Fallujah & Mao

[NousDefionsDoc]

From a blog. I won't link it because I don't think we want them over here.

Any thoughts?

What if they left? Mao and Guerrilla Warfare

Much media hand-wringing has been heard in the last 48 hours about insurgents possibly escaping the city.

How to take this? First a few quotes from Mao Tse-Tung, who successfully prosecuted a variety of guerrilla campaigns before bequeathing such lovely things as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution to history [note: for an excellent film about these events, rent the movie, Huozhe (1994) ("To Live")].

I use the text of Mao's book translated by Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith II, USMC, who had a PhD in Chinese military history from Oxford. Mao's text was written in 1937.

Mao's political goal was the complete emancipation of the Chinese people from the Japanese. He states the fundamental steps necessary as these:

1. Arouse and organize the people.
2. Achieve internal unification politically.
3. Establish bases.
4. Equip forces.
5. Recover national strength.
6. Destroy enemy national strength.
7. Regain lost territories.

Six full pages of this book are dedicated to the importance of establishing bases. Let's focus on that, as it is the most relevant to the Fallujah battle. Here are some further quotes:

"The problem of establishment of bases is of particular importance."

"The guerrilla base may be defined as an area, strategically located, in which the guerrillas can carry out their duties of training, self-preservation, and development. Ability to fight a war without a rear area is a fundamental characteristic of guerrilla action, but ths does not mean that guerrillas can exist and function over a long period of time without the development of base areas."

And here we have the way to understand what is happening in Fallujah. The battle is accomplishing several goals:

1. Kill all those who fight us.
2. Eliminate a base of operations for terrorist and anti-Iraq forces.
3. Establish a representative government, politically friendly or part of the national government.
4. Allow Iraqi forces to participate in the battles and to build their warfighting skills, and the legitimacy of their government.
5. Defeat various means of insurgent media-strength: safe places to keep hostages; inflated casualty figures.
6. Destroy insurgent command and control networks.
7. Exploit intelligence.

The insurgency now has no base in Fallujah. It will soon have no base in Ramadi or the other few towns where insurgents are massed. An insurgency without a base cannot survive. The only places that will be left for bases will be outside the country . . . Syria, Iran, etc, . . .

[magician]

this thesis omits to mention that much of the Iraqi cityscape is a spotted mess of base areas.

guerrillas swim in the ocean of the populace, to hijack Mao's own dictum, and it is enough if guerrillas are able to coerce grudging acceptance of their presence from the population.

the hard fact is, until Abdul Average Iraqi believes that the guerrillas are harming his own interests to a point where he feels that he must act against them, the broader populace will remain a petri dish where guerrillas can survive, and sometimes flourish.

it is good, on the other hand, to deny guerrillas internal sanctuaries where they can plan, train, fit and refit, and retire after action. Forcing them use sanctuaries outside the country lengthens their lines of communication, and eases interdiction.

But we should also recognize that there is a difference, particularly from the Maoist perspective, between an underground resistance organization, and guerrillas.

guerrillas present far more of a target, and can often be neutralized when they mass by superior tactics and firepower. An underground....that is primarily a law enforcement and intelligence challenge, and it is in combatting the underground that we are getting our asses handed to us.

[NousDefionsDoc]

I agree with everything you just said Brother, except - An underground....that is primarily a law enforcement in the third world. Its late and I'm tired, so I'm going to bed. I'll be back manana to 'splian why.

[magician]

cool, hermano.

te espero.

s.
-

[Guy]

I agree with everything you just said Brother, except - in the third world. Its late and I'm tired, so I'm going to bed. I'll be back manana to 'splian why.

Is that what you were going to say? :munchin

[NousDefionsDoc]

No, despite the rosy picture of Mao's regime painted by...well...Mao's regime, it was probably just as corrupt as the rest.

Let's hear what some of the 18Xers and general membership think.

