and Crown Prince. Two of Sultan's sons are Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Ambassador to the United States, and Gen. Prince Khalid bin Sultan, Assistant Minister of Defense and commander of Arab forces in Desert Storm. After Desert Storm, given the prominence of his sons, there was fear he had too much power, and there was a period of reshuffling (Khalid was dismissed as commander of the Army), but he has since returned to prominence.

The Power Portfolios

There are some 3000 royal princes, so everyone has some sort of job, but power rests in certain key positions, which I have mentioned in passing above in connection with the name of the Prince. Here are the key positions, by position rather than holder:
The Royal Court - Fahd's turf
Ministry of Defense and Aviation; the Saudi Armed Forces - the tanks and planes; also the General Intelligence Directorate is under it, but the Prince who runs it is fairly autonomous
Ministry of the Interior - controls the police, Frontier Guards, Coast Guard and the mutawiin, or "religious police". Also, the regional governorates report to the Ministry.
Saudi Arabian National Guard - a tribally-based military force which acts as a check on the Army and a way for the tribal leaders to retain influence. Although the Army has the M-1A2s and Bradleys, the SANG is probably a more capable fighting force.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs - not a power ministry per se, but important in presenting the Saudi face to the world.A second-tier power portfolio is, oddly, the Ministry of Municipal & Rural Affairs, formerly the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, which among other things controls alot of patronage through various projects. The Minister is Mit'ib ibn Abd al-Aziz, another half-brother of the King.

The Next Generation

Since King Abd al-Aziz al-Saud's death, the succession has been horizontally among his sons. The brothers together choose a Crown Prince. Abdullah has been Crown Prince since Fhad ascended to the throne. But as this generation of sons grows older, and the 100 or so grandsons get restless, there may be problems. Two of those grandsons managed to get killed (one was killed in riots in 1965 and another was executed after he assassinated King Faisal in 1975.

It remains possible that some of these sons whose fathers were Kings might think they have as much of a royal prerogative as someone whose brother was king.

Baer's piece is a bit over the top (albeit not too much), but he posits that Fahd's youngest son Abd al-Aziz ibn Fahd has ambitions of being King. Abd al-Aziz ibn Fahd carries the many outwardly empty titles Minister of State, Cabinet Member and Chief of the Court of Cabinet's Presidency; his power is as a gatekeeper to his father and as a hoarder of oil wealth. His older brother Saud is Deputy Chief of General Intelligence and his oldest brother Muhammad is Governor of the oil-rich Eastern Province.Interior Minister Prince Naif's son Saud, meanwhile, is Deputy Governor of the Eastern Province.

I already mentioned Prince Sultan's sons Bandar and Khalid. Bandar has the biggest profile in the US, but has no claim to the throne as his mother was a house servant (or slave if you ask some people).

The late King Saud's sons Muhammad and Misha'al are both governors, but are not major players.

As mentioned, King Faisal's son Saud is Foreign Minister and his son Turki was Chief of General Intelligence and is now Ambassador in London. His son Khalid is Governor of Asir Region.

None of King Khalid's sons is very prominent, but judging by the "who's in" criteria, they are close to the Crown Prince.

Conclusion

One thing to keep in mind is that despite talk of various rivalries within the royal family, these people have managed their relationships with each other for quite some time. In 1962-63, as King Saud slipped into medical problems, a power-sharing arrangement was worked out for the power portfolios. Fahd became Interior Minister, Abdullah took command of the National Guard, Sultan became Defense Minister and Salman became Governor of Riyadh. Naif took over the Interior Ministry when Fahd became Crown Prince in 1975, but in essence they have held their relative power positions for 40 years.

Although I don't agree with all Baer's conclusions, he does hit on most of the major issues and especially whether this forty-plus year system of checks and balances is on the edge of collapse. He doesn't address the Shi'a problem, though, which has many Saudis deathly concerned about developments to their north in southern Iraq. Perhaps that should be the next topic?

Regards,
Dave

[Valhal]

Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
Just read Baer's article. All I can say is, "Holy ^%$#!"

I know, pretty scary stuff. I highly recommend the book. I've been wanting to talk to someone about it.

[D9 (RIP)]

Do we have a Saudi Arabia policy? I thought we were just flying by seat-of-your-pants pragmatism.

There is a problem with Saudi Arabia: it is one of the wellsprings on the militant Islamic ideology, and promotes religious totalitarianism. The monarchy is a puppet regime, who makes a lot of pomp out of their "power," but whom are very mindful that if they don't play it the way the mullahs want in the end, they will be assassinated. It is the mullahs, who control the hearts and minds, who run Saudi Arabia - the monarchy is just a front and the legacy of an old power-sharing arrangement.

There has been talk recently, esp by Rumsfeld, of convincing the mullahs to "moderate" their positions. This is one of the hallmarks of his "war of ideas." And it is a disaster.

