Your thoughts?

[ScubaNinja]

After studying warfare for years and being in a war myself I’ve become aware of the following issue that today’s soldier faces on the battlefield.
Due to modern technology general-level officers are now able to communicate with junior officers on the battlefield perhaps hundreds of miles away. While this may seem like an advantage it has its drawbacks particularly when conducting UW or any Special Operations.

When conducting Special Operations, and wars seem to be increasingly dependent on such operations, junior level officers as well as NCO’s must make strategic decisions in a timely manner. However, they are still subject to the will of their chain of command. This can lead to bad decisions because clearly the junior level commander on the ground has more accurate, and up to date information than the more senior officer hundreds of miles away. He has what we call ‘ground truth.’ While, the junior level officers must always act to fulfill their commander’s intent it is clear that this evolving relationship has developed a snag in operations.
How can junior officer and NCO’s be allowed to make their own decisions without disregarding their commander’s orders? Is it possible, or would it involve some sort of change in the dynamics in the chain of command while in certain operations that necessitate it?

[GreenSalsa]

While I am NOT going to suggest that GO or other Senior Officers / NCOs should be involved in your day to day operations--they do need to be involved in being able to provide Mission, Intent, Endstate, and more importantly Resources to your organization / detachment. In addition to all that, your efforts at the tactical level need to be coordinated and synchronized at the operational and strategic level and direct communication can help provide clarity.

Again, while I am not going to say every GO, Senior Officer, or Senior NCO is not a mico-manager, I will say this--they have ALL been in your shoes at one time or another. What makes you think you have all the answers?

The last trip over to Afghanistan, we set up a weekly VTC with senior people so the guys on the ground could learn from each other, coordinate tactical operations with adjacent ODAs / Platoons in order to leverage advantages. Finally, several times--yes, GOs did sit in these meetings and listened to detachments talk about problem sets they were facing and then directed their staffs to support them in a manner the detachments needed.

No detachment should be an island unto itself--your efforts need to be worked with ALL of the forces in country to support a unified effort.

[ScubaNinja]

I agree with you on the issue of co-ordination Green Salsa.
I just wanted to add an example so everyone can see the exact type of situation I'm referring to. In the introduction to book The Mission, The Men, and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander Pete Blaber narrates the story of his unit in fighting behind enemy lines leading up to and during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. His small band of marauders faced off against a vastly superior force. His commander hundreds of miles away gave the order for him to push the attack. He used his on the spot knowledge of the situation to determine that this was a suicidal order, and blatantly disregarded his superior.

While this face-off between soldier and commander has played itself out ad-naseum for centuries I believe it has now fundamentally changed because the commander is no where near the battlefield and can't possibly have enough real time, and situational information to make as good a decision as the guy on the ground even if he was in similar situations previously in his own career.

[mark46th]

I preferred the tell me what you want and when you want it done, give me what I ask for then get the hell out of the way approach.

[Dozer523]

I like the Casey Ryback - Admiral Bates command model.

[longrange1947]

While I agree with what Green Salsa says, I also am worried about info overload win which a Command attempts to see the whole picture down to the lowest level. They can get into the weeds with stuff they should not worry about as it is at a level taken care of far below them. This can take their eye off the ball.

On the disregarding orders, that has been done time and time again. teh ground commander has to have the balls to make that decision AND the ability to justify it.

Mark, officer questions and NCO questions:

Officer - What needs to be done and when
NCO - How to do it and by whom.

Long ago, when there was a real difference in the officer and NCO corps, i.e., officers were moved every 13 to 22 months, NCOs and Team SGTs stayed put to get it done, the reason so that the officer knew what needed to be done and the NCO who was there all the time knew how to get it done.

Now they move Tm SGTSs so much they may as well be officers. Not a good plan.

[mark46th]

LR- No argument on those points...

[longrange1947]

LR- No argument on those points...

Sorry Mark, was completely agreeing with your post and expounding. :D

[tom kelly]

With the UAV armed with hell-fire missles over the sand box, the pilot-operator of the drone in San Diego or someplace other that the AO and the SOC Admiral in Tampa, & with the current ROE's who calls the shot? TK

[Dozer523]

With the UAV armed with hell-fire missles over the sand box, the pilot-operator of the drone in San Diego or someplace other that the AO and the SOC Admiral in Tampa, & with the current ROE's who calls the shot? TKMultiple choice question?
A. Guy on the ground who was responsibe for developing and executing the plan in effect.
B. Guy with most senior command authority
C. Guy with finger on the most leathal firepower
D. Guy most like to correctly assess subsequent enemy CoA's

[mark46th]

LR-:lifter:lifter