[Roguish Lawyer]

I would like to know what percentage of the Iraqi population is part of the insurgency. Is this really a discrete group or are we at war with Islam? :munchin

[The Reaper]

I would like to know what percentage of the Iraqi population is part of the insurgency. Is this really a discrete group or are we at war with Islam? :munchin

Northern Iraq with the Kurds appears calm.

Southern Iraq with the Shia appears calm, except for periodic agitation by al Sadr.

The Sunni Triangle, which contains a fraction of the population of Iraq, is the main hotbed of unrest, and a small percentage of the people there support the terrorists. An even smaller percentage are actually terrorists.

If we can keep the rest of the country calm, whittle the numbers of terrorists down while avoiding adding to their numbers or allowing foreign fighters to enter the country, and dissipate their popular support, I see little future in their cause.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

[NousDefionsDoc]

Well, less than 25k have been holding Colombia, population of about 43MM, hostage for 40 years. There were estimates a couple of years ago that the 25k were in control of about 60% of rural Colombia. They used a lot of the same tactics.

[Roguish Lawyer]

Northern Iraq with the Kurds appears calm.

Southern Iraq with the Shia appears calm, except for periodic agitation by al Sadr.

The Sunni Triangle, which contains a fraction of the population of Iraq, is the main hotbed of unrest, and a small percentage of the people there support the terrorists. An even smaller percentage are actually terrorists.

If we can keep the rest of the country calm, whittle the numbers of terrorists down while avoiding adding to their numbers or allowing foreign fighters to enter the country, and dissipate their popular support, I see little future in their cause.

Just my .02, YMMV.

TR

What sayeth the magic birthday boy with respect to these assessments? :munchin

Guy? :munchin

[Roguish Lawyer]

Well, less than 25k have been holding Colombia, population of about 43MM, hostage for 40 years. There were estimates a couple of years ago that the 25k were in control of about 60% of rural Colombia. They used a lot of the same tactics.

But the Iraqi tangos don't have 360,000 square miles of jungle to hide in, right? :munchin

[The Reaper]

Well, less than 25k have been holding Colombia, population of about 43MM, hostage for 40 years. There were estimates a couple of years ago that the 25k were in control of about 60% of rural Colombia. They used a lot of the same tactics.

Some would argue that the Colombian government and its forces have failed to eliminate the insurgency there for their own reasons.

Not to take away from the Colombians, but I would propose that the American forces in Iraq and the new Iraqi forces together are significantly more effective fighting forces than the Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia.

TR

[magician]

What sayeth the magic birthday boy with respect to these assessments?

well....big bite to chew on...but here goes.

The South, per se, is relatively quieter, because the majority of the population there believe that their time to rule is nigh. The Shia support the current roadmap to representative government because historically, they have been suppressed and oppressed by the Sunni minority, and they can do math.

That said, it is perilous to ascribe uniform behavior and beliefs to any population, as the larger your sample, the more that schisms and exceptions emerge. And indeed this is the case with the Shia, with Sadr and his "army" merely one example.

It is also important to remember that Iraq is more than just Shia, Sunni, and Kurd, with a small Christian minority keeping its head down. Tribal affiliations are also important, and it is tribal affiliations which often serve as faultlines within the larger religious groupings.

And then, you have the wildcards represented by the Jihadis, and the criminals, or those who have resorted to criminal activities, due to the extreme economic disruption and dislocation of the occupation.

Trying to analyze Iraq is like trying to be systematic about a kaleidescope.

I would also advise reading what my esteemed brother and colleague The Reaper wrote very carefully:


The Sunni Triangle, which contains a fraction of the population of Iraq, is the main hotbed of unrest, and a small percentage of the people there support the terrorists. An even smaller percentage are actually terrorists.


I would like to gently point out that it is not so important that a "small percentage of the people there support the terrorists," as historically, a virulent underground does not require a huge infrastructure or broad apparatus as much as it requires well-placed sympathizers and co-conspirators. We all know that one mole in the right place can cripple entire governments, and anecdotes from Iraq are replete with tales of endemic insurgent penetrations of Iraqi police, military, and national guard forces.