One can see this by observing what the so-called moderates are saying themselves. In an October meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Mohathir Mohammed (Malaysian PM) addressed the assembled delegation. Mohathir is widely applauded moderate, whom NYT columnist Paul Krugman describes as, "....as forward-looking a Muslim leader as we are likely to find." Krugman and others have praised Mohathir for encouraging Islamics to rediscover the sciences and mathematics, which he correctly identifies as having been lost to them in the 12th c.

But look what Mohathir, the quintessential Muslim moderate, has to say about what they would like to do with this science and technology. Quoting from his speech, in reference to what fruits progress will bear in the Islamic world: (my comments in brackets)

"We are enjoined by our religion to prepare for the defense of the ummah [NOTE: ummah: Islamic realm]. Unfortunately, we stress, not defense, but the weapons at the time of the prophets [in other words, they are hopeless to defend themselves b/c they have not embraced science and technology]. Those weapons and horses cannot defend us anymore. We need guns and rockets, bombs and warplanes, tanks and warships for our defense. But because we discouraged the learning of science and mathematics, etc., as giving no merit.... today we have no capacityto produce our own weapons for our defense. We have to buy our weapons from our detractors and enemies.... Times have changed. Whether we like it or not, we have to change, not by changing our religion but by applying its teachings in the context of a world that is radically different from that of [antiquity]."

This is what is taken as moderation. Does it sound as if there is less hostility to the West? Of course not, just the pragmatic compromise on their part in recognition of the obvious fact that they have no hope against us militarily without modern weapons.

And for all his attention to "defense," one may think he means just regular old border security. But later in the speech he clarifies:

"[O]ur detractors and enemies do not care whether we are true Muslims or not. To them, we are all... followers of a religion and a Prophet whom they declare promotes terrorism, and we are their sworn enemies. They will attack and kill us, they will invade our lands, bring down our governments, whether we are Sunnis or Shia, Alawite or Druze, or whatever. And we aid and abet them by attacking and weakening each other, and sometimes by doing their bidding, acting as their proxies to attack fellow Muslims."

Wonder who he's talking about there? :rolleyes:

"We know [Muhammad] and his early followers were oppressed by the Quraysh. Did he lauch retaliatory strikes? No. He was prepared to make strategic retreats..... At Hudaibiyah, he was prepared to accept an unfair treaty, against the wishes of his companions and followers. During the peace that followed, he consolidated his strength, and eventaully was able to enter Mecca and claim it for Islam..... It cannot be that there is no other way; 1.3 billion Muslims cannot be defeated by a few million Jews. And we can only find a way if we stop to think, to assess our weaknesses and our strengths, to plan, to strategize, and then to counterattack."

This is moderation? Houston, we have a problem.

The problem is that if you take an evil idea - like slavery - moderation is not the answer. For the US to embrace a "moderated" version of Islam as the answer in Saudi or elsewhere, without demanding fundamental changes in the precepts of that faith or its expulsion from public life, may be only to embrace a more deadly form of the virus that already infects that region.

To some extent, the zealous maniacs like Bin Laden are so self-deluded as to be self-defeating. A person obsessed with living in caves while destroying his enemies, may be less dangerous in the long run than the man who still sees driving infidels out of the ummah as his ultimate goal, but who realizes the value of science in developing nuclear weapons towards that end.

Unfortunately, however, this push of Rumsfeld's to moderate Islam appears to have some currency in Washington. Of course, following our usual MO this will probably mean financial enticements to those whom we decide are "moderates," and we'll probably once again wind up funding the next generation of antagonists from that region, whose depredations will take the form of nuclear brinkmanship someday rather than conventional terrorism.

The only way to solve this problem is not to continue to fawn over "Islam: Religion of Peace." It is not to be the apologists of the world's Muslims, branding the most vile "extremists" while embracing moderates who have an equally vile though more practical idea about how to destroy the West. Moderation is not what Islam needs. Islam needs to be completely changed starting at the most basic level. It is a religion that is incompatible with any dissent, it demands absolute authority, it demands sacrifice and death on its behalf of both its adherents and those who stand in the way of their other-worldly goals. Before we have peace, it has to be exposed as such. If some vestigial version of it remains as the dying cultural legacy of a corrupt totalitarian ideology, then so be it. But until it ceases to exists as a political force in the world, America (at least not as a free nation) will not be safe.

We will not solve Saudi, or any of the middle-east, until we impose upon them the ultimatum they seek to impose upon us: change or die. We are not doing that now for sure, and I don't see it in the near future. But it will come to that before my generation is gone, mark my words. Unfortunately, I'm afraid, a lot more innocent people are going to die before we recognize the full extent of the problem.

[Valhal]

Dave, which conclusions of Baer do you have issue with?

Also, I just finished that Foriegn Affairs article. Some interesting topics were presented. I need time to ruminate on them.

Mark

D9, Amen Brother.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Dave:

Another fantastic post. Looking forward to the next installment.

One thing is quite clear to me: we need to reduce our dependence on Saudi oil ASAP. Drilling in the ANWAR is the place to start, IMO.

[D9 (RIP)]

Originally posted by Roguish Lawyer
One thing is quite clear to me: we need to reduce our dependence on Saudi oil ASAP. Drilling in the ANWAR is the place to start, IMO.

