Richard
07-30-2012, 07:02
The PLA clearly sees SOF as occupying an essential role in any future conflict. In future “local wars under informationized conditions,” special operations are likely to be called upon to undertake a range of activities, including mounting direct attacks, providing targeting information to enhance the effect of other forces and affecting not only the materiel but information available to enemy forces. In particular, SOF are seen as an integral part of any political warfare effort; countering foreign SOF are therefore also likely to be a major concern.
And so it goes...
Richard :munchin
The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Special Operations
Dean Cheng, Special Warfare, Jul-Sep 2012
Part 1 of 2
Since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has steadily evolved its view of how future wars will be fought. Where the PLA had originally expected to fight with massed air, land and sea forces in “local wars under modern conditions,” it shifted, first to preparing for “local wars under modern, high-tech conditions,” and now “local wars under informationized conditions,” where quality and technology play an ever greater role.
In order to fight such wars, the PLA has placed much greater emphasis on the ability to conduct joint operations. At the same time, it is an article of faith that the human factor will continue to play a key role in any future war; therefore, the PLA has also remained interested in the conduct of “political warfare” (zhengzhi zhanzheng; 政治战争), which roughly correlates with the American concept of “psychological warfare.” These Chinese approaches have important implications for the American special-operations community.
How the PLA Defines Special-Operations Forces
Chinese discussion of special-operations forces seem to resemble American and western concepts. Special operations (tezhong zuozhan; 特种作战), for example, are described as the use of specially organized, trained and equipped elite units to achieve particular operational and strategic goals, through the conduct of unconventional or irregular warfare means.1 Chinese concepts of special-operations forces’ missions appear to closely resemble the SOF core activities as enumerated by U.S. Special Operations Command. They include:
• Special reconnaissance missions (strategic or operational reconnaissance deep in an opponent’s territory);
• Special strikes, including at enemy strategic and operational command posts and key personnel, as well as countering enemy deep penetration forces;
• Disruption of enemy facilities, including transportation and logistics sites; ambushes and other hit-and-run attacks; and
• Special technical combat, including various forms of computer network attacks, broadcasting propaganda and disruption of enemy navigation and positioning systems.2
The Chinese view of the role of special operations and special-operations forces has been influenced, in part, by the evolving PLA concept of how future wars will be fought.
Evolution of Chinese Concept of Warfare
Since at least the end of the Cold War, the PLA has been a careful student of foreign, and especially American, military developments. As the PLA has not fought a war since concluding the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, it has necessarily had to rely upon close observation and analysis of foreign military experience to help shape its own preparations for future conflict. From these analyses, the PLA appears to have concluded that future wars will be marked by several characteristics.
One key conclusion is that future wars will require joint operations, i.e., cooperation by forces drawn from all the services (which in the case of the PLA includes not only land, sea and air forces, but also the Second Artillery, which is responsible for missile operations). This marks an enormous shift for the PLA. Prior to the first Gulf War, the PLA was focused on ground forces, and engaged in learning how to perform combined arms operations, i.e., the ability to have various branches interoperate. The PLA Navy and PLA Air Force seemed to be relegated mainly to supporting roles. With the conclusion of the first Gulf War, however, the PLA concluded that it had not understood the impact of modern technology on warfare, and the resulting global military transformation.
After extensive debate in the 1990s, the PLA moved from focusing on combined arms operations from a ground force-centric perspective towards a concept of joint operations, where the various services were at least more nominally equal. This shift was codified in the 1999 New Generation Operations Regulations. Under these new regulations, the PLA made joint operations the basis for operational thinking by all parts of the PLA. Service campaigns, whether by the ground forces, navy, air force or second artillery (responsible for missile operations) were subordinated to joint campaigns, which are seen as more important, and more decisive.
In addition, PLA analysts appear to have concluded that future wars will be marked by the “three non” warfares: non-contact (fei jierong; 非接融) warfare, non-linear (fei xianshi; 非线式) warfare and non-symmetric (fei duicheng; 非对称) warfare. Wars will be non-contact, in that the more advanced side will tend to remain out of reach of the majority of the other side’s weapons, while itself retaining the ability to engage the enemy. The emphasis will be on concentrating firepower from a variety of sources, rather than massing troops.3 Moreover, it may employ not only very long-range, precision munitions capable of covering the entire strategic depth, but also exploit “soft-kill” methods (e.g., computer-network attacks) that will effectively nullify an opponent’s forces without having to directly confront or engage them.