More significantly, it is that the majority of the population tolerates the presence of what they term "resistance fighters," perhaps through misguided Islamic allegiance, or traditions of hospitality, or because of intimidation and fear to act.

It is not necessary for the majority of the population to support the Jihadis. It is enough if the majority of the population simply tolerates their presence, and does not act to expel them from their villages and neighborhoods and cities.

I would also point out that it is better for our enemy, in fact, in strategic terms, if the Jihadis are numerically small in number. Their target profile is accordingly lessened, and their vulnerability to penetration diminished. Given the destructive potency of modern weapons of war, and the emergence of the IED in all its permutations as the insurgent weapon of choice, it is simply not necessary for many Jihadis to wage war on US forces, and the nascent Iraqi security forces. It is enough if small cells with evolved expertise do so. In fact, their security is improved.

I personally would like to thank the Jihadis for congregating in places like Fallujah. They are easier to kill.

Until we are somehow able to find a prescription for broadening the security umbrella, and consolidating simple peace and order over stable swaths of territory and population concentrations, we are chasing a chimera in Iraq. Until the equation can be somehow changed, and Abdullah Average Iraqi is motivated to inform on insurgents laying low in the house next door, we will forever be reacting to insurgent strikes, rather than effectively targeting insurgent units, and their internal lines of communication. We will remain on the defensive, and the initiative will remain with the bad guys.

I have been receiving reports from pals elsewhere in Iraq, and it is apparent to me that the assault on Fallujah, vital and necessary as it was, may have merely precipitated the wider distribution of insurgents throughout broader parts of the country. Truly draconian population control measures are required in Iraq, with Soviet-style internal passports and ubiquitous checkpoints and roving patrols. These measures are inimical to a flourishing economy, which fundamentally is the one thing that can save Iraq.

Then, we need the equivalent of neighborhood block security committees, and we have to start running agents and hiring informants everywhere. And this will require an Iraqi infrastructure of security institutions which no longer exists.

Unfortunately, the cure for Iraq may be inimical to the spirit of democratic institutions. In a place that has no tradition of democracy, but does have some experience with fascism, and the features of a police state, an Iraq that is kept from the clutches of the Mullahs in Iran, or is somehow contiguously saved from the chaos of civil war, may come to resemble its old self under Saddam more than we would like to admit.

I would like to write more, but I am getting chased out of the office. Maybe tomorrow. And besides, I am hungry.

:)

[brownapple]

I suggest a little research into the success of the anti-Communist operations in Thailand in the 70s and early 80s, especially the establishment of economic situations that created incentives for the population to not tolerate the insurgents.

[The Reaper]

Concur with Magician's insightful analysis, and GH's comment.

This is something I have touched on before in other threads. Mao said that the guerrilla in the populace must be as a fish in the water.

When the average Iraqi sees that the terrorists are more of a perceived threat to him than the government forces, and starts providing actionable intel, then we will see this violence coming to an end.

It remains to be seen whether the elections in January will cause this to happen as the Iraqis finally have their own freely elected government, or whether the elections will spawn more violence as the losing factions attempt to destabilize the elected government.

As GH stated, once the population has an incentive to at least provide intel if not directly act against the terrorists, their days will be numbered. Hearts, minds, or pocketbooks, that is the key to winning this war.

TR

[Weazle23]

Any speculations on the breakdown of the insurgants in regards to nationality? If the majority are not Iraqi, could this be a factor to be exploited in the average Iraqi citizen's attitude towards helping or not helping? Or does the idea of establishing their own Iraq play second fiddle to the Greater Islamic Cause of being anti-Western?

[Roguish Lawyer]

Magician:

Thank you! That was exactly what I was hoping for.

GH:

Any book suggestions?

[Guy]

The different factions and their history are going to make it difficult to set up, security and stability.

If the elections go ahead as planned. I would place my money on the "interim prime minister" Allawi.

1. He’s a Shiite. (Largest of all-the the factions).
2. Although he is secular, he reportedly has the support of the country's top Shiite cleric (Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani).
3. He just married a prominent Kurdish woman. Which reminded me of Kerry/Heinz…lmao!

The Sunnis are in some serious trouble, which makes them “ripe” for foreign influence by these so-called insurgents or terrorists. If you think for a second the Shiites and Kurds will not try, to quell the Sunnis as they position themselves for some political power, after being knocked around for 20-plus years?

Think about the “KISS” principle…”Paybacks a bitch”!

[The Reaper]

Too bad that the Sunnis do not appear to have a central leader who could be brought in and have things explained to him that he can play nicely, and have a piece of the pie, or continue down this path, and see what the Kurds and Shias have for him after we step out and they take over.

Do they think that they will continue to dominate Iraq over the Kurds and Shia after we leave?

TR

[Roguish Lawyer]

Too bad that the Sunnis do not appear to have a central leader who could be brought in and have things explained to him that he can play nicely, and have a piece of the pie, or continue down this path, and see what the Kurds and Shias have for him after we step out and they take over.

Do they think that they will continue to dominate Iraq over the Kurds and Shia after we leave?

TR

I think this guy may be available . . .

:munchin

[The Reaper]

I think this guy may be available . . .

:munchin

I heard that he already has a previous engagement with the hangman.

TR

[Guy]

Too bad that the Sunnis do not appear to have a central leader who could be brought in and have things explained to him that he can play nicely, and have a piece of the pie, or continue down this path, and see what the Kurds and Shias have for him after we step out and they take over.

Do they think that they will continue to dominate Iraq over the Kurds and Shia after we leave?

TR

I’ve been keeping a close eye on the combat operations to secure Fullujah. I thought it was funny that we are pushing those (Sunnis) into Shiite held territory to the South. :eek:

The security and stability within the Kurdish held area is solid. Plus they control the oil fields in the north. The Shiites control those to the South.

The Sunnis control nothing of economic value when it comes to territory. You would think they would come to the bargaining table however…

That’s what makes them ripe for exploitation from radical Islamic or terrorist groups!

[NousDefionsDoc]

I suggest a little research into the success of the anti-Communist operations in Thailand in the 70s and early 80s, especially the establishment of economic situations that created incentives for the population to not tolerate the insurgents.

Gotta love the work, because its never done, is it? ;)

NARATHIWAT TARGETED
The Nation
13 November 2004
Don Pathan

At least 16 hurt in three separate blasts, defence weapons stolen in raids on villages

On the worst day for the deep South since the deadly Tak Bai events, three explosions injured at least 16 people, militants stole an arms cache from security volunteers and a martial arts teacher was shot dead in broad daylight.

Most of the attacks were here in Narathiwat province.

A powerful bomb exploded at about 6pm at the Angmor Restaurant owned by a Chinese-Thai in Narathiwat's Muang (city) district, damaging the front of the restaurant and shattering glass as far as 30 metres across the street. At least 16 people were seriously injured.

Police said a person posing as a customer left an explosives-filled bag behind a refrigerator in the restaurant and detonated it via mobile phone after leaving. The restaurant is a favourite with ethnic Thais and Chinese in the province.

An hour later, another bomb went off at the Surin motorbike shop in Tak Bai, the district where the deadly October 25 crackdown on Muslim protesters occurred. There were no reports of casualties.

Another bomb went off at a military checkpoint at 8pm in the province's Bacho district but no one was injured.

Assailants attacked villages in Narathiwat's Chanae, Bacho, Sukhirin and Rangae districts, stealing at least nine shotguns from village defence volunteers. A villager and two soldiers were injured during attacks in Chanae district.

A military vehicle was attacked in Rangae district and the attackers placed spikes on main roads to thwart any pursuers, causing flat tires to at least 20 vehicles on the road connecting Bacho and Narathiwat town.

Experts managed to defuse a bomb found near the fence of Ban Yi-ngor School in Yi-ngor district, next to the residential quarters of the local police station.

A Buddhist couple narrowly escaped a shooting in the evening in Joh I Rong district. Dee Suksabai, 67, and his wife Borseang Suksabai, 51, were uninjured, an eyewitness said.

Yesterday's violence in Narathiwat was most likely the biggest coordinated attack after the uprising on April 28, when 106 Islamic militants were killed after a pre-dawn assault against security posts in Pattani, Yala and Songkhla.

While violence continued unabated, Narathiwat governor Pracha Terat offered to send two security officials to each family in the province who requested protection.

The chief of Rusoh district, Thanawat Buranapipop, said the district would ask for security officials to guard villagers when they went rubber tapping and urged villagers to go in groups for safety.

In the adjacent province of Pattani, an unidentified assailant on a motorcycle threw a Molotov ____tail into a Muslim restaurant in Muang district, slightly damaging the shop but causing no injuries.

Pirom Chumchuan, 37, the restaurant's owner, said he received a warning the shop would be bombed if he continued to sell food during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, when the faithful are expected to fast during daylight hours. However, he ignored the warning.

In a separate incident, Hiran Khongchareon, 45, a Buddhist martial-arts teacher, died after being shot in the head while riding a motorcycle in Pattani's Yarang district.

Meanwhile, Pattani governor Chertphan Na Songkhla yesterday instructed district officials to urge village defence volunteers to keep their government-issued shotguns after 26 guns were returned to the Pattani authorities.

Village defence volunteers feared possession of government weapons could make them targets for militants.

Don Pathan

The Nation

NARATHIWAT

[magician]

the successful Thai campaign against the Communist Party of Thailand is an example of Hidden History, as it is not well-known, even among specialists of the subject, and very little has ever been published about it.

I am fortunate to work for a man who spent some 17 years in ISOC, Thai intelligence, who has shared many insights with me.

I would love to write about it...but just learning Thai is a long-term proposition, much less actually doing research in that language.

It is a truism of counterinsurgency doctrine that successful strategies depend on overarching contexts incorporating economic and political reforms. Oftentimes, there are racial components, and interestingly, a religious dimension.

The religious dimension is one that characterizes ancient counterinsurgencies, and very recent counterinsurgencies. The core of revolution studies, which is primarily the study of revolutionary Marxism in the 20th Century, is fairly mute on the religious aspects of those revolutions and their antitheses. Even accounts of the longrunning campaign against the Moro in the PI only mention the Islamic element of that conflict in passing.

But I think that a larger criticism that can be made is that professional counterinsurgents end up giving lip service to the concept of the context. They all agree that social reforms, economic reforms, political reforms, are all necessary. But they often end up saying just that, and then moving on to the sexier tidbits which they somehow find more fascinating.

In the case of Iraq, there is an undeniable religious aspect to the conflict. It is far more than just another Crusade. If we are smart, we will foment Sunni vs Shia disputes, which are historical and virulent, and exploit them to weaken our enemies until we can get allied Iraqi forces up off their knees. And we will recognize, sooner rather than later, that the context is the real war, in Iraq. Killing bad guys just addresses the symptom. It does not address the underlying syndrome.

[The Reaper]

If we are smart, we will foment Sunni vs Shia disputes, which are historical and virulent, and exploit them to weaken our enemies until we can get allied Iraqi forces up off their knees. And we will recognize, sooner rather than later, that the context is the real war, in Iraq. Killing bad guys just addresses the symptom. It does not address the underlying syndrome.

Exactly.

And maybe turn the Kurds loose on them as well.

TR

[brownapple]

GH:

Any book suggestions?

Not unless you read Thai.

Decent article, but not detailed http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/tango/thailand1959.htm

I have no idea if this book http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/9748496309/absolutsearch05/103-6943758-6390224 is accurate or not.

This speech by General Prem is useful: http://www.generalprem.com/Speech4.html

A few months ago, the SFA Chapter here in Thailand had a excursion to the last of the basecamps of the Communist Party of Thailand along with a few senior Royal Thai Army Special Forces Officers. Magician and I were among the folks who went, and it was a very enlightening tour.

[Guy]

In the case of Iraq, there is an undeniable religious aspect to the conflict. It is far more than just another Crusade. If we are smart, we will foment Sunni vs Shia disputes, which are historical and virulent, and exploit them to weaken our enemies until we can get allied Iraqi forces up off their knees. And we will recognize, sooner rather than later, that the context is the real war, in Iraq. Killing bad guys just addresses the symptom. It does not address the underlying syndrome.

Especially from a strategic point of view.

And maybe turn the Kurds loose on them as well.

Now that is a tactical point of view. If the two factions of Kurds settle their differences. Iraq will divide into two maybe three different sections, states or areas. Even though they (Iraq) may have a central "interim" government with elections on the horizon.

The Kurds are not, going to give up their "cultural and ethnic identity."

[Guy]

SUNNIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Last column: % Sunnis of the population
Algeria 32,800,000 99%
Bahrain 150,000 22%
Egypt 64,600,000 90%
Iran 7,000,000 10%
Iraq 9,200,000 37%
Israel 950,000 16%
Jordan 5,400,000 80%
Kuwait 1,300,000 60%
Lebanon 750,000 20%
Libya 5,100,000 96%
Mauritania 2,900,000 100%
Morocco 32,900,000 99.7%
Oman 380,000 14%
Palestine 2,900,000 83%
Qatar 620,000 76%
Saudi Arabia 20,000,000 82%
Spanish North Africa 35,000 27%
Sudan 26,000,000 70%
Syria 12,600,000 72%
Tunisia 9,970,000 99.7%
Turkey 66,800,000 99.7%
United Arab Emirates 1,400,000 45%
Western Sahara 800,000 100%
Yemen 5,250,000 27%
Total *) 309,800,000 72%
*) Calculated for the total population of North Africa and the Middle East, approx. 430,000,000.

The majority of Kurds are Sunnis. Now watch AL come along with something to confuse the hell out of me. :D

[Roguish Lawyer]

Not unless you read Thai.

Decent article, but not detailed http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/tango/thailand1959.htm

I have no idea if this book http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/9748496309/absolutsearch05/103-6943758-6390224 is accurate or not.

This speech by General Prem is useful: http://www.generalprem.com/Speech4.html

A few months ago, the SFA Chapter here in Thailand had a excursion to the last of the basecamps of the Communist Party of Thailand along with a few senior Royal Thai Army Special Forces Officers. Magician and I were among the folks who went, and it was a very enlightening tour.

Thanks.

[magician]

Possible Outlines of an Iraqi Nightmare.

We have to be cautious where the Kurds are concerned, I believe, as using them as convenient proxies will not best serve their long term interests. They do make pretty damned good guards in the meantime, and it can be very useful to have a Kurdish protection detail in your hip pocket, as they intimidate the hell out of the Shia and Sunni, and particularly the Sunni. Memories are long in Iraq.

But we have to be cautious about unleashing the Kurds, as it is in no one's best interest to let the Kurdish genie out of the bottle. A scenario where Kurds engage in wholesale retribution against Sunni remnants would quickly turn nightmarish.

Maybe it would be a good idea, at this point, to extrapolate a worst-case end state for Iraq.

Perhaps some form of partition along ethnic and religious lines is inevitable, with a central state too weak to enforce greater political integrity. If that is so, then we need to start planning for relationships with a Shia state in the South, and its likely alignment with elements in Iran.

One apparent tenet of US regional policy is that significant strata in Iran desire closer ties to the West, for both social and economic reasons. There is some belief among US analysts that the reign of the Imams will not endure. Whether this is true or not is a question for future history to decide. In the meantime, we had best get serious about border security and border interdiction, and dust off our target folders. Not so we can hit Iranian targets. So Iraqi proxies, or even Israeli forces, can do it for us. If we are not prepared to take off the gloves where Iran is concerned, then we need to ask ourselves whether a Southern Iraq which is for all intents and purposes annexed by Iran is unacceptable to our greater goals in the region. Particularly if Iran continues along its current nuclear path.

We already have longstanding ties to the Kurds in the North. In fact, US SF were there long before the invasion, and have been there since the last Gulf war. We do need to keep our finger on the pulse of the ultimate Kurdish desire for a homeland, a de facto Greater Kurdistan, as concrete Kurdish steps towards this goal could bring US forces into open conflict with Syrian forces, and could complicate relations with Turkey, a NATO ally.

In fact, Turkey has a lot to gain, and a lot to lose, with its bid to join the EC at stake. It would be best, in the long run, to continue nudging Turkey in this direction, and to seek to incorporate Turkey into the broader family of European nations. The last thing that anyone needs is a Turkey more beset with internal contradictions, or worse, a Turkey which feels compelled to intervene in Northern Iraq against Kurdish elements more or less aligned with the US.

While it is possible that conflict with Syria is a foregone inevitability, at least in broader regional terms, it would be better for the US if we engage Syria in a quiet war for those reasons, because of their perennial support for Hezbollah and Hamas, because of their emnity towards Israel, than because we are precipitously forced to support Kurdish allies who we need to buttress an artificial Pax Americana in post-Saddam Iraq.

It is tempting to conclude that the Iraqi Sunni, the inevitable losers in the emerging Iraqi state, regardless of how you slice and dice it, may end up like the Palestinians: subjected to a disaspora, remnants encircled and embattled, in conflict with diminishing coalition forces, Kurd and Shia alike, dependent on the largess of Sunni populations in other countries, which Guy's data suggests could be considerable.

I do not know anyone who thinks that Allawi can endure in power after elections, as he is widely viewed as a creature of the Americans. This is unfortunate, but Iraq is, after all, for Iraqis to ultimately save or demolish.

Personally, I do not consider a Sunni boycott of the elections to be a problem. If they do not want to participate, fine. They can marginalize themselves, and watch from refugee camps as Shia and Kurds bicker over their land, their homes, and their businesses. It is, in the end analysis, their choice.

I do not think that Shia and Kurds will long tolerate Sunni insurgent misbehavior, if the forthcoming elections feature majority Shia and Kurdish participation, and consequent majority Shia and Kurd domination of a new constituent assembly. It will be interesting to see what sort of constitution emerges from a provisional government comprised primarily of Kurds and Shia. It will be even more interesting to see if such a constitution has any relevance to actual events on the ground.

It is clear to me that the Sunni are the past, in Iraq. It would be in their best interest to make the best deal that they can make now, before Shia and Kurd are invested in a new Iraq, as a result of popular elections--and assuming that Iraq, as a contiguous political entity, even endures after the Shia and the Kurds divide the country between themselves.

The Sunni need to snuggle up to the UN, as no one else is going to champion their cause. If the UN, as seems the case at this time, declines to midwife a new Iraqi state, it will only consolidate its increasing irrelevance. The UN has accomplished nothing, really, for the Palestinians. The UN cannot stop genocide in Africa. The UN cannot even quench the inferno in Haiti.

What is more of a threat for American aims in Iraq, I think, is the possibility of Shia on Kurd violence, as the Kurds are very rich, in comparison to the Shia, and Northern Iraq is much richer than Southern Iraq. If the Kurds simply isolate themselves, it would not surprise me to see Shia fighters migrating North. And Iranian support for this would certainly broaden the ambit of warfare in the region.

The best that we could hope for in this worst-case scenario is a relatively stable Balkanization of Iraq, with a relatively reliable Kurdish ally in the North, a nervous, watchful Shia South with Iranian sponsors, and a central region increasingly devastated by warfare, with its primarily Sunni population moving to other countries, and subject to legendary discrimination and payback for decades of repression under Saddam.

If you think that a lot of Islamic insurgents came out of Afghanistan, watch what happens with military age males from the Sunni Triangle in Iraq. Not only will they cut their teeth against the armed forces of the sole global superpower, they will be able to draw on support from significant Sunni populations elsewhere in the region.

We will be lucky if they focus their immediate ire on Shia and Kurdish usurpers.