I have a better idea, how about we sack up and go and take back the oil that was nationalized from us in the 50's, 60's and 70's.

[Maya]

This is a problem that not only manifests itself in SA, but the entire world. The Islamic militant/fundamentalist movement is one that we need to have an expanding/dynamic strategy to deal with, so that we can respond to 'opportunities' that present themselves on a global basis. The extremist Islamic global game board would best be addressed by having a light, fast moving group of assets that can react/respond to the fruit of our expanding intelligence, and run down the BG's where and whenever they pop their little heads up. Gee, that sounds like something our SF/SOCOM/Intel folks might like doing..........more of!

ButÉ

We also need to be smarter in our dealings with this part of the world, rather the world in general. We have treated this problem, militant Islamic, as a secular one when in fact it is a spiritual/religious one. The dynamics involved in religious motivated insurrections and violent actions based upon fanatic fervency remove the 'logic' from the equations, and thereby redraw the lines of confrontation to the individual combatant level. As everyone here knows itÕs almost impossible to stop a determined individual with the goal of destroying a target if that individual has no provision in their plan for their egress/survival. Which is the most ominous part in Robert BaerÕs report/analysis of Saudi Arabia and the House of Saud. The analysis given by Baer as to vulnerabilities in SA applied to the global arena is over whelming in scale if we apply similar methodologies to it. This sounds very similar to what David Steele has been saying regarding the State of Warfare and needs in intelligence gathering.

Skipper

[nmap]

I wonder - could the current economic situation, along with population growth, have created a problem in Saudi Arabia? More pointedly, is the money running low, with all which that implies?

LINK (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=amhf6ZV5uWq0)

Saudi Arabia’s Algosaibi Said to Owe $9.2 Billion (Update2)


By Zainab Fattah and Camilla Hall

June 26 (Bloomberg) -- Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi & Brothers Co., the Saudi family holding company whose Bahraini bank has defaulted, owes 34.6 billion Saudi riyals ($9.2 billion) to more than 100 banks, two people familiar with the situation said.

The Algosaibi group held a meeting with creditors in Bahrain June 24 to ask for a grace period of 90 days to investigate the debt, said one person involved in the talks, who declined to be identified because the information is confidential. A spokesman for the company, which bottles Pepsi Cola in Saudi Arabia and holds stakes in lenders including Saudi British Bank, had no immediate comment when contacted by Bloomberg News.

The size of Algosaibi’s liabilities “strikes the markets as a surprise,” said Luis Costa, an emerging-markets debt strategist at Commerzbank AG in London. “This is a problem when it comes to buying anything originated from the Middle East, how to properly measure the leverage of players there.”

Algosaibi said June 11 it had discovered “substantial irregularities” within its financial services arm after The International Banking Corporation BSC in Bahrain defaulted on debt. An Algosaibi spokesman said last month that Maan al-Sanea, the Saudi billionaire who owns a stake in HSBC Holdings Plc, managed TIBC. A spokesman for Saad Group, al-Sanea’s holding company, denied he had a management role at the bank.

The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency on May 28 froze the accounts of al-Sanea, according to a person who read the central bank’s circular. Five days later, Saad Group, which is based in Al-Khobar in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province, said it was restructuring debt because of “a short-term liquidity squeeze.”

Ratings Downgrade

Moody’s downgraded Saad by five levels to below investment grade before withdrawing the rating because of a lack of “adequate” information about the company’s finances.

Al-Sanea, who married into the Algosaibi family, ranked No. 62 among the world’s richest people by Forbes in March, with an estimated net worth of $7 billion.

Algosaibi is setting up steering groups for each of its four financial divisions to figure out how to repay debt.

Banks that provided at least $64 billion to Saudi borrowers in the past five years as record oil prices spurred economic growth for the world’s biggest crude exporter now risk losses because the country’s first recession in a decade is threatening the wealth of some of the most powerful families.

BNP, Citigroup

International banks hold 30 percent of the debt of Algosaibi’s four financial divisions, TIBC, Saudi Arabia-based Money Exchange, Bermuda-based Algosaibi Trading Services, and Bahrain-based Algosaibi Investment Holding, according to the two people, who are involved in the talks to restructure the debt. Another 30 percent is owed to Saudi-based banks and the remaining 40 percent to banks from the other five members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Algosaibi borrowed $700 million in May 2007 through a three-year loan arranged by banks including Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Arab Bank Plc, BNP Paribas SA, Lloyds Bank Plc, Mashreq Bank, NBD Bank NA, Qatar National Bank and WestLB AG, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

BNP Paribas and Citigroup Inc. provided about $500 million each in syndicated loans to companies owned by al-Sanea and the Algosaibi family, according to a document obtained by Bloomberg News. The banks top a list of 37 creditors that provided $5.6 billion in syndicated loans to units of Saad Group.

To contact the reporter on this story: Zainab Fattah in Dubai on zfattah@bloomberg.net; To contact the reporter on this story: Camilla Hall in Dubai at chall24@bloomberg.net

Last Updated: June 26, 2009 07:35 EDT