The Future of Special Operations

[Dive08]

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138232/linda-robinson/the-future-of-special-operations

Heard a general overview of this on NPR this evening, basically she talks about the need for a shift from such a DA focus in SOF to a partnering focus w/ HNs.

Edit: Got the PDF - see attached for those interested in the read.

For SA: Robinson is the author of Masters of Chaos

[Trapper John]

First a humble suggestion from ex-SF OF. SA is everything. IMO this should have been posted in the Insurgencies & GW forum/Special Ops Command Seeks Bigger Role thread started by Richard. Just a suggestion for an SF Candidate. ;)

Now with that out of the way, I really enjoyed reading the attachment, "The Future of Special Operations" by Linda Robinson. I am in complete agreement with her analysis and I hope that Admiral McRaven is successful with his plan for SOCOM.

Coming from an era where there was no unified command structure for SOF and SF was not a branch of the Army and officers could not choose SF as a career choice, I am very envious of the present day SOF environment.

Nonetheless, there are some valuable lessons from the Vietnam conflict - a live-fire, field training exercise with pop-up, shoot-back targets :D In my post (#5) in the thread "Special Operations Command Seeks Bigger Role..." (where this thread should be as a separate post - sorry I just couldn't resist :p), I posted an attachment (After Action Report) re: the FID mission of SF written by LTC Bowra from that era.

IMO the FID mission is the most cost efficient, long-term beneficial mission of SF that embodies the motto De Opresso Liber. For most of us that is not merely a motto - it's our raison d'etre that stays with us long after we leave SF.

Properly employed the FID mission prevents future conflicts and is stabilizing. Let's hope that the mission continues in Afghanistan after the official draw down of US forces, targets other hot spots (West Africa, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq), and is employed to stabilize other troubled areas like Mexico. As Robinson pointed out this requires a long-term political commitment (not to mention foresight), something I am not sure we have. In the absence of that commitment we will certainly be involved in major military conflicts in the not too distant future. A very expensive (human and financial capital) proposition.

Robinson did not mention one other consequence for the politicos if they fail to follow through with the required "long-term" commitment - another generation of pissed-off ex-SF OFs with long memories. :D

Thanks for the post {Salute}

[BRAVO-SMASH]

She came out to our VSP not too long ago... Very nice lady.
23723

[MR2]

I like the Smiley hat!

[BRAVO-SMASH]

I like the Smiley hat!

It's actually a smiley with a beard :cool:

[MR2]

It's actually a smiley with a beard :cool:

Way cool!

[Trapper John]

I just received this follow-up report and wanted to post it for all to read. I haven't read it yet, but here is the overview.

Overview
U.S. special operations forces are doing more things in more places than ever before. They are now active in some seventy countries and, since 2001, have seen their combined budget nearly quintuple—a trend that seems likely to continue. As the United States seeks ways to tackle a range of security threats worldwide, shore up the resilience of its friends and allies against terrorist and criminal networks, and minimize need for large-scale military interventions, the importance of special operations forces will grow.

Yet, writes Linda Robinson in this Council Special Report, the strategic vision for special operations forces has not kept pace with the growing demands for their skills. Most people—and, indeed, many policymakers—associate the special operations forces with secret nighttime raids like the one that targeted Osama bin Laden: tactical operations against a particular individual or group. The abilities of special operations forces, however, extend much further, into military training, information operations, civilian affairs, and more. As the United States shifts its focus from war fighting to building and supporting its partners, Robinson argues, it will become critical to better define these strategic capabilities and ensure that special operations forces have the staffing and funding to succeed. Robinson further calls on the Pentagon to remove bureaucratic and operational obstacles to cooperation among the special operations forces of each service, and between special and conventional forces. She also recommends that all special operations forces commands work to develop a pipeline of talented, motivated officers with expertise in these issues, and that the role of civilian leadership in budget and operational oversight be reinforced.

The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces is a timely report on the future of what may become the military's most important troops. It offers a broad set of recommendations covering institutional, operational, and intellectual reforms that could improve the versatility and effectiveness of the special operations forces. As the Pentagon seeks new ways to exert American power in an era of lower budgets and higher aversion to wars on the scale of Iraq and Afghanistan, this report argues that expanding the role of special operations forces can—and should—be high on the agenda


Looks interesting and will read and comment later.

[Trapper John]

The central issue, IMO, begins on p.13 and the last paragraph (top of p.14) is a concise statement of the issue.

This is not a formula for the optimum employment of special operations forces. The root issue is conceptual clarity about how these forces should be used to best effect (i.e., a scarce asset to be employed to accomplish ends that no other military force can achieve). Without greater clarity, there is a serious danger that special operations forces
will be employed in a permanent global game of whack-a-mole and in other tactical and episodic ways, rather than as part of deliberate campaigns that can achieve lasting outcomes. In addition, the special operations community is not organized to implement such orchestrated and linked special operations activities, and it has not oriented its institutions
to make this its central priority.

[Trapper John]

The second operational shortfall is the lack of unity of command.
Special operations forces have been routinely employed for the past
decade under separate organizations that operate under separate chains
of command, even within the same country. Unity of command, which
holds that all forces should operate under a single command structure
to best employ them in pursuit of a common objective, is a basic principle
of military operations. Only once, in Afghanistan beginning in
July 2012, have all special operations units in one country been brought
together under one command. This should become standard procedure
in new theaters such as Yemen and Africa, as the ideal means to cooperate
internally and with other partners. Except for large-scale special
operations efforts such as in Afghanistan, the logical entities to exercise
command over all special operations units are the theater special operations
commands. This should be standard for any units operating in a
persistent manner. Even discrete, time-limited operations by special
mission units should be coordinated and their potential effects on the
wider effort assessed. The existence of two separate special operations
organizations with headquarters in the field creates internal frictions
and makes coordination with conventional commanders, U.S. embassies,
and host-nation governments even more complex and fraught with
potential misunderstandings.

[Trapper John]

■■ The U.S. Army Special Operations Command should open its John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School to train as conventional forces advisers, as it has done in the past.

Interesting idea IMO. Cross-thread point with SWS to train scouts?

[Richard]

■■ The U.S. Army Special Operations Command should open its John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School to train as conventional forces advisers, as it has done in the past.

Interesting idea IMO. Cross-thread point with SWS to train scouts?

A return of the MATA programs...and the more things change, the more they remain the same...

And so it goes...

Richard :munchin

[Trapper John]

A return of the MATA programs...and the more things change, the more they remain the same...

And so it goes...

Richard :munchin

And the MATA Mile too I hope. Many a fun day on that course, Loved it :lifter

I can still remember "Pappy" Kittleson putting us to shame:eek:

[Trapper John]

I sent the article by Linda Robinson to another Brother (career SF just retired and former SF medic classmate). His comments are priceless and I thought I should share them here.

"Yah. It's incredible, but on the other hand, it figures. For decades, SF was the bastard child of the military -- having to scourge, beg, borrow, and steal everything they needed to make missions happen. This was the legacy that you and I were brought up on. This is what was instilled in us by our mentors at Camp Mackall from the very start. Where ever we went, the regular Army treated us with disrespect and suspicion, and whenever SF needed something, they did their best to block it. SF was a career ender for officers who did more than one tour with SOF. TH legs (INCLUDING THE RANGERS!) always wanted to take over SF and "straighten it out." Sorry bastards did not realize that it was the ability to operate at the edges of the envelope that made us great. Legs also feared SF, due to our famous unorthodox methods of getting missions accomplished -- and our ability to always get mission accomplished.

Even asshole Schwarzkopf -- that big fat blustering pansy -- hated SF, until he was forced into a situation in Gulf War I where he directly saw how SF could help him, and where the Press was there to document it so he had to acknowledge SF's deeds.

Now, after these decades of struggling, EVERYONE wants to get on the SOF bandwagon. Everyone wants to be a SF groupie. All officers want to join SOF or have a SOF affiliation. Everyone is ready to tout the virtues of SOF. Everyone is the fucken expert in SOF -- even women liberal Academicians. Everyone is writing about the obvious strength of SOF, as though they are the ones who have just discovered it -- EVEN THOUGH NOTHING HAS CHANGED IN DECADES!

Everyone in bars across the nation want to be a Green Beret -- which is why where ever you go and announce that you were a GB, you will be doubted.

In fact, this "join the SF bandwagon" movement is not incredible; it's not "it figures." It's just plain disgusting.
People! Predictable disingenuous and grovelling behavior.

Makes one want to join the next level of SF -- somewhere closer to the edge of the envelope."

[Dusty]

Makes one want to join the next level of SF -- somewhere closer to the edge of the envelope."


Does that level exist? :confused:

[Trapper John]

Does that level exist? :confused:

I think he is suggesting that we push the envelope and create it. If SF becomes the accepted norm then what is the next frontier? That's all.

[Dusty]

I think he is suggesting that we push the envelope and create it. If SF becomes the accepted norm then what is the next frontier? That's all.

I'd think making this SOP would help:

"Only once, in Afghanistan beginning in
July 2012, have all special operations units in one country been brought
together under one command."