Wars will be non-linear, both physically and temporally. In the physical aspect, given the non-contact nature of future wars, the battlefield will not have many set battle-lines. Instead, opposing forces are likely to find themselves intermingled. Moreover, given the vulnerability of concentrated forces to modern precision munitions, each side is likely to field smaller forces that will operate in a more dispersed fashion throughout the strategic depth of the theater. In the temporal aspect, operations are likely to occur simultaneously, rather than sequentially.4
Wars will be non-symmetric, not only in terms of the quality of the forces involved (where Chinese analysts have tended to assume that they would be at a significant disadvantage), but also how the two sides fight. That is, far from the two sides grappling head-on in battle, with similar forces using similar tactics, each will instead seek out the other’s weak spots and try to exploit them. The two sides are not only likely to deploy different forces, but are also likely to employ different tactics, exhibit different operational patterns and pursue different strategies in the process. Chinese writings suggest that they see the 2003 Iraq War as embodying many of these aspects, as the United States employed various forms of operations, engaging on land, sea, air, outer space and cyber-space in order to utterly overwhelm the Iraqis.5
The third conclusion seems to be that political warfare will play a growing role in future conflicts. Political warfare (zhengzhi zuozhan; 政治作战) or wartime political work (zhanshi zhengzhi gongzuo; 战时政治工作), according to both the 2003 and revised 2010 Chinese People’s Liberation Army Political Work Regulations, includes public-opinion warfare, psychological warfare, legal warfare and other measures to undermine the enemy’s will and morale. Political warfare, in this context, strikes at an opponent’s psychology and is equated with Western concepts of psychological warfare.6
In some ways, one might consider political warfare an extension of the “three nons.” It employs political means (including legal, public opinion and psychological elements) to attack an opponent non-symmetrically and in a non-lethal manner at a remove from their physical location. The goal of political warfare is to sap an opponent’s will to fight, both in the military and the larger population, thereby shortening a conflict and reducing the cost, especially to one’s own side.
(Cont'd)
And so it goes...
Richard :munchin
The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Special Operations
Dean Cheng, Special Warfare, Jul-Sep 2012
Part 1 of 2
Since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has steadily evolved its view of how future wars will be fought. Where the PLA had originally expected to fight with massed air, land and sea forces in “local wars under modern conditions,” it shifted, first to preparing for “local wars under modern, high-tech conditions,” and now “local wars under informationized conditions,” where quality and technology play an ever greater role.
In order to fight such wars, the PLA has placed much greater emphasis on the ability to conduct joint operations. At the same time, it is an article of faith that the human factor will continue to play a key role in any future war; therefore, the PLA has also remained interested in the conduct of “political warfare” (zhengzhi zhanzheng; 政治战争), which roughly correlates with the American concept of “psychological warfare.” These Chinese approaches have important implications for the American special-operations community.
How the PLA Defines Special-Operations Forces
Chinese discussion of special-operations forces seem to resemble American and western concepts. Special operations (tezhong zuozhan; 特种作战), for example, are described as the use of specially organized, trained and equipped elite units to achieve particular operational and strategic goals, through the conduct of unconventional or irregular warfare means.1 Chinese concepts of special-operations forces’ missions appear to closely resemble the SOF core activities as enumerated by U.S. Special Operations Command. They include:
• Special reconnaissance missions (strategic or operational reconnaissance deep in an opponent’s territory);
• Special strikes, including at enemy strategic and operational command posts and key personnel, as well as countering enemy deep penetration forces;
• Disruption of enemy facilities, including transportation and logistics sites; ambushes and other hit-and-run attacks; and
• Special technical combat, including various forms of computer network attacks, broadcasting propaganda and disruption of enemy navigation and positioning systems.2
The Chinese view of the role of special operations and special-operations forces has been influenced, in part, by the evolving PLA concept of how future wars will be fought.
Evolution of Chinese Concept of Warfare
Since at least the end of the Cold War, the PLA has been a careful student of foreign, and especially American, military developments. As the PLA has not fought a war since concluding the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, it has necessarily had to rely upon close observation and analysis of foreign military experience to help shape its own preparations for future conflict. From these analyses, the PLA appears to have concluded that future wars will be marked by several characteristics.
One key conclusion is that future wars will require joint operations, i.e., cooperation by forces drawn from all the services (which in the case of the PLA includes not only land, sea and air forces, but also the Second Artillery, which is responsible for missile operations). This marks an enormous shift for the PLA. Prior to the first Gulf War, the PLA was focused on ground forces, and engaged in learning how to perform combined arms operations, i.e., the ability to have various branches interoperate. The PLA Navy and PLA Air Force seemed to be relegated mainly to supporting roles. With the conclusion of the first Gulf War, however, the PLA concluded that it had not understood the impact of modern technology on warfare, and the resulting global military transformation.
After extensive debate in the 1990s, the PLA moved from focusing on combined arms operations from a ground force-centric perspective towards a concept of joint operations, where the various services were at least more nominally equal. This shift was codified in the 1999 New Generation Operations Regulations. Under these new regulations, the PLA made joint operations the basis for operational thinking by all parts of the PLA. Service campaigns, whether by the ground forces, navy, air force or second artillery (responsible for missile operations) were subordinated to joint campaigns, which are seen as more important, and more decisive.
In addition, PLA analysts appear to have concluded that future wars will be marked by the “three non” warfares: non-contact (fei jierong; 非接融) warfare, non-linear (fei xianshi; 非线式) warfare and non-symmetric (fei duicheng; 非对称) warfare. Wars will be non-contact, in that the more advanced side will tend to remain out of reach of the majority of the other side’s weapons, while itself retaining the ability to engage the enemy. The emphasis will be on concentrating firepower from a variety of sources, rather than massing troops.3 Moreover, it may employ not only very long-range, precision munitions capable of covering the entire strategic depth, but also exploit “soft-kill” methods (e.g., computer-network attacks) that will effectively nullify an opponent’s forces without having to directly confront or engage them.
Wars will be non-linear, both physically and temporally. In the physical aspect, given the non-contact nature of future wars, the battlefield will not have many set battle-lines. Instead, opposing forces are likely to find themselves intermingled. Moreover, given the vulnerability of concentrated forces to modern precision munitions, each side is likely to field smaller forces that will operate in a more dispersed fashion throughout the strategic depth of the theater. In the temporal aspect, operations are likely to occur simultaneously, rather than sequentially.4
Wars will be non-symmetric, not only in terms of the quality of the forces involved (where Chinese analysts have tended to assume that they would be at a significant disadvantage), but also how the two sides fight. That is, far from the two sides grappling head-on in battle, with similar forces using similar tactics, each will instead seek out the other’s weak spots and try to exploit them. The two sides are not only likely to deploy different forces, but are also likely to employ different tactics, exhibit different operational patterns and pursue different strategies in the process. Chinese writings suggest that they see the 2003 Iraq War as embodying many of these aspects, as the United States employed various forms of operations, engaging on land, sea, air, outer space and cyber-space in order to utterly overwhelm the Iraqis.5
The third conclusion seems to be that political warfare will play a growing role in future conflicts. Political warfare (zhengzhi zuozhan; 政治作战) or wartime political work (zhanshi zhengzhi gongzuo; 战时政治工作), according to both the 2003 and revised 2010 Chinese People’s Liberation Army Political Work Regulations, includes public-opinion warfare, psychological warfare, legal warfare and other measures to undermine the enemy’s will and morale. Political warfare, in this context, strikes at an opponent’s psychology and is equated with Western concepts of psychological warfare.6
In some ways, one might consider political warfare an extension of the “three nons.” It employs political means (including legal, public opinion and psychological elements) to attack an opponent non-symmetrically and in a non-lethal manner at a remove from their physical location. The goal of political warfare is to sap an opponent’s will to fight, both in the military and the larger population, thereby shortening a conflict and reducing the cost, especially to one’s own side.
(Cont